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Abstract

The digital era presents National Competition Authorities (NCAs) with new challenges since the impact of the fourth industrial revolution reaches all markets and affects market behaviour. Datafication, digitalisation, data-driven markets, online platforms, digital economy, the Internet of Things—even this short list of examples highlights that a new set of terminology requires interpretation and the underlying new market phenomena require new assessment methods. The digitalisation of the value chain is reshaping processes from the development of products through production, logistics and sales systems to their acquisition by end users. Product digitalisation is creating new markets and is fundamentally changing data-driven business models, which are simultaneously generating new organisational structures and working methods. There are industries where consumers pay with their personal data for ‘free’ services, and consumers’ data serve as the fuel for economic growth. These parallel processes result in new channels and context in the communication with buyers, consumers, customers, clients, users and employees. At the same time, traditional roles have been expanded since consumers are present on the demand side not only by virtue of their purchasing decisions but also because they create new content, share information, rank products and discuss their performed or planned consumer choices in all available public fora.

Members of the Working Group (in alphabetical order): Virág Balogh, Bálint Bassola, Balázs Bence, Borbála Dömötörfy, Krisztina Grimm, Maxim Járdai, Anikó Keller, Márton Kocsis, Ádám Liber, Ákos Réger and Ildikó Sopov.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    National competition authorities.

  2. 2.

    A. Preta, A. and M. Maggiolino (Eds.), Data Driven Economy: Market Trends and Policy Perspectives (2018), available from: http://www.itmedia-consulting.com/DOCUMENTI/datadrivensummary.pdf. Accessed 10 August 2020.

  3. 3.

    J. Firniksz and B. Dömötörfy, Information Exchange Going Digital – Challenges to Hungarian Competition Law Enforcement. YARS, 12(19), pp. 133–133.

  4. 4.

    Decision of the GVH no. Vj/88-71/2016, GVH Press Release, available at https://www.gvh.hu/en/press_room/press_releases/press_releases_2018/competition_proceeding_against_google_is_closed. Accessed 9 September 2021.

  5. 5.

    Decision of the GVH no. Vj/85-189/2016.

  6. 6.

    Bundeskartellamt Beschluss no. B6-22/16 Facebook.

  7. 7.

    Guidance on the Implementation/Application of Directive 2005/29/EC on Unfair Commercial Practices, section 5.2.1.

  8. 8.

    Facebook case, para 38–39.

  9. 9.

    Business-to-business.

  10. 10.

    Business-to-consumer.

  11. 11.

    Decision of the GVH no. Vj/24-60/2019, paras 43–46.

  12. 12.

    Decision of the GVH no. Vj/34-68/2018, para 55.

  13. 13.

    Decision of the GVH no. Vj/12-248/2019.

  14. 14.

    Netrisk/Biztosítás.hu case, paras 74–79.

  15. 15.

    Case M.8788 - Apple/Shazam.

  16. 16.

    Decision of the GVH no. Vj/14-175/2019.

  17. 17.

    eMAG/Extreme Digital case, para 74.

  18. 18.

    GVH Order no. 11/2017. (XII. 20.) on the notification form and related fill-in guidance to be applied for the notification of concentrations under Section 24 of the Competition Act.

  19. 19.

    GVH Order no. 11/2017, point V.9.2.

  20. 20.

    Decision of the GVH no. Vj/19-60/2019.

  21. 21.

    Decision of the GVH no. Vj/89-236/2015.

  22. 22.

    NetPincér case, paras 69–70.

  23. 23.

    NetPincér case, paras 76–78.

  24. 24.

    Quality considerations in the zero-price economy – Note by Hungary, available at https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/WD(2018)131/en/pdf, point 5. Accessed 9 September 2021.

  25. 25.

    Hungarian Competition Authority - Mid-Term Digital Consumer Protection Strategy, 2018 https://www.gvh.hu/pfile/file?path=/en/gvh/strategy/GVH_Stategia_Digitalis_fogyved_startegia_2018_09_27_a&inline=true, point 13.

