Abstract
Introduced into Western scholarship briefly for the first time in the late nineteenth century and later more elaborately in the fourth quarter of the twentieth century, the Persian philosopher of the Safavid period Mullā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī (d. 1045/1635-6) has so far been studied for his ontology, epistemology, eschatology, political philosophy, and commentaries on the Qurʾan and Tradition. One area of his work that has not been studied as much is logical theory and meta-theory. This chapter focuses on Mullā Ṣadrā’s meta-theory of logic with respect to three subjects that he discussed in his logical and philosophical writings. First, the place of logic among sciences that also includes the question of the subject matter of logic. Second, the relation between logic and ontology of knowledge that shapes his position on the nature of assent. Third, his confirmation of Shihāb al-Dīn Suhrawardī’s modification of modal logic, which Mullā Ṣadrā defends based on his own existence-centered metaphysics.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
This treatise is also known as al-Lumaʿāt al-mashriqiyya that is translated into Farsi and annotated by Mishkāt al-Dīnī (1981).
- 4.
Since in this article I discuss Avicenna’s meta-theory of logic only as a background for understanding Mullā Ṣadrā’s position, in discussing the former, I rely on secondary sources by experts in the field and references to primary texts are through those secondary sources. The question of the subject matter of logic in Avicenna is still an ongoing conversation among Avicenna scholars.
- 5.
In his forthcoming book, Hodges provides a more formal treatment of this topic and concludes the discussion as follows: “In a nutshell, Ibn Sīna’s characterization of the subject term of logic answers the question ‘What does it mean for logic to be formal?’, and his answer bears close comparison with the views of Bolzano. His characterization of the ‘features’ of the subject individuals answers a different question, namely ‘What are the logical constants?’ The reader should be warned that over the centuries, Ibn Sīna’s characterization of the subject term of logic has captured the interest of quite a number of people whose logical knowledge didn’t reach to distinguishing between these two questions. As a result one often sees a confusion between the subject individuals of logic, which are arbitrary well-fined meanings, and their ‘features’, which are a small group of higher-order concepts.” (Hodges, forthcoming, p. 69)
- 6.
This movement was resisted by a group of philosophers and logicians, most prominently, Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī (d. 672/1274), Shams al-Dīn Samarqandī (d. 722/1322) and Quṭb al-Dīn Rāzī Tahtānī (d. 766/1365) who advocated for the Avicennan position on the subject matter of logic and critiqued the other trend (El-Rouayheb, 2012).
- 7.
In this regard, Chatti (2019, p. 21) quotes Ṭūsī’s commentary on al-Ishārāt where he expounds on Avicenna’s definition of logic by saying that logic is “a science by itself (ʿilmun bi nafsihi) and a tool with regard to other sciences…”
- 8.
For the further shift through Khūnajī’s students from “conception and assent” to “the objects of conception and assent,” see El-Rouayheb (2012, p. 72).
- 9.
All quotations from Mullā Ṣadrā’s texts are my translation unless noted otherwise.
- 10.
I have made slight changes in Inati’s translation (1984) of this passage.
- 11.
- 12.
In his Tanzīl al-afkār, Abharī tries to prove that the subject matter of logic is “conceptions” and “assents,” against which Ṭūsī has a detailed argument in his Taʿdīl al-miʿyār fī naqd tanzīl al-afkār (El-Rouayheb, 2012, pp. 78–80).
- 13.
Robert Wisnovsky (2000) has a profound discussion on this topic and considers the difference of opinions among Avicenna scholars to have been caused by Avicenna’s developing ideas across his different writings. Wisnovsky (2000, pp. 199–200, footnote 36) correctly mentions that Catholic interpreters of Avicenna have for the most part understood him to imply that existence is “attached” to essence as an accident.
- 14.
In Mullā Ṣadrā’s metaphysics, existence is the reality with essences being determinations of it in the mind as he says in al-Asfār “the quiddity (al-māhiyya) itself is not one of the things (shay’un min al-ashyā) unless it becomes existent because its very quiddity depends on the realization of its existence (taḥaqquq wujūdihā).” (1999, I, p. 75; 2014, p. 15)
- 15.
The debate over the status of philosophical secondary intelligibles dates back to Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī and the ambiguity in his treatment of the topic. For a history of the topic and Ṭūsī’s influence on later thinkers, see Sharif and Javadi (2009).
- 16.
