Keywords

1 Introduction

The ending of the old regime, whereby monarchies were no longer considered a divine mandate, gave rise to new power scenarios, in which the emerging bourgeoisie claimed their right to choose the new forms of government and, above all, their right to participate in the political decisions of these governments. The wealth of discussions taking place helped form a new idea of the State: a government that is the result of the expression of popular will and shaped via elections. This provided citizens with a clear instrument for participation and, at the same time, limited them to certain participatory acts aimed at establishing the representative government.

This liberal democratic formula was unquestionably successful, as, when we speak of taking part in politics, we automatically think of the electoral process. However, when we speak only of participating, other possibilities come to mind, often implying a more active attitude on the part of citizens, particularly when it is a question of social or cultural issues.

Certainly, elections have not been the only form of political participation. This is evident from the long tradition of social movements. A product of the period of time we refer to, social movements were and are a different way of doing politics and, likewise, a differentiated expression of popular sovereignty, as stated by Tilly and Lesley (2009). These movements took off especially in the 1960s. Faced with institutionalised representation, they claimed the right to direct participation and subjectivity, starting with solving problems they considered were closer to home (v. among others, Offe, 1988; Pleyers, 2019; Santos, 1998).

With these new movements, participation in decision-making becomes just as important as achieving goals, and there is a tendency to distrust representative democracy. This distrust is based on the conviction that, over time, inertia prevents political parties and their agents from satisfactorily meeting the needs of the people and, more so, from enabling full participation in decision-making.

These positions have often led to settling for the levels closest to the individual and, to a certain extent, giving up on other levels, due to the impossibility of participating fully in them. However, on other occasions, coordination or collective work may become necessary for certain laws to be passed, for example, or for certain practices or specific policies to be exposed. In relation to these popular demands, as we shall see, the so-called right to decide makes total sense.

2 The Right to Participate and Make Decisions on Territorial Issues

The state forms of the old regime performed a limited number of functions, particularly those relating to taxation, which is why they were quite permissive in their approach to territory regarding the different peoples residing in their demarcations. However, the needs of the bourgeoisie arising in the industrialisation process that began to spread from the eighteenth century onwards called for a greater uniformity of the states, in relation to their customs as well as the training of workers.

This new scenario brought with it a movement of cultural uniformisation, in an effort to train the population, and implied a clear departure from the previous administrative and cultural permissiveness. The new emerging political form was the nation-state, that is, the state where one nation clearly predominates and imposes a specific culture that serves as a link between all those residing in the state. There is little room for other cultures or nations, and, at best, they must remain in the background (on the nation state, v. Tivey, 1981; Guibernau, 1996).

However, just as some cultures are in danger of being overlooked, the bourgeoisie linked to these cultures too run the risk of suffering the same fate. The different nationalist movements that began to spread from the eighteenth century onwards and, particularly, during the nineteenth century were the response of many of these peoples to the cultural and financial uncertainty with which they were threatened. This became more evident in the successive pro-independence movements emerging in America, and which, within a single century, almost completely transformed the political map of America, from the creation of the United States or Haiti to the independence of Cuba.

All of these cases involved revolts against the mother countries, through armed conflict, with varying degrees of intensity. Nonetheless, from the nineteenth century onwards, there was increased interest in alternatives ensuring a democratic and participatory approach for catering to territorial problems, thus leading to the formulation of the right to self-determination. Its initial direction had two reference points of totally different ideological persuasion: on the one hand, European socialist tradition, and, on the other, North American liberal democracy.

Socialist thinking of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries had to contend necessarily with the territorial problems of the great empires still existing in Europe. In the case of the Austro-Hungarian empire, particularly noteworthy is one of its most striking proposals for dealing with its enormous national diversity, put forward by the so-called Austro-Marxist socialist movement, including Karl Renner and, particularly, Otto Bauer. The latter’s proposal eschews territorial solutions and focuses on the possibility of a specified number of members of a given culture organising themselves with a certain degree of autonomy, anywhere in the empire, without a designated space being allotted to each of the existing nations. This ‘personal’ non-territorial solution did not allow for the option of seceding, as it was circumvented by allowing the possibility to set up a self-governing entity anywhere within the Austro-Hungarian territory (Bauer, 2000; Nimni, 2005, 2007; Renner, 2005).

The possibility of territorial separation was, in contrast, contemplated by Lenin, and this is reflected in the Soviet constitution of 1924. Although Lenin held different views on socialism’s stance in relation to national movements, he eventually recognised their legitimacy. Hence, the need to incorporate the national question into the socialist struggle without a preliminary selection of the national movements of interest to the strategic goals of socialism as all popular national movements deserved the respect of socialism (Villanueva, 1987).

Liberal thinking too was obliged to tackle the issue and offer solutions. Particularly striking is American president Woodrow Wilson’s proposal to solve the territorial problem in the Austro-Hungarian empire, following its defeat in the First World War. He also defended a territorial solution: grounded on what he called the principle of nationalities, it entailed recognising a territory for each of the different nations making up the fallen empire. Despite the obvious problems arising from the enormous mix of nations in different spaces, new states were founded. In some of these cases, a new tool, until then rarely used, was drawn upon, namely, plebiscites or popular consultations on the suitability of creating new states.

As pointed out by Orentlicher (2003: 20–25), this first stage of the right to self-determination, marked by the principle of nationalities, helped form or restructure a variety of states. However, it was highly localised in Central and Eastern Europe and limited to the period between the two world wars, with no intention of becoming universal. This was followed by a second, more widespread, stage corresponding to the decolonisation process. Theoretically, following the Second World War, it went from being a guiding principle to becoming a right recognised by the United Nations. This brought about a radical change in the world map of states, with numerous new states emerging, mainly in Asia and Africa. Although they were not spared armed conflict, they differed from the previous decolonising processes in that they were created as a result of some form of agreement, on many occasions following plebiscites.

However, this right reflected in the United Nations Charter likewise failed to become universal, as it was clearly intended to be restricted to the official colonies of the main European mother countries. Thus, a third stage opened up, aimed at achieving the universal realisation of the right to self-determination as an inalienable right at the end of the twentieth century. We shall now take a closer look at this stage.

3 Theories on Types of Self-Determination

When referring to the right to self-determination, we cannot use the singular and speak of just one theory encompassing and developing said right. On the contrary, we need to refer to theories of self-determination, in the plural, which could number as many as the authors developing this right. Below we shall try to give a brief overview of some of them, considering that “all of these theories should not be interpreted as if they were totally different from each other. Certainly, there are substantial differences between them, but there are also similarities” (Beobide, 2008: 69; our translation).

For our own classification, we take as our main basis the one developed by Requejo and Nagel (2017), with modifications based on the theories of Buchanan and Norman. The theories of self-determination are summed up under four types:

  • Nationalist theories: with the nation as a central element, they understand the former as a legitimate political subject with the right to self-determination. Thus, a pre-existing political unit confers legitimacy on secession (Requejo & Nagel, 2017).

  • Remedial theories: just-cause theories see secession as a political solution to be avoided, except in extreme conditions. Buchanan (1991) gives a detailed list of the causes for which secession is justifiable: cases of injustice or oppression with respect to social groups in the shape of infringements of human rights or discriminatory policies.

  • Procedural theories: they are usually classified within remedial theories (Requejo & Nagel, 2017), given that secession is understood as a last resort, even going so far as to recommend proceduralisation as a means to hinder secession, though combining it with a guarantee “the State is united by consensus, and not only by force” (Norman, 2002: 95; our translation). These theories lay down that secession must be the consequence of a rational process within a fair and democratic constitutional framework (Norman, 2002).

  • Plebiscitary theories: also called democratic theories, of free choice, freedom of association or individual consent (Beobide, 2008). We are particularly interested in them because they emphasise the radicalisation or intensification of democracy and, in addition, because they serve as a basis for framing the concept of the right to decide. Let us expand further on them.

Plebiscitary theories are generally more tolerant as regards secession and focus on the democratic exercise of the process of self-determination. This tolerance can go so far as to accept secession, despite it not being the most desirable option in certain aspects (Beran, 1984).

The legitimacy of secession lies, in this case, in the democratisation of the separation process, individual autonomy and the right to voluntary political association being key (Requejo, 2002). Plebiscitary theories concur that self-determination affects individual rights and not collective rights (Gauthier, 1994; Philpott, 1995; Requejo, 2002). In this respect, self-determination marks the peak in the pursuit of the emancipation of the individual (Requejo, 2002). Nonetheless, though it is considered an individual right, self-determination is exercised in groups (Philpott, 1995); for this reason, at the heart of the process of self-determination is the plebiscite, namely, a consultation or referendum, in which the population exercising the right to self-determination gets to decide on its legal and political status.