  26. 26.

    Quality considerations in the zero-price economy – Note by Hungary, point 6.

  27. 27.

    Google Allo case, para 245.

  28. 28.

    To conducts until 31 August 2018 the GVH applied the Competition Act, and from 1 September 2018, it applies the UCP Act. The latter ensures compliance with the UCP Directive.

  29. 29.

    GVH press release, available at https://www.gvh.hu/en/press_room/press_releases/press_releases_2008/5022_en_broadband_paid_narrow-band_provided.html. Accessed 10 August 2020.

  30. 30.

    Decision of the GVH no. Vj/93-34/2011.

  31. 31.

    Google Allo case, para 214.

  32. 32.

    The commitments had been fulfilled as the GVH established it in the Google Allo follow-up case (Decision of the GVH no. Vj/18-14/2019).

  33. 33.

    Google Allo case, para 207.

  34. 34.

    Google Allo case, para 245.

  35. 35.

    Google Allo case, para 220.

  36. 36.

    Google Allo case, para 245.

  37. 37.

    UCP Act, Section 3 (1) and (6); Section 3 (1) point c).

  38. 38.

    Facebook case, para 256.

  39. 39.

    Facebook case, para 274.

  40. 40.

    Digital Comparison Tools.

  41. 41.

    GVH Press Release, available at https://www.gvh.hu/en/press_room/press_releases/press-releases-2020/how-can-digital-comparison-tools-affect-consumer-decision-making. Accessed 9 September 2021.

  42. 42.

    The concept of DCT is defined in the DCT Market Study in accordance with the concept outlined by the multi-stakeholder group also referred to in Section 5.2.7 of the Guidance on the Implementation of UCP Directive. Thus, also for the purposes of this document, the term DCT includes all digital content and applications developed to be used by consumers primarily to compare products and services online, irrespective of the device used or the parameter(s) on which the comparison is based (e.g. price, quality, user reviews). To the extent that operators of search engines, travel or ticket booking sites, e-commerce platforms acting as a marketplace for several traders develop functions or applications dedicated to the comparison of products and services, these functions or applications are also covered by the term DCT.

  43. 43.

    Act XLVII of 2008 on the Prohibition of Unfair Business-to-Consumer Commercial Practices.

  44. 44.

    Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market and amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

  45. 45.

    Pursuant to the UCP Act, ‘consumer’ means ‘any natural person who is acting for purposes which are outside his/her independent profession or economic activity’ (UCP Act, Section 2., point a)), while a ‘business entity’ means ‘any person who, in commercial practices, is acting for purposes relating to his/her independent profession or economic activity’ (UCP Act, Section 2., point b)). Further, according to the UCP Act, ‘B2C commercial practices’ means ‘any act, omission, course of conduct or representation, commercial communication including advertising and marketing, by a person for a business entity or in the name and on behalf of a business entity, directly connected with the promotion, sale or supply of a product to consumers’ (UCP Act, Section 2.., point d).

  46. 46.

    Comparison Tools - Report from the Multi-Stakeholder Dialogue - Providing consumers with transparent and reliable information, Report presented at the European Consumer Summit 18–19 March 2013. Available at https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/consumer-summit-2013-msdct-report_en_0.pdf. Accessed 9 September 2021.

  47. 47.

    The DCTs that are imposed by law, cannot, in our view, be considered a ‘B2C commercial practice’. In Hungary, the operation of a comparison portal is currently required by law for the monetary and credit market and telecommunications services. Concerning financial services, the Hungarian National Bank (Magyar Nemzeti Bank) has prepared financial product search and comparison programs and calculators, while for the telecommunications services, the joint information page of the NRA and the Commissioner for Media and Communications provides information on fixed and mobile tariffs, data on the costs of roaming (using a mobile phone abroad) and information enabling a comparison between bundled service providers (landline, Internet and television together).

  48. 48.

