Keywords

1 Introduction

More democratic planning processes are acknowledged to facilitate several positive outcomes, including acceptance, support, better solutions and ownership (Healey 1998; Hillier 2002; Innes and Booher 2004; Albrechts 2013), which are even more critical in developing countries where resource limitation is debilitating. The paradox lies in needing to institute more democratic planning processes inside less democratic systems. Many external variables influence the process design as planning and its governance model evolve and operate inside a system context where political dynamics, power relations and other related institutional characteristics exist (Huxley and Yiftachel 2000; Fainstein 2005; Brand and Gaffikin 2007).

Even though collaborative planning aims to transform social and political institutions by building shared meaning, civic capacity or capable civil society, social capital and more participatory forms of democracy (Healey 1998; Innes and Booher 2004; Booher and Innes 2005), its focus on operationalising certain techniques in the process design for neutralising power imbalances and building consensus pays little attention to factors in the overall system context that can hinder making these possible. It takes for granted that the conditions for creating democratic planning processes and rigorous discourse are always readily available everywhere. For instance, the role of the planner in the collaborative discourse is to empower citizens (Forester 1987), facilitate consensus building (Forester 1987; Healey 1998) and social learning (Booher and Innes 2005), build trust (Emerson and Gerlak 2014) and provide collaborative leadership by ensuring the integrity of the consensus building process (Ansell and Gash 2008). But planners are not always “open to democratic processes” (Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger 1998: 1984). They are neither neutral nor can remain apolitical experts and cannot be entirely free from personal motivation or pre-packaged values and preferences born out of sociopolitical and economic contexts (Tewdwr-Jones 2002).

As a source of institutional order with inherent characteristics that produce asymmetry in power relations (O’Donnell 1993), it is the state that shapes society (Skocpol 1985), and the nature of the state and government systems influence the system context in which planning is carried out. This influence is not limited to its implication on the planning process, as planning is largely a public domain that is undertaken “by, or in relation to the state” (Huxley and Yiftachel 2000: 106), also requiring transparency and accountability in government transactions (Albrechts 2004). The influence of government systems on planning extends well beyond this. For instance, since democratic systems allow more oversight of governments (Delhey and Newton 2004) and ensure their accountability (O’Donnell 1993), instituting collaborative or democratic planning processes requires a democratic system context because organisational practices and structures are the reflection of the overall institutional environment (Powell and DiMaggio 1991). Similarly, the importance of trust is a widely discussed input and outcome norm in the collaborative literature. Collaborative or participatory planning processes are said to build trust among participants, while social capital is expected to enable participants to generate and share knowledge, create understanding and build trust as well as mobilise participants into action (Healey 1998, 1999). The proponents of collaborative/participatory planning and collaborative governance argue that continuous interactions are expected to build trust and stronger relations among participants, as trust ensures stakeholder commitment to the process (Ansell and Gash 2008). This seems to emphasise particularised trust as an input norm, which limits the expectation of reciprocity to only those involved, as opposed to social trust which assumes that people who are not kin, close associates, or who do not have shared experiences can generally be depended upon to act for the common good. On the other hand, an initial basic level of trust needs to exist in society (Brand and Gaffikin 2007) in order to enable the planning process to build trust among participants. This also includes trust for process organisers (Newig et al. 2018).

Collaborative planning or any other form of democratic planning process also necessitates some level of democratic culture in society for both process organisers and participants to effectively negotiate or diffuse power and cooperate in collective action. Democracy also encourages the development of social belief systems such as social trust (Uslaner 1999; Delhey and Newton 2004). In contrast, undemocratic regimes are neither consensual nor power sharing (Freitag and Bühlmann 2009). They destroy the development of alternative sources of power such as civil society (Uslaner 1999) and lack institutions that promote wider political engagement (Bratton and Van De Walle 1994), thereby eroding the development of democratic culture (Agger and Löfgren 2008) and confidence or trust in government. Lack of trust or confidence in government, in turn, inhibits the development of social trust and cooperation (Rothstein and Teorell 2008; Freitag and Traunmüller 2009; Robbins 2011). Cooperation is the we-intention and joint action (Tuomela and Miller 1985), or a set of actions taken by two or more individuals to achieve the same or complementary goals based on interdependence (Deutsch 1949) or reciprocity, which may require some measure of sacrifice (Khamis et al. 2006) built on individuals’ moral value (Daniel 1994) or trust (Deutsch 1949).

