Keywords

1 Introduction

Traditionally characterised as a country of emigration, Greece started receiving small-scale inflows of immigrants in the early 1970s and 1980s. It was the collapse of the former Soviet Union in 1989/1990 though that triggered the mass entry of immigrants, initially from the Balkans (and particularly from Albania), Central and East Europe. In the 2000s, immigrants also originated from Asia and sub-saharan Africa, while during the 2015–2016 period approximately 1.2 million individuals transited through the country towards other European countries.

It took the Greek state more than a decade in order to commence drafting and implementing a coherent immigration policy, which remained short-sighted for a considerable amount of time. In addition, it regarded the phenomenon as rather unfortunate and unavoidable. As a consequence, the developed immigration policy treated immigration more through a bureaucratic lens, aiming to regulate it, than as an opportunity. The notion of immigrant integration made its appearance as a concept and a goal in the relevant legislation and proposed Action Plans in the early 2000s. However, this chapter argues that a coherent and proactive policy for immigrants’ integration in the Greek society was almost never a Greek state’s priority. Even though lip service was paid to the concept of immigrant integration, by drafting Action Plans and Strategies, or by inserting ‘integration’ in the title of immigrant related legislature, these were not followed through by concrete and suitable measures.

This contribution therefore attempts to make a historical assessment of the past 30 years, by examining the legislative and policy framework of each period and evaluating the suggested and implemented measures. In order to do so, a timeline of the immigration policy for integration is proposed, where the key points that defined each policy are identified and analysed. This timeline builds upon previous work in defining a chronology of Greek immigration policy (Triandafyllidou, 2010), but focuses more on the specific aspect of integration.

As such, the decade 1991–2000 could be characterised as an ‘early’ phase for the development of the Greek immigration policy, during which strict control measures and a repressive approach towards the new phenomenon were adopted. During the following period (2001–2008) the first comprehensive laws attempting to regulate immigration in the country were presented, hinting at the importance placed on the integration of this population, while a more positive attitude towards the phenomenon was also recorded. The period 2008–2015 was characterised by the economic crisis that severely affected the country. During this period immigration policy came of age, even though missed opportunities for the social and political integration of immigrants were recorded. More importantly, this period was defined by the dis-integration of immigrants, as a direct consequence of the economic crisis. Finally, the present period which starts in mid-2016 is characterised by the primacy of the refugee issue. Even though during the 2015–2016 refugee crisis more than 1.2 million individuals transited through the country, the population that actually remained was considerably lower than that. Applicants for and beneficiaries of international protection are estimated to be close to 120,000 (UNHCR, 2020), yet the issue remains highly politicised, as it disproportionally affects certain geographical areas (Bousiou, 2020). Therefore, moving again out of necessity, the Greek state is in the process of identifying ways by which to integrate this population as well into the Greek society.

2 Immigration Policy for Integration of Third Country Nationals During the 1990s

It is well documented that Greece was completely unprepared for the migration flows of the early 1990s (Cavounidis, 2002). The relevant legal framework in place at the time dated back to the 1930sFootnote 1 and was primarily focused on issues of emigration; as such, it was inadequate to cope with the new developments. The first law of this period was presented in 1991Footnote 2 and fully adopted a repressive approach towards the new phenomenon. The (then) Ministry of Public Order was designated as the competent Ministry, while the law primarily focused on deterring new immigrants from entering, and facilitating the deportation of those who were already in the country. To this end, the very issue of entering the country without documents and residence permits was defined as a criminal act, a number of provisions and sanctions such as imprisonment or financial penalties were introduced, and special bodies to combat irregular immigration were created.

Since mid-1990s, another policy instrument used by the Greek government was that of massive deportations of immigrants (Triandafyllidou, 2009). By 2001, it is estimated that over two million immigrants (predominantly from Albania) were deported back to their country without any legal procedure (Baldwin-Edwards, 2004). Yet neither the provisions of the 1991 law, nor the en masse deportations brought the desired outcomes the Greek state had envisaged. On the contrary, what they achieved was to define migration in Greece as an illegal phenomenon. As such, by 1997 the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, 1999) estimated that close to 75,000 legal migrants lived and worked in the country, while irregular migrants were close to or more than 500,000.

