Abstract
Anne Conway (1631–1679) is sometimes said to be a Monist. I present several kinds of Monism and then investigate whether any of these adequately capture Conway’s theory of substance and individuals. I outline Conway’s reasons for postulating that there are three irreducibly distinct kinds of essence or substance, which by itself demonstrates that she is not an unrestricted Token Monist. I then examine her various remarks about created substance, which she sometimes refers to as “a creature” and other times as “creatures.” Here I argue that, while the texts are ambiguous, there are compelling reasons—especially given her views about salvation and justice—to believe that she is merely a Type Monist at the level of created substances. I then examine two theses that result from her relativized Type Monism. First, there are no substantial barriers between, say, horses and humans, and thus all created things can convert into one another as they improve or regress morally. Second, there is no substantial difference between minds and bodies. I suggest that Conway’s arguments against Descartes’ Type Pluralism could easily be included as part of a more inclusive philosophy syllabus.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
- 2.
All quotations of Conway’s Principles are from the 1690 edition, which is the basis for all other editions of the Latin text. All translations in this chapter are mine, although they have been checked against translations that will appear in an edition of the Principles being prepared by Andrew Arlig, Christia Mercer, Jasper Reid, and Laurynas Adomaitis.
- 3.
To these friends and anonymous translators we owe a tremendous debt, as no one has been able to find the original manuscript. The extant seventeenth-century English version (included in Conway 1982) is a translation of the 1690 Latin edition.
- 4.
On this reading of Hobbes, see Principles ch. 9, S. 3–6. Conway also mentions Spinoza (ch. 9, S.3 and 5), but she does not pay him as much heed. Indeed, there are reasons to think that she is unfamiliar with Spinoza’s magnum opus, the Ethics.
- 5.
Conway also thinks that beings have “modes,” or ways that they are, and “attributes.” We might consider modes and attributes to also be things that are, and thus in a sense, beings. Hence, for clarity, I characterize Conway’s position as one that pertains to substantial beings.
- 6.
The relation between the natura media and the historical Christ, which is primarily discussed in Chap. 5 of the Principles (Conway 1690, 29–40), is complicated and one that I cannot relate here.
- 7.
This is one of the ways in which Conway breaks quite dramatically from orthodox Trinitarian theology. In her defense, Conway insists that once we reject Trinitarianism, and particularly, the thesis that Christ is God, we remove one of the “stumbling blocks” that has made it difficult for Jews and “Turks” (i.e., Muslims) to embrace the true path. See Principles Chap. 1, S.7, Chap. 5, passim, and Chap. 6, S.5 (Conway 1690, 4, 30–40, and 50).
- 8.
For more on life, and its concomitant properties, perception, and thought, see Section 4.
- 9.
This does not mean that everything in the universe can be understood by a finite, human mind. She only means to say that there is nothing that exists that is not part of the plan developed and enacted by a perfectly wise creator.
- 10.
For a survey of the evidence in favor of both readings, as well as an inventive compromise solution, see Gordon-Roth (2018).
- 11.
For more on what Conway might mean by “complete” (integrum), see Section 2.2.
- 12.
More precisely, some part of what I presently point to when I say “I” is a per se individual. See Principles, ch. 7, S.4 (Conway 1690, 108), where she argues that the “ruling spirit” of a human is something that will persist indefinitely. In her discussion of the virtuous horse (see below), she also suggests that it is only a part—the horse’s spirit—that goes through the transformations described. For our purposes, we can safely ignore this complication.
- 13.
Conway might also be thinking, albeit inchoately, that individuals must be stable across possible worlds. But pursuing this issue would take us too far afield.
- 14.
Although, I concede that this kind of mundane conversion seems to be foremost in her mind in the text just quoted.
- 15.
See the final section of this chapter for more on this.
- 16.
Conway believes that the first of these antecedent conditions does in fact hold: Just as there are an infinite number of creatures and worlds, there is an infinite amount of time. These follow from God’s omnipotence and goodness: God can do it, and since God wants to make as much good as possible, he will do what he can. See, especially, Principles Chap. 2.
- 17.
This doesn’t mean that dirt has thoughts or intentions in any respect like we do. But it does mean that even the lowest of created beings—and here Conway explicitly mentions dirt and dung—are not permanently blocked from acquiring higher-order capacities.
References
Conway, Anne. 1690. Principia Philosophiae antiquissimae & recentissimae de Deo, Christo, et creatura id est de spiritu & materia in genere. In Opuscula philosophica quibus continentur Principia Philosophiae Antiquiassimae et Recentissimae, ac Philosophia Vulgaris Refutata, quibus subjuncta sunt C.C. Problemata de Revolutione Animarum Humanarum. Amsterdam.
———. 1982. In The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy, ed. Peter Loptson. The Hague / Boston / London: Martinus Nijhoff.
Elisabeth of Bohemia, and René Descartes. 2007. The Correspondence between Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia and René Descartes. Edited and translated by Lisa Shapiro. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Gordon-Roth, Jessica. 2018. What Kind of Monist is Anne Finch Conway? Journal of the American Philosophical Association 4: 280–297.
Hutton, Sarah. 2003. “Lady Anne Conway.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2021 Edition), edited by Edward N. Zalta. Last modified December 22, 2020. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2015/entries/conway/.
———. 2004. Anne Conway: A Woman Philosopher. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pasnau, Robert. 2011. Metaphysical Themes, 1274-1671. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2010. Monism: The Priority of the Whole. The Philosophical Review 119: 31–76.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2023 The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Arlig, A.W. (2023). Anne Conway on Substance and Individuals. In: Griffioen, A.L., Backmann, M. (eds) Pluralizing Philosophy’s Past. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-13405-0_2
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-13405-0_2
Published:
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-031-13404-3
Online ISBN: 978-3-031-13405-0
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)