Through local government-residents’ joint neighbourhood upgrading projects in Addis Ababa, the article shows the extent to which lack of democratic culture, trust and cooperative norms are closely linked with government systems, also shaping planning processes and cooperation. The article investigates why residents in two localities of Addis Ababa choose to cooperate or not in joint neighbourhood upgrading projects that local governments convene. The article aims to bring the state back into the collaborative planning discourse by analysing how government systems affect the conceptions and actions of the different urban actors in collective action.

2 Methodology

The research primarily adopts the qualitative approach and uses interviews and surveys to analyse the dynamics of collective action in two districts in Addis Ababa through local government-residents’ joint urban upgrading projects. The discussion investigates relations between government systems, planning processes, trust and cooperation in the dilapidated poor inner-city old neighbourhoods of the capital, and in poorly serviced “informal” and relatively new settlements in expansion areas of Addis Ababa.

Interviews with semi-informal resident development committee members and local government actors are used to investigate structures, processes, acceptance, support and ownership in the joint initiative. The parameters acceptance, support and ownership are used to investigate the state of cooperation. Acceptance is assessed based on favourable reception of spatial policy goals/projects. While resident support for the joint initiative is expressed in the degree of voluntary involvement and resource mobilisation, ownership is assessed in terms of the management of communal facilities and public infrastructure built through the joint initiative by beneficiaries. And through a survey of randomly selected households, the research determines the level of confidence in the respective local governments by using two parameters, corruption and the quality of service delivery in the local government, asking respondents to grade the levels of each parameter for confidence in the local government on a scale from zero to four, representing very low, low, moderate, high and very high, respectively.

By using the same grading system, the research establishes public confidence in resident development committees. To determine the type of trust that exists in the respective areas, the survey asked respondents if they sometimes leave their houses unlocked. Interviews with randomly selected households were used to establish if residents in the two localities consider that people can be generally trusted to determine the level of social trust in the respective localities. The survey also included queries designed to determine the extent of participation and transparency in planning, accountability, acceptance, support, ownership and trust.

3 Background

The nationalisation of extra urban houses through proclamation 47/75 in 1975 has had a negative impact on the physical environment of the capital of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa. Depending on the amount of monthly rents, the administrations of the nationalised houses were transferred to either kebeleFootnote 1 administrations or to a government agency established for this purpose. Most kebele houses are mud-constructed attached single-story single-room tenements. In 2008, they represented up to 66% of residential houses in the inner-city, where 42% of the city’s residents were living on only 11.2% of the total built-up area (Yitbarek 2008). The fact that nearly 82% were rented out for less than 30 birr (less than €2) per month had made the generation of funds for their maintenance difficult (Yitbarek 2008). Moreover, the 1986 Master Plan of Addis Ababa that prohibited the upgrading of such houses had prevented the able and willing tenants from maintaining their homes for more than two decades. Little has changed regarding the ownership structure and predominance of kebele houses after more than four decades, while the value of money collected from rent continues to decline and the state of dilapidation worsens. Moreover, sub-division and sub-letting by tenants despite restrictions on unauthorised transformations, as well as widespread informal land allocation by kebele authorities, has not only perpetuated illegal housing construction in the inner-city (UN-Habitat 2010), but also intensified overcrowding and the physical deterioration of most of the older inner-city neighbourhoods.

On the other hand, as the sole owner and administrator of land in Addis Ababa, the city government has neither been able to adequately supply serviced land for housing nor effectively manage lateral irregularities in land administration. The introduction of the urban land lease system in 1994 initiated the practice of attaching market value for the use right of urban land and allocating plots based on auctions. Given the limited supply of land, the system has pushed land prices up, and out of reach for the majority. As a result, a significant number of low and middle-income residents have resorted to illegally invading urban land and making unauthorised purchases from farmers on the periphery. For instance, in the six years between 1985 and 1991, the number of new, unauthorised houses built on illegally occupied land reached 13,104, but by 2002 the total number exceeded 60,000 (ORAAMP 2002). Even though government intervention regarding squatter settlements mainly constitutes bulldozing, those who had informally settled on the fringes before 1995 (and later before 2005) were legalised provided the land was not immediately needed for “public purposes”, or their safety and the safety of others was not endangered. The layouts of some of these settlements are better organised, and the houses, in some cases, are built from more durable construction materials than found in many inner-city neighbourhoods. Squatting and illegal purchases has continued to grow, and bulldozing is sometimes met with violent resistance.