In an attempt to manage the situation at hand, the Greek government followed the example of other Southern European countries (Levinson, 2005) and launched a series of regularisation programmes. Two Presidential Degrees that were signed in 1997Footnote 3 initiated a process of mass regularisation of irregular foreigners, yet a series of practical and bureaucratic difficulties hindered their proper implementation (Triandafyllidou, 2005). It is estimated that only 213,000 immigrants received a temporary residence permit, out of 370,000 who applied for one (Cavounidis, 2000).

While regularisation programmes are not integration policies as such, they should be understood as an indirect recognition by the Greek State that the adopted policies of ‘arrest and deport’ were not sufficient to manage the phenomenon, and therefore, new approaches and policies were needed. Nevertheless, during this first decade there were no provisions in place regarding the integration of immigrants in Greece. On the contrary, the emphasis on preventing the entry of undocumented immigrants and facilitating the deportation of those already present in the country, defined immigration in terms of illegality. Therefore, laws and initiatives put in place after 2000 attempted to some extent to lessen the effects caused during this period.

3 Immigration Policy for Integration of Third Country Nationals During 2000–2008

An attempt to address the issues and shortcoming raised by the 1991 Law was made almost after a decade, with Law 2910/2001.Footnote 4 This new legislation had two main aims. It provided a policy framework to manage immigration, by establishing avenues of legal entry for employment or studies, and defining naturalisation conditions for immigrants already residing in the country. In addition, it attempted to implement a second regularisation programme, for new arrivals and those who did not benefit from the first one. This programme also suffered from serious organisational issues that significantly reduced its overall effectiveness (Triandafyllidou, 2009).

During this period a first Action Plan on the social integration of immigrants (2002–2005) was drafted, supported by the European Social Fund and the European Commission. Measures were foreseen for the integration of immigrants in the labour market, access to healthcare, and initiatives to combat racism and xenophobia in the Greek society, even though most of these actions were not implemented (Triandafyllidou, 2005). It can therefore be argued, that with this Action Plan a vicious cycle commenced, that of integration action plans, which were more or less ambitious, and that generally remained only on paper.

A next law that was presented in 2005 (Law 3386/2005)Footnote 5 can be considered important in terms of semiotics, since for the very first time ‘integration’ was explicitly mentioned in the title of a law that regulated the phenomenon. Interestingly though, issues that deal with integration were only covered in two articles (65 and 66). According to that law, integration aimed to:

grant rights to third country nationals that ensure their ‘proportionally equal participation’ in the economic, social and cultural life in the country, aspiring at the obligation to respect the fundamental rules and values of Greek society (…) while maintaining their own national identity (Law 3386/2005, article 65).

In accordance with article 66 of law 3386/2005, the Ministry of Interior presented in 2007 an Integrated Action Plan for the smooth adaptation and social integration of third country nationals legally residing in the Greek Territory –programme Emergency Support to Integration and Accommodation (ESTIA).Footnote 6 ESTIA was structured into sub-programmes based on areas of integration, such as housing, employment, education, healthcare, and was designed to be implemented in the time period 2007–2012. Due to domestic financial constrains however, this programme also remained largely on paper (Anagnostou & Kandyla, 2014). Complementary to ESTIA were actions implemented through the European Integration Fund (EIF), a multi-annual programme (2007–2013) aiming towards assisting the integration of this population. Highly ambitious in its scope, it aspired to actively engage local, regional and national authorities and streamline social integration goals into all relevant policy sectors. Even though its success was considered limited due to insufficient funding (Anagnostou & Kandyla, 2014), a crucial design flaw was the limited time frame to implement each action (usually only a number of months).

As a concluding note, it should be pointed out that even though Law 3386/2005 established the preconditions for facilitating the social integration of immigrants, it still overlooked reality. As noted, at that time almost 70% or irregular immigrants in the country lacked the opportunity to obtain a residence permit (Gropas & Triandafyllidou, 2005).

4 Immigration Policy for Integration of Third Country Nationals During 2008–2015: Coming of Age, Missed Opportunities and ‘Dis-integration’ of Immigrants

4.1 Citizenship Acquisition, Granting of Voting Rights and Migrant Integration Councils

With the completion of 20 years since the transformation of Greece into a de facto immigrant destination country, 2010 can be characterised as a year of ‘missed opportunities,’ regarding the prospects of immigrants’ integration in the Greek society. That year an attempt was made to adopt two legislative interventions which could have fundamentally altered the issue of social and political integration of immigrants in Greek society, both of which though failed to bring the desired outcomes.