These theories likewise concur that self-determination is a fully democratic exercise. On the other hand, they differ as to which territories are potential holders of this right. It is broadly held that groups of individuals with a clearly defined territory and the will to associate themselves can exercise the right to self-determination – although Philpott (1995), for example, states that ethnicity cannot be considered criteria for identifying these territories – considering that the new State to be created should be efficient and capable of taking on the basic competencies of a State (Philpott, 1995; Beran, 1984; Wellman, 1995). However, the conditions do not include the requirement of the existence of extreme threat (in which case the application of the right to self-determination as a last resort or just cause is almost consensual).

4 The Right to Decide: Closing the Loop

Continuing our search for participation at territorial levels, we have focused on plebiscitary theories of self-determination, given that they see the latter as a democratic process. It could be said that the theoretical basis of the concept of the right to decide derives from the development of the right to self-determination, a step further on our journey. What is considered the right to decide? Where and why does it arise? What relation does it have with the theories of self-determination?

As we have already pointed out, the theoretical hurdle for different nationalist movements implied by the practical limitation of the right to self-determination to the colonial context and to the legal framework put forward by the United Nations lies in the origin of the concept of self-determination (Cassese, 1995; López-Jacoiste Díaz, 2019; Urrutia et al., 2012). We speak of a theoretical hurdle, as there are numerous examples in practice that refute the same, though they are always linked to conflictive emergency settings with an international impact. A first example can be found in Bangladesh, separated from Pakistan in 1971, and there are many others following the end of the Cold War: the reunification of Germany, the splitting of former Czechoslovakia into two states, the founding of new states as a result of the dissolution of the Soviet Union (the Baltic countries, the Caucasus and Asian Republics) and of Yugoslavia (Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, etc.). Beyond Europe too we have the case of the secession of Eritrea from Ethiopia in 1993.

In fact, the number of new states set up outside the context of decolonisation is far from few. Despite this being the case, it has failed to lead to a review of the legal situation internationally, though it has helped increase the doubts already raised regarding the pertinence of the right to self-determination being linked exclusively to decolonising processes. Indeed, since the end of the twentieth century, there have been numerous attempts to theorise on and carry out processes of emancipation not linked to decolonisation nor necessarily to emergency situations. What’s more, there have been theories suggesting that “even without using the right to self-determination, a process of secession can be carried through, on the grounds of democratic principle” (Urrutia et al., 2012: 64; our translation). Kosovo and Canada are examples in this respect.

The most well-known case of secession not based on the right to self-determination is Kosovo, in 2008. In the absence of an agreement with the mother state, it was set up as a state following a unilateral declaration of independence by the Kosovan Parliament. What is relevant in this case is that the International Court of Justice concluded that the international declaration of independence was not in contravention of international law, precisely because there is no specific legislation on this question (Advisory Opinion delivered on 22 July 2010, 56th paragraph). It is clear that the long conflict in the former Yugoslavia had a direct impact on its continued independence, and, on the other hand, it illustrated the importance of recognition by the international community which, though it may not have been unanimous, support came from numerous countries around the world (Urrutia Libarona, 2012).

We can draw this same conclusion from studying the pro-sovereignty process in Quebec, a turning point in how the right to self-determination was perceived in the latter part of the twentieth century. Two referenda were held in Quebec about its separation from Canada, in 1980 and 1995, both with an adverse outcome for the secessionists (by just one point in the second consultation). However, what is relevant about this experience for the theories of self-determination is the endeavour to solve territorial problems democratically. It triggered an intense academic debate on politics and the law (see, e.g. Moore, 1998; Macedo and Buchanan, 2003), including on the ruling by Canada’s Supreme Court in 1998 on the secession of Quebec and the subsequent Clarity Act, in 2000 (see Buchanan, 2003). It was concluded that it was essential that a process of separation always be agreed between the Federal Government and the Government of the Province wishing to separate. Moreover, it was likewise agreed that a unilateral process could be considered valid if the international community was in agreement.

These long and interesting debates on the conflict between Quebec and Canada also gave birth to a key idea: the need to be able to accommodate in the best possible way the interests of the population, including their territorial demands, and all of it within a democratic framework, and based on a democratic consultation. The Scottish case provides us with an example. The British government, through the Edinburgh Agreement, acknowledges the Scottish people’s right to decide via a referendum if they wish to go on being part of the United Kingdom, taking the Act of Union between Scotland and England of 1707 as a basis (v. among others, Keating, 2015).