    The Netrisk I. case (Decision of the GVH no. Vj/43/2008/19), the Netrisk II. case (Decision of the GVH no. Vj/75-84/2013), the Biztosítás.hu case (Decision of the GVH no. Vj/19-81/2010), the Szállás.hu case (Decision of the GVH no. Vj/112-61/2013), the Allegro Group/Hotel Outlet case (Decision of the GVH no. Vj/113-103/2013), the Agoda case (Decision of the GVH no. Vj/93-37/2014), the Airbnb case (Decision of the GVH no. Vj/89-90/2016), and the Booking.com I. case (Decision of the GVH no. Vj/70-59/2014) and Booking.com II. case (Decision of the GVH no. Vj/17-110/2018) are to be mentioned as leading cases.

  49. 49.

    GVH Press release is available at https://www.gvh.hu/en/press_room/press_releases/press-releases-2020/gigantic-fine-imposed-on-booking.com-by-the-gvh. Accessed 9 September 2021.

  50. 50.

    As compared to the previous five years, in 2019 the fines imposed in both the cartel and the consumer protection cases were significant, and the sum of the consumer protection related fines (HUF 4,891,162,500 – approx. 14,162,504 EUR) materially exceeded that of the cartel fines (HUF 3,389,910,300 – approx. 9,815,585 EUR) (calculated on the official daily exchange rate published by the Central Bank of Hungary [Magyar Nemzeti Bank, MNB] on 10 August 2020, when EUR 1 equalled HUF 345.36). The GVH’s report to the Hungarian Parliament, 2019 – available at https://gvh.hu/pfile/file?path=/gvh/orszaggyulesi_beszamolok/gvh_ogy_pb_2019&inline=true, pp. 22–23. Accessed 9 September 2021.

  51. 51.

    Section 43/D of the Competition Act.

  52. 52.

    Hungarian Competition Authority - Report on the Sector Inquiry on the Online Accomodation Booking Market - May 2016.

  53. 53.

    Final Report on the Online Accommodation Booking Sector Inquiry published by the GVH on 8 June 2016 is available at https://www.gvh.hu/pfile/file?path=/en/resolutions/sectoral_inquiries_market_analyses/sectoral_inquiries/Agazati_vizsgalat_online_szallashelyfoglalas_piacan_vegleges_jelentes_2016_06_08_a&inline=true. Accessed 9 September 2021.

  54. 54.

    Online Accomodation Booking Sector Inquiry, pp. 6–7.

  55. 55.

    Most-favoured-nation.

  56. 56.

    ‘Fully applied’ or ‘wide’ price parity means that the obligor of the price parity clause (e.g. an accommodation provider) is not allowed to offer/advertise either itself (on its own website) or through a third party (e.g. a third-party accommodation booking platform intended to utilise) more favourable prices or conditions concerning its product/service than those offered towards the party entitled by the price parity clause (e.g. another accommodation booking platform with whom the accommodation provider already concluded a contract).

  57. 57.

    ‘Narrow’ price parity means that the obligor of the price parity clause (e.g. an accommodation provider) itself is not allowed to offer/advertise (on its own website) more favourable prices or conditions concerning its product/service than those offered towards the party entitled by the price parity clause (e.g. another accommodation booking platform with whom the accommodation provider already concluded a contract), but it is allowed to offer/advertise more favorable prices or conditions concerning its product/service through a third party (e.g. a third-party accommodation booking platform that the obligor intends to utilise).

  58. 58.

    Platforms usually invest heavily in the design and development of the online interface, as well as, while aiming at the widest possible consumer base, allocate significant amounts to advertising, marketing and other support functions (consulting, warranty, etc.). The return on these investments may be jeopardised, and the incentive for further investments may be reduced, if partners, leveraging the platform's services, make these products more affordable for consumers through their own channels (the so-called ‘free-rider’ phenomenon) (NetPincér case, para 95).

  59. 59.

    NetPincér case.

  60. 60.

    Online Accomodation Booking Sector Inquiry, pp. 6–7.

  61. 61.

    Online Accomodation Booking Sector Inquiry, p. 7.

  62. 62.