For example, in his al-Taʿlīqāt, Avicenna (1972, p. 167) discusses secondary intelligibles in the context of describing the subject matter of logic. There he argues that “secondary intelligibles” are first proved in “metaphysics” and then they become the subject matter of logic only by virtue of directing the mind from the known to the unknown. However, this is debatable and the present article is primarily concerned with Mullā Ṣadrā’s understanding of Avicenna in favor of his own existence-centered metaphysics.
- 17.
Parildar (2017) offers a detailed discussion of how the ontology of knowledge in Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy explains his position on conception and assent.
- 18.
For this treatise, I translate from the original Arabic that is available as an appendix in Ibn al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī’s Jawhar al-naḍīd fī sharḥ manṭiq al-tajrīd (1894). For a different English translation of the cited passages from this treatise, see Lameer (2006).
- 19.
Mullā Ṣadrā devoted a chapter of al-Asfār (1999, vol. 1, pp. 263–326) to the topic of mental existence (al-wujūd al-dhihnī) which is an essential concept in his ontology of knowledge. On this topic, see Rizvi (2009, pp. 77–101).
- 20.
- 21.
In their footnotes on their translation of the passage, Haʾirī Yazdī (1988, p. 33, n.1) and following him Lameer (2006, p, 112, n.5) provide examples for active and passive knowledge. Active knowledge is such as God’s knowledge of everything other than his own essence or the knowledge that a cause has of its effect. Passive knowledge is the knowledge that humans have of the extra-mental world via noetic forms. As we can see, these examples exclude the immediate knowledge that both God and human beings have of themselves, i.e. knowledge by presence (al-ʿilm al-ḥuḍūrī), which is central to Mullā Ṣadrā’s theory of knowledge since he argues that all knowledge is possible against the backdrop of knowledge by presence that is immediate, i.e. not in need of noetic forms. For elaborate discussions of Mullā Ṣadrā’s theory of knowledge, see Haʾirī Yazdī (1992), Kalin (2010).
- 22.
Mullā Ṣadrā’s professed indebtedness to Suhrawardī is noticeable in many parts of his philosophy. Yet, for the most part, he adopts from Suhrawardī what reinforces his own position rather than accepting the latter’s ideas in their totality. One of the most important instances of this approach is the adoption of Suhrawardī’s concept of gradation (tashkīk) that is applied to essence/quiddity in the Illuminationist ontology (Suhrawardī, 1999). Mullā Ṣadrā depart from Suhrawardī by applying “gradation” to existence rather than essence. According to Mullā Ṣadrā, “the instances of being are different in terms of intensity and weakness as such, priority and posteriority as such; nobility and baseness as such, although the universal concepts applicable to it and abstracted from it, named quiddities, are in contrast essentially, in terms of genus, species, or accidents (Shīrāzī, 1999, IX: 186).”
- 23.
For Mullā Ṣadrā, knowledge is a mode of being realized for an immaterial being such as the human soul and is issued from the soul itself since “God has created the human soul with the power to create forms of both immaterial and material objects (Shīrāzī, 1999, I: pp. 264–265).” In his theories of knowledge and truth, the correspondence between our knowledge and the extra-mental world is justified because the mind creates forms as the mental or ideal existence of the material objects. The mental or ideal existence ranks higher in its intensity than those forms which are dependent on the matter because the immaterial is always more intense in existence than the material (Kalin, 2014, pp. 121–123; Meisami, 2013, pp. 44–47).
- 24.
In Suhrawardī’s texts and all commentaries on him in both Arabic and Persian this term appears as “بتاته”.
- 25.
I have made slight changes to Ziai’s translation of the passage. According to Hossein Ziai in his explanatory note on the above passage from Ḥikmat al-ishrāq, the term “definitively necessary proposition” has no precedence before Suhrawardī and in contemporary formal logic it is comparable to a type of “iterated modal proposition” (Suhrawardī, 1999, p. 173, n. 20).
- 26.
Other than in Ḥikmat al-ishrāq, Suhrawardī mentions this thesis in the logic part of al-Talwīhāt al-lawḥiyya wa’l-ʿarshiyya only in passing: “if the mode (jihat) becomes a part of the predicate (juzʾ al-maḥmūl), then the relation (rabṭ) would be necessary” (Suhrawardī, 1955, p. 90).
- 27.
- 28.
The other case is section five under part four that he titles as “Sparkle of Wisdom” (lumʿa ḥakamiyya). In this section Mullā Ṣadrā introduces an additional condition for negation of propositions, namely, “unity of predication” (wiḥdat al-ḥaml). (2006, p. 214).