Another different case, in contrast, is that of Catalonia, where the right to decide has resulted in a series of unsuccessful attempts on the part of the Catalan authorities to renew and readapt their statute of autonomy. The refusal of Spanish political parties and, in particular, the Spanish Constitutional Court to negotiate the proposals put forward by Catalan authorities prompted a search for new ways. Foremost among these is the very interesting development of the theory of the right to decide, closely linked, as we shall see, to the Catalan pro-sovereignty experience (Vilajosana, 2014).

However, one of the first places to make use of this concept, as one comparable to the right to self-determination, was the Basque Country (López, 2013a). Under the influence of the newly created states in Europe following the reunification of Germany in 1989, and clearly aided by the Irish peace process, in the last decade of the twentieth century, it was considered the right time among the different sectors of Basque nationalism to jointly seek new solutions to the Basque problem. This culminated in the agreement for joint action, called the Lizarra-Garazi Agreement, reached by the main cultural, socio-economic and political actors in the Basque Country in 1998.

This context favoured the exploration of new formulas for emancipation inextricably linked to the democratic principle which could help overcome the obstacle implied by international jurisprudence. Therefore, renewed efforts were made to theorise on the right to self-determination, either as a democratic or political process for change (Zubiaga, 1999), or to propound channels and instruments for it to be developed democratically (Zubiaga, 2002). All these contributions provided the basis for the initiative to reform the Political Statute of the Autonomous Community of the Basque Country (the community made up of the three western territories in the Basque Country, traditionally with a Basque nationalist majority), presented by the then president Juan Jose Ibarretxe, and approved by the Basque Parliament in 2004. Although it had little success in overcoming the institutional hurdles (it was immediately blocked in the Spanish Parliament), its theoretical principles were used as the basis for a subsequent proposal for a statute in Catalonia and, in particular, for enriching its theory (as well as practice) in what would subsequently become known as the procés de Catalunya.

What Elements Define the Right to Decide?

One of the first questions that arise when speaking of the right to decide is its relation with the right to self-determination. We can appreciate different views: there are those who see it as a right to “decide (or not) on secession” (Zubiaga, 2014); those who see in the new concept an “evolution in strategy and discourse” (Vilaregut, 2011); or those who see it as a new political category, a “neologism” (López, 2013b; Ridao, 2014), widening the differences with respect to the theories of self-determination. Even so, all the interpretations have something in common: what is most important is the democratic legitimisation of the process (Urrutia et al., 2012), as they are all based on the principle of democratic radicalism (López, 2011).

Thus, the right to decide would not be merely a pro-independence or secessionist demand, but rather one linked to a specific conception of democracy. It arises in democratic contexts and aims at being a formula for meeting all demands emerging in the political sphere, based on democracy’s potential for the same, including the demand for independence (Vilajosana, 2015). In this way, it is obvious that the right to decide is conceptually tied to the right to self-determination, to theories of secession and to minority rights (López, 2015). Let us further examine these ties.

As for the relation between the right to decide and the right to self-determination, Lopez points out (2015) that the right to decide offers peoples a way to manage the conflicts for their liberation within the framework of the rules of the game of democracy, as it includes two basic ideas: the fulfilment of a people’s wish for freedom – recognised by the right to self-determination – and the exercise of said will using democratic means. To a certain extent, we could say that the right to decide democratises the right to self-determination.

In respect of its connection to secession (López, 2015), the right to decide creates a close relation between secession and democracy, that is, a new legal approach based on the plebiscitary theories of secession. Therefore, secession is justified on the grounds of individual freedom, on the voluntary decision by individuals who make up a political community. The right to decide thus legitimises secession as an extension of the democratic principle, a principle that must be at the core of all political decisions and of all decisions relating to territorial limits.

Thirdly, regarding the relation with minority rights, the right to decide comes into play in the presence of inequality, that is, unequal treatment by the State of a part of its territory. Rather than seeking privileged treatment, the right to decide aims at reaching a democratic solution while taking into account the differences and circumstances of the sub-state territories. The objective is to rebuild the institutional structure in pursuit of a level playing field. In this case, the situation of inequality or discrimination is not a result of cultural or linguistic conditions, but rather as a consequence of the clash of democratic wills (López, 2015).

