Abstract
Classical political philosophy and the mainstream modern and contemporary political theories have mostly ignored the issues of women and gender equality. Mainstream theories are those that have dominated particular epochs and the legacy of political thought as a whole, and which tend to be universally accepted. Mainstream theories have been characterized by the male dominated discourse and considerations. Introducing of gender equality perspective into the mainstream political thought assumes a critical reconsideration of the mentioned legacy from a feminist perspective. The legacy of feminist thought is increasingly growing, yet it is mostly overlooked or marginalized, with little systemic or substantial impact on the mainstream political thought.
The background of the mentioned invisibility and neglect of women throughout the legacy of political philosophy and contemporary mainstream political thought will be outlined in the introduction. Certain conceptual clarifications related to pre-modern and modern times, and the political ideas associated with them, will be briefly discussed. The first chapter will be devoted to a detailed elaboration of the introductory ideas concerning a gender incompetent history of political philosophy, primarily gender-insensitive contemporary political philosophy of justice and accompanying political theories. The political ideas of Aristotle and John Rawls will be taken as a paradigmatic example. The second chapter will consider the meaning and aspects of gender perspective in the political thought, with a sub-chapter devoted to laying out the ideas that converged and became common among the different streams of feminist thought. The third chapter offers a gender competent reconsideration of the old, already existing political categories, as well as new ones brought by feminists to political theories. The conclusion will reemphasize the importance of introducing the most relevant feminist ideas and gender competent political notions into the mainstream of political thought.
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Notes
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The notion traditional or classical political philosophy is related to the history of Western political legacy starting from the fifth century BC and covering undifferentiated political, economic, legal, ethical, and moral ideas. The end of traditional political philosophy is linked to cutting through the integrated mentioned fields of knowledge in the eighteenth century and establishing specific social, political, economic, legal theories. This was later followed by the founding of special social, political, economic, legal sciences with the rise of so-called positivist trends within social thought. The differentiation process counter-posed to the integral consideration of social-political issues was anticipated in the works of Machiavelli and More at the beginning of the sixteenth century. The groundwork was later laid by the seventeenth century Descartes’ rationalism and Bacon’s empiricism, as well as by Hobbes’s attempts to arrange the various pieces of natural science and the science of politics, which propelled the gradual transition towards modern political theories. Berry (1981); Held (2006); Vujadinović (1996).
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Vujadinović in: Jovanović and Vujadinović (2013).
- 5.
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Vujadinović (2020).
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Modernity or modern society is a product of Western civilization associated with the eighteenth, ninteenth, and twentieth centuries, with roots dating back to the previous centuries. It was shaped by industrialization, capitalist logic, and political revolutions, which resulted in universalizing projects of political emancipation and the economic domination of capital. During this period, the relations of mutual dependence, common in pre-modern societies, were abolished. See Heller (1982, 1999), Feher and Heller (1983) and Gay (1998).
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Modernity brought emancipatory tendencies concerning gender equality. These emancipatory tendencies were associated with the industrial and political revolutions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as well as educational and social rights revolution and human rights revolution in general during the twentieth century. In addition, the second half of the twentieth century witnessed placing human rights at the center of international law, followed by an increased focus on issues of women’s rights and gender equality in international and national law, and a significant impact of gender mainstreaming tendencies in different fields of policy-making during the twenty-first century. The ideas of universal rights, liberty, and equality, originating from the political revolutions, inspired and motivated suffragette movements to counterpose the ideas of women’s rights to vote and education to the patriarchal legacy. This was followed by feminist movements’ struggle for all-encompassing gender equality and against contemporary manifestations of patriarchy in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Vujadinović (2020).
- 9.
Vujadinović (2020).
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- 11.
- 12.
Vujadinović (2013).
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Moller Okin (1980), p. 5.
- 14.
- 15.
Lyotard (1984).
- 16.
Agger (1991).
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Bryson (1982), p. 194.
- 18.
Barnet (1998).
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Bryson (1982), p. 1.
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Maleness, or the sexist structure of thought, as the constituent dimension of patriarchy, implies the devaluation of women’s human nature, regarding women as inferior persons or non-citizens, or inferior political subjects and legal subjects, ignorance towards women as political and legal subjects. The mentioned devaluation of women had represented, for example, the basic denomination of the English legislature of the nineteenth century. At the same time and in the same historical context, women were praised as the “angels in the house”, and their “female nature” was marked the best, different and extraordinary (Zaharijević 2014/2019).
