Abstract
Bostrom's simulation argument argues that humanity either dies out or will reach the posthuman stage. In the latter case, if it was to drive ancestor-simulations of its history, then it was almost certain that we are living in such a simulation (Bostrom, Philosophical Quarterly 53:243–255, 2003a). Although the reasoning in Bostrom’s paper appears logical in its steps, it also appears intuitively implausible. This is because Bostrom presupposes several background assumptions without making them explicit or taking them into account in his probability calculations. The goal of this paper is to tease out the most important of these background assumptions to highlight the questionability of the argument. The conclusion then will be that, although we might never be able to prove it, we are most likely not simulated.
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Notes
- 1.
Hans Moravec seems to be the first one to formulate the basic idea of the simulation argument. It is to be found in this paper.
- 2.
We, of course, do not know how many intelligent and conscious biological observers there are in the universe. However, some rough calculations might help to substantiate the claim: A study by Conselice et al. (2016) estimate the number of galaxies in the universe with around two trillion (2*1012). Another study by Westby and Conselice (2020) tries to estimate the number of civilizations in our galaxy with up to 211. If we take the number of humans that ever lived on earth till now (100 billion) as a reference point to estimate the number of observers per civilization to calculate a total number of biological observers in the universe, it sums up to 4*1025. The point here is not if these estimations are exact or right. For the claim in question, only the dimensions are relevant. Taken these rough estimations, the number of potential digital lives generated by one technologically advanced civilization, according to Bostrom, is a factor of more than 1032 (!) higher than the number of biological observers in the universe.
- 3.
Every reader is invited to give her own credence to the ten assumptions to calculate the individual assessment of the likelihood of the simulation hypothesis in a Drake-equation-style manner.
- 4.
I am grateful to Caterina Moruzzi, Vincent C. Müller, Anna Strasser, Alberto Termine and Jeff White for valuable advice and fruitful comments.
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Stapelfeldt, R. (2022). Is It Likely that We Are Living in a Computer Simulation?. In: Müller, V.C. (eds) Philosophy and Theory of Artificial Intelligence 2021. PTAI 2021. Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics, vol 63. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-09153-7_16
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