Law 3838/2010Footnote 7 attempted to renegotiate issues related to the granting of Greek citizenship and the rights to vote and be elected to the immigrant population. Up to that point, Greece had one of the most restrictive policies for granting citizenship in the EU through the right of blood (jus sanguinis), and extremely strict naturalisation preconditions (Howard, 2009). Under the new provisions, special procedures were established for the acquisition of citizenship for the children of immigrants, either by birth or by their participation in the educational system. More specifically, the new law allowed for children born in Greece who had at least one non-Greek parent living in the country legally for at least 5 years to acquire citizenship at birth, or through a simple declaration of their parents, as long as they attended a Greek school for at least 6 years. The second innovation of the law concerned the provision, for the first time, to certain categories of legally residing third-country nationals of the right to vote and to be elected in local elections, thus initiating the political integration of immigrants (Boswell, 2003). This provision was implemented in the November 2010 Local Government elections.

However, both provisions proved to be short-lived, since the Council of State found them in 2013 to be unconstitutional (Christopoulos, 2017). According to its ruling, naturalisation as described in the law was only based on typical and legal requirements, such as length of stay, birth in the country, or participating in the Greek educational system for 6 years. What the process of naturalisation lacked was proof of a ‘real bond’ between a foreigner and Greek state, in terms of self-affiliation and self-identification as constituents of Greek consciousness. In addition, voting rights were reserved to Greek citizens alone, and were not to be extended to non-Greeks without a prior Constitutional amendment. It is estimated that approximately 13,500 migrant children were naturalised within the time period of March 2010 and August 2012, when the relevant provisions of the law were in effect (Anagnostou & Gemi, 2015).

The second legislative intervention, which could have significantly enhanced the integration of immigrants in the local society, concerned the establishment in 2010 of Migrant Integration CouncilsFootnote 8 (Simvulia Entaxis Metanaston, SEM). SEM were established in each municipality as advisory bodies, aiming to record and investigate problems faced by immigrants living permanently in the municipality. In addition, they were tasked with submitting proposals to the municipal council for local actions to promote immigrants’ smooth social inclusion and to organise awareness events that would strengthen the social cohesion of the local population.

Success of the Councils was nevertheless limited, for two main reasons. First and foremost, there was a lack of political will for their implementation. As pointed out, while at a central government level there were extensive and well-coordinated efforts for the consolidation of the new institution, at a local level there was considerable variation regarding their proper implementation (Skamnakis & Polyzoidis, 2013). Secondly, the new institution was not properly supported by adequate human and financial resources. MICs were to be assisted by existing local authorities personnel, organisations who are usually significantly understaffed. At the same time, there were no provisions for financial resources, in order for MICs to achieve their stated goals. Hindered by these shortcomings, their participation in designing and implementing integration measures at a local level remained rather marginal (Skamnakis & Polyzoidis, 2013).

4.2 The Immigration and Social Integration Code & the National Strategy for the Integration of Immigrants

The next evolutionary step was the codification in 2014 of immigration legislation in the Immigration and Social Integration Code. This codification aimed to consolidate all immigration legislation provisions, harmonise with EU legislation, and rationalise the existing institutional framework. Even though social integration was again only analysed in two articles (128 & 129), its reference to the title showed the legislator’s special interest in the subject (Anagnostou & Gemi, 2015).

According to the Code, integration policy aims on the one hand to assist third country nationals to adapt to the Greek society, and on the other hand for the Greek society to recognise the possibility of their equal participation in the economic, social and cultural life of the country. In addition, in an effort to regulate the status of the second generation of immigrants, which was left in limbo since 2010, the Code introduced a special favorable residence status and a broader spectrum of protection, aiming thus at enhancing their integration perspective.

Finally, an important element of the Code is the promotion of a long-term residence permit, as a ‘migration policy in disguise’ (Mavrommatis, 2017). As characteristically mentioned, this permit can essentially be seen as ‘a kind of “reward” (…) for those immigrants who prove that they have developed strong ties with Greece, by residing and working in the country legally for a number of years’ (Ypuryio Metanasteftikis Politikis [Ministry of Migration Policy], 2019). It should be noted though, that by April 2020, out of a total of 538,000 active residence permits, only 30,000 were long-term residence permits (Ministry of Migration & Asylum, 2020).