The Public Participation Development Agency (PPDA) was established in 2011 under the Addis Ababa City Government’s Construction and Housing Development BureauFootnote 2 to facilitate collaboration between the city government and residents in neighbourhood upgrading. In addition to physical infrastructure and communal facility maintenance and construction, the PPDA is also responsible for coordinating, supporting and monitoring public participation in the maintenance of houses for “the poorest of the poor”. It operates through the Public Participation Development Offices (PPDOs), setup at the existing 10 sub-cities (Kifle Ketemas)Footnote 3 and 116 woreda administrations. Overall, 2.04 billion birr (around €73 million) worth of support was mobilised between 2011 and 2015 mainly from residents through the different development committees established at woreda and zoneFootnote 4 levels. In 2016, some 1,044 residents were organised in woreda core development committees (9 members per woreda), and 11,580 in zone development committees (15 members per zone). The joint initiative also uses development teams in “menders”Footnote 5 and the one-for-five structureFootnote 6 for mobilising residents. An annual budget of 100 million birr (€1.97 million at the current exchange rate) is allocated by the city government for this purpose; and a flat rate of 65% matching fund needs to be mobilised from the community by the respective development committees and deposited in a bank account dedicated for this purpose before the government’s share of 35% for the respective projects is released.

Residents elect woreda and zone level development committees through a general assembly, and members provide their services from their free time without payment. These development committees, in collaboration with the respective woreda administrations, plan, collect community contributions and facilitate the implementation of the neighbourhood upgrading projects. Woreda PPDOs support activities of zone development committees and integrate zone committees’ plans by prioritising projects based on pledged contributions in the respective zones; and woreda level core development committees submit their annual plan and copies of bank deposit receipts to the sub-city PPDO, upon which the sub-city PPDO writes a letter to Addis Ababa City Government Bureau of Finance and Economic Development for the release of government matching funds. Interviewees from the PPDA’s wing responsible for planning and public mobilisation processes contend that the programme intentionally promotes the involvement of residents in the planning, implementation, monitoring and management of the public goods and communal facilities built through the initiative to enhance community ownership.

4 Addis Ketema Sub-City, Woreda 6

Woreda 6 of Addis Ketema sub-city is located inside the deteriorated inner parts of Addis Ababa. There are around 38,000 residents in the woreda; and the size of the woreda is 64 ha. The survey was conducted on a randomly selected 154 households with an average family size of 5.9. According to the PPDA, the sub-city was the poorest performer in 2016 in terms of the volume of physical upgrading work it undertook and the resources it mobilised from residents for the joint neighbourhood upgrading initiative. The woreda development council, which is chaired by the Woreda 6 office of the ruling party, comprises 178 members of woreda and zone development committees, NGOs operating in the woreda, businessmen, community elders and religious leaders, as well as representatives of the local government.

The local government estimates that there are just over 1,500 housing units in the two zones selected for the research. Most of these housing units do not have a private kitchen or toilet and use ditches for sewage. These two zones were selected based on their performance with respect to resource mobilisation and asset management, where the performance of one was considered the best and the other the poorest by officials of the woreda administration. However, analysis of the survey data indicates that there is no significant difference between the responses of the randomly selected residents from the two zones regarding trust perceptions on processes and outcomes, and confidence in the local government and development committees. The only observable difference lies in the physical state of public goods (local cobblestone roads and drainages) and facilities (communal toilets and kitchens) built through the joint initiative. While the public goods and communal facilities in some areas of the better performing zone are in good condition, most built through the collaborative initiative in the poorer performing one are either partly damaged or no longer functional. The open ditch constructed along cobblestone roads for drainage in the poorer performing zone is clogged with debris and dirt. There are several spots where household wastewater has collected and overflows onto the road, which becomes worse during the rainy season. Some of the stones have been removed from the road and communal toilets in some areas no longer function (Fig. 2.1).

