Abstract
Early medieval reflections on modalities are deeply indebted to the modal theories developed by Aristotle in his De Interpretatione, to which scholars were acquainted through the mediation of Boethius’ translations and commentaries. Although Aristotle’s modal system was considerably enriched in the early Middle Ages with a more sophisticated syntax and a more expressive logic, the general framework in which modal language was analyzed remained essentially Aristotelian in spirit. However, Aristotle’s modal views were also loaded with metaphysical assumptions that some early medieval authors felt uncomfortable carrying along. This metaphysical background was connected to the Aristotelian interpretation of possibilities as ontologically grounded in the potencies or potentialities of things, that is in the powers, tendencies or capacities that certain substances have of being otherwise than they actually are (See e.g. Simo Knuuttila, Modalities in Medieval Philosophy, London, 2003, New York: Routledge, pp. 19–31; 46–48). The potency-based account of possibility, further reinforced by Boethius in his commentaries, was questioned by some logicians in the early twelfth century. These authors were driven by a special interest in unactualized possibilities and in the modalities of non-things, an interest that ultimately led them to detect a number of problems related to the Aristotelian modal paradigm. In opposition to it, they developed a modal theory according to which the term “possible” has no such ontological correlate, and does not denote any modal property or intrinsic feature possessed by substances.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
See, for example, Knuuttila (1993, 19–30 and 46 ff.), Knuuttila (2017, Sections 1–2). In this article I will use the terms “powers,” “capacities,” “tendencies” as being roughly synonymous, and I will not enter into the (in other respects, important) discussions concerning the differences between them.
- 2.
See Knuuttila (1993, 8–9).
- 3.
See, in particular, Knuuttila (1993, 11–12).
- 4.
See Boethius (1880, 411 ff. and 454 ff.).
- 5.
See e.g. Boethius (1877, 203).
- 6.
Of this last category, there are some possibilities that remain eternally unrealized because of some contingent development of events, such as that of the cloth that can be cut in half but which will wear out first (the example is from Aristotle’s De interpretatione IX 19a12–14), and there are some that are in principle unrealizable, for instance, the existence of an infinite number (Boethius 1877, 207; 1880, 463).
- 7.
See Boethius (1880, 453).
- 8.
See Boethius (1877, 201–202).
- 9.
See, for example, Boethius (1880, 203): “nam et quae actu quidem non est, esse tamen poterat, ut homo cum non ambulat, ambulandi tamen retinet potestatem, non est eum impossibile ambulare.”
- 10.
See Boethius (1880, 413).
- 11.
See Boethius (1880, 411): “Possibilis duae sunt partes: unum quod cum non sit esse potest, alterum quod ideo praedicatur esse possibile, quia iam est quidem. Prior pars corruptibilis et permutabilis propria est. In mortalibus enim Socrates potest esse cum non fuit, sicut ipsi quoque mortales, qui sunt id quod antea non fuerunt. Potest enim homo cum non loquitur loqui et cum non ambulat ambulare” (my emphasis).
- 12.
See Boethius (1877, 206): “quae actu sunt cum potestate, id est quae et actum habent et aliquando habuerunt potestatem, ut fabricata iam domus aliquando potuit fabricari et prius habuit potestatem secundum tempus, postea vero actum.” One may interpret this passage as if the relevant potentiality were attributed to some substance other than the house, for example, the builder of the house or the materials with which the house will be fabricated. However, Boethius does not explicitly appeal here to these explanations.
- 13.
See Vetter (2018, 291).
- 14.
See Vetter (2018, 292).
- 15.
See Borghini (2016, 159).
- 16.
See Knuuttila (2017, Section 2).
- 17.
