Abstract
In this introduction to the Being of Negation in Post-Kantian Philosophy, I elucidate the problem of negation in classical Greek philosophy, Kant, and German Idealism. Inspired by the Platonic insight that any inquiry into non-being must impute non-being with the being of non-being, this book sets out to think the being of nothing. Whenever we ask ‘what is nothing?’ we are implicitly asking ‘what is it for nothing to be?’ To answer with a judgment of the form ‘nothingness is such and such’ inevitably identifies the being of nothing. To think nothingness by itself cannot be achieved without introducing what nothingness is not—namely being. Thus, inquiries into nothingness turn back on themselves [παλίντροπός] in the manner of Heraclitus’ back turning harmony [παλίντροπος ἁρμονίη].
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Notes
- 1.
Aristotle (2002, 1003a21).
- 2.
Plato (1997c, 238e–239a).
- 3.
Note that here I do not intend to lose myself in a close exegesis of Plato’s text, and its meaning. Rather, I take Plato as an inspiration to think more precisely about the problem of non-being.
- 4.
Plato (1997a, II.5).
- 5.
Barnes (2002, 9.2).
- 6.
Barnes (2002, 49a).
- 7.
Plato (1997c, 238d).
- 8.
Plato (1997c, 238d–239a).
- 9.
Plato (1997c, 257b). Throughout the course of the dialogue ‘non being’ is pluralized in the sense that there are many forms any that are not the same as being, e.g. ‘same,’ ‘different,’ etc. are not identical to being. As Plato writes: “[…] we dared say that that which is not [τὸ μὴ ὄν] really is just this, namely each part of the nature of the different that’s set over against [ἀντιτιθέμενον] that which is.” Plato (1997c, 258e).
- 10.
Plato (1997c, 258b).
- 11.
See Plato (1997c, 255e): καὶ διὰ πάντων γε αὐτὴν αὐτῶν φήσομεν εἶναι διεληλυθυῖαν: ἓν ἕκαστον γὰρ ἕτερον εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων οὐ διὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ φύσιν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μετέχειν τῆς ἰδέας τῆς θατέρου.
- 12.
See Plato (1997c, 257a). καὶ τὸ ὂν ἄρ᾽ ἡμῖν, ὅσαπέρ ἐστι τὰ ἄλλα, κατὰ τοσαῦτα οὐκ ἔστιν: ἐκεῖνα γὰρ οὐκ ὂν ἓν μὲν αὐτό ἐστιν, ἀπέραντα δὲ τὸν ἀριθμὸν τἆλλα οὐκ ἔστιν αὖ.
- 13.
See Spinoza (2017, 75). Spinoza writes: “Therefore, because the shape is nothing but a determination, and determination is (as they say) a negation, it cannot be anything but a negation.”
- 14.
See Plato (1997c, 258c).
- 15.
- 16.
See Priest’s argument for a dialetheic concept of nothingness in Priest (2022, 16) (Forthcoming).
- 17.
More generally, if one denies that one cannot meaningfully speak about what does not exist, then the truth of such a distinction can no longer be taken as a self-evident given. Although such distinctions invoke concepts that demand further clarification, here it is sufficient to indicate that any inquiry into non-being must critically investigate the distinction between the non-being constitutive of determinate identity, and the non-being that signifies the non-existence of such determinate identities. In any case, we must (at least) acknowledge that the negation constitutive of the determinacy of something already entails some commitment to non-existence in some form. The proposition expresses the mutual exclusion of two concepts, such that in the species ‘elephant’ one finds an absence of humanity, or the non-instantiation of the concept ‘humanity.’ Likewise, the statement, ‘there are no humans in the Espresso Cove Café in Hong Kong,’ signifies the absence or non-existence of particular human beings in the café. Even though the former case specifies the non-identity of the concept of human beings with the concept of another kind of entity, while the latter case specifies the non-existence of particular human beings at a certain place and time, in each case nonbeing indicates an absence of being from some determinate context or other—whether this be the species of elephant or the café.
- 18.
I agree with Priest that Carnap has unduly restricted our capacity of speak about nothing when he restricts the use of nothing as a quantifier. See Priest (2022, 7) (Forthcoming).
- 19.
What is more, some philosophers, e.g. Hegel, will further distinguish being from existence. Accordingly, a further question must be asked about the meaning of non-being and whether it is identical to expressions of non-existence.
- 20.
Plato (1997b, 509c).
- 21.
See Pseudo-Dionysius (1990, 49) [585–88].
- 22.
See Pseudo-Dionysius (1990, 85).
- 23.
Kant (1998), B106/A80.
- 24.
Kant (1998), A70/B95.
- 25.
In Kant’s terms, Sensibility is the capacity to receive representations in virtue of being affected by objects. Qua receptive, Sensibility is a passive faculty in which representations are given.
- 26.
Kant (1998), A169/B210, 291.
- 27.
See Kant (1998), §20, B143.
- 28.
The categories of quality, like all categories, has its own schema, the principle of which is “in all appearances the real, which is an object of the sensation, has intensive magnitude.” See Anticipations of Perception in Kant (1998), B208.