Fig. 2.1
A flowchart of the hierarchy of committees and teams involved in the resource mobilization and asset management process of the construction and housing development bureau.

(Source Interviews with experts from the PPDA and PPDOs, and members of development committees)

Structure of a local government collaborative neighbourhood upgrading programme in Addis Ababa

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Even though there are differences in the average income level of households at zone or even mender levels, out of 154 households randomly selected for the survey, less than half (41%) state that they did not make financial contributions to the joint initiative because they were poor. Depending on the specific project it was intended for, households in the respective zones had contributed around 300 birr (less than €6 at the current exchange rate) annually. Almost three-quarters of those surveyed (72%) state that the amount each household contributed for the different projects of the local government-residents’ joint upgrading initiative was either decided by semi-informal development committees established at zone levels or imposed by the woreda administration. This indicates that contributions were not voluntary as was claimed by officials. In addition, the fact that 83% of the respondents of the survey express high dissatisfaction with the physical outcome and 72% with the overall process can be evidence that the process was not participatory.

On the other hand, members of zone and woreda core development committees argue that the minimum amount regarding specific projects is decided collectively through a general assembly. However, they also state that since only a few appear for these meetings, most residents do not have firsthand knowledge. Members of zone level development committees contend that when an amount is proposed by the floor, the motion usually passes unanimously because anyone who dares to oppose is labelled “anti-development”. One adds,

We are silent flunkies. We accept and obey any decision that the local government makes without questioning for fear of repercussions. We are even afraid to resign from the committee. The people are in the same boat. So, they have no choice but to agree. They think we are government reps. Then the problem becomes ours because they won’t give us the money when we go to their doors to collect.

Another adds,

They give us a couple of hundred birr and expect us to provide the roads and facilities at each mender. We have to select what to do and where. Besides, everyone is generally tired of contributing for several causes and asks us why the government does not do it on its own.

He further elucidates that this is because local government actors repeatedly inform residents that they are required to make contributions not because the government does not have the money, but so that the residents will “own” the projects and products.

The survey shows that confidence in government and the semi-informal development committees is low. While 69% responded that their confidence in the semi-informal development committees is between low and very low, at least three-quarters of the respondents have little confidence in the local government (woreda administration). Indicative of this, 77% claim that the quality of service delivery by the woreda administration is between low and very low, and 75% claim that the level of corruption in the woreda administration is between high and very high. Furthermore, 34% claim that they either refrained from making financial contributions or contributed less than what was required because they did not believe that the money would be used for the intended purpose, while 21% claim that they only attend meetings convened by local government actors because they believe that they can get some sort of benefit by being in the good graces of local government actors.

Two individuals who had served as members of zone committees in different capacities for several years argue that mismanagement of resources mainly occurs during procurement and supervision. One of these individuals says that he had left the committee of his own volition because he could not stop local government actors from claiming purchases they did not make, awarding contracts through illicit agreements and endorsing low quality products and services. Another claims that local government actors force the hands of those in committees into authorising payments for low quality physical work, and associates lack of trust by residents for the committees with corrupt practices in the local government and delays due to civil service lethargy. He says,

The people want to see the finished products overnight and think that we have taken their money because of delays. Engineers in the woreda administrations are supposed to supervise the constructions. We are volunteers, we serve in our free time and we need government support every step of the way. They [government actors] get paid but just sit there doing nothing, and everything takes a long time before we can make headway.

Other committee members share these sentiments.

A member of one zone development committee explains that prior to 2015, activities of zone and woreda committees were not audited and thus, some members of zone and woreda committees have misappropriated resident contributions. He elaborates,

Due to lack of transparency in the local government, the people do not know how much money was embezzled. They probably think it is larger than it is and assume that we are doing the same thing. These individuals were not held accountable. In fact, one individual who was also a member of the Addis Ababa City Council was reassigned to a better position. This is the system we have in Ethiopia.

This individual was a member of the ruling party, and such individuals are perceived, and more often treated as untouchables.