See Anselm of Canterbury (1969, 341, 1–12): “DISCIPULUS. Plura sunt, de quibus tuam diu desidero responsionem. Ex quibus sunt postestas et impotentia, possibilitas et impossibilitas, necessitas atque libertas. Quas idcirco simul quaerendo connumero, quia earum mihi mixta videtur cognitio. In quibus quid me moveat, ex parte aperiam, ut cum de his mihi satisfeceris, ad alia, ad quae intendo, facilius progrediar. Dicimus namque potestatem esse aliquando, in quo nulla est potestas. Nullus enim negat omne, quod potest, potestate posse. Cum ergo asserimus, quod non est, posse esse, dicimus potestatem esse in eo, quod non est; quod intelligere nequeo, velut cum dicimus domum posse esse, quae nondum est. In eo namque, quod non est, nulla potestas est.”
- 18.
- 19.
For this reconstruction of Anselm, see Serene (1981, 120–121. Cf. in particular p. 121): “The paradoxical status of the future house is symptomatic of two gaps in the Aristotelian-Boethian view of modalities: the lack of a systematic explanation of the relationship between capacity and possibility, and the lack of an adequate treatment of antecedent ascription of capacity or possibility to particular subjects.”
- 20.
Anselm of Canterbury (1946–1961, vol. I, 253): “Et possibile et impossibile erat antequam esset. Ei quidem in cuius potestate non erat ut esset, erat impossibile; sed deo in cuius potestate erat ut fieret, erat possibile. Quia ergo deus prius potuit facere mundum quam fieret, ideo est mundus, non quia ipse mundus potuit prius esse.” This reference to God’s ability to create the world as existing “before” (prius) creation should perhaps be interpreted as a natural priority rather than a temporal one. The latter interpretation would in fact commit Anselm to the assumption that there existed time before creation, which he does not explicitly state here.
- 21.
Anselm of Canterbury (1946–1961, vol. I, 253–254): “Ita ergo quidquid non est, antequam sit sua potestate non potest esse; sed si potest alia res facere ut sit, hoc modo aliena potestate potest esse.”
- 22.
- 23.
The authorship of this logical textbook is still debatable. Iwakuma (1992, 47–54) argued that the author should be identified with Gerlandus of Besançon, who died after 1148, and not with Garlandus Compotista, who was believed by de Rijk to be the author. Because of the uncertainty concerning the authorship, the dating of the Dialectica also remains an open question. Marenbon suggests that the text could have been written any time between the 1080s (or even earlier) and the 1120s (see Marenbon 2011, 194–196 on this).
- 24.
See Boethius (1969, 238).
- 25.
See Garlandus Compotista (1959, 84): “Item possibile est quod absolute omni tempore contingere potest, ut ‘possibile est avem volare’: licet enim avis omni tempore non sit, potest tamen contingere ut fiat a Deo et ut volet.”
- 26.
- 27.
M3: Orléans, Bibl. Municipale, 266, pp. 252b–257b.
- 28.
In the glosses on De interpretatione contained in the Logica Ingredientibus, Abelard offers a different reading of such modal propositions, stating that all claims about possibility and necessity (with the exception of those that are impersonal in both grammatical construction and meaning) have an implicit existential import. Appealing to the same example used in the Dialectica, he affirms that the proposition “it is possible for my future son to exist” is false if there is no actual object to which the subject term refers (Abelard 2010, 417). On this, see Binini (2018).
- 29.
In logical sources of this time, nominal modes (casuales modi) are opposed to adverbial ones. Propositions containing adverbial and nominal modes are considered by some authors to have a different nature and different semantics. Other authors, such as Abelard, argue instead that every nominal proposition, despite a few exceptions, may be rephrased as having a corresponding adverbial form. On the relation between these two categories of modal, see Binini (forthcoming).
- 30.
Abelard (1970, 204): “Nunc autem utrum aliqua proprietas per modalia nomina, ut quidam volunt, praedic[ar]etur, persequamur. Aiunt enim per ‘possibile’ possibilitatem praedicari, per ‘necesse’ necessitatem, ut, cum dicimus: ‘possibile est Socratem esse vel necesse’, possibilitatem aut necessitatem ei attribuimus. Sed falso est. Multae verae sunt affirmationes huiusmodi etiam de non existentibus rebus, quae, cum non sint, nullorum accidentium proprietates recipiunt. Quod enim non est, id quod est sustentare non potest. Sunt itaque huiusmodi verae: ‘filium futurum possibile est esse’, ‘cbimaeram possibile est non esse’, vel ‘necesse est non esse hominem’; nihil tamen attribui per ista his quae non sunt, intelligitur.”