- 29.
Avicenna regards such propositions as definite and particular. According to him, “if it is evident that the judgment is about some and does not extend to the rest, or it extends [to the rest] in an indirect manner, then the definite proposition is particular” (Avicenna, 1984, p. 80).
- 30.
Chatti (2016) draws attention to the “complexity” of Avicenna’s position on existential import. According to her definition of existential import, “a categorical proposition of the form subject-predicate, whether singular, indefinite or quantified, has an existential import if and only if it requires the existence of its subject’s referent(s) to be true,” and the corollary of this is “if such a proposition has an existential import, it implies the existence of the objects satisfying the subject term. If it can be true when the subject is empty, it does not have an import.” (p. 47)
- 31.
The application of this position on existential import could impact syllogistics in problematic ways, which is beyond the scope of this paper and requires further study and evaluation by logicians.
- 32.
This may be interpreted as a combination of de re and de dicto senses: That the above propositions are respectively possible and impossible de re, but both are necessary de dicto. Yet, the application of the medieval logical terms de re and dicto, in Arabic logic is debatable. As far as Avicenna’s modal logic is concerned, Bäck (1992, pp. 229–231) argues against corresponding what he calls Avicenna’s “strict necessity” and “derivative necessity” with de re and de dicto despite “the temptation” to do so. On the other hand, Chatti (2014) argues for the existence of de re/de dicto distinction in Avicenna’s modal logic though she admits that his “treatment of modal propositions remains incomplete.” Also, Thom (2008) discusses the de re/de dicto distinction in the context of investigating the metaphysical application of Avicenna’s modal theory.
- 33.
I have made slight changes in Ziai’s translation.
- 34.
This gives rise to the question whether for Mullā Ṣadrā, existence is a real predicate. In the history of Western philosophy Emmanuel Kant is credited with raising the issue and arguing that existence is not a real predicate, hence for him the failure of the ontological arguments for the existence of God. But Rescher (1960) argues that Abū Naṣr Fārābī (d. 339/950) initiated this question long before Kant, and Avicenna too pursued the discussion. Both philosophers are said to have addressed this question mainly for its metaphysical import regarding the distinction between essence and existence (pp. 429–430). Mullā Ṣadrā departs from the Peripatetic understanding of the relation between existence and essence since for him existence is the only authentic reality and in existential propositions, existence is the subject not the predicate. For Mullā Ṣadrā, “X exists” means “this existence is X” where “X” signifies a determination of existence in the mind. In the extra-mental world, there is only existence, and quiddity is only predicated of existence in the mind (Shīrāzī, 2014; p. 32).
- 35.
On the usage of “syncategoremata” and “categoremata,” in classical Arabic logic, see Chatti (2014b)
- 36.
- 37.
Mullā Ṣadrā’s use of two different terms, “ḍarūra” and “wujūb” for necessity recalls Avicenna’s application of them. Bäck (2018, p. 20) argues that there are two types of “necessary” for Avicenna which are expressed by the two different Arabic terms, “wājib” and “ḍarūrī,” with the latter having a more general sense and used in logical discussions while the former is used in metaphysical discussions which address the Necessary Being. For the different meanings of necessity in Avicenna, also see Chatti (2014a, pp. 336–337).
- 38.
According to Avicenna, the general possibility (al-imkān al-ʿāmm) is “that which accompanies the negation of the necessity of non-existence.” And the narrow-possibility (al-imkān al-khāṣṣ) “is meant that which accompanies the negation of both the necessity of non-existence as well as the necessity of existence, attributed to a subject.” (Avicenna, 1984, p. 95) In modern logic, these two notions are referred to as “one-sided possibility (“M”) and two-sided possibility (“Q”)” which in addition to the notion of “necessity” and “impossibility” comprise “the alethic modalities” (Thom, 2008, p. 361). Hodges (2010) and Chatti (2014a) examine the different meanings of possibility and according to the latter, the “narrow-possible is the one that Avicenna considers as the genuine meaning of possibility” (p. 335).
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Meisami, S. (2022). Shīrzī and the Meta-TTheory of Logic?>Mullā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī and the Meta-Theory of Logic. In: Chatti, S. (eds) Women's Contemporary Readings of Medieval (and Modern) Arabic Philosophy. Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning, vol 28. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-05629-1_3
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