Most respondents argue that it is only a few culprits who misuse facilities and selfishly cause damages to the roads constructed through the joint initiative. Even though 59% state that they have either notified the committees or the woreda (17%), 62% suggest that no action was taken. But officials in the local government and woreda PPDO disagree with this and argue that people do not intervene or report to the woreda administration when infrastructure and facilities are harmed. “They rather stay silent than quarrel with neighbours they have eaten with”. In Amharic, the phrase “they have eaten with” implies “those who have been there with you through thick and thin”. This attitude was also suggested by a senior official and an expert working in the PPDA. Nonetheless, the state of the physical infrastructure and facilities shows that lack of conformism/compliance, and confidence in the development committees and the local government are also perpetuated by a lack of accountability. This confirms Ostrom’s (1986) argument that ensuring accountability is paramount for collective action and the assertion by Khamis et al. (2006) that states that sanctions and enforcement are necessary for cooperation. Related to this, 12% contend that they refrained from making financial contributions because the infrastructure or facilities built through such endeavours would be damaged soon enough.

Most of those interviewed indicate that people generally are not to be trusted. However, 70% of the respondents maintain that they sometimes leave their doors unlocked, which may indicate that they trust their neighbours. This could also be related to the settlement pattern and housing typology as well as shared facilities that enable more interactions than in areas where secluded and more private living is possible. On the other hand, interviews with members of development committees provide a different perspective on social capital that exists in the locality. For instance, one member of a zone development committee contends,

Let us say we plan to build or repair an existing communal toilet or kitchen for ten households living inside a compound and ask each to contribute a flat rate. Some refuse to make equal contribution by arguing that they have smaller family sizes than their neighbours. Others who are not direct beneficiaries of the communal toilets urinate on the walls. And we had to spend nights guarding the dumped sub-base material and cobblestones because some residents were removing these materials to lay the ground inside their compounds or homes.

They also contend that people contribute only if they directly benefit from the intervention. And even then, the resource they willingly contribute depends on their calculation of the relative benefits to others. Another committee member suggests that some of the residents still perceive these facilities and public goods produced through the joint initiative as government property. He argues, “They are unhappy with the political system and think that they are stealing from the government”. Another agrees and states, “Some do not trust or like the government. Refusal to contribute and misuse or causing intentional damage is a reaction against the (government) system”.

Even though there are several informal community associations such as iddirs in the area, which most residents are members of, the type of social capital or particularised trust that exists in the area has not produced cooperative norms. There is a claim that bounded solidarity has dwindled following the in-migration of new and temporary residents mostly through sub-division and sub-letting of the majority of kebele-administered houses. Two development committee members of the zone also argue that those who rent makeshift beds per night carelessly destroy facilities and those who rent rooms selfishly refuse to contribute. Nonetheless, the relatively high, particularised trust in the area may have pushed aside the development of social trust as Uslaner (1999) suggests. Or the absence of trustworthy government systems and officials has prevented this particularised trust, based on proximity, from evolving into social trust as suggested by Freitag and Traunmüller (2009).

5 Bole Sub-City, Woreda 9

Woreda 9 of Bole sub-city is situated on the outer fringes of Addis Ababa and encompasses 769 ha of land with an estimated 85,000 residents. A report by the PPDA indicates that the sub-city took first prize in 2016 in the local government-residents’ collaborative neighbourhood upgrading initiative and the contribution of Woreda 9 for this was considered large. Formal and semi-informal structures and processes for the joint initiative are identical with what exists in Woreda 6 of Addis Ketema sub-city. The woreda development council has 166 members, the woreda core development committee has 9 members, there are 9 zone committees (each with 15 members), and 555 residents have been organised into 95 one-for-five structures. Out of the nine zones in Woreda 9 of Bole sub-city, Zone 2 was selected for the research upon the recommendation of the PPDA, and sub-city and woreda heads of the PPDOs. The total number of households in the zone is 900.

Most neighbourhoods in the zone had been squatter or informal settlements on illegally purchased land from farmers. Due to the difficult terrain, irregular parcellations, and lack of social services nearby, residents had faced challenges getting the sick to hospitals. Women had to carry water uphill several times a day, and children had to travel long distances to school. Furthermore, the streets had been too narrow and muddy, making the settlements inaccessible to ambulances or fire trucks. However, except for a few, most households have recently received title deeds certifying land use rights. The survey was conducted on a randomly selected 124 households with an average family size of 3.8. The majority who participated in the survey claim that they had lived in the area since the year 2000.