- 31.
See Abelard (1970, 196): “Quod futurum est, possibile est.”
- 32.
Abelard (1970, 204): “Alioquin haberemus quod, si erit, tunc est, vel, si non est, est. Quod sic ostenditur: ‘si erit, possibile est esse’; unde ‘et possibilitatem existendi habet’, unde ‘et est’; qua re ‘si erit, et est’. Sic quoque: ‘si non est, est’, ostenditur: ‘si non est, possibile est non esse’; unde ‘et possibilitatem non-existendi habet’; unde ‘est’; ‘si non est, est’.”
- 33.
Abelard (1970, 98): “Sic quoque et potentiae non esse album, cum sit actus non esse album, ipsi tamen universaliter subdi non potest, ut videlicet dicamus omne quod non est album potentiam illam habere, sed fortasse ita: ‘potens non esse album,’ ut nullam formam in nomine ‘potentis’ intelligamus, sed id tantum quod naturae non repugnet; in qua quidem significatione nomine ‘possibilis’ in modalibus propositionibus utimur.”
- 34.
Abelard (1970, 205): “Similiter et quando dicimus: ‘possibile est Socratem esse hominem,’ non aliquam alicui attribuimus proprietatem, sed id dicimus quod id quod dicit haec propositio: ‘Socrates est homo,’ est unum de his quae natura patitur esse.” The use of the term “natura” in this and similar contexts is still not yet entirely understood. On some occasions, Abelard and other authors of his time use “nature” to talk about the nature of individual substances (e.g., natura Socratis). Elsewhere, they talk about the nature of species of genera (e.g., the nature of human beings), or even about nature in a more general sense, such as “Natura rerum.” In the passage in question, it seems to me that Abelard is using “natura” in this latter and wider sense, but this is open to speculation. On the notion of nature in Abelard, see, for example, King (2004) and Binini (2021).
- 35.
See H9: Orléans, Bibl. Municipale, 266, p. 37a–b: “Notandum etiam quod iste voces ‘possibile’, ‘necessarium’ et alii modi qui predicantur, nichil ponunt in rebus de quibus agitur in propositionibus illis. Si enim ponerent, sequeretur: ‘si nichil est, aliquid est’ hoc modo. Verum est enim ‘si non est possibile Socratem esse lapidem, tunc impossibile est Socratem esse lapidem’. Et si quia non est possibile Socratem esse lapidem, impossibile est Socratem esse lapidem, et quia non est possibile Socratem esse lapidem, Socrates habet impossibile, et ita Socrates est. Et si quia non est possibile Socratem esse lapidem, Socrates est, et quia nichil est, Socrates est – ab antecedenti, quia si nichil est, Socrates non est; si Socrates non est, non habet possibile, et ita non est possibile eum esse lapidem. Quare si nichil est, aliquid est. Quare dicendum est – quando ‘possibile’ et ‘impossibile’ et ‘necesse’ in modalibus praedicantur – quod significant possibilitatem et impossibilitatem et necessitatem, sed nihil ponunt circa res de quibus agitur in propositionibus modalibus.”
- 36.
For the analysis of the theory of modals included in M3 and a comparison with Abelard, see Binini (forthcoming).
- 37.
See M3, p. 254b: “Investigato sensu modalium, videamus utrum aliqua proprietas per modalia nomina ponatur. Si enim per ea aliquid ponitur, multa sequentur inconvenientia. […] Item “si erit, et est”, sic: Si Socrates erit, possibile est esse Socratem; et sic Socrates habet possibilitatem existendi; et ita est. Item si non est, non possibile est esse, quia si est possibile esse, et est. Si Socratem esse est possibile, Socrates habet possibilitatem existendi; et ita possibilitas est in Socrate; et ita est.”
