Rethinking the Unity of Science Hypothesis: Levels, Mechanisms, and Realization

Shapiro, Lawrence

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-99425-9_12

Lawrence Shapiro²⁶

Part of the book series: Jerusalem Studies in Philosophy and History of Science ((JSPS))

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Abstract

At least since Oppenheim and Putnam’s “Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis” (1958), many philosophers have adopted the idea that nature consists in distinct levels of organization, and that sciences, theories, or models take these levels as their subject matters. Unity of science requires that these sciences, theories, or models stand in a particular kind of relationship to each other. In this paper I will examine some skeptical challenges to the idea of levels and consider the conception of levels that has emerged from work on mechanistic explanation. I will then argue that instead of trying to analyze unity of science in terms of levels, it should instead be based on the realization relation. Doing so provides a coherent picture of unity of science, even if the prospects for such a unification remain dim.

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Notes

1.
Strictly, Pt does not suffice for micro-reduction. Additionally, conditions for reduction, which are entailed by micro-reduction, must be satisfied, such as that the vocabulary in science N is not included in the vocabulary of N-1, and that the observational data that science N explains can be explained by N-1. (Oppenheim & Putnam, 1958: 5–6). These two conditions, as well as a nebulous third that concerns the systematization of theories, are criteria for reduction, which must be satisfied for micro-reduction. But we can safely assume their satisfaction in the present context.
2.
Craver illustrates his point with a discussion of spatial memory. An explanation of how spatial memory works will draw on “anatomy, biochemistry, computational neuroscience, electrophysiology, molecular biology, neuroanatomy, pharmacology, psychiatry, and experimental psychology” (2007: 176).
3.
I find this locution cumbersome and will continue to use single letters to refer to mechanisms and components. Craver’s motivation for labeling mechanisms and components as he does, as S’s Ψ-ing and X’s Φ-ing, is to ensure that one does not lose sight of the fact that mechanisms are defined in terms of what they do (2015: 17).
4.
In a footnote, he mentions that Lindley Darden had raised issues like those I discussed above.
5.
I use the term ‘object’ quite generally, to mean property, type, token, event, or whatever.
6.
Some of the following ideas got their start in Shapiro and Polger (2012).

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University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI, USA
Lawrence Shapiro

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Department of History & Philosophy of Science, National & Kapodistrian University of Athens, Athens, Greece
Stavros Ioannidis
Edmond and Lily Safra Center for Brain Sciences, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel
Gal Vishne
Philosophy Department, University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel
Meir Hemmo
Sidney M. Edelstein Center for the History & Philosophy of Science, Technology and Medicine The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel
Orly Shenker

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Shapiro, L. (2022). Rethinking the Unity of Science Hypothesis: Levels, Mechanisms, and Realization. In: Ioannidis, S., Vishne, G., Hemmo, M., Shenker, O. (eds) Levels of Reality in Science and Philosophy. Jerusalem Studies in Philosophy and History of Science. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-99425-9_12

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-99425-9_12
Published: 09 June 2022
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-99424-2
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-99425-9
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