Major interventions by the joint upgrading initiative in the area constituted the construction of 3.1 km of cobblestone local roads, 230 m of open ditches and 1566 m of culverts. Nearly 1.4 million birr in cash, 410,000 birr worth of labour and 87,000 birr worth of materials were mobilised from residents. Clearing right-of-way for the local roads had affected 78 residential houses in the zone. In addition, 116 fences delineating private compounds needed to be moved back and re-erected which according to the woreda PPDO office sacrificed 1,132,950 birr, making the total contribution of residents reach 3.03 million birr (€5,987 at the current exchange rate). Zone development committee members claim that while almost all had willingly agreed to either take down their walls and fences without any kind of compensation, less than half a dozen had initially refused in one mender. But most finally agreed after the committees used scare tactics by labelling those who remained adamant as “anti-development”. One claims, “A couple of residents connected to individuals in the woreda leadership are still giving us headaches”.

Even though 81% of the respondents of the survey claim that the amount of the contribution they had to make was decided by development committees,Footnote 7 95% state that they made the contributions to the initiative willingly. And more than 65% agree that local cobblestone road construction addresses the most pressing challenge in the area. These responses indicate that the initiative had addressed the needs of the majority better than in Woreda 6 of Addis Ketema sub-city even though the level of participation and transparency in decision-making was equally questionable. Related to this, zone committee members state that they had faced relatively few challenges in collecting community contributions that were paid in three instalments. The total amount was at least 16 times more than the residents of Woreda 6 of Addis Ketema sub-city had to contribute annually for a project. Even though they badly needed the roads, some initially had refused to pay their share as a result of insecurities related to lack of tenure security. In the eyes of the law, they were squatters without legal rights when the project started in 2011. Moreover, mismanagement of funds by previous committees had made some suspicious. Unlike in Woreda 6 of Addis Ketema sub-city, zone committee members acknowledge and applaud the continuous support they had received from individuals in the woreda PPDO. They also used different sanctions, including refusing to write a support letter for the issuance of resident identification cards to the woreda administration for those who did not contribute. Residents who refused to contribute were also prohibited from making a private connection to the main water distribution line brought to the area through the initiative. The woreda administration had provided support for the enforcement of these sanctions.

Not all localities in the zone benefited from the infrastructure projects even though cash contributions had been collected from residents in all neighbourhoods of the zone. The size of the area vis-à-vis the number of households had required larger contributions, but sparse settlement patterns, leapfrogging and legal right issues had made some benefit more than others from the projects. For instance, a few are settled on land reserved as a green buffer zone by the local development plan for the river nearby. As a result, the authorisation of the project as well as the provision of title deeds were delayed in these settlements, which increased tenure insecurities and angered those who had already contributed the required amount of cash. For instance, out of the 240 households in one such settlement or mender, the construction of local cobblestone roads could not be extended to serve 60 households. This created a rift between zone committees and the households. As a result, these households discontinued their contribution for the joint initiative. Tension between residents of the different neighbourhoods also developed. But committee members argue that sub-city officials and civil servants created some conflicts that could have been avoided. In addition to delaying the provision of street designs, which negatively impacted community confidence in the local government and the zone development committee, the design the sub-city finally endorsed indicates that there may have been some irregularities involved. For example, the road designs introduced different right-of-ways in which next-door neighbours on the same street had to setback their properties for either an eight, seven or six metre wide local road.

The cobblestone local roads and open ditches are of better quality and still in good condition. Zone committee members disclosed that the sub-base material and cobblestones dumped on the site were guarded, used without delay and the residuals collected on the spot. The group discussion with zone committee members also reveals that the reason for the better performance in terms of community resource mobilisation and the better state of the physical infrastructure is directly or indirectly related to property right issues. One committee member expounds,

The government does not recognise these kinds of settlements and will not provide physical infrastructure. It was a good opportunity that we did not dare miss. Those in the inner city have access to everything because of proximity and since the government provides these infrastructures [in legal settlements]. They may not feel they have to protect assets or contribute because they have not experienced what we had to go through and thus take things for granted.

