Abstract
Theoretical studies show that a block withholding attack is a considerable weakness of pool mining in Proof-of-Work consensus networks. Several defense mechanisms against the attack have been proposed in the past with a novel approach of sending sensors suggested by Lee and Kim in 2019. In this work we extend their approach by including mutual attacks of multiple pools as well as a deposit system for miners forming a pool. In our analysis we show that block withholding attacks can be made economically irrational when miners joining a pool are required to provide deposits to participate which can be confiscated in case of malicious behavior. We investigate minimal thresholds and optimal deposit requirements for various scenarios and conclude that this defense mechanism is only successful, when collected deposits are not redistributed to the miners.
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Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Michael Zargham (BlockScience, USA), Jamsheed Shorish (ShorishResearch, Belgium), and Hitoshi Yamamoto (Rissho University, Japan) for their useful comments. We thank Alfred Taudes (former Director of the interdisciplinary Research Institute for Cryptoeconomics at the Vienna University of Economics) for his management of our project.
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A Proof of Theorems
A Proof of Theorems
1.1 A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof
(Theorem 1). If no attacks occur in the network both \(x=y=0\) by definition. Plugging both in into Definition 1 we get
and
which respecting Definition 2 yields
and
Due to Definition 3 we get \(E_A = E_B = 1\).
1.2 A.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Proof
(Theorem 2). For \(x > 0\) and \(y=0\) plugging in into 1 yields
and
which again can be inserted into 2 and thus since \(y=0\) then \(R_B\) reduces to
which can be plugged into \(R_A\)
and therefore both efficiencies compute as:
and
This shows that \(E_A>E_B\) because
This is true because \(( x - x^2)>0\) as \(x<1\). This further shows that \(E_B < 1\) because:
since the denominator is greater than the numerator. Further we show when \(E_A>1\):
which is the case when
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Okada, I., De Silva, H., Paruch, K. (2022). Sending Spies as Insurance Against Bitcoin Pool Mining Block Withholding Attacks. In: Kotsis, G., et al. Database and Expert Systems Applications - DEXA 2022 Workshops. DEXA 2022. Communications in Computer and Information Science, vol 1633. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-14343-4_23
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-14343-4_23
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