- 38.
See M3, p. 254b: “Sunt qui exponant ita ‘Omnem hominem esse animal est possibile’: res habent possibilitatem quod omnis homo sit animal. Sed hoc nihil est. Vera est enim ‘chimaeram non esse hircocervum est possibile’. Dicemus: quomodo [corrected from: dicemus modo quod] res habent possibilitatem quod chimaera non sit hircocervus, quippe nullae res habent illam possibilitatem, quia neque chimaera neque alia, tamen vera est illa propositio. Item antequam mundus fieret, si diceretur ‘possibile mundum fieri’, vera esset talis propositio; sed cum nulla res esset, quae res habebant possibilitatem ut mundus fieret? His et multis aliis exemplis nulla esse ostenditur illa expositio.” I thank Professor Wciórka for suggesting me this reading of the text.
- 39.
Abelard (2010, 472): “Nota etiam quod ex verbis Aristotelis, cum ait ‘potestates’, videtur ipse in hoc nomine ‘possibile’ (quod etiam nomen rerum facere videtur) potestatem sive possibilitatem, quandam formam, intelligere, cum ipsum in modalibus propositionibus ponit; quod supra negavimus. Nos tamen, cum dicit ‘potestatem’ vel ‘necessitatem,’ nullas intelligimus formas sed iuxta sensum modalium omnia exponimus.”
- 40.
On the notion of consignificatio in Abelard and in the grammatical tradition of the late eleventh-century Glosulae on Priscian, see for example, Rosier-Catach (2003).
- 41.
See Abelard (2010, 407–408): “At vero cum ‘possibile’ vel ‘necessarium’ sumpta non sint nec res aliquas nominando contineant nec formas determinent, quid significent quaerendum est; non enim, cum dicitur: ‘Id quod non est possibile est esse’ vel: ‘Deum necesse est esse’ vel: ‘Chimaeram necesse est non esse’ quasi formas aliquas in rebus accipimus. Dicimus itaque necessarium sive possibile in huiusmodi enuntiationibus magis consignificare quam per se significationem habere; nil quippe in eis est intelligendum nisi subiectae orationi applicentur, et tunc modum concipiendi faciunt circa res subiectae orationis sicut facit verbum interpositum vel coniunctio si, quae ad necessitatem copulat; ac, sicut in istis nulla imagine nititur intellectus sed quendam concipiendi modum anima capit per verbum vel per coniunctionem circa res earum vocum quibus adiunguntur, ita per possibile et necessarium. Et est hoc loco necessarium pro inevitabili, possibile quasi non repugnans naturae.”
- 42.
See, for example, Abelard (1970, 98; 176; 196–198; 200–204; 385).
- 43.
See, for example, Abelard (2010, 266; 408; 414–415).
- 44.
- 45.
See Martin (2016, 121).
- 46.
See Abelard (1970, 193–194): “‘Possibile’ quidem et ‘contingens’ idem prorsus sonant. Nam ‘contingens’ hoc loco <non> quod actu contingit accipimus, sed quod contingere potest, si etiam numquam contingat, dummodo natura rei non repugnaret ad hoc ut contingat, sed patiatur contingere; ut, cum dicimus: ‘Socratem possibile est esse episcopum’, etsi numquam sit, tamen verum est, cum natura ipsius episcopo non repugnet; quod ex aliis eiusdem speciei individuis perpendimus, quae proprietatem episcopi iam actu participare videmus. Quicquid enim actu contingit in uno, idem in omnibus eiusdem speciei individuis contingere posse arbitramur, quippe eiusdem sunt omnino naturae.”
- 47.
See Garlandus Compotista (1959, 83–84): “Potentia vero extra actum quam effectus non consequitur, est illa cui nec natura repugnat nec tamen umquam erit, ut cum dico: ‘possibile est Iarlandum fieri episcopum’, numquam tamen episcopus erit.” Notice that, differently from Abelard in the Dialectica, Garlandus speaks here not of the nature of a thing but of nature in general.