    Online Accomodation Booking Sector Inquiry, p. 7.

  63. 63.

    Online Accomodation Booking Sector Inquiry, page 7. Booking.com has previously switched to this model on a global level; the press release is available at https://news.booking.com/bookingcom-to-amend-parity-provisions-throughout-europe/. Accessed 10 August 2020.

  64. 64.

    Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Germany, France, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingdom.

  65. 65.

    Online Accomodation Booking Sector Inquiry, pp. 7–8.

  66. 66.

    Press release by the European Commission is available at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_19_6812. Accessed 10 August 2020.

  67. 67.

    Section 43/C of the Competition Act.

  68. 68.

    Hungarian Competition Authority – Paper Summarizing the Results of the Market Study on Exploring the Impacts of Digital Comparison Tools on Consumer Decisions – 2020.

  69. 69.

    The GVH’s Digital CP Strategy is available at https://www.gvh.hu/pfile/file?path=/gvh/strategia/GVH_Stategia_Digitalis_fogyved_startegia_2018_09_27, point 29. Accessed 9 September 2021.

  70. 70.

    Hungarian Competition Authority – Paper Summarizing the Results of the Market Study on Exploring the Impacts of Digital Comparison Tools on Consumer Decisions – 2020.

  71. 71.

    DCT Market Study, pt 27.

  72. 72.

    DCT Market Study, pt 29.

  73. 73.

    DCT Market Study, pts 1, 7 and 30.

  74. 74.

    DCT Market Study, pt 39.

  75. 75.

    DCT Market Study, pt 40.

  76. 76.

    DCT Market Study, pt 3.

  77. 77.

    DCT Market Study, pt 4.

  78. 78.

    DCT Market Study, pts 63–64.

  79. 79.

    DCT Market Study, pts 65–67.

  80. 80.

    DCT Market Study, pt 152.

  81. 81.

    DCT Market Study, pt 155.

  82. 82.

    DCT Market Study, pt 160.

  83. 83.

    DCT Market Study, pt 164.

  84. 84.

    DCT Market Study, pt 168.

  85. 85.

    DCT Market Study, pt 171.

  86. 86.

    DCT Market Study, pt 176.

  87. 87.

    DCT Market Study, pt 181.

  88. 88.

    DCT Market Study, pts 184 and 187.

  89. 89.

    DCT Market Study, pts 194–195.

  90. 90.

    DCT Market Study, pts 200–201.

  91. 91.

    DCT Market Study, pt 203.

  92. 92.

    DCT Market Study, pt 204.

  93. 93.

    Online Accomodation Booking Sector Inquiry, point 5.2.4., p. 79.

  94. 94.

    Online Accomodation Booking Sector Inquiry, point 5.3.9., pp. 84–85.

  95. 95.

    NetPincér case, para 76–78.

  96. 96.

    Act C of 2012 on the Criminal Code (Criminal Code), Section 417, paras (2)–(4).

  97. 97.

    Criminal Code, Section 459, para (1), pt 22.

  98. 98.

    See for example: Békés Ádám: A fogyasztók érdekeit sértő bűncselekmények - In: Hollán Miklós, Barabás A. Tünde (szerk.) - A negyedik magyar büntetőkódex: régi és újabb vitakérdések. p. 384 - Budapest: MTA Társadalomtudományi Kutatóközpont, 2017. pp. 247–258 (https://jog.tk.mta.hu/uploads/files/17_BekesA.pdf) (in Hungarian). Accessed 9 September 2021.

  99. 99.

    According to the Criminal Statistics System (Bűnügyi Statisztikai Rendszer) operated by the Ministry for Home Affairs, there have been a total of 15 registered cases in the last two years. The data are available on the website: https://bsr.bm.hu/. Accessed 9 September 2021.

  100. 100.

    Act V of 2013 on the Civil Code (Civil Code), Section 6:91, para (1) and (3).

  101. 101.

    Civil Code, Section 6:89 para (1) and (3).

  102. 102.