Another one adds,

The community is linked through iddirs and other [informal social] associations. And most of us are in the same trade and frequently interact to share information with regard to jobs. We had been here for several years struggling and are used to working together to solve our own problems. That is why we value and protect our assets. Everyone protects the cobblestone road in front of their house as if it was inside their sitting room.

These statements seem to verify the argument by Ansell and Gash (2008) that a history of cooperation makes collective action more likely. Working through the project with the local government was also construed as the first step to government recognition for the legalisation of the settlement and properties.

We concede that lack of property rights was also a major motivating factor for dedicating our energy and resources to the initiative. We have been the first to arrive when they [local government actors] call meetings or ask residents to contribute to whatever cause they have on their agendas. But I can guarantee that our support has not dwindled after we received the title deeds.

Confidence in the zone committee is low for 32% of respondents, medium for 46%, and between very high and high for 22%. None of the respondents indicated that their confidence in the committee is very low. Confidence in the local government is also relatively better than in Woreda 6 of Addis Ketema sub-city. Indicative of this, service delivery by the local government is very high and high for 17%, medium for 42% and a lesser proportion than Woreda 6 residents (close to 41%) said that it is either low or very low. Corruption in the woreda administration is rated either very low or low for 53%, medium for 39% and between high and very high for the remaining 8%. However, 68% state that they do not leave their houses with the doors unlocked. Interviews with randomly selected individuals revealed that this does not necessarily mean that particularised trust or social capital in the area is lower than what exists in Woreda 6 of Addis Ketema sub-city. The location of the zone, sparse settlement patterns with vegetation and private compounds that reduce visibility make the area less secure. Social trust is nonetheless low as most interviewed had responded in the negative when asked if people can generally be trusted.

To conclude, a draft report prepared in 2017 for the PPDA by the Addis Ababa University on research conducted in 91 woredas of Addis Ababa indicates that 71% of respondents were willing to continue their contribution and participation in the local government-residents’ joint upgrading initiative. The report also shows that income levels are not directly related to individuals’ support, while property rights, type of tenure and corruption-related perceptions regarding the management of funds are. This research also shows that most respondents in both woredas want these kinds of initiatives to continue, but those in Woreda 6 of Addis Ketema are more reluctant than those in Woreda 9 of Bole to contribute their share. Even though most families in the investigated zones of Woreda 6 of Addis Ketema live inside public rental houses, residency of more than forty years and use rights that are passed down to children make tenants perceive these properties as their own, giving them a higher perception of tenure security than those in Woreda 9 of Bole. Strangely, this provides a stark contrast to the assertion by Agrawal and Ostrom (2001) on the implication of property rights on collective action (Table 2.1).

Table 2.1 Survey results for confidence in the local government and semi-informal community development committees
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Social trust that could have provided the basic minimum level of trust needed for collective action and building trust is similarly low in both woredas. However, the type of social capital or particularised trust found in Woreda 6 of Addis Ketema sub-city has not enabled cooperation (in terms of acceptance, support and ownership). Moreover, misuse and mismanagement of public goods and communal facilities in Woreda 6 of Addis Ketema is as much a reaction against government systems as it is a lack of civic morality which the particularised type of trust in the area has not enabled. Yet with the contribution of government support, membership in such institutions also enhanced through years of working together to improve living conditions in underserviced squatter settlements and lack of tenure security have facilitated cooperation in Woreda 9 of Bole sub-city. Lack of confidence in the semi-informal committees or local government actors in the above two cases varies and is directly related to confidence in the respective local governments. However, irregularities in government systems, albeit inside higher hierarchies, have created social rifts between neighbourhoods and neighbours in Woreda 9 of Bole sub-city. Lack of transparency in selection of projects and project sites, and top-down imposition of the amount of contribution may have deterred overall willingness and satisfaction in Woreda 6 of Addis Ketema sub-city. In the case of Woreda 9 of Bole sub-city, overall satisfaction is better because the selected projects were more responsive to the needs of residents and the better quality of physical assets even though, likewise, there was a low level of transparency in the decision-making process. This is also directly related to norms in the local government. Finally, it is not social trust that created better opportunities for cooperation in Woreda 9, but rather years of toiling together for place making, moderate confidence in the local government, government support and property right issues, that played a great part.