- 29.
See Kant (1998), B295/A236.
- 30.
For this hierarchy see Plato (1997b), V, 477–479, 1104–1106.
- 31.
Note that in the Parmenides Plato also refutes the very common concept of participation present in other Platonic dialogues in which the Forms are conceived as the paradigms that are imitated by the sensory particulars. Plato (1997a), 132d–a, 366–367.
- 32.
See Kant (1998), A572/B600.
- 33.
Kant (1998, 554).
- 34.
Kant (1998, 554).
- 35.
Kant (1998, 556).
- 36.
Kant (1998), A576/B606. Insofar as the sum of all possible predicates is conceived as the all of reality, Kant also notes that negations are “the sole predicates through which everything else is to be distinguished from the most real being.” Negation’s functions of limitation and relation can also be clearly illustrated in the case of the infinite judgment. For example, consider the infinite judgment “humans are non-plants.” In this judgment, the concept of the human is placed in the category of ‘non-plant.’ Because ‘non-plant’ excludes plants from the concept of the human, Kant posits the category of limitation (the unity of reality and negation) as the logical function in the infinite judgment. However, what does “non-plant” predicate of the human? The negation places ‘human’ in relation to ‘non-plant’ but fails to provide cognition of any determinate being called ‘non-plant.’ ‘Non-plant’ does not give us any cognition of a non-being. See CPR, A 572/B 600. Rather, according to Kant, ‘non-plant’ is indefinite, for it does not specify any determinate object in the class of non-plants. Rather, it leaves it completely undetermined what kind of non-plant is affirmed of the human. There are many different predicates that fall within the class of ‘non-plant’ and ‘non-plant’ does not specify any of them. Thus, the predicate ‘non-plant’ is infinite in the sense of apeiron—it is an indefinite predicate. Insofar as it excludes predicates, the infinite judgment imposes a limit upon the subject, however what is affirmed of the subject itself remains undetermined. The negation is determinate, but the affirmation to which it corresponds remains indeterminate. For more on the infinite judgment, see CPR, A70/B94. That infinite judgments form their own class of judgments is a matter of dispute. Although it arguably has a distinguished pedigree harkening back to Maimonides, Hegel famously denies that infinite judgments really count as a legitimate form of judgment. For more on the infinite judgment, see Kant (1998), A70/B94.
- 37.
Kant (1998), A575, B603. For example, in order for the category of negation to apply to experience, the category of reality must first apply to sensation and thereby produce an experience of reality with an intensive magnitude. There must already be reality in the sensation as a condition for negation, otherwise there would be no object for negation to negate.
- 38.
Kant does not seem to hold that every determinate category must already presuppose negation. Although Kant does not hold this, one can make a good case for it. In order to state the various predicates that constitute the sum of all possible predicates, one must arguably implicitly invokes negation, for each predicate is different from the others, and thus not the others. However, supposes that one can state the sum of all possible predicates without already appealing to negation.
- 39.
From a purely logical point of view, Kant’s philosophy argues that negations are relational determinations. See Kant (1998), A572/B600. According to Kant, logical negation is an operation in a judgment that relates concepts to each other. Subjects are related to their complete set of predicates in virtue of negation. To return to our example, Q is predicated of s in virtue of the negation of P. S relates to P by excluding it, and relates to Q by having it as its predicate.
- 40.
Kant (1998), A 290/B347.
- 41.
See Aristotle (2002), Book Beta.
- 42.
Kant (1998), A290/B347.
- 43.
See Kant (1998), B110.
- 44.
For a discussion of the problem of onto-theology in Kant, see Moss (2018, 11–12).
- 45.
Kant (1998, A572/B600).
- 46.
Kant (1998, 556–57)
- 47.
Aristotle also affirms this thesis. See Aristotle (2002), Book Lambda. For Aristotle, there is nothing contrary to being.
- 48.
See Bruno (2018, 67–84).
- 49.
Bruno (2018, 69).
- 50.
Kant (1998), B145–B146.
- 51.
As Fichte states, “Nowhere did Kant consider the foundation of all philosophy.” Fichte (1982, 46).
- 52.
Hegel (1977b, 111).
- 53.
Fichte (1982, 46).
- 54.
Fichte (1982, 114) (See Paragraph 3, Section 7).
- 55.
Cited in Schwab (2017, 69).
- 56.
“The celebrated question which Kant placed at the head of the Critique of Pure Reason: How are synthetic judgments a priori possible? is now answered in the most universal and satisfactory manner. In the third principle we have established a synthesis between the two opposites, self and not-self, by postulating them each to be divisible; there can be no further question as to the possibility of this, nor can any ground for it be given; it is absolutely possible, and we are entitled to it without further grounds of any kind. All other syntheses, if they are to be valid, must be rooted in this one, and must have been established in and along with it. And once this has been demonstrated, we have the most convincing proof that they are valid as well.” Fichte (1982), Section 5 of Part III.
- 57.