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Devaluation of women does not necesserally mean the hatred towards women, i.e. misogyny. However, milder forms of misogyny can also mean dislike of women, contempt for them, ingrained prejudices against them; all milder forms of misogyny can easily devolve into a direct hatred and violence against women. See Blagojević (2000), p. 5. The worst contemporary manifestations of misogyny are, among others, forced genital mutilation, sex and human trafficking, honor crimes, femicide and the current Sharia Law application in Afghanistan.
- 22.
- 23.
On the role of language in reproducing patriarchal culture, see Wolstonnecraft; Rowbotham (1973), pp. 34–38.
- 24.
Moller Okin (1980), p. 5.
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“Feminist theory over the past twenty-five years has revealed that the history of political thought has often been one of barely masked power, disingenuously representing the beliefs and values of particular subjects in particular places and times as timeless, universal, and eternally true. Such constructions have been importantly based on a vision of humanity that is historically specific and consistently exclusive in terms of class (propertied), race (white), sex (males), and gender (masculine subjects).” Hirschmann and Di Stefano (1986), p. 3.
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“The sort of detailed interest that we now tend to have in the differentiation between male and female psychological characteristics, the idea of a clear contrast or polarization between masculine and feminine qualities, or the idea that they are complementary, is foreign to the work of Plato and Aristotle. They held, indeed, strong views about what a man should be like, but they were basically very uninterested in women.” Grimshaw (1986), p. 63.
- 27.
“To Plato and Aristotle, the life of the household was merely the means of enabling free males to live a public life in the polis. It had no value in itself… . Rousseau, on the other hand, saw private life as the source of the most intense affections and emotions (though he saw it too, as the means of containing or controlling the power of women, and as the means of educating future citizens.” Grimshaw (1986), p. 64.
- 28.
The changes in conceptions of home, family, and personal life under capitalism are examined in Zaretsky (1976).
- 29.
Aristotle (1962).
- 30.
Grimshaw (1986), p. 39.
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Grimshaw (1986), pp. 40–42. Plato also had devaluating views about women, which were relevant in the development of his philosophical position; however, his ideas in the Republic about women’s participation in politics seem truly original, shocking, and revolutionary for his time, given that he seemed to believe that women could become philosopher queens. However, on the other side, he proposed for lower-class women becoming a common property (the idea of the common possession of women and children). The abolition of family and property as well as the possibility of philosopher queens described in the Republic, were left out in the Laws, which turned to the functionalist interpretation of women’s role in the family, i.e. women as private wives. Susan Moller Okin highlights the controversial character of his ideas: “Plato’s ideas on the subject of women appear at first to present an unresolvable enigma. One might well ask how the same, generally consistent philosopher can on the one hand assert that the female sex was created from the souls of the most wicked and irrational men, and on the other hand make a far more radical proposal for the equal education and social role of the two sexes than was to be made by a major philosopher for more than two thousand years? How can the claim that women are ‘by nature’ twice as bad as men be reconciled with the revolutionary idea that they should be included among the exalted philosophic rulers of the ideal state?” Moller Okin (1980), p. 15.
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See also Moller Okin (1991b).
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Susanne Moller Okin says about this functionalist patriarchal reduction the following: “As a result of this functionalist definition of women, our philosophical heritage rests largely on the assumption of the natural inequality of the sexes. So long as the view survives, with its deep rooted assumptions about the traditional family and its relations to the wider world of political society, the formal equality women have been granted has no chance of becoming true equality, in the real meaning of the word.” (Moller Okin 1980).
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Rawls says: “It seems reasonable to suppose that the parties in the original position are equal. That is, all have the same rights in the procedure for choosing principles; each can make proposals, submit reasons for their acceptance, and so on. Obviously the purpose of these conditions is to represent equality between human beings as moral persons, as creatures having a conception of their good and capable of a sense of justice.” (Rawls 1971, 1999a), p. 17.
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Moller Okin says: “This linguistic usage would perhaps be less significant if it were not for the fact that Rawls is self-consciously a member of a long tradition of moral and political philosophy that has used in its arguments either such supposedly generic male terms, or even more inclusive terms of reference (‘human beings’, ‘person’, ‘all rational beings as such’), only to exclude women from the scope of the conclusions reached.” Moller Okin (1991b), p. 182.