6 Conclusion

The main conception of the state in collaborative/participatory planning discussions emphasises the government agency-community interaction (Ansell and Gash 2008) rather than taking a comprehensive view of the effect of the state or government systems on the system context in which collective action such as planning takes place. Where state characteristics or undemocratic government systems shape the system context, democratic planning processes, trust and cooperation are compromised.

Even though Freitag and Bühlmann (2009) state that trust among members in democratic systems tends to contribute towards the development of social trust, the research shows that the particularised form of trust and social capital that exists in the type of political/institutional environment found in Ethiopia does not provide a good foundation for cooperation or collaborative planning. Even Knack’s (2002) argument that the effect of such ties, networks or membership on building trust remains within the network or among members falls short as the particularised form of trust that exists has not been able to create cooperation. In addition, the research provides evidence that cooperation is not motivated by shared goals or a we-intention, trust or some moral as Deutsch (1949), Tuomela and Miller (1985) and Daniel (1994) argue. Rather, people are willing to be part of a collective action in this kind of institutional/political environment only when they do not have other alternatives or are coerced. Agrawal and Ostrom’s (2001) claim that individuals calculate their net benefit from collective action against their cost is not always the case because the research also shows that individuals base this calculation by weighing the net benefit against the benefit of participating others. And a history of cooperation works largely when it is based on sanctions as well as shared purposes. In addition, the research shows that membership in social associations (Paxton 2002) or networks (Paxton 2007) do not always guarantee the development of social trust and social capital that can be mobilised voluntarily for collective action or form the preconditions to institute collaborative planning or cooperation. Moreover, the discussion on civil society in the collaborative literature pertains to their role in articulating the interests of political communities (Healey 1999; Booher and Innes 2005). However, the research demonstrates that government systems also penetrate civil society organisations or community associations, diminishing their overall acceptance and their role in articulating public demand and bridging differences between the state and the people.

As de Satgé and Watson (2018: 8) argue, the “thin and instrumental assumptions” that planning theories make regarding the applicability of public participation or collaborative planning do not fit in with what is on the ground in other contexts, such as what is found in many parts of Africa. Yiftachel (2006) makes similar arguments by stating that practices and possibilities of planning in societies where there are fewer personal liberties, less stable property and different configurations of rationalities, among other things, require rethinking planning theorisation. The basic minimum level of trust needed for building trust and enabling cooperation, democratic institutions and culture for conducting democratic planning processes and ultimately building more participatory forms of democracy, or even the willingness to be part of a collective action may not be available in a political/institutional environment shaped by less democratic states and government systems. For instance, empirical studies have shown that social trust in African countries is low (Delhey and Newton 2004; Freitag and Bühlmann 2009). There are practical difficulties in accommodating collaborative planning methods even in countries with more liberal democratic traditions (Harris 2002). For instance, systems and environments that perpetuate individualism over social responsibilities hinder collective actions. Healey (1996) acknowledged the long way to transforming adversarial habits associated with neoliberal emphasis on competition and paternalistic government cultures. And there is evidence that collective action is being eroded faster in liberal democracies than in nations with more social democratic traditions (Putnam 1995; Delhey and Newton 2004; Stolle and Hooghe 2005; Freitag and Bühlmann 2009).

Therefore, as Healey (2003) argues, understanding socially constructed and embedded concepts and rationalities to pragmatically shape the process as per the specificity of local conditions of social structures, power relations and political possibilities highlights the need for designing planning processes within the framework of a given system’s context. In a more democratic institutional/political environment, there may be a need to pay more attention to power structures born out of cultural specificities or the political economy. On the other hand, realities in the Global South necessitate focusing on the relationship between the government and the people, as the state in less democratic systems is stronger in penetrating society and shaping social norms and the world-view of actors (O’Donnell 1993). Hence, understanding the dynamics in state–society relations will clarify how certain aspects of social belief systems (for instance, trust and collectivism) are affected by government systems and become socially embedded. This will provide insight on how to organise more contextualised and accommodating planning processes or at least determine what works where.