In parallel with the publication of the Immigration and Social Integration Code, and in response to a relevant EU request for the design of national integration strategies by all Member States (European Commission, 2010), the Ministry of Interior presented in 2013 the National Strategy for the Integration of Third Country Citizens (Ypuryio Esoterikon [Ministry of Interior], 2013). Aiming to include policies and integration measures in all relevant policy areas, government levels and public services, the Strategy presented an ambitious set of Actions and Measures to achieve this goal.

For the purposes of this article, however, it is worth emphasising the rejection of both ‘multiculturalism’ as an ‘anachronistic and non-functional choice’ and ‘simple (sic) integration’ as the preferred model for the integration of immigrants into Greek society. Instead, the Strategy opts for what it defines as ‘structural integration’ which is ‘characterised by the positive attitude of the immigrant towards the society of the host country, as evidenced by the active demonstration of his willingness to adapt to the dominant political and cultural context.’ Structural integration is comprised of four components, political, economic, social and cultural integration. Cultural integration is also of interest, since:

It is identified with the acceptance by immigrants of the dominant cultural context, as has been shaped after a prolonged period of time by the majority of the native population. Cultural integration presupposes acceptance of the dominant national ideology of the host country (…).

As has been rightly noted, neither the Strategy nor the Code, which entered into force in March 2014, refer to the right of immigrants to maintain their distinct national, cultural and religious identity (Anagnostou & Kandyla, 2014). In addition, it should be pointed out that in essence, under the name ‘structural integration,’ what is proposed through the Strategy is a process of assimilation of immigrants in Greek society, who should ensure the ‘acceptance of all principles of the political and cultural reference of the host country,’ by abolishing their previous characteristics.

4.3 Economic Crisis and the Disintegration of Immigrants

Along with the institutional developments of this period, the factor that may have had the greatest impact on the issue of immigrant integration during the 2009–2015 period was the economic crisis and its effects, on the one hand on the society and economy of the country, and on the other hand on the migrant population. During what the Economist described as ‘the deepest depression suffered by any rich country since the second world war’ (Economist, 2018), Greece’s per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) fell by 25%, while Household Disposable Income (HDI) fell by 30% (Hellenic Statistical Authority, 2020).

Economic crises tend to affect the most vulnerable economic and social strata in a country, with immigrants usually being among the groups mostly affected. Until the onset of the economic crisis, the unemployment rate of foreigners was consistently lower than that of Greeks, a situation reversed from 2009 onwards. Therefore, while in 2008 the Greeks’ unemployment rate was 7.9% and foreigners’ unemployment rate residing in the country was 6.8%, the corresponding percentages during the peak of crisis in 2013 were 26.5% and 38.2% (Eurostat, 2020a). Although this difference has been decreasing since 2013, the unemployment of foreigners is still consistently higher than that of Greeks and this figure has stabilised between six to ten percentage points.

In order for the migrant population to respond to the new conditions arising from the economic crisis, the present chapter argues that it adopted the following three main strategies.

The first strategy was for immigrants returning to their countries of origin. The Hellenic Statistical Authority estimates that more than 250,000 immigrants left the country during the 2010–2015 period (Hellenic Statistical Authority, 2019). This move concerns mainly immigrants from neighboring countries and predominantly from Albania. Although relevant anecdotal reports exist in the press (for example: Economist, 2012), there is not enough documented research to accurately depict this trend. An exception is a survey by the Albanian Statistical Office and the International Organisation for Migration which estimated that during 2009–2013 133,000 people voluntarily repatriated to Albania, 71% of whom originated from Greece (about 95,000 people) (INSTAT & IOM, 2014).

The second strategy was for immigrants to change from a regular to an irregular status. As previously mentioned, since the early 1990s a large proportion of immigrants has been employed in the country’s shadow economy. According to the relevant estimates, the number of illegal immigrants at the end of the 2000s was close to 300,000–400,000 (Maroukis, 2010), while the legal and illegal immigrants were estimated close to 1.2 million in total (Triandafyllidou 2010).

