Abstract
Philosophy of technology has increasingly emphasized the particular nature of technological knowledge, mainly the fact that it is different from scientific knowledge. This paper brings together several characteristics of technological knowledge which are scattered throughout the literature. Its aim is to contribute to a better understanding of technological knowledge as a whole and to resolve some questions on the nature of science, in particular its possible intrinsic relation to technology.
I reproduce here, translated by Jeffrey Hoff and with small modifications, my article La Peculiaridad del Conocimiento Tecnológico, published in Scientiae Studia 4(3), 2006: 353–371. Republished with kind permission of the publisher.
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Notes
- 1.
For example: Singer et al. (1954) and Daumas (1962). Layton observes that the works of U.S. historians (Lynn White, Derek Price, among others) are more sensitive to the peculiarity of technology, although they have not been able to prevent a certain emphasis on technique, with which technology is often identified, which also mars perception of the cognitive aspect of the latter (Layton, 1974: 33).
- 2.
It should be clarified that, although the majority of scholars of technology refer to the artificial as if it were a field of objects, there are also artificial materials (such as plastics) and artificial processes (such as damming rivers). Bunge treats this variety quite carefully and defines the artificial as “everything, state or process, that is controlled or deliberately made with the help of some learned knowledge, and that can be used by others” (Bunge, 1985b: 33–34, my translation).
- 3.
Substantive theories produce knowledge about technological action itself (for instance, a theory about the flight of airplanes). Operative theories refer to the actions on which the correct function of artifacts depends (e.g., a theory about the optimal decisions concerning the distribution of air traffic in a determined area (Bunge, 1969: 684).
- 4.
For instance the scientific law: “Magnetism disappears above the Curie temperature” supports the nomo-pragmatic statement: “If a magnetized body is heated above its Curie point, it loses its magnetism”, which entails the rule: “To avoid the loss of magnetism of a body, do not heat it above its Curie point” (Bunge, 1969: 684, my translation). Nevertheless, it should not be thought that the derivation of rules based on laws is obvious or mechanical. This would be to ignore the creative aspect of technology (cf. Kroes, 1998: 8).
- 5.
The variables to be taken into account in the phenomenon to be explained in science depend on the discipline (physics, chemistry etc.), the theory (classical or quantum mechanics) and focus (structuralist, Marxist etc.). Variables, in turn, also characterize those three aspects. In terms of the general conditions for the production of artifacts (from which the interesting variables derive) Bunge (1985a: 226) mentions: not violating natural laws, being plausible, operating effectively and reliably, having a cost that does not exceed a certain amount and producing benefits that (ideally, at least) exceed the undesirable collateral effects.
- 6.
The link between the philosophy of technology and the philosophy of rational action (“praxeology”) is found here.
- 7.
From a realistic perspective, however, Bunge considers technological theories to be richer from a practical perspective, although theoretically poorer (Bunge, 1969: 686).
- 8.
Baird identifies three types of instruments: those that represent the known object, like the material models (from the “planetariums” of the nineteenth century to the helicoid model of DNA), those that encompass “working knowledge”, like the air pump or the particle accelerator, and those that constitute “encapsulated knowledge”, which are the measuring instruments, from a ruler to a spectrometer (Baird, 2004, chaps. 2, 3 and 4).
- 9.
It is important to recall that K. Popper (1902–1994) put forward an epistemological theory according to which ideas, problems and arguments constitute a “world” that is in some way objective, which would exist with a degree of autonomy in relation to the material world and to human minds (Popper, 1975 [1973]).
- 10.
There are, Mitcham opportunely adds, different interpretations of this justification: the realist, the instrumentalist and the pragmatic. Technologists subscribe readily to the realist interpretation (Mitcham, 1994: 194).
- 11.
Naturally, the later non-cognitive stages of technological production remain outside this comparison (mass production, monitoring, etc.).
- 12.
The cases analysed by Vincenti correspond to his field of experience (aeronautic engineering) and to “normal” design. However, he convincingly argues for the plausibility of seeing in his conclusions aspects of design that are applicable to other technological fields.
- 13.
Vincenti points here to an “important” difference between science and technology, because although scientific knowledge can help to understand an operational principle (for example, the principle of flight by the elevation produced by a rotor on a helicopter), scientific knowledge does not merely imply the principle. Certainly, this repeats Kroes’ observation that the characteristic of a technological device is its function.
- 14.
At times resorting to ordinary experiments that have no place in advanced science, such as breaking things to verify the resistance of materials (Vincenti, 1990: 232).
- 15.
Without giving examples, Laudan seems convinced that “medical technologies, at least until the twentieth century, fall almost entirely within this class” (Laudan, 1984b: 86).
- 16.
On a conventional level, the apparent insolvability of a problem causes events to be seen as a fatality and induces an appeal to social solutions. For example, a community that sees its village ravaged by a flood and cannot imagine means of avoiding this type of catastrophe may opt to move to another location (Laudan, 1984b: 84).
- 17.
Cf. The “disciplinary matrix” of scientific disciplines (in Kuhn, 1970 [1962]).
- 18.
For instance, when the limits of piston-engine airplanes were foreseen, as previously mentioned. Constant addressed the issue in his most important and quoted book, The Origins of the Turbojet Revolution (Constant, 1980).
- 19.
A revolution, Baird clarifies, not in the line of T. S. Kuhn (there were no anomalies or “incommensurability”), but in that of authors like Cohen (1985) and Hacking (1987), because it was something seen as such by the scientists themselves, had an impact on treatises and text books, was judged by historians to be a revolution, implied conceptual changes, gave rise to new institutions and even produced social changes.
- 20.
“Beginning with tools and instruments constructed for their usefulness in practical tasks, it was only a short logical distance to instruments invented for what they could discover about the nature of things” (Feibleman, 1982: 8).
- 21.
Schummer (2001) shows that preparative chemistry, which corresponds to more than 90% of research in the field, must be considered as a technology, because 95% of the substances known today are artifacts. Moreover, to improve the ability to produce new substances has become an end in itself in chemistry.
- 22.
A trend stimulated by the epistemology of John Dewey, according to Cordero, (2001: 133). Nevertheless, not everything in this epistemology can be criticized, Cordero warns, and he uses Dewey’s ideas to put forward his own interpretation of the relationship between science and technology.
- 23.
These “complexes” that guide research include codes of professional ethics, disciplinary convictions, definitions of fields of research and even sets of problems, according to Weingart (1984: 116).
- 24.
On the other hand, usefulness is not the only value used in identifying technological problems. Aesthetic and intellectual motivations are also important at times, as Laudan recognizes (1984b: 8–9).
- 25.
According to which all human problems can be solved if we find the suitable means to obtain desired ends, as emphasized by Borgmann (1984).
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Cupani, A. (2023). The Specificity of Technological Knowledge. In: Jerónimo, H.M. (eds) Portuguese Philosophy of Technology. Philosophy of Engineering and Technology, vol 43. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-14630-5_10
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