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The COVID-19 Pandemic in Cyprus: A Problematic Legal Regime, and the Potential of Rule of Law in Emergencies

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Democracy after Covid

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Abstract

In the first part of this chapter, we shall argue that the legal regime under which most of the COVID-19 measures were adopted in Cyprus is problematic both from the standpoint of the democratic principle and from the standpoint of the meta-principle of rule of law. In the second part, in the context of an analysis of the path that the Republic of Cyprus did not follow, i.e. a Proclamation of Emergency under Art. 183 of the Constitution, we shall see how a “compulsion of legality” (Dyzenhaus) was incorporated into the emergency doctrine upon which the operation of the constitutional order of Cyprus has been based since 1964. The doctrine of necessity in Cyprus illustrates the potential of the rule of law even in emergencies. The “compulsion of legality” which animates the Cypriot version of the doctrine of necessity affirms the importance of legislative action and of judicial review. At least on COVID-19 measures, this compulsion should orient courts away from constructions (such as the doctrine of “actes de gouvernement”) which insulate executive action from judicial scrutiny.

I would like to thank Professor Achilles Emilianides for his crucial (as always) suggestions.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See European Court of Human Rights (Grand Chamber), Loizidou v. Turkey, judgment of 18 December 1996, app. no. 15318/89, paras 52–56.

  2. 2.

    Ibid. paras 19–23, 42, 44 (citing the relevant resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and other international documents).

  3. 3.

    See European Court of Human Rights (Grand Chamber), Cyprus v. Turkey, judgment of 10 May 2001, app. no. 25781/94.

  4. 4.

    UN High Commissioner (2021).

  5. 5.

    Ibid.

  6. 6.

    Statement by the President of the Security Council, 23 July 2021, UN document S/PRST/2021/13, referring to UN Security Council resolutions 550 (1984) and 789 (1992).

  7. 7.

    FRA (2020). A collection of many relevant decrees translated in English can be found at: https://www.pio.gov.cy/coronavirus/eng/categories/decrees (last accessed 24 May 2022).

  8. 8.

    See e.g. District Court of Nicosia, Savvides et al. v. Attorney-General et al., lawsuit no. 1498/2021, interim judgment of 9 July 2021.

  9. 9.

    FRA (2021), pp. 11–12.

  10. 10.

    Kombos (2020, 2021).

  11. 11.

    In autumn 2021, the government submitted to the House of Representatives a bill which, if adopted, will replace the colonial Quarantine Law, on which most COVID-19 measures have so far been based. Apart from a more detailed description of the measures that the executive may enforce in case of pandemics, the draft new law follows the philosophy of the colonial legislation (and, in many parts, it simply repeats the wording of the colonial law), i.e. it grants vast authority to the executive, uncontrolled by the parliament and/or by means of procedural guarantees involving experts in the decision-making process. Thus, most of (although not all) our critical remarks in part 2 apply to the draft law as well. We shall be noting possible differentiations of our critique in footnotes.

  12. 12.

    The draft law on pandemics that is pending in the parliament grants explicitly the authority to issue decrees both to the Council of Ministers and to the Minister of Health individually. However, it remains the case that the measures that are prescribed therein introduce exceptionally wide restrictions on a series of fundamental rights.

  13. 13.

    The Police and Hondrou, 3 RSCC 82. To be noted that the President of the Court was the famous German professor (and student of notorious Carl Schmitt) Ernst Forsthoff.

  14. 14.

    Spyrou and others (No. 2) v. The Republic (Licensing Authority) (1973) 3 CLR 627. See also Emilianides (2019), p. 72.

  15. 15.

    The Police and Hondrou, at 86 (our emphasis).

  16. 16.

    The new draft law has taken positive steps in this direction, i.e. it prescribes possible measures in some detail.

  17. 17.

    Kombos (2021).

  18. 18.

    To be noted that in Cyprus, the case law of the Supreme Constitutional Court and of its successor, i.e. the Supreme Court, is binding for lower courts, not least in administrative law, which in other respects follows the continental system. See Hatzimihail (2013), pp. 91–92.

  19. 19.

    This last defect, i.e. the absence of procedural guarantees, remains in place in the new draft law.

  20. 20.

    In one of the interim measures judgments that have been issued so far with regard to the COVID-19 measures, the District Court of Nicosia responded to this allegation by arguing that Law 99/1989 applies only to regulations, not to decrees. See District Court of Nicosia, Kosta et al. v. The Attorney-General et al., lawsuit no. 1322/2021, interim judgment of 27 July 2021. This argument runs contrary to the letter of the Quarantine Law, Art. 6, which authorises the Council of Ministers to issue regulations by means of decrees. And so did the Minister of Health (after the sub-delegation of such authority), who issued regulations by means of decrees. To justify the distinction between decrees and regulations, the District Court appealed to the Law on Interpretation, Cap. 1, and to two Supreme Court judgments, but neither this Law nor the judgments guarantee the distinction. Not surprisingly, the new draft law mentions only decrees, not regulations. But the substance of the problem, i.e. the absence of parliamentary approval, remains in place.

  21. 21.

    This is another argument that rebuts the distinction between decrees and regulations, as introduced by the District Court of Nicosia (see previous note).

  22. 22.

    For a summary of this case law, see Emilianides (2019), pp. 61–66.

  23. 23.