As any estimate of the irregular labour market involves the inherent uncertainty of that sector, estimates of the shift from the legal to the irregular labour market can only be made indirectly. In Greece, legal residence status is associated with the completion of a prerequisite number of social security stamps resulting from employment. Based on the relevant data, a significant part of immigrants who had legal documents before 2009 could not complete the required number of stamps during the crisis period, and as a consequence lost their legal status. More specifically, residence permits were reduced from 610,800 in 2009 to 440,100 just 3 years later. Therefore, it is estimated that more than 150,000 citizens of non-EU countries were unable to renew their permits during this period, as they could not find employment (OECD, 2013). In the following years this number increased and stabilised at around 550,000 (538,000 in April 2020) (Ministry of Migration & Asylum, 2020).

According to the first strategy developed above, a percentage of those who did not renew their residence permit left the country. However, by extending the relevant reasoning, it could be argued that a significant number of immigrants chose to remain in the country, even without documentation, anticipating an improvement of the economic situation and the subsequent recovery of their legal status.

Finally, a third strategy was moving from one sector of economic activity to another. Since 2009, a sharp decline was noted in all economic indicators, and especially in construction, where the majority of immigrants found employment. Consequently, a change in the distribution of migrants between the primary, secondary and tertiary sectors of economic activity was recorded, with immigrants moving from the secondary sector to the primary and tertiary. Therefore, while in 2008 about half of the migrants (49.6%) were employed in the secondary sector, this percentage dropped to 29.1% in 2013. Respectively, the percentage of migrants employed in the primary sector more than doubled between 2008 and 2013, from 5.4% to 13.5%, while an increase in the employment rate was also observed in the tertiary sector, from 45% in 2008 to 57.3% in 2013 (Zografakis & Kasimis, 2014).

In summary, it is estimated that during the economic crisis, a part of the migrant population of Greece returned to their countries of origin, especially Albania. For the purposes of this article, this is particularly important as it may concern a population that has already been successfully integrated into the country. In addition, this is particularly important for second-generation immigrants, many of whom were born and / or raised in Greece, were adequately integrated, and who had no particular ties to their parents’ country of origin. Finally, it is estimated that a significant portion of the immigrant population during this period fell out of legitimacy, i.e. lost their legal status, a fact which clearly hindered their integration prospects and possibilities. In conclusion, based on the above, the 2009–2015 period could be characterised as a period of dis-integration of immigrants.

5 Immigration Policy for Integration of Third Country Nationals 2016 – Today: The Primacy of the Refugee Issue

5.1 Establishment, Abolition and Re-establishment of the Ministry of Migration and Asylum

As a result of the significant influx of mixed migration flows in the 2015–2016 period, and the increasing complexity of managing the phenomenon, an autonomous Ministry of Migration Policy was established in November 2016.Footnote 9 Although its establishment was rather hasty, the concentration under one institution of services and responsibilities concerning all stages of the immigration process, as well as issues concerning applicants and beneficiaries of international protection was a clearly positive development.

While all relevant Secretariats, Authorities and Services were transferred to the new Ministry, the Citizenship Directorate remained at the Ministry of Interior. In a relevant interview, the then Minister of Immigration Policy stated that:

(…) there are two opinions internationally. One, that citizenship is the deep core of the state and must remain in the Ministry of Interior. The other is that citizenship is the culmination of the integration of immigrants and must go to the Ministry of Migration (Aggelidis, 2016).

As the Citizenship Directorate eventually remained in the Ministry of Interior it could be argued that the then SYRIZA (Sinaspismos Rizospastikis Aristeras [Coalition of the Radical Left])-ANEL (Anexartiti Elines [Independent Greeks]) government adopted the first interpretation.

With the election of a new government with different political orientation, it was decided in July 2019 to merge the Ministry of Migration Policy with the Ministry of Citizen Protection.Footnote 10 During the handover ceremony, the competent Deputy Minister of Protection clarified the rationale behind this merge by arguing that when managing the refugee-immigration issue, one needs to take under consideration on the one hand the respect of people, human life and human rights, and on the other hand the country’s security. Therefore, management of the issue should not, in any case, create a feeling of insecurity among the citizens of the country (Ministry of Citizen Protection, 2019).