With the aim of defining the right to decide, we must point out three main characteristics. In the first place, it is a radical expression of the democratic principle. In other words, it defends the right to be able to decide without limitation on any desired issue, including such fundamental questions as the institutional structure (López, 2011). In the second place, as far as the subject is concerned, it is a right which is held by the demos, namely, a community located in a specific territory and democratically organised. Although it is an individual right, it is a right that is exercised collectively (Barceló i Serramalera, 2015).

In the third and last place, it is a right that is exercised in two stages. A first stage is aimed at knowing the will of the demos, what we would call the expression stage, and it implies the capacity to express the will of a specific community. The most common tool for implementing this stage is a referendum or non-binding consultation. At a second stage, the right to decide involves guaranteeing the fulfilment of the will expressed, what we would call the fulfilment stage. This is the stage when the right to decide makes sense as an autonomous right, and it is precisely when the real substance of the right is developed (Barceló i Serramalera, 2015). This second stage for actually carrying out the will expressed by the people would be done following a process of negotiation by both parties (Corretja, 2016).

The Right to Decide as a Tool of Radical Democracy

The right to decide has evolved as a radical democratic tool, which can be used in very different settings and moments. From the legal point of view, it is therefore inevitable that the concept of sovereignty be reconceptualised, at least in three respects. On the one hand, there needs to be a constituent power that understands sovereignty in a dynamic and non-dogmatic fashion. We are referring to an institutionalised constituent power which, together with the rule of law, contemplates the freedom of public opinion and the principle of participation (Arendt, 1990), in contrast with an absolute power, or non-institutionalised one, which can only be changed through great revolutions that inevitably entail a continuous of total breaks. The legal framework must necessarily reflect a continuous flow of ideas and claims between the constituent assemblies, institutional authorities and society (Pisarello, 2014).

On the other hand, it is also important to understand sovereignty not as a single power that implies binding and perpetual unity, but rather as a practical power that can be exercised in multiple stages and by diverse subjects. If we understand the constituent power as an open and dynamic power, we must understand that this implies questioning its existence as something inextinguishable. In other words, there is an opportunity for the legitimacy of the constituent subject to be questioned and a new one to emerge in any specific political community. The theories of plurinational federalism provide us with a way to tailor these new realities by questioning the idea of a single demos and legitimising the coordination between multiple nations and even legitimising the emergence of a new constituent power (Maiz, 2008).

Lastly, in order to understand a conception of the right to decide as a radical democratic tool, it is essential to keep in mind how the concept of sovereignty, together with the concept of territory, is developed in feminist theories. Feminism lays down the need to rethink sovereignty or the right to self-determination by putting life at the centre. In other words, sovereignty is understood as the capacity to make decisions about our lives, about the lives we wish to live and about the resources we need for the same – sexuality, identity, care, the economy, etc. – and to organise sovereignty based on the socialisation of the control of these resources (Verge Maestre, 2018). Thus, sovereignty is not only understood as linked to territory, but, by putting life at the centre, feminism speaks of a sovereignty that includes the body itself, as well as the capacity to make decisions about ourselves (Gabriel Sabaté, 2018).

In this respect, and as we shall analyse below, the right to decide has the potential to be an instrument to respond to multiple needs and issues that may arise in a given territory and, at the same time, to be a tool for dialogue between different movements with the same emancipatory and democratic values.

5 The Right to Decide and Its Use by Social Movements: Experiences in the Basque Country

We have seen how a concept, arising from the liberal interpretations of the plebiscitary theories of self-determination, evolved to end up taking on the features of what we have called democratic radicalism. It is an evolution that has aroused great interest in the Basque Country, from the point of view of Basque nationalism, as well as from that of diverse social movements, particularly interested in furthering democratic participation. Let us see in what terms the Basque movement for the right to decide is currently operating.

To this end, we must inevitably speak of the Gure Esku movement (originally, Gure Esku Dago; It’s in our hands) (cf. Scensei and Columbia University, 2015). Set up in 2013, it is the citizens’ movement that has designed and developed the practice of the right to decide in the Basque Country. Its aim is to determine the political future in the territories of the Basque Country in a free and democratic way via a referendum. For that purpose, it has developed numerous initiatives, all of which are focused on the participation and empowerment of citizens, based on democratic and pacific values.

Two stages can be appreciated in its short history, and defining them will help provide us with a clear picture of the conceptual evolution of this right, as described earlier in the section on theory.

