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Levelling the Universe

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Levels of Reality in Science and Philosophy

Part of the book series: Jerusalem Studies in Philosophy and History of Science ((JSPS))

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Abstract

Reductionist, ‘bottom-up’, programmes in philosophy and in the sciences are often depicted as attempts to explain higher-level phenomena in lower-level terms. In practice this would mean deriving higher-level predictions and explanations from laws governing phenomena at lower-level (perhaps with the help of ‘bridge principles’). Reductionism has not lived up to expectations. Scattered successes have been overshadowed by widespread failures. In response, many researchers have embraced a hierarchical conception of the universe. This chapter reflects on the history of considerations thought to support this hierarchical conception and concludes that the considerations have negligible metaphysical weight.

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Correspondence to John Heil .

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Heil, J. (2022). Levelling the Universe. In: Ioannidis, S., Vishne, G., Hemmo, M., Shenker, O. (eds) Levels of Reality in Science and Philosophy. Jerusalem Studies in Philosophy and History of Science. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-99425-9_7

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