    Civil Code, Section 6:95.

  103. 103.

    Act CXXX of 2016 on the Code of Civil Procedure, Part Eight (Actions for the collective enforcement of claims), Chapter XLIII (Class actions), Sections 580–591.

  104. 104.

    Competition Act, Section 85/A., para (1) and (3).

  105. 105.

    In recent years there were only two cases in which interim measures have been imposed: one in 2017 (Orangeways et Al. case - Decision of the GVH no. Vj/100-98/2016) and another one in the first half of 2020 (Global AQA Pty Ltd. / Globoport Média Holding Kft./Glenwood Media Kft. case – Investigation of the GVH no.Vj/3/2020).

  106. 106.

    Decisions of the President of the National Media and Infocommunications Authority no. PC/17915-64/2017. and PC/17920-64/2017. - ‘Ensuring the wholesale provision of fixed local and central access to broadband networks’ (dated 14 December 2017).

  107. 107.

    Calculation on the basis of forward-looking long-run incremental costs (LRIC), see Commission Recommendation of 7 May 2009 on the Regulatory Treatment of Fixed and Mobile Termination Rates in the EU (2009/396/EC).

  108. 108.

    For earlier case-law concerning infocommunications markets see the UPC/RubiCom case (Decision of the GVH no. Vj/80-98/2011).

  109. 109.

    Decision of the GVH no. Vj/42-272/2018.

  110. 110.

    Telekom/Telenor Broadband Sharing I. case - Investigation of the GVH no. Vj/18/2015, Telekom/Telenor Broadband Sharing II. case, Investigation of the GVH no. Vj/1/2018.

  111. 111.

    DIGI/Invitel case, para 139.

  112. 112.

    DIGI/Invitel case, paras 134–136.

  113. 113.

    DIGI/Invitel case, paras 158–165.

  114. 114.

    CASE M.8864 – Vodafone/Certain Liberty Global assets. This transaction also affected the Hungarian market since it resulted in the merger of Vodafone’s Hungarian branch (primarily mobile services) with UPC (retail fixed telephony, retail fixed Internet access and retail TV services).

  115. 115.

    Decision of the GVH no. Vj/56-244/2017.

  116. 116.

    GVH press release available at https://www.gvh.hu/en/press_room/press_releases/press_releases_2019/magyar_telekom_launches_a_new_low_priced_tv_intern. Accessed 9 September 2021.

  117. 117.

    Decision of the GVH no. Vj/15-147/2015.

  118. 118.

    GVH press release available at https://www.gvh.hu/en/press_room/press_releases/archive/press_releases_2015/gvh_investigating_cooperation_between_telekom_and_. Accessed 28 February 2022.

  119. 119.

    GVH press release available at https://www.gvh.hu/en/press_room/press_releases/press_releases_2018/the_gvh_held_unannounced_inspections_at_the_premis. Accessed 28 February 2022.

  120. 120.

    Decision of the GVH no. Vj/13-66/2018.

  121. 121.

    GVH press release available at https://gvh.hu/en/press_room/press_releases/press_releases_2019/fine-of-over-eur-5.45-m-imposed-by-the-hungarian-competition-authority-on-telenor-for-its-misleading-commercial-practices. Accessed 9 September 2021.

  122. 122.

    Decision of the GVH no. Vj/76-142/2016.

  123. 123.

    GVH press release available at https://gvh.hu/en/press_room/press_releases/press_releases_2019/fine-amounting-to-a-total-of-over-eur-3-m-imposed-on-vodafone-for-repeated-infringements. Accessed 9 September 2021.

  124. 124.

    Decision of the GVH no. Vj/4-50/2018.

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Firniksz, J., Mezei, P. (2023). Hungary. In: Kilpatrick, B., Kobel, P., Këllezi, P. (eds) Antitrust in Data Driven Markets & Legal Framework for Influencers, Native Advertising and Control over the Use of AI in Marketing. LIDC Contributions on Antitrust Law, Intellectual Property and Unfair Competition. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-07422-6_7

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