Gure Esku: Its Beginnings and Its Alliance with Social Movements

The three principles held as its starting point by this citizens’ movement at its inception were as follows: “We are a people; we have the right to decide and now is the time for citizens”.Footnote 1 During the course of its existence, as we shall see, these principles have been developed, broadened and reconceptualised.

To begin with, for Gure Esku, the concept of the right to decide was linked exclusively to the solution of a territorial conflict, although there were some innovations. Among them, of note was the ambiguous use of the concept people, and the avoidance of the term nation, clearly associated with nationalism. However, even more important, and connecting with new political stances at the time, this people is subdivided into three demoi, three territorial communities, each of which has the capacity to decide.

In other words, the Basque Country is divided into three democratic communities with their own institutions (Basque Autonomous Community, Foral Community of Navarre and Agglomeration Community of the Basque Country), and each one of them has the right to decide within its own framework. Thus, we can speak of a people with three demoi whose decision-making capacity is recognised; three demoi, a people and a focal point which is “citizenry”. The citizens of each one of the demoi are the ones who will have to exercise their capacity to decide.

Nevertheless, in the course of its evolution, and the strengthening of the right to decide, Gure Esku has benefited from contributions of other social movements which have helped put flesh on the discourse, as they have helped to include some form of decision-making in it. For instance, the feminist movement claims women’s right to make decisions about their own bodies; trade unions claim greater decision-making capacity with respect to their socio-economic conditions; the environmental movement defends the right to make decisions on waste management (among other questions), etc. The issues susceptible to joint decision-making by the citizenry grow in number, and there is a certain distancing from the almost exclusive connection with territory, upheld so far.

This broadening of concepts became evident in Gure Esku in 2017. This can be appreciated in a document published that same year, “Herritarron Ituna – Citizens’ pact”, and in the following years with different initiatives along these lines. The last of these was the so-called “Hamaika Gara” (we’re a multitude), in 2020, where these ideas were repeated as can be appreciated in its declaration: “We have the right to decide on questions affecting our lives and our community” (our translation).

However, in this case, it was not just an isolated initiative organised by Gure Esku. It was supported by diverse movements and actors who had a similar outlook, namely, that the citizenry or political community should be given the necessary tools in order to make a decision about such questions as affect them, and the right to decide is one of them. Thus, the right to decide is understood as a way to exercise sovereignty: as a tool for the emancipation of both the individual and the group. Below are some examples.

Among them, we would highlight the theory and practice of the Basque Country’s feminist movement. From this perspective, Bilgune FeministaFootnote 2 develops the concepts of sovereignty – understood as the capacity for decision-making –, territory and citizenry. With respect to sovereignty, it states that:

Feminist sovereignty has the capacity to decide about the life we wish to live and to have control over what we need for the same; socializing control over production and reproduction and organising sovereign from there. (our translation)

Thus, sovereignty is understood as both an individual and collective process, not only rooted in a territory but rather:

It does not refer solely to the territory because it is a sovereignty that includes our bodies, what we are saying is that we are controllers of our own lives. Being sovereign is being in charge of our bodies and our emotional and sexual relations, paving the way to being healthy, having the capacity to decide for ourselves. (our translation)

We can speak of citizenry in the same way, although putting the needs and care of people at the centre of its obligations and rights, giving priority to the latter above the needs of the markets.

Similar statements are made in other spheres too. The LGTBI+ movement understands sovereignty as freedom and the capacity to decide on sexual identity and gender. The movement in favour of the Basque language claims the right for a democratic administration in a multilingual situation to be able to contemplate, recognise and guarantee the linguistic rights of the individual and the group.Footnote 3

A close look at another, currently active, major movement, the old age pensioners movement, reveals that the idea to put the socio-economic system of life and its care at the centre and not capital is behind the demands and numerous debates on the public pension system, the laws on dependence and on loneliness and care for the elderly (Fernandez San Martin, 2020). It is assumed that there is a need for a society based on mutual care as a limit of individual sovereignty and there is a demand for a sovereignty that strengthens reciprocity.Footnote 4

The environmental movement has likewise adopted the concept of the right to decide. A recent example is the public reaction to the construction of the waste incineration plant in Zubieta (San Sebastian), with people calling for the “right to decide on waste management”. In this respect, the platform Erraustegia ErabakiaFootnote 5 held popular consultations on 23 October 2016 in order to come to a decision about the building of this incineration plant in the towns affected.

