Abstract
This chapter argues that epistemic charity (EC) is a necessary deliberative virtue during times of populist polarization. Section “Epistemic Charity” identifies three features of EC: (1) EC seeks to discover truth in an opponent’s position when plausibly possible, (2) EC seeks to interpret an opponent’s argument in the most rational way possible, and (3) EC seeks to respect an opponent during a deliberative exchange. Section “Populist Polarization as an Epistemic Challenge” introduces the notion of populist polarization, where I contend that populist polarization occurs when opposing populist movements—with hostility between competing “elites”—claim to express the general will of the people. Such a circumstance illustrates the unique relevance of EC as a deliberative virtue. Section “Applying Epistemic Charity to Populist Polarization” then attempts to explicate this unique relevance by contrasting EC with the related virtues of open-mindedness and intellectual humility.
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Notes
- 1.
I call this first feature non-essential, since one can practice EC in situations where CM is not justified. That said, EC is still unique in its ability to undermine the negative epistemic effects of CM. This is even true in epistemically hostile environments, where CM is justified. For situations where CM is justified, see Battaly (2018a, b).
- 2.
This first condition modifies Glüer’s description of the principle of charity: “Assign truth conditions to alien sentences that make native speakers right when plausibly possible” (Glüer 2006, 339).
- 3.
Blackburn describes charity as a principle that “constrains the interpreter to maximize the truth or rationality in the subject’s sayings” (Blackburn 2016, 79). Likewise, Roberts and Wood describe EC as “an attitude toward, most notably, interlocutors and authors of texts. If one reads a text charitably, one is reading the text as coming from an author who would like to be treated with respect and goodwill” (Roberts and Wood 2009, 73).
- 4.
Roberts and Wood explain that the goals of charity are “not embarrassing my interlocutor, making him aware of my respect for him, staying on friendly terms with him, and bringing it about that he gets some genuine intellectual goods out of our conversation” (Roberts and Wood 2009, 73–74).
- 5.
Given this definition, I disagree with those who claim that charity is not primarily aimed at epistemic goods. For example, Roberts and Wood argue that intellectual charity “has a distinct motivation component, but unless we confuse it with love of knowledge (both being loves in some sense), charity’s motivation does not seem to be directed at an intellectual good” (Roberts and Wood 2009, 73). Instead, they contend that charity is more about loving God or fellow human beings. On their account, the reason charity might be considered an intellectual virtue is because it “enhances the agent’s prospects of achieving the aims of the intellectual life” (ibid.). To truly be charitable, however, one must display goodwill toward one’s interlocutor. Therefore, If one seeks good epistemic effects, Roberts and Wood argue that one is really displaying the love of knowledge. On my account, charity is an intellectual virtue because it provides epistemic goods in three ways: (1) those acting charitably will receive epistemic benefits, (2) those receiving charity will receive epistemic benefits, and (3) intellectually charitable acts will create an epistemic environment that more suitable for delivering epistemic goods.
- 6.
James Spiegel agrees with this interpretation of Hare, and notes, “[On Hare’s view, to] refuse to consider the possibility that one’s view is false is to be dogmatic and closed-minded, an attitude that is evident when a person refuses to even listen to objections or counterarguments” (Spiegel 2019, 176).
- 7.
On this definition of open-minded, Gardner explains, “I am open-minded … about whether soft drugs should be legalized, about whether Britain should become a republic, and about whether the salmon season in England should be extended. I have thought about these things, I have even listened to some of the arguments about them, but I have no views, certainly no firm views, for or against” (Gardner 1993, 39).
- 8.
Of course, this might cause some to feel epistemically vulnerable. Roberts and Wood note that a person with intellectual charity “may be at an epistemic disadvantage in a situation dominated by hardened egoistic hyper-autonomous cut-throat intellectuals” (Roberts and Wood 2009, 81). Even so, I do not think such vulnerability detracts from my overall argument. In fact, I think that epistemic vulnerability, in such cases, might be complementary with EC as another unique intellectual virtue within epistemically hostile environments.
- 9.
I should note that some argue that the virtue of charity is unique, in that charity does not (or ought not) seek benefits from engaging in charitable acts. Roberts and Wood, for example, provide this clarification of intellectual charity: “If I make a ‘charitable’ interpretation of [a] passage, because doing so will enable me to better crush the author in the noetic dust under my feet, then I have not acted charitably, even if I have acted ‘charitably’. But even if I ‘use’ charity in the interest of knowledge and understanding, rather than of crushing my opponents, I do not act from the virtue of charity, since the characteristic aim of charity is the well-being of a person” (Roberts and Wood 2009, 74). While this clarification might be true (though I am not fully convinced) when it comes to one’s personal motivation, I do not think it is true when it comes to understanding the overall effects of charitable acts. One of my assumptions concerning all of the virtues is that they should lead to good effects. Concerning intellectual virtues, a particular trait should be considered an intellectual virtue if, and only if, it leads to good epistemic effects. The notion of EC is no different. For EC to be considered an intellectual virtue, it should lead to good epistemic effects—for those engaging in epistemically charitable acts, for those receiving epistemic charity, and for the overall epistemic environment.
- 10.
Concerning the additional category of victimization, Goldberg writes, “Populism is fueled by resentment, the sense that the ‘real people’ are being kept down or exploited by the elites or the establishment or, in numerous extreme cases of populism, shadowy conspirators” (Goldberg 2018, 294).
- 11.
Conversely, she considers a vice as an acquired defect.
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Berhow, M.C. (2022). Epistemic Charity in Times of Populist Polarization. In: Peterson, G.R., Berhow, M.C., Tsakiridis, G. (eds) Engaging Populism. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-05785-4_9
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