‘[My philosophy] restricts reason, considered by itself, to the mere faculty of perceiving relations clearly, i.e. to the power of formulating the principle of identity and judging in conformity with it. . .’ Jacobi (2016, 255–256).
- 58.
Fichte’s philosophy begins from the self-intuiting of the I, and this requires abstracting away all other contents of the mind. Fichte himself claims that the original principle concerns the form of thinking, not its content. See Fichte (1982, 94–95/ I, 93).
- 59.
Jacobi (2016, 80).
- 60.
Jacobi (2016, 255).
- 61.
Since the a priori form of reason is never sufficient to derive the content of reason, the content of reason must be arrived at a posteriori.
- 62.
Jacobi (2016, 509).
- 63.
See Frank (2004), Ch. 12, 207 KA XII: 39.
- 64.
- 65.
Schelling (1980, 177).
- 66.
Schelling (1980, 177).
- 67.
Schelling (2013, 34).
- 68.
See Schelling (2001, 353) (Explanation to Corollary 14).
- 69.
See Schelling’s Seventh Letter. Schelling (1980, 177).
- 70.
See Schelling’s Sixth Letter. Schelling (1980, 173).
- 71.
Schelling (2001), Paragraph 14, 222.
- 72.
Schelling (2000, 12).
- 73.
See McGrath (2015, 3). Presented at the 2015 meeting of the Metaphysical Society of America at the University of Georgia. See https://www.metaphysicalsociety.org/2015/papers/McGrath.pdf
- 74.
Schelling (2008, 128).
- 75.
Schelling (2008, 137).
- 76.
Schelling (2008, 143).
- 77.
According to Schelling, Hegel’s logic of negativity does not respect this distinction between essence and existence, and attempts to derive existence of concepts from the concept alone. Schelling writes: “The philosophy that Hegel presented is the negative driven beyond its limit: it does not exclude the positive, but thinks it has subdued it within itself.” See Schelling (2008, 145).
Indeed, Hegel endorses a version of the ontological argument for God’s existence in his Science of Logic, particularly in the transition from concept to objectivity, and in his lectures on the philosophy of religion. See Hegel (1984).
- 78.
Schelling (2008, 171–191).
- 79.
Schelling (2008, 154).
- 80.
Although Schelling admits that although the beginning may be anarchical, he is equally adamant that reason and order develop out of that initial anarchy. The task of philosophy consists in the scientific grasp of the development of the rational order out of the contradiction that constitutes the primordial chaos. Schelling is clear that “nowhere does it appear as if form and order were what is original but rather as if initial anarchy had been brought to order.” See Schelling (2006, 29), SW 359–60. What is more: “The transition from contradiction to unity, on the other hand, is natural, for contradiction is insufferable to everything and everything that finds itself in it will not repose until it has found the unity that reconciles or overcomes it.” See Schelling (2000, 12). Schelling adeptly points out that the story of the development of the rationality of the world is mirrored in the story of the development of the rational person: “Certainly one who could write completely the history of their own life would also have, in a small epitome, concurrently grasped the history of the cosmos.” Schelling (2000, 3).
- 81.
Schelling (1980, 178).
- 82.
Schelling (2013, 11) “[…] und dass nur die unmittelbare anschauende Erkenntnis jede Bestimmung durch Begriffe unendlich übertrifft.”
- 83.
“[…] jede menschliche Sprache zu schwach ist” Schelling (2013, 18).
- 84.
Schelling (2013, 16–17). “[…] indem sie die Nichtigkeit aller endlichen Gegensätze zeigt, und die Seele indirekt zur Anschauung des Unendlichen führt.”
- 85.
See Hegel (1969, 152).
- 86.
Hegel (1977a, 100).
- 87.
For a thorough summary, explication, and critique of the various and more recent approaches to the dialectical development from Being to nothing, see Brown (2020, 46–64).
- 88.
Although Hegel does explain how the determinate arises out of the indeterminate, this development of determinacy cannot simply be equated with the dialectical developments concerning finitude and infinitude. Because infinitude develops out of finitude, the question ‘how does the infinite go forth from itself and make itself finite?’ is poorly formulated. Rather, the infinite can only be in virtue of the self-negation of finitude. As the logic of being develops, something is finite if it has its limit within itself. Finitude is that which comes to an end, or ceases to be. Because it contains its limit within itself, or has its own ceasing to be within itself, it contains its own negation within itself. When finitude is posited as absolute or all-encompassing, it is no longer in a relationship of limitation but is without limit. Insofar as it is without limit, the finite—that which ceases to be—does not cease to be. When finitude no longer ceases to be, it can no longer be finite. Instead, finitude itself becomes non-finite. Hegel develops this dialectic further to show how the bad infinite and the true infinite develop out of non-finitude.
- 89.
See Pseudo-Dionysius (1990, 85).
- 90.
Hegel (1969, 109).
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Moss, G.S. (2023). Introduction: The Being of Negation in Post-Kantian Philosophy: The Problem of Negation. In: Moss, G.S. (eds) The Being of Negation in Post-Kantian Philosophy. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-13862-1_1
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