Last of all, we would mention the demonstrations organised by the Charter of Social Rights of the Basque Country,Footnote 6 a platform agglutinating many of the abovementioned movements. The platform held a general strike in the Autonomous Community of the Basque Country and the Foral Community of Navarre on 30 January 2020 and called for “the right of the workers of the Basque Country to decide on the best way to guarantee the public pension system and decent pensions” and the “right to decide our own model of industrial relations as well as our own collective bargaining framework without interference of any kind” (our translation). Moreover, in the context of the health crisis resulting from the Covid-19 pandemic, the same platform was responsible for a demonstration held in June 2020 and called Life first, in which they stated “we want to be in control of our decisions for sustaining lives and make the decisions here…” (our translation).

All these movements have something in common, they claim the right to be able to decide directly about issues which current political practice reserves for legal, democratic representative bodies. They all think that the right to decide can be an excellent democratic tool for channelling different problems and demands. In other words, they go beyond the liberal democratic theory of the right to self-determination as a tool for channelling territorial problems, helping it develop into a much broader radical democratic theory, as a useful tool for solving very different problems.

The Right to Decide and the Basque Political Parties

This new theory obliges those who, so far, have been considered the main players in this field, namely, political parties (as democratic representatives of the will of the people, expressed in the different electoral cycles), to reconsider their role and representativity. We can appreciate a variety of stances.Footnote 7

At the heart of the approach of the Basque Nationalist party, EAJ-PNV (Christian Democrat, the main party in the Autonomous Community of the Basque Country) is the conviction that there is a differentiated Basque national identity. Furthermore, it has traditionally linked these national demands to the historical rights of the Basque people and considers that this “manifests itself through the citizenry’s right to decide expressed in a free and democratic way” (p. 423). At all times it refers only to the territorial issue and reminds the Spanish state of its obligation to respect what Basque citizens may have decided.

EH Bildu (a coalition of left-wing Basque nationalist parties, the second largest force in the Autonomous Community of the Basque Country and the fourth in the Foral Community of Navarre) also claims the existence of a Basque nation and proposes a solution for the Spanish “territorial conflict”, based on the premise that “Basque citizens and their institutions are the only subjects who can define the future of Basque citizens” (p. 148; our translation). However, we can appreciate a broadening of this territorial approach in the assertion that sovereignty “is not only linked to the nature of the Basque nation but also to the will to guarantee and develop the welfare of the citizens living in Basque territories” (p. 146; our translation). EH Bildu endorses the growing demand for the right to participate and decide: “increasingly more citizens want to take the floor and decide on the issues that have a direct impact on their life. There is a growing number of social and political stakeholders who demand new channels for expressing their opinions and for decision-making” (p. 151). To this end, it is necessary to be able to make decisions in different spheres, not only as regards territory: making decisions on the economic model, on our body, etc. In short, “the right to decide everything” (p. 149; our translation).

Elkarrekin Podemos (a Spanish left-wing party, the fourth largest force in the Autonomous Community of the Basque Country and the fifth in the Foral Community of Navarre) does not speak of a Basque nation but does refer to the plurality of Basque society and recognises the existence of a territorial problem. Though always in association with the territorial aspect, it defends “the need to address the recognition of Basque citizenry’s right to decide” (p. 206).

Geroa Bai (a coalition of centrist parties in Navarre, including the EAJ-PNV; the third largest electoral force in Navarre) does not speak of a Basque nation either, although it does refer to Navarre’s specific character, considering it a political subject, and trusts in Navarre’s citizens’ power of decision to decide their political future, within the Spanish state.

Euskal Herria Bai (EH Bai, a coalition of left-wing Basque nationalist parties in the Agglomeration Community of the Basque Country; the third most important force in the French legislative elections in 2017) defends a Basque nation, although it understands the current diversity in identity and calls for an independent Basque Country. To this end, the Basque people should be given the right to decide their social, cultural, economic and political future.

As we can appreciate, political parties place the right to decide within the territorial dispute of the Basque Country, whereas some social movements, as well as Gure Esku, have broadened the term and speak of a variety of areas of sovereignty. This may have helped win over new supporters for the territorial claim, from social movements not overly interested in this issue. However, extending sovereignty to other areas may, on the one hand, water down the territorial claim and, on the other, cause some support to be lost in pro-sovereignty sectors, less keen on exceeding the territorial scope.