- 48.
See H9, p. 39b: “Possibilia alia sunt in actu, alia numquam in actu. Subdividit ea etiam que sunt in actu, sic: quod alia sunt in actu sine precedente potestate, ut divine substantie, alia vero sunt in actu cum precedente potestate, idest prius habuerunt potestatem quam actum, ut fabricata domus. […] Que, scilicet ea que sunt in actu, priora sunt et digniora scilicet potestatibus natura, idest per naturam ipsius actus. Actus namque natura et dignitate precedunt solas potestates, sed vera sunt posteriora in tempore ipsis potestatibus. Potestas namque, ut dictum est, eos actus secundum tempus precedit. Vel sic. Que priora sunt natura, idest naturaliter, prius potuerunt existere quam fuerunt et ita quod natura non repugnat; tempore vero, idest secundum tempus existendi actu, sunt posteriora se ipsis quantum ad hoc quod natura prius potuerunt existere. Alia vero numquam sunt, sed potestate sola, ut quod rusticus fiat episcopus vel rex.” (my emphasis).
- 49.
See M3, p. 255a: “Investigato sensu modalium, videamus utrum aliqua proprietas per modalia nomina ponatur. Si enim per ea aliquid ponitur, multa sequentur inconvenientia. […] Item si non est, non possibile est esse, quia si est possibile esse, et est. Si Socratem esse est possibile, Socrates habet possibilitatem existendi; et ita possibilitas est in Socrate; et ita est. Quare si possibile est esse, et est. Quare ‘si non est, non est possibile esse’ haec et plura alia inconvenientia, si per modales voces aliquid ponatur, sequi manifestum est. Unde m. W. exponebat eas in negativo sensu, ut istam: ‘Socratem esse animal est possibile’, id est non repugnat natura rei Socratem esse animal.”
References
Primary Texts
Anselm of Canterbury. (1946–1961). In F. S. Schmitt (Ed.), S. Anselmi Cantuariensis Archiepiscopi Opera Omnia, 6 vols. Nelson.
Anselm of Canterbury. (1969). Philosophical fragments. In R. W. Southern & F. S. Schmitt (Eds.), Memorials of St. Anselm (pp. 334–351). Oxford University Press.
Boethius. (1877). In C. Meiser (Ed.), Commentarii in librum Aristotelis Perihermeneias (vol. I). Teubner.
Boethius. (1880). In C. Meiser (Ed)., Commentarii in librum Aristotelis Perihermeneias (vol. II). Teubner.
Boethius. (1969). In L. Orbetello (Ed.), De hypotheticis syllogismis. Paideia.
Garlandus Compotista. (1959). In L. M. de Rijk (Ed.), Dialectica. Van Gorcum.
Peter Abelard. (1970). In L. M. de Rijk (Ed.), Dialectica (2nd ed.). Van Gorcum.
Peter Abelard. (2010). Glossae super Peri Hermeneias. In K. Jacobi & C. Strub (Eds.), Petri Abaelardi Glossae super Peri Hermeneias. Brepols.
Secondary Literature
Binini, I. (2018). “My future son is possibly alive.” Existential presupposition and empty terms in Abelard’s modal logic. History and Philosophy of Logic, 39(4), 341–356.
Binini, I. (2021). Some further remarks on Abelard’s notion of nature. In I. Chouinard et al. (Eds.), Women’s perspectives in ancient and medieval philosophy. Springer.
Binini, I. (forthcoming). The “De re”-“De dicto” distinction: A twelfth-century logical discovery. Vivarium.
Borghini, A. (2016). A critical introduction to the metaphysics of modality. Bloomsbury.
Brower, J. E., & Guilfoy, K. (Eds.). (2004). The Cambridge companion to Abelard. Cambridge University Press.
Iwakuma, Y. (1992). “Vocales”, or early nominalists. Traditio, 47, 33–111.
Jacobi, K. (2004). Philosophy of language. In Brower–Guilfoy 2004, 126–157.