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“Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) to the greatest expected benefit of the least advantaged and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.” Rawls (1999a), p. 72.
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Rawls (1999a), p. 85.
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“We can adopt a motivation assumption and think of the parties as representing a continuing line of claims. For example, we can assume that they are heads of families and therefore have a desire to further the well-being of at least their more immediate descendants.” Rawls (1999a), p. 11.
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Rawls (1999a), p. 126.
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Moller Okin (1991b), p. 183.
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Rawls (1971), pp. 465–475.
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Moller Okin (1991b), pp. 189 and 190.
- 43.
- 44.
Moller Okin (1991b), p. 190.
- 45.
- 46.
Moller Okin (1980), p. 4.
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Rousseau elaborates on the natural subordination of women in the family more often than most other philosophers of previous times and of his time, with arguments that the male has to rule because there must be a single authority that decides, because women are incapacitated by their reproductive function, and because the man must have authority over his wife due to the requirement of paternity certainty: “The relative duties of the two sexes are not, and cannot be, equally rigid. When woman complains of the unjust inequality which man has imposed on her, she is wrong; this inequality is not a human institution, or at least it is not the work of prejudice but of reason: that one of the sexes to whom nature has entrusted the children must answer for them to the other.” (Rousseau 1978).
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Friedich Nietzsche says: “From the beginning, nothing has been more alien, repugnant, and hostile to woman than truth—her great art is the lie, her highest concern is mere appearance and beauty.” (Nietzsche 2016) He also says: “Woman’s love involves injustice and blindness against everything that she does not love... Woman is not yet capable of friendship: women are still cats and birds. Or at best cows...”. (Nietzsche 2006) “Woman! One-half of mankind is weak, typically sick, changeable, inconstant... she needs a religion of weakness that glorifies being weak, loving, and being humble as divine: or better, she makes the strong weak—she rules when she succeeds in overcoming the strong... Woman has always conspired with the types of decadence, the priests, against the ‘powerful’, the ‘strong’, the men.” (Nietzsche n.d.).
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Arthur Schopenhauer says in his publication On Women: “The fundamental defect of the female character is a lack of a sense of justice. This originates first and foremost in their want of rationality and capacity for reflexion but it is strengthened by the fact that, as the weaker sex, they are driven to rely not on force but on cunning: hence their instinctive subtlety and their ineradicable tendency to tell lies: for, as nature has equipped the lion with claws and teeth, the elephant with tusks, the wild boar with fangs, the bull with horns and the cuttlefish with ink, so it has equipped woman with the power of dissimulation as her means of attack and defense, and has transformed into this gift all the strength it has bestowed on man in the form of physical strength and the power of reasoning… But this fundamental defect which I have said they possess, together with all that is associated with it, gives rise to falsity, unfaithfulness, treachery, ingratitude, etc. Women are guilty of perjury far more often than men. It is questionable whether they ought to be allowed to take an oath at all.”; “[Women are] the second sex, inferior in every respect to the first.”; “The lady . . . is a being who should not exist at all; she should be either a housewife or a girl who hopes to become one; and should be brought up, not to be arrogant, but to be thrifty and submissive”; “Taken as a whole, women are . . . thorough-going philistines, and quite incurable” (Schopenhauer 2008).
- 50.
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Georgina Waylen assumes that the methodology and range of neoliberal ideas make it impossible to include women and gender equality within its theory and practice. “The doctrine of individuals is the doctrine of the male, as the sex which can enjoy the ‘rights’ and ‘privileges’ of the free market. Indead the free market can only function if women are not considered as individuals.” (Evans et al. 1986), p. 97. Neoliberalism’s theoretical basis and practical implications intensify women’s subordination, excluding them from the free market and confining them to the private realm of the family. (Evans et al. 1986), pp. 85–102.
Far right and populist ideologies generally affirm traditional family and patriarchal social roles. They identify traditional family as the main unit of affection, thereby excusing domestic violence. All attempts to democratize family relations and introduce gender equality they interpret as jeopardizing society’s most basic unit of society and, as a result, harming the nation and the state. See, for example Dworkin (1981).
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Hirschmann and Di Stefano (1986), p. xiii.