We are therefore faced with two lines of thought within the current Basque pro-sovereignty movement. The traditional one limits the right to decide to the territorial sphere and is supported by the EAJ-PNV. On the other hand, the perspective developed by social movements and Gure Esku understands the right to decide as a tool for solving the Basque territorial problem as well as numerous other problems, always on the basis of political participation, deliberation and consultation. This vision is supported by EH Bildu (who combines it with the traditional vision) and by Elkarrekin Podemos.

It could be said that the debate confronts the concept of sovereignty with that of sovereignties and the territory concept with that of territories (in the broadest sense). It is evident that social movements and some left-wing political parties defend the latter concept of sovereignty in the plural (energy, food, feminism and also territory), whereas other parties maintain a more historical conception of the right to decide, comparable to what we have seen as plebiscitary self-determination.

According to the traditional conception, the Basque sovereignty process has been understood as a unique process, guided in the main by the national question and boosted by Basque nationalist political parties. With the new proposals put forward by social movements which we have studied, the aim is to build a sovereign process that includes sovereignty or sovereignties and the subjects that exercise the same in a variety of areas while understanding the multiple needs for emancipation overlapping each other and, at the same time, building a sovereignty process from the bottom up.

The contrast between both lines of thought gives rise to many doubts and much debate on core concepts in political theory such as democracy, sovereignty, the demos or territory.

6 Conclusions

In this chapter we have seen how the ways of understanding political participation vary depending on the time in history and the theoretical and ideological point of view. In order to govern institutions, liberal democracy places the emphasis on representativeness, that is, on the fact that, on a periodic basis, by means of elections, citizens choose their desired representatives for government. This predominant option has not, however, been the only one, as other more direct forms of government and, above all, forms of decision-making have been pursued by the so-called social movements.

From the moment that political territories were understood to not be royal property but rather people’s property, the decision on territorial disputes too began to evolve, and it is on this that we have focused in this work. Progressing from wars or violent positions in order to take ownership of, or lay claim to, a territory, from the twentieth century onwards, democratic formulas for consulting the citizenry began to be used. The former were subsequently assimilated into the right to self-determination by the international community. However, it is a right that imposes stringent requirements for non-colonial cases and one which does not work for other claims.

It is precisely in relation to these cases, where it was not possible to legally appeal to the right to self-determination, that other formulas for solving certain territorial disputes began to come into play. With its origins in plebiscitary theories, and a result of the development of the concept of democracy, the right to decide began to emerge in the twenty-first century. We have defined it as a new concept, linked to political participation and democracy, and not just another plebiscitary theory on the right to self-determination.

This new theory has been closely monitored in the Basque Country, particularly with regard to the Catalan case. Just as in Catalonia, the right to decide has evolved, and it is clearly reflected in the new path taken by the Gure Esku movement, along with other social movements: the right to decide is not just a new liberal democratic tool for solving territorial problems, seeing as certain sectors of nationalist movements (at least, those more closely linked to the left and social movements) use it as a new radical democratic procedure for solving numerous problems.

This new conception breaks with former models, and this inevitably raises many doubts, particularly among those who, so far, have been the major stakeholders in the Basque sovereignty process, namely, the political parties, but also among those supporting the right to decide for the Basque Country. These doubts, together with the consequent disputes, can be summed up in four great questions, some of which date from time immemorial:

  • The concept of democratic participation, that is, the clash between a conception of representative democracy, internationally approved, and a more radical conception, which defends participation for deciding on issues in multiple spheres of our lives.

  • The concept of democracy, as an option for exercising power over a given spatial framework at state level or extended to smaller frameworks, such as, our bodies, food, etc.

  • The concept of territory, with different levels of dispute. From a single, indivisible national territory (the seven Basque historical territories), to three territories with self-governing administrative demarcations and with the power to decide on them, to territories at local level, or even understood in a more diffuse way, not linked to a specific spatial framework.

  • The holder of the right to decide. We mention it last because it is where there seems to be greatest consensus, at least, as regards the more classical concept of territoriality: three demoi can be differentiated, one for each administrative space, the citizenry of each one of these demarcations being considered the subject holding the right. However, when we speak of the subject, let us not forget the fact that diverse social movements have been reconceptualising territory.

Undoubtedly, a new conception of the right to decide in the Basque Country will arise from these disputes.