Skip to main content

Part of the book series: Issues in Business Ethics ((EVBE,volume 53))

  • 790 Accesses

Abstract

The work of Donaldson and Dunfee (Ties That Bind: A Social Contracts Approach to Business Ethics, 1999) offers an example of how normative and descriptive approaches to business ethics can be integrated. We suggest that to be truly integrative, however, the theory should explore the processes by which such integration happens. We, therefore, sketch some preliminary thoughts that extend Integrative Social Contracts Theory (ISCT) by beginning to consider the process by which microsocial contracts are connected to hypernorms.

Originally published in: J Bus Ethics, 88, 685–692 © Springer, 2009

Reprint by Springer, DOI 10.1007/s10551-009-0333-4

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 89.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Hardcover Book
USD 119.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    Though this essay is in honor of Tom Dunfee, Tom Donaldson is one of our important conversational partners as well, and we thank him for his helpful feedback on an earlier draft.

  2. 2.

    The challenge of connecting microsocial contracts with hypernorms bears some similarity to the issue of resolving moral disagreement among actors that lack common normative ground – a common problem. Although discourse ethics (e.g., Habermas 1990) approaches this challenge mainly as a problem of moral justification, others (e.g., Painter-Moreland 2008; Stansbury 2009) have begun to focus on the application of discourse ethics to organizational contexts.

  3. 3.

    See Donaldson and Preston (1995) for a fuller discussion of these distinctions.

  4. 4.

    If Donaldson and Dunfee had simply left out “economic” and made sense of microsocial contracts in terms of “communities”, then we would see “business” as a normal part of “community”. The problem is that there would not appear to be a special role of “economic ethics” here. That doesn’t seem to be a problem unless one is worried about keeping a special role for “business ethics” within either philosophical or management theory.

  5. 5.

    Language shapes how we see the world. Words shape our actions. Philosophers such as Wittgenstein, Dewey, Quine, Putnam, Davidson, and Rorty have outlined a view of language that relies on understanding the multiple tasks of language, rather than searching for a particular meaning or set of meanings. Wittgenstein’s ([1952]2001) idea of “don’t ask for the meaning, ask for the use” reminds us that language shapes what we do, how we interact with each other, and how we create meaning for each other. Quine’s (1960) view of the indeterminacy of translation illustrates how interpretation and conversation are always an issue. If part of the normative task of scholars is to show us how to live better, then the Duhem metaphor of rebuilding the ship while it remains afloat shows the connection between the micro real world (the ship) and making it better (the rebuilding). Putnam (2002) asks us to see such an entanglement of facts and values (and for Dewey ([1927]1954), means and ends) as a normal part of the way that language works, even in science (Kuhn 1962). Rorty (1981) reminds us that the whole edifice of the “meaning” of the words simply takes the Greek ocular metaphor far past where it is useful. Our “web of belief” (c.f. Quine 1951) is always revisable, and Davidson (2001) reminds us of language’s constitutive role in the making of meaning.

  6. 6.

    This highlights a related problem: what to make of inconsistency of actions? Merck is a saint for donating Mectizan (in perhaps the most famous case in business ethics), but then they are proclaimed sinners for their behavior in the Vioxx case. The recognition of both organizational complexity and the connection between microsocial norms and generalized hypernorms might be useful in making sense of these kinds of actions.

References

  • Davidson, D. 2001. Inquiries Into Truth and Interpretation. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Dewey, J. [1927]1954. The Public and Its Problems. Athens: Ohio University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Donaldson, T., and T. Dunfee. 1999. Ties That Bind: A Social Contracts Approach to Business Ethics. Cambridge: Harvard Business School Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Donaldson, T., and L. Preston. 1995. The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation: Concepts, Evidence and Implications. Academy of Management Review 20 (1): 65–91.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Granovetter, M. 1985. Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness. The American Journal of Sociology 91 (3): 481–510.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Habermas, J. 1990. Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. Trans. C. Lenhardt and S. W. Nicholsen. Cambridge: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Harris, J.D., and R.E. Freeman. 2008. The Impossibility of the Separation Thesis. Business Ethics Quarterly 18 (4): 541–548.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kuhn, T.S. 1962. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nagel, T. 1986. The View from Nowhere. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Painter-Moreland, M. 2008. Business Ethics as Practice: Ethics as the Everyday Business of Business. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Putnam, H. 2002. The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Quine, W.V.O. 1951. Two Dogmas of Empiricism. The Philosophical Review 60 (1): 20–43.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • ———. 1960. Word and Object. Cambridge: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rawls, J. 1971. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Rorty, R. 1981. Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Searle, J.R. 1964. How to Derive “Ought” From “Is”. The Philosophical Review 73 (1): 43–58.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Stansbury, J. 2009. Reasoned Moral Agreement: Applying Discourse Ethics within Organizations. Business Ethics Quarterly 19 (1): 33–56.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Werhane, P.H. 1999. Moral Imagination and Management Decision Making. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wittgenstein, L. [1952]2001. Philosophical Investigations. Trans. G. E. M. Anscombe. Oxford: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to R. Edward Freeman .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2023 Springer Nature Switzerland AG

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Freeman, R.E., Harris, J.D. (2023). Creating Ties That Bind. In: Dmytriyev, S.D., Freeman, R.E. (eds) R. Edward Freeman’s Selected Works on Stakeholder Theory and Business Ethics. Issues in Business Ethics(), vol 53. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-04564-6_34

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics