Abstract
Can we describe the ethical views of premodern Buddhist authors, without distorting them, using the terms and concepts employed in contemporary discussions of philosophical ethics? If we can, just how should we do so? Mark Siderits was one of the first authors to propose that we try to understand the normative views of the South Asian Buddhist tradition considered as a whole, and of Śāntideva in particular, as forms of consequentialism. Since his pioneering work, the discussion has advanced considerably, and scholars have raised a number of questions about, and objections against, consequentialist interpretations of Buddhist ethics. This paper defends a consequentialist interpretation of Śāntideva in particular, offering replies to the most important of these questions and objections. If my arguments are successful, they reveal that Siderits’ pioneering articles about Buddhist ethics were quite close to the mark, at least so far as Śāntideva is concerned.
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Notes
- 1.
Siderits (2007).
- 2.
Siderits (2000).
- 3.
- 4.
He cites Kagan (1998, p. 190), for this.
- 5.
Goodman (2008).
- 6.
See, e.g., Portmore (2011).
- 7.
In particular, by Harris (2015, p. 15).
- 8.
Parfit (1984, p. 27).
- 9.
In Clayton (2009).
- 10.
Clayton (2009, p. 21).
- 11.
Clayton (2009, p. 21).
- 12.
Smart and Williams (1973, pp. 97–98).
- 13.
See SS 134. The discussion as a whole is found at Goodman (2016, pp. 128–31).
- 14.
See Dutt (1954, pp. 481–82).
- 15.
Nattier (2003).
- 16.
Harris (2015, p. 257).
- 17.
- 18.
Extensive textual evidence could be cited in support of this claim. See, e.g., ŚS 9, at Goodman (2016, p. 11).
- 19.
See Vaidya and Tripathi (1988, p. 163). This is my translation, but I follow Crosby and Skilton in several respects.
- 20.
Pettit (1997, p. 142).
- 21.
Greene (2013, p. 200).
- 22.
Take, say, BCA II.45, Crosby and Skilton (1995, p. 18).
- 23.
Is there any other way to read BCA IX.141? Crosby and Skilton (1995, p. 130).
- 24.
BCA V.54 is a very clear example; Crosby and Skilton (1995, p. 38).
- 25.
Harris (2015, p. 6).
- 26.
Goodman and Siderits (2016, p. 246).
- 27.
Goodman and Siderits (2016, pp. 246–47).
- 28.
Harris (2011, p. 116).
- 29.
Harris (2011, p. 118).
- 30.
Sidgwick (1981, pp. 507–9 et al.).
- 31.
Harris (2011, p. 108).
- 32.
Singer (1972).
- 33.
In Johnston (1997).
- 34.
Perrett (2002).
- 35.
Parfit (1984, p. 307).
- 36.
Parfit (2007, p. 36).
- 37.
- 38.
Johnston (2010, p. 312).
- 39.
Parfit (1984, pp. 227–228).
- 40.
Johnston (2010, p. 315).
- 41.
Johnston himself calls attention, at pp. 314–5, to the possibility that out-of-body post-mortem experiences could be shown empirically to provide information that could not have been obtained in any other way. Yet some Buddhists also believe in experiences of this kind.
- 42.
Śāntideva, Bodhicaryāvatāra VI.29–30, following Crosby and Skilton p. 52.
- 43.
And the intrinsic significance of whatever implements the mental states, if it has any such significance.
- 44.
Goodman (2009, pp. 303–4).
- 45.
See Nidditch (1979, pp. 335–336).
- 46.
The Cowherds (2016, ch. 8).
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Goodman, C. (2023). Can We Know Whether Śāntideva Was a Consequentialist?. In: Coseru, C. (eds) Reasons and Empty Persons: Mind, Metaphysics, and Morality. Sophia Studies in Cross-cultural Philosophy of Traditions and Cultures, vol 36. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-13995-6_22
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