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Just to exemplify this statement in the context of human rights theories, which connect and intertwine political and legal philosophies—there is no mention of women’s human rights in the most recent books written by prestigious authors. For example: Corradetti (2012) and Varady and Jovanović (2019).
- 54.
Saeidzadeh (2022).
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In his last works, Rawls tried to open the question of global justice within international law, as well as to develop a theoretical framework for conciliating conflicts between liberal and non-liberal societies. However, he did not take into consideration the growing conflicts between liberal and non-liberal cultures and values within multicultural nation states, nor did he open his liberal theory of justice for acknowledging the rights of disadvantages groups, nor for connecting universal equality and universal human rights with the recognition of differences based on sex, gender, race, religion, culture, etc. Despite attempting to broaden his understanding of the international arena to include diversity, plurality, and the recognition of differences, he neglected the issues of women’s struggle for recognition and the issue of gender equality (also related to transgender people). Gender equality is completely ignored in the most prestigious and influential contemporary theory of justice within contemporary political philosophy. See Rawls (1971, 1993, 1999a, b).
- 56.
“Gender with its ascriptive designation of positions and expectations of behavior in accordance with the inborn characteristics of sex, could no longer form a legitimate part of the social structure, whether inside or outside the family.” Moller Okin (1991a), p. 191.
- 57.
Moller Okin (1991a), p. 191.
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“This means that if any roles or positions analogous to our current sex roles, including those of husband and wife, mother and father, were to survive the demand of the first requirement, the second requirement would prohibit any linkage between these roles and sex.” Moller Okin (1991a), p. 191.
- 59.
Moller Okin remarks that Rawls’ idea of original position is brilliant and significant, also because the original position “forces one to question and consider traditions, customs, and institutions from all points of view, and ensures that the principles of justice are acceptable to everyone, regardless of what position ‘he’ ends up in.” Moller Okin (1991a), p. 190.
- 60.
Traditional family roles are essentially opposed to his major requirement that, in addition to basic political liberties, people have the “liberty of free choice of occupation.” They are also in opposition to his demand that in the original position it is necessary not only to be subjected to formal political liberties, but also not to be subjected to any inequalities linked to poverty and ignorance. In addition, while Rawls argues that the rational moral person in the original position must feel self-respect, it is obvious that this primary value is in a sharp contrast with the traditional gender roles and family structures, because they do not provide women with self-respect. See Moller Okin (1991a), p. 191.
- 61.
Moller Okin (1991a), p. 194.
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Moller Okin concludes: “Only when men participate equally in what have been principally women’s realms of meeting the daily material and psychological needs of those close to them, and women participate equally in what have been principally men’s realms of larger scale production, government, and intellectual and creative life, will members of both sexes be able to develop a more complete human personality than has hitherto been possible.” Moller Okin (1991a), p. 195.
- 63.
Richards (1982).
- 64.
Benhabib in: Shanley and Pateman (1991), p. 7.
- 65.
O’Brien (1991).
- 66.
Evans et al. (1986), p. 7.
- 67.
Like Carol Pateman did in her book Feminist Contract, which serves as an exceptional example.
- 68.
Evans et al. (1986), p. 13.
- 69.
Evans et al. (1986), p. 130.
- 70.
Evans et al. (1986), p. 132.
- 71.
Saeidzadeh (2022).
- 72.
Fredman (2011).
- 73.
According to Grimshaw, a good starting point for differentiating when misogyny is not in itself sufficient for determining the “maleness” of philosophy in a philosophically relevant sense and when it is sufficient, is “to consider the ways in which women have been excluded by many philosophers from philosophical ideals of such things as human nature and morality, and the inconsistencies and problems this may generate in their theories.” Grimshaw (1986), p. 37.
- 74.
The cases of “men’s right” and “human rights” are indicative from the point of gender blindness. The French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen did not consider women to be political subjects but rather “male” persons, which it identified with the seemingly neutral and general notion “men.” Olympe de Gouges was beheaded for questioning the malestream understanding of the official Declaration. She wrote the “Declaration of the Rights of Woman and of the [Female] Citizen”) as a reply to the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the [Male] Citizen.
A long struggle of the Suffragette movement was necessary for women getting the right to vote; the struggle lasted 142 years in the US, and around 156 years in France. When the concept of “human rights” was introduced in the international law following the WWII and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, the intention was that the notion “human” replace the notion “men,” in order to emphasize women as human beings. However, the dominant discourse on human rights has been caught in the prejudiced identification of “human” with “male.” See, for example: Offen (2011).