    The draft new law on pandemics has addressed only point (a), not points (b) and (c) of our critique.

  24. 24.

    For a discussion on the necessity for introducing a special regime for public health emergencies in France, see Gelblat and Marguet (2020).

  25. 25.

    See Kombos (2021).

  26. 26.

    The draft new law on pandemics did nothing to alleviate these concerns.

  27. 27.

    Patsalidi v. Republic of Cyprus, case no. 301/2020, judgment of 16 April 2020, ECLI:CY:DD:2020:188.

  28. 28.

    See e.g. Mavronicola (2012, 2017); Smet (2013); Greer (2011, 2015, 2018); Biggar (2020), pp. 167–189; Gewirth (1981).

  29. 29.

    In the Greek legal order, a source of the case law of Cypriot courts on administrative law issues, regulatory acts are clearly susceptible to the power of administrative courts to annul administrative acts. The difference between the Cypriot and the Greek legal order in this respect could find an explanation to the fact that the system of government in Cyprus is presidential, whereas in Greece it is parliamentary.

  30. 30.

    Louca v. The President of the Republic (1983) 3 CLR 783, followed, inter alia, by Karaliota ν. The Republic (1985) 3 CLR 2053; Loizou et al. v. The Republic (1992) 4 CLR 2643 (in Greek); Hatziandreou v. The Republic (2001) 3 CLR 352 (in Greek); Kyriacou v. The Republic, case no. 692/2012, judgment of 26 November 2012.

  31. 31.

    Patsalidi v. Republic of Cyprus, case no. 301/2020, judgment of 16 April 2020, ECLI:CY:DD:2020:188.

  32. 32.

    See Laferrière (2020).

  33. 33.

    For a rebuttal of the view that courts should play a minimal role in issues of contentious public policy such as national security issues, including discussion on the political questions doctrine (the American analogue of the French doctrine of “actes de gouvernement”), see Greene (2018): chap. 4.

  34. 34.

    The Attorney-General of the Republic v. Mustafa Ibrahim and others (1964) CLR 195. For the doctrine or law of necessity in Cyprus, see Polyviou (2015); Kombos (2015); Emilianides et al. (2016).

  35. 35.

    Ibrahim, at 265 (Josephides, J.).

  36. 36.

    See Kombos (2015); Polyviou (2015); contra Özersay (2004).

  37. 37.

    Dyzenhaus (2012), p. 451.

  38. 38.

    Dyzenhaus (2012), p. 452.

  39. 39.

    For the defense of legality in emergencies, see inter alia, Dyzenhaus (2006a); Greene (2018). The relationship between liberal-democratic institutions and emergency powers is more complex outside the context of the “western world”. See in this regard the excellent treatise of Ramraj (2009). In our view, the Cypriot version of the doctrine of necessity sits uncomfortably both with the “western” typologies of emergency powers (e.g. Gross and Ní Aoláin (2006); Ferejohn and Pasquino (2004); Dyzenhaus (2012) and with the types of cases to which Ramraj refers.

  40. 40.

    Reference re Language Rights under the Manitoba Act 1870 [1985] 1 RCS, 763. For a discussion of the use of Ibrahim in the Manitoba Language cases and in other court judgments from various countries (most of them addressing upheavals in government), see Polyviou (2015), chap. 7; Kombos (2015), chap. 3.

  41. 41.

    President v. House of Representatives (1986) 3 CLR 1439.

  42. 42.

    Nicolaou v. Nicolaou (1992) 1 CLR 1338.

  43. 43.

    Koulountis and other v. House of Representatives (1997) 1 CLR 1026.

  44. 44.

    For positive views, see inter alia, Greene (2020); Jovičić (2021).

  45. 45.

    For a skeptical view, based on considerations relevant with rule of law, see Emilianides 2020. Cf. Kombos (2020), arguing that “the proclamation of a state of emergency was not constitutionally possible”.

  46. 46.

    Ibrahim at 215.

  47. 47.

    The Turkish Communal Chamber v. The Council of Ministers (1963) 5 RSCC 59, at 77.

  48. 48.

    Ibrahim, at 215 (Vassiliades, J.).

  49. 49.

    Ibid. See also Ibrahim, at 225–226, 234 (Triantafyllides, J.), and 265–266 (Josephides, J.).

  50. 50.

    For the concept of black and of grey holes, see Dyzenhaus (2006b); also Greene (2018). Dyzenhaus (2006b) considers grey holes more harmful to the rule of law than black holes, since the limited protection that grey holes provide cloak the lack of substantial protection, and equip the executive with some constitutional legitimacy, whereas in the case of black holes, it is at least apparent that the executive moves outside the contours of the Constitution.

  51. 51.

    Kombos (2021).

  52. 52.

    Louca, op. cit.

  53. 53.

    Kombos (2021).

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  1. School of Law, University of Nicosia, Nicosia, Cyprus

    Costas Stratilatis

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  1. Faculty of Law, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Thessaloniki, Greece

    Kostas Chrysogonos

  2. Faculty of Law, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Thessaloniki, Greece

    Anna Tsiftsoglou

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Stratilatis, C. (2022). The COVID-19 Pandemic in Cyprus: A Problematic Legal Regime, and the Potential of Rule of Law in Emergencies. In: Chrysogonos, K., Tsiftsoglou, A. (eds) Democracy after Covid. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-13901-7_6

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