Abstract
Thanks to scientific progress, we have today the possibility to improve some of our physical and cognitive abilities through pharmaceutical, surgical, or genetic techniques. In a broad sense, we can refer to all these practices as human enhancements. They are the topic of an interesting ethical debate. In this paper, a particular kind of human enhancement will be investigated: moral enhancement. It is the possibility, even if only prospective for the moment, to use biomedical technologies to improve not a physical or cognitive ability, but our morality.
In this paper, I will examine some criticisms of moral enhancement concerning contextualism. The concept of morality, in fact, is indissolubly connected with the context where moral phenomena and behaviours are performed. So, it is hard to separate morality from its social dimension. Nevertheless, the role of the context represents one of the main criticisms about the idea of moral enhancement.
In particular, I will analyse two ethical questions: first, I will examine the problem of the context-dependence of morality. It is crucial because what is considered good in one moral framework could be bad in another. So, what represents a moral enhancement according to some people could be considered a moral worsening according to others. Secondarily, I will focus on the problem of the normative content of morality. There are different ideas and normative theories that offer divergent perspectives about what we should or should not do to be moral. This is a good thing per se, because it reflects the pluralism of principles and values. Nevertheless, it is a critical point for the success of the moral enhancement project because, again, what counts as moral enhancement in a moral system or according to a specific ethical theory could not count equally according to another. Our knowledge of the neurobiology of morality is increasing every day. But, I will conclude, we are not ready to improve our morality biomedically, and also that there are good reasons to consider moral enhancement unattainable.
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Luverà , C. (2023). Moral Enhancement and Contextualism: Some Reasons for the Unattainability of the Program for Moralizing People. In: Capone, A., Penna, A. (eds) Exploring Contextualism and Performativity. Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology, vol 30. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-12543-0_13
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