- 75.
“From Plato and Aristotle to the early social contract theorists to John Rawls, the ‘great books’ of political theory have offered radically ‘new’ pictures of the state and of politics that have captured the imaginations of large numbers of people at critical junctures in history. Feminist political theorists have brought to bear on this discursive enterprise different epistemological perspectives, ontological framework, and sets of experiences and values that demonstrate that the problems of such ‘new’ visions… often stem from the very ‘old’ ones they claim to replace.” Hirschmann and Di Stefano (1986), p. 3.
- 76.
Bryson (1982).
- 77.
Bryson (1982), p. 262.
- 78.
Hirschmann and Di Stefano (1986), p. 6.
- 79.
Hirschmann and Di Stefano (1986), p. 6.
- 80.
Bryson (1982), p. 263.
- 81.
Bryson (1982), p. 264.
- 82.
Bryson (1982), p. 264.
- 83.
Bryson (1982), p. 265.
- 84.
“…[I]t seems unlikely that an economic system based purely upon the pursuit of profit would provide good quality childcare and the kind of flexible working arrangement that would allow men and women to combine full participation in child-rearing with the pursuit of a career.” Bryson (1982), p. 265.
- 85.
Crenshaw (1989).
- 86.
Bryson (1982), p. 266.
- 87.
Bryson (1982), p. 266.
- 88.
- 89.
Bryson (1982), p. 267.
- 90.
Bryson (1982), p. 267.
- 91.
“Good feminist theory will not be easy, but it must not be needlessly obscure, and if it is to form the basis of collective action and understanding, it must get out of its ivory tower and into the minds of women. Feminism is not a closed book; it is essential that it becomes a readable one.” Bryson (1982), p. 267.
- 92.
Hirschmann and Di Stefano (1986), p. 6.
- 93.
“In challenging, changing, and broadening our notions of the political, feminist politicization of concepts such as ‘community’, ‘family’, ‘privacy’ and ‘care’ adds to the existing stock of available political terms, thus enriching the political vocabulary.” Hirschmann and Di Stefano (1986), p. 7.
- 94.
Hirschmann and Di Stefano (1986), p. 6.
- 95.
Tronto, in Hirschmann and Di Stefano (1986).
- 96.
Phelan, in Hirschmann and Di Stefano (1986).
- 97.
Phelan, in Hirschmann and Di Stefano (1986).
- 98.
- 99.
Patriarchal heteronomous social roles and relations have been the basis of authoritarian political culture and authoritarian political order. See Vujadinović and Stanimirović (2019).
- 100.
Eisenstein, in Hirschmann and Di Stefano (1986), p. 181.
- 101.
Eisenstein, in Hirschmann and Di Stefano (1986), p. 181.
- 102.
“Feminism needs to continually redefine the meaning of democratic rights to require equality of access via an affirmative and noninterventionist state.” Eisenstein, in Hirschmann and Di Stefano (1986), p. 190.
- 103.
Allen, in Hirschmann and Di Stefano (1986), p. 208.
- 104.
Mansbridge in Hirschmann and Di Stefano (1986), p. 121.
- 105.
Mansbridge in Hirschmann and Di Stefano (1986), p. 117.
- 106.
Mansbridge in Hirschmann and Di Stefano (1986), p. 117.
- 107.
Mansbridge in Hirschmann and Di Stefano (1986), p. 124.
- 108.
Mansbridge in Hirschmann and Di Stefano (1986), p. 125.
- 109.
As Mansbridge concludes, “[A]pplying the insights of ‘connection’ to the exercise of democratic power means retaining the equal respect crucial to the relations of friendship by making the balance of coercive power as equal as possible among the partners…, insisting that the exercise of power not undermine anyone’s deepest interests, … and developing a deliberative arena that can judge the legitimacy of different acts of coercive power”. Mansbridge in Hirschmann and Di Stefano (1986), p. 129.
- 110.
Mansbridge in Hirschmann and Di Stefano (1986), p. 132.
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Vujadinović, D. (2023). Feminist Reconsideration of Political Theories. In: Vujadinović, D., Álvarez del Cuvillo, A., Strand, S. (eds) Feminist Approaches to Law. Gender Perspectives in Law, vol 1. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-14781-4_1
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