King, P. (2004). Metaphysics. In Brower – Guilfoy 2004, 65–125.
Knuuttila, S. (1993). Modalities in medieval philosophy. Routledge.
Knuuttila, S. (2004). Anselm on modality. In B. Davies (Ed.), The Cambridge companion to Anselm (pp. 111–131). Cambridge University Press.
Knuuttila, S. (2017). Medieval theories of modality. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Summer 2017 Edition). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/modality-medieval/.
Kristina, E., & Michael, Q. (Eds.). (2018). Handbook of potentiality. Springer.
Marenbon, J. (1993). Medieval Latin commentaries and glosses on Aristotelian logical texts, before ca.1150 A.D. In C. S. F. Burnett (Ed.), Commentaries and glosses on Aristotelian logical texts: The Syriac, Arabic and Medieval Latin traditions (pp. 77–127). Warburg Institute, University of London (republished and updated in Marenbon 2000a, 77–140).
Marenbon, J. (Ed.). (2000a). Aristotelian logic, Platonism, and the context of early medieval philosophy in the West. Routledge.
Marenbon, J. (2000b). Abelard’s concept of possibility. In Marenbon 2000a, 595–609.
Marenbon, J. (2011). Logic at the turn of the twelfth century: A synthesis. In I. Rosier-Catach (Ed.), Arts du langage et théologie aux confins des XIe-XIIe siècle (pp. 181–218). Brepols (Studia Artistarum, 26).
Marmodoro, A. (2018). Potentiality in Aristotle’s metaphysics. In Engelhard–Quante 2018, 15–43.
Martin, C. J. (2001). Abaelard on modality: Some possibilities and some puzzles. In T. Buchheim, C. H. Kneepkens, & K. Lorenz (Eds.), Potentialität, und Possibilität. Modalaussagen in der Geschichte der Metaphysik (pp. 97–124). Frommann-Holzboog.
Martin, C. J. (2004). An amputee is bipedal! The role of categories in the development of Abelard’s theory of possibility. In I. Roseier-Catach & J. Biard (Eds.), La tradition médiévale des Catégories (pp. 225–242). Editions de l’Institut Supérieur de Philosophie.
Martin, C. J. (2016). Modality without the prior analytics: Early twelfth century accounts of modal propositions. In M. Creswell, E. Mares, & A. Rini (Eds.), Logical modalities from Aristotle to Carnap (pp. 113–132). Cambridge University Press.
Rosier-Catach, I. (2003). Priscien, Boèce, les Glosulae in Priscianum, Abélard: Les enjeux des discussions autour de la notion de consignification. Histoire Epistémologie Langage, 25(2), 55–84.
Serene, E. F. (1981). Anselm’s modal conceptions. In S. Knuuttila (Ed.), Reforging the great chain of being: Studies of the history of modal theories (pp. 117–162). Reidel (Synthese Historical Library 20).
Thom, P. (2003). Medieval modal systems: Problems and concepts. Ashgate.
Vetter, B. (2018). From potentiality to possibility. In Engelhard–Quante 2018, 279–301.
Acknowledgements
This research has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation program, under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement n° 845061. I am very grateful to Yukio Iwakuma and C.H. Kneepkens for sharing with me their transcriptions of some unedited texts that will be considered in this article, and to Wojciech Wciórka for his valuable help in the interpretation of several manuscript passages. I am also grateful to the anonymous referees for their useful suggestions. I dedicate this article to Professor Massimo Mugnai, who first introduced me to the study of Abelard and twelfth-century modal logic. For this and for his supervision during the first steps of my research, I am extremely thankful.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2022 Springer Nature Switzerland AG
About this paper
Cite this paper
Binini, I. (2022). Turning Potentialities into Possibilities: Early Medieval Approaches to the Metaphysics of Modality. In: Ademollo, F., Amerini, F., De Risi, V. (eds) Thinking and Calculating. Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science, vol 54. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-97303-2_7
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-97303-2_7
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-97302-5
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-97303-2
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)