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Object and Something in General in Contemporary Formal Ontology

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The Meaning of Something

Part of the book series: Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning ((LARI,volume 29))

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Abstract

If the project of formal ontology was first formulated by Edmund Husserl in his third Logical Investigation, it has been pursued during the last 40 years in the analytical tradition. In this paper, it is argued that formal ontology has been understood in at least two different ways in the analytic tradition. The first approach emphasizes its formal component and conceives formal ontology as a kind of formalised science of being. The second approach, which is more promising and closer to Husserl’s original project, claims that the formal domain contains a logical part and an ontological part, and that the two should not be confused. Therefore, according to this “substantial view” of formal ontology, there are formal structures that are properly ontological. In this paper, the two analytical approaches of formal ontology in contemporary analytic metaphysics are set out and it is shown that only the substantial view can really be considered as a theory of the object or something in general.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    In realist phenomenology, Husserl’s project of formal ontology was especially pursued by Roman Ingarden (see 2016/1965). I briefly discussed the differences between the Husserlian and Ingardenian views about formal ontology in Richard (2016).

  2. 2.

    The bibliography of these authors is quite impressive. The following references are representative of their work in formal ontology: Smith (1978), Smith and Murray (1981), Smith (1982, 1992, 1998), Mulligan et al. (1984, 1987), Smith and Mulligan (1982, 1983), Simons (1987, 1992) and Poli and Simons (1996). Some biographical information on these philosophers can be found in Mulligan et al. (1987).

  3. 3.

    On this school, see Smith (1994, in particular, pp. 2–3).

  4. 4.

    Husserl thought that we can transit from material categories to a more general one through abstraction. However, he denied that we can transit in this way from material categories to a formal one. Formal ontological categories are obtained from necessary ontological truths via formalisation, i.e., by replacing their material content by variables. As intuitive as it may seems, this is not perfectly clear. On this point, see Richard (2014, pp. 225–235). For his part, Mulligan (2006) suggested that the second kind of transition is possible through what he calls “formal ascent”. For instance, from ‘Sam is sad’, we can via such ascent obtain ‘the state of affairs that Sam is sad’ or ‘the property of being sad’.

  5. 5.

    There are for Husserl two distinct systems of ontological categories that are “orthogonal” to each other.

  6. 6.

    If we cannot arrive at formal concepts thanks to generalisation from material concepts, does that mean that these concepts do not exhibit species-genus or determinable-determinate relations? This seems to have been what Husserl thought. However, are not exclusive and inclusive disjunctions specifications of disjunction (Mulligan, 1998, p. 343) or proper and improper parthood specifications of parthood? To my knowledge, no satisfactory answer has been given to this question.

  7. 7.

    On the relationship between material ontologies and formal ontologies, see Richard (2014).

  8. 8.

    A proper part of an object is a part of this object that is not identical with it.

  9. 9.

    Several choices of formal logical systems are possible. For instance, we can use a first-order classical logic or a first-order free logic, if we want to avoid any ontological commitment.

  10. 10.

    See, among others, Husserl (1970b, pp. 408–429/2003, pp. 385–408; and 1970a, vol. II, pp. 68–71/1901, IV, §13).

  11. 11.

    See Wittgenstein (1974 [1961], p. 77; 2001 [1921], 6.126, p. 152).

  12. 12.

    See Smith and Murray (1981), Smith and Mulligan (1982, pp. 81–91), Smith and Mulligan (1983) and Smith (1992).

  13. 13.

    This idea was already expressed by Peirce and Wittgenstein, but it finds its origin in the works of Leibniz and Frege. See Smith (1992, pp. 48–49).

  14. 14.

    The Polish notation invented by Jan Łukasiewicz renders the use of parentheses superfluous to write down traditional logical propositions, making them available for other uses. See Richard (2018).

  15. 15.

    Roman Ingarden later pursued the ontological project of his former master by exploring the different forms of entities and the relations between them in the second volume of his Controversy Over the Existence of the World (2016/1965).

  16. 16.

    In (2005) and (2006), Mulligan also makes a distinction between what he calls “formal objects”, such as states of affairs, facts, sets, properties, relations, and so on, and “formal properties and relations”, such as being true, exemplifying (properties), subsisting, falling under (concepts), and being a member of (sets).

  17. 17.

    In my opinion, Lowe’s conception of ontological forms is close to Ingarden’s. To my knowledge, he never expressed his proximity with this author.

  18. 18.

    If I understand Lowe correctly, the various kinds are material (ontological categories), while kinds itself is an ontological (formal) category.

  19. 19.

    Smith (1992) also uses the expression charateristica universalis to characterise formal ontology, but as was shown in the fourth section, his understanding of this theory is quite different.

  20. 20.

    In my opinion, this is quite a simplistic view.

  21. 21.

    The idea of such a theory can be traced back to Quine’s relativity of ontology.

  22. 22.

    I explained Husserl’s project of formal ontology and its sources in Medieval and Modern metaphysics in Richard (2014).

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  1. Université Libre de Bruxelles, (ULB), Brussels, Belgium

    Sébastien Richard

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  1. University of Tours, Tours, France

    Fosca Mariani Zini

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Richard, S. (2022). Object and Something in General in Contemporary Formal Ontology. In: Mariani Zini, F. (eds) The Meaning of Something. Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning, vol 29. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-09610-5_6

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