It is noteworthy though that only 6 months since its abolition, it was decided to re-autonomy the Ministry, and rename it ‘Ministry of Migration and Asylum.’Footnote 11 In the relevant announcement of (re)establishing the Ministry, the Government Spokesman referred to the governments’ comprehensive action plan which was based on four pillars: border controls, acceleration of asylum procedures, increased returns and closed pre-departure centres (Petsas, 2020). Interestingly, while migration was explicitly mentioned in the title of the Ministry, those four pillars ignored its dimension and focused almost exclusively on issues of containment and deterrence.

5.2 National Strategy for Integration 2019: Reception and Integration

One of the main outputs of the Ministry of Migration Policy before its abolition was a new ‘National Strategy for Integration’ which was presented in January 2019. The new strategy was the result of both new needs arising from international and domestic developments, and the different approach of the SYRIZA-ANEL government on the issue of immigration. Consequently, this document proposes a ‘fundamental revision of the (previous) National Strategy for Integration’ (Ypuryio Metanasteftikis Politikis [Ministry of Migration Policy], 2019).

Within this context, a significantly different approach and scope is adopted regarding the integration of the immigrant and henceforth refugee population in the country. While the 2013 Integration Strategy favoured in essence the assimilation of immigrants into the Greek society, the 2019 Strategy proposes a new model of integration, which among others ‘aims to create and sustain an open society that respects diversity’ and has as its ultimate goal the ‘conquest’ of interculturalism (Ypuryio Metanasteftikis Politikis [Ministry of Migration Policy], 2019). The 2019 Strategy identifies three target groups: applicants for international protection, beneficiaries of international protection and migrants already residing in the country. In addition, it approaches integration policy as a multidimensional process, formed at two main levels.

The first level, called ‘reception’ is aimed at applicants for international protection and can be understood as a form of early integration. Therefore, immediately after recording them at their entry point, the State is called upon to provide this group with protection and basic material reception conditions (such as housing, financial assistance and access to health), thus setting the foundations for their subsequent successful integration into the host society (Mantanika & Arapoglou Chap. 10 in this volume).

The second level is called ‘integration,’ and is addressed to both beneficiaries of international protection and immigrants already residing in the country. The actions and measures are specialised according to the needs of each group. Thus, for beneficiaries of international protection, the goal is a smooth transition from the protection status of the asylum seeker to insertion into the host society. To this end, the State is expected to provide temporary housing, financial aids, Greek language courses, actions to enter the labour market, etc. With regard to the immigrant population, the aim is, among others, to return to the status of legality (for those who have lost their legal status), to obtain permits faster and more efficiently, to have non-discriminatory access to state benefits, and to ensure their public participation.

As with previous Strategies, further actions and policy measures are proposed, elaborating on issues such as labour market, education and xenophobia. The Strategy reserves a significant role for the Local Government, which is called to become the main executive mechanism of the integration initiatives. To this end, other institutional initiatives were also put in place in the same period, such as the Immigrant Integration Centres (Kentra Entaxis Metanaston, KEM) and the Migrant and Refugee Integration Councils (Simvulia Entaxis Metanaston ke Prosfigon, SEMP), in order to facilitate and enhance the integration process.

KEM aim to act as a local reference point for the provision of specialised services to third-country nationals in order to improve their living standards and their social inclusion, and are to be developed within each Municipality. SEMP are the evolution of the SEM presented earlier. Yet, apart from the inclusion of the word ‘Refugee’ in their title, there is no significant difference with SEM and are therefore estimated to suffer from the same weaknesses as the institution they are replacing.

5.3 Integration of Beneficiaries and Applicants for International Protection: The Disparity Between Theory and Practice

While the issue of immigrants’ integration in Greece has preoccupied, to a greater or lesser extent, the Greek state for the past 20 years, integration of beneficiaries and applicants for international protection has been raised as a major issue of concern only since mid-2016 (Afouxenidis et al., 2017). When Greece gradually transformed from a transit country to a country of refugee protection in the 2000s, the state was mainly concerned with the criticism it was receiving on prolonged detentions of asylum seekers at the borders, inhuman conditions in reception centres, the backlog of asylum applications, or the proper transposition and implementation of EU Directives on temporary protection, reception of asylum seekers, minimum standards and the identification procedures (Karamanidou & Schuster, 2012; Sitaropoulos, 2000).

The focus point changed with the mix migration flows of 2015–2016, and more importantly with the EU-Turkey Statement and the closing of the Balkan route, which resulted in a significant number of individuals remaining stranded within the country. As a consequence, asylum applications rose sharply since March 2016, due to individuals aiming to secure their legal stay. While asylum applications before 2015 were close to 10,000 annually, they shot up to 51,110 in 2016 and continued rising each year, reaching 77,275 applications in 2019 (Eurostat, 2020b). In total, 17,355 people were granted international protection in 2019, up from 15,192 in 2018 and 10,351 in 2017 (Ministry of Migration and Asylum, 2018). These developments placed significant pressure on the state, since it needed to provide for integration measures for this population.

The main state vehicle for the integration of beneficiaries of international protection in the Greek society is through the HELIOS Programme (Hellenic Integration Support for Beneficiaries of International Protection), implemented by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) since July 2019 and supported by the European Commission. The project offers services promoting independent living, including rental subsidies, integration courses, employability support and integration monitoring. Up to November 2020, close to 22,000 beneficiaries have enrolled to the programme (IOM, 2020).

Yet, when discussing the integration of this population to the host society, a main feature that needs to be highlighted is the significant disparity between the possibilities and provisions provided by the respective legal framework and the reality as reflected on the field (Dimitriadi Chap 11 in this volume). For the scope of this contribution, analysis will focus on four areas of integration: labour market, health, social welfare and education.

Regarding access to the labour market, Law 4636/2019Footnote 12 provides that ‘beneficiaries of international protection are allowed to engage in employment or independent professional activity’ with the same conditions as the nationals, with only the prerequisite of having the relevant residence permits. The situation differs with regard to applicants for international protection, since they have the right to employment or independent professional activity only once 6 months have elapsed from the submission of the application, while this right is revoked in case the application is rejected.

Reality though appears to be harsher. A series of bureaucratic obstacles and difficulties, such as the granting of Social Security Numbers (AMKA, Arithmos Mitrόu Kinonikis Asfalisis) (up to July 2019) and Value Added Tax (VAT) Registration Numbers, or the difficulty in opening bank accounts in order for salaries to be deposited in, create barriers to access to employment (Joint Agency Briefing Paper 2017; Solidarity Now et al., 2017). In addition, given the economic crisis and high unemployment rates, foreigners who find employment are often employed in the irregular economy, which makes them more vulnerable, increases the risk of exploitation and clearly reduces their integration prospects (ActionAid et al., 2016).

Regarding access to health services, according to Law 4636/2019 beneficiaries of international protection have access to medical care on the same conditions that apply to Greek citizens. The main issue though appears to be accessibility, since some services are not always provided free of charge (such as medicines and medical examinations), the health system itself is overloaded (even before the Covid-19 pandemic), and there is often a lack of interpreters, intercultural mediators or the ability to be examined by female doctors (ActionAid et al., 2016; Skleparis, 2018).

A major issue arose in July 2019 when AMKA were stopped been issued to applicants for international protection and were replaced with Provisional Insurance and Health Care Numbers (Prosorino Arithmo Asfalisis ke Yyionomikis Perithalpsis Alodapu, PAAYPA). Because the transition period lasted significantly more than originally planned, applicants lost access to the public health system for close to a year. This situation had also considerable side effects, by impeding access to employment, insurance or education (for example, the inability to vaccinate children living in refugee camps, which is a prerequisite for their access to education) (Greek Ombudsman, 2019).

The same situation is also observed in issues related to social welfare. Applicants and beneficiaries of international protection have the right to access services provided by the Manpower Employment Organisation (Organismos Apascholisis Ergatiku Dinamiku, OAED), such as unemployment benefits, subsidised vocational training programmes and advisory services for access to the labour market, on the same terms as Greek citizens. In practice, however, the number of applicants and beneficiaries of international protection who receive any type of such assistance is significantly low, as access to these services requires proof of employment for at least one year (Solidarity Now et al., 2017).

As far as education is concerned, Law 4415/2016Footnote 13 provided for the establishment of Reception Facilities for Refugee Education (Domes Ypodochis ke Ekpedefsis Prosfigon, DYEP), a programme of afternoon preparatory classes for all school-aged children aged 4 to 15, implemented in public schools, neighbouring camps or places of residence. In the first year (2016–2017) 2643 school-age students attended DYEP (Ministry of Education Research and Religious Affairs, 2017), a number which almost doubled to 4577 in 2018–2019. In total, 12,867 refugee children were enrolled in formal education during the school year 2018–2019 (Ypuryio Pedias & Thriskevmaton [Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs], 2019).

