Abstract
Andrew Ward argues, at odds with the standard interpretation of Hume on the self, that the Appendix does not express Hume’s dissatisfaction with the bundle theory or with his scepticism concerning personal identity. The Appendix, rather, is designed to clarify and strengthen Hume’s scepticism: after publishing Book I of the Treatise Hume realises that there is not only no positive evidence for realist accounts of personal identity, but that, given two principles of his philosophy, such accounts are self-contradictory. This is the message of the Appendix.
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Notes
- 1.
Locke (1975, 2.27 [‘Of Identity and Diversity’], sections 4, 5, and 10). This chapter was first published in the second edition (1794).
- 2.
Strictly, what Hume here refers to as ‘impressions of the memory’ are ideas; but owing (in general) to their greater force and liveliness than the ideas of the imagination, he often terms them ‘impressions’ (see T. 1.1.3, 1.3.5).
- 3.
See (T 1.4.6.6, 22). Cf. ‘Of the ancient philosophy’ (T 1.4.4.2–4) where a parallel account is offered of belief in material substance.
- 4.
For a clear statement of this well-known objection, see Mackie (1976, 200–201).
- 5.
- 6.
- 7.
The general point at issue here is summed up in a very clear passage in his later Enquiry concerning human understanding: ‘The first time a man saw the communication of motion by impulse, as by the shock of two billiard balls, he could not pronounce that the one event was connected: but only that it was conjoined with the other. After he has observed several instances of this nature, he then pronounces them to be connected. What alteration has happened to give rise to this new idea of connexion? Nothing but that he now feels these events to be connected in his imagination, and can readily foretel the existence of the one from the appearance of the other’ (EHU 7.28). It is not, I suggest, of any relevance that, with the self, we are concerned with the conjunction of perceptions (frequently recalled) rather than the conjunction of material objects (frequently observed). In each case, we believe we are acquainted with a causal connection between the given data; whereas all that is discoverable is one event regularly following another, together with the association of their ideas in the imagination. That we talk of a cause having the power to produce an effect is no proof, Hume adds, that ‘we are acquainted, in any instance, with the connecting principle between cause and effect’ (EHU 7.29n17.2).
- 8.
As a number of commentators have pointed out, Hume had previously denied that there are any difficulties or contradictions in the theories concerning the nature of the mind: see the opening paragraph of ‘Of the immateriality of the soul’ (T 1.4.5).
Bibliography
Garrett, D. (2011) ‘Rethinking Hume’s Second Thoughts about Personal Identity’ in The Possibility of Philosophical Understanding: Essays for Barry Stroud, ed. J. Bridges, N. Kolodny, and W.-H. Wong. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 15–40.
Mackie, J. L. (1976) Problems from Locke. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Strawson, G. (2011) The Evident Connexion: Hume on Personal Identity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Strawson, G. (2012) ‘“All My Hopes Vanish”: Hume on the Mind’ in The Continuum Companion to Hume, ed. A. Bailey and D. J. O’Brien. London: Continuum, 181–98.
Stroud, B. (1977) Hume. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
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Ward, A. (2022). How Sceptical Is Hume’s Theory of Personal Identity?. In: O'Brien, D. (eds) Hume on the Self and Personal Identity. Philosophers in Depth. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-04275-1_1
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