However, obstacles remain, making it difficult for refugee children to access the Greek education system, since only one out of three refugee children of school age were enrolled in formal education during the 2018–2019 school year (12,900 out of an estimated total of 37,000) (UNICEF, 2019). That is especially the case for the 4656 school-age refugee children residing in the Greek islands’ reception centres, where three out of four do not attend school (UNHCR, 2019). In addition, issues have been recorded on the student enrolment process, students’ varied language backgrounds, constant changes and inexperience of teachers, school dropout, as well as the reactions from both refugees and the native population (Action Aid et al., 2017; Ministry of Education, Research and Religious Affairs, 2017).

Summarising, while in theory the conditions are in place for a smooth integration of beneficiaries and applicants of international protection in the Greek society, in practice there are significant administrative and bureaucratic barriers that hinder their access to these resources. Moreover, since March 2020 there exists a crucial integration and protection gap, once a person in granted international protection status. According to an amendment to the asylum legislation:

after the issuance of the decision granting the status of international protection, material reception conditions in form of cash or in kind are interrupted. Said beneficiaries residing in accommodation facilities, including hotels and apartments have the obligation to leave them, in a 30-days period since the communication of the decision granting international protection.Footnote 14

As stated by the competent Minister, the rationale behind this amendment was that ‘benefits and hospitality act as a pull factors (for them) to come to our country and take advantage of these benefits’ (Proto Thema, 2020). The above decision rendered thousands of beneficiaries of international protection homeless and extremely vulnerable, since they ended up been recognised but unprotected (Refugee Support Aegean, 2020).

6 Conclusion

Since the late 1990s, Greece was registered as a ‘new host country for immigrants’ and was identified as part of the Southern European model of immigration (King, 2000). However, given that Greece has been an immigrant host country for more than 30 years, the continuous use of ‘new host country’ as a justification for masking structural and other weaknesses in managing the phenomenon is debatable.

Based on the previous analysis, the issue of immigrants’ integration in the Greek society has never been a Greek state priority. On the contrary, the country’s immigration policy over the last 30 years has been exhausted in the effort to manage and curb flows, enhance border controls, conduct police checks inside the country for irregular immigrants, implementing legalisation programmes (until 2007) and a perpetual effort to streamline the process of issuing residence and work permits.

Only the legislative initiative of Law 3838/2010, which discussed in a new light the granting of citizenship to the second generation of immigrants and that of voting rights to immigrants (even at the local level) can be perceived as an active initiative of the state towards this direction. Both interventions, however, were deemed unconstitutional, and therefore did not bring the desired results.

On the contrary, a series of Strategies, Actions, Plans, etc., which were in their design more or less grandiose, remained only on paper, without bearing any significant outcomes. The main reasons for these actions’ ineffectiveness should be attributed to insufficient connection to financial resources, design shortcomings, lack of political will for their implementation and changes of political correlation. In the context of this recurring pattern, the same fate is expected to befall the National Strategy of 2019. The recent change of government and its focus on other aspects of immigration governance, are clear indications that this Strategy will also remain irrelevant. Therefore, it would not be an exaggeration to conclude that historically, the integration of migrant populations in the country ended up being based on their own agency, initiatives and actions, rather than on state policies.

A rather recent development is the integration of applicants and beneficiaries of international protection, a topic raised in the political agenda since mid-2016. The state sponsored HELIOS programme is a positive and welcome initiative; yet, its significance is counterbalanced or even outweighed by other state measures that clearly hinder the integration prospects of this population.

Summarising, the Greek state’s unfading significance attributed to the protection of its external borders from new immigrant flows is more than evident. Particularly when these flows transit through a neighbouring country that demonstrates an interest in instrumentalising the phenomenon as a pressure mechanism for both Greece and the European Union, aiming at its own benefit. However, a coherent immigration policy cannot be solely based on certain aspects of the phenomenon while ignoring others. Just as it cannot focus only on the integration aspect, by ignoring the importance of external borders, so it cannot solely rely on containment and deterrence, disregarding the importance of safeguarding and strengthening social cohesion. Therefore, in place of a short-sighted and day to day management of the situation in hand, it is high time to prioritise the drafting of an encompassing long-term evidence-based policy.