Keywords

1 Introduction

The first industrial revolution began in the late eighteenth century, and it was an age of steam and iron, exemplified by the first mechanized industry—textiles—and the birth of the railroads. This was superseded in the late nineteenth century by the second industrial revolution, the age of steel, oil, electricity, the internal combustion engine, and heavier-than-air flight. The third industrial revolution—the digital revolution in which we exist and operate today—began in around 1950 with the invention of the solid-state transistor and integrated circuitry, which subsequently led to the widespread development and use of computers, digital telecommunications, and the Internet.

Now we supposedly stand on the cusp of a fourth industrial revolution (“4IR”): artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning, automation and robotics, 5G networking, quantum computing, big data, and the “Internet of Things” (IoT). AI describes computers that can “think” like humans—recognizing complex patterns, processing information, drawing conclusions, and making recommendations. Technologies such as cloud computing, quantum computing, and the IoT are enabling computers to process vast amounts of data faster than ever before and then permit this data to be safely stored and accessed from anywhere with Internet access, at any time. In particular, the 4IR is about connectivity: the IoT permits users to collect data from constantly connected sources and subsequently transmit and share this to the total network (McGinnis, 2018, December 20). The 4IR differs from earlier IRs in that it is more about software than hardware. The first IR is synonymous with the steam engine, the second with the internal combustion engine, and the 3IR with microelectronics. The 4IR has no great identifying piece of hardware, except perhaps even more advanced semiconductor chips. Nevertheless, 4IR technologies promise to create new opportunities and new challenges in identifying new and significant military technologies and understanding how these capabilities could provide a military advantage in the decades to come.

It should come as little surprise, therefore, why Russia and China are so keen to exploit the 4IR for military leverage and political gain. Few countries are more appreciative of the potential military impact of 4IR technologies than these two. At the same time, it is important to note that most 4IR technologies are firmly centered in the civilian realm, that is, most research—and certainly the biggest breakthroughs—is occurring in the commercial science and technology (S & T) base. This has two implications for future military-technological innovation: first, that the 4IR is only further eroding the already blurring distinction between military and civilian technologies and, second, the growing criticality of 4IR technologies to future military capabilities has correspondingly raised interest in how countries can use the 4IR to exploit such commercial technologies for military-technological innovation.

2 China: Exploiting the 4IR Through Military-Civil Fusion

2.1 Chinese Military Modernization: Mechanization and Informatization

Since the late 1990s, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been engaged in an aggressive, concerted effort to modernize and upgrade its capabilities. According to China’s 2019 white paper on defense, China’s “strategic goals” for the long-term development of its national defense and military are:

  • By 2020, the PLA was expected to generally achieve mechanization with significantly enhanced informationization and greatly improved strategic capabilities. This “double construction” approach of “mechanization and informatization” (Ji, 2004, November 24) called for both the near-term “upgrading of existing equipment combined with the selective introduction of new generations of conventional weapons” and a longer-term transformation of the PLA along the lines of the information technologies-based “revolution in military affairs” (RMA) (Cheung, 2009, pp. 30–31).

  • By 2035, the PLA is to achieve “complete military modernization,” by comprehensively advancing “the modernization of military theory, organizational structure, military personnel, and weaponry and equipment in step with the [overall] modernization of the country.”

  • By approximately 2049 (“the mid-twenty-first century”), the PLA is to be transformed into a “world-class” military (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2020, p. 14).

The next 15 years or so (2020–2035) could likely be the most crucial phase of this modernization process. In this regard, the concept of informationization is central to understanding what China means by the “complete military modernization” of the PLA. “Informationization” (xinxihua) means that information technologies, especially those capabilities relating to command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR), are considered paramount to expanding military effectiveness. This entails, among other things, dominating the electromagnetic spectrum through integrated network electronic warfare as well as exploiting technological advances in microelectronics, sensors, propulsion, stealth, and especially cyber to outfit the PLA with new capacities for long-range strike and disruption.

“Informationized warfare” also puts a much greater emphasis placed on both space and cyber operations. China’s 2019 defense white paper bluntly states that “outer space is a critical domain in international strategic competition” (State Council Information Office, 2019, July, p. 13). As such, the weaponization of space is increasingly a fact of life and a key future battlespace, and China plans to develop the capacity to “enter, exit, and openly use outer space.” At the same time, cyberspace is regarded to be “a key area for national security, economic growth and social development,” and therefore the PLA is accelerating the building of its cyberspace capabilities (State Council Information Office, 2019, July, p. 14).

2.2 Intelligentized Warfare and Artificial Intelligence

While the PLA labors to adopt “informationized warfare,” it is already thinking about the next phase of military modernization, which it has termed “intelligentized” (zhinenghua) warfare. According to Elsa Kania, “military intelligentization” builds upon earlier phases of “mechanization and informatization.” As China’s 2019 defense white paper put it, “war is evolving in form towards informationized warfare, and intelligent warfare is on the horizon” (State Council Information Office, 2019, July, p. 6, emphasis added). At the 19th Party Congress in 2017, Xi Jinping urged the PLA to accelerate the development of military intelligentization, and this “authoritative exhortation” has in turn “elevated ‘intelligentization’ as a guiding concept for the future of Chinese military modernization” (Kania, 2021, p. 528).

Intelligentized warfare essentially entails the militarization of the fourth industrial revolution—in other words, exploiting the 4IR in order to create “intelligentized weaponry” (Kania, 2021, p. 531). The 4IR, in particular, is seen as a key enabler in China’s efforts to gain a dominant technological advantage over the US military. According to Work and Grant, “the Chinese believe artificial intelligence (AI), big data, human-machine hybrid intelligence, swarm intelligence, and automated decision-making, along with AI-enabled autonomous unmanned systems and intelligent robotics, will be the central feature of the emerging economic and military-technical revolutions” (Work & Grant, 2019, p. 13).

China particularly values artificial intelligence as a critical technology that could prove consequential its strategic competition with the United States. Chinese military thinkers believe AI likely will be the key to surpassing the US military as the world’s most capable armed force. Consequently, China has laid out an ambitious program for it to lead the world in AI by 2030. In July 2017, Beijing released its “New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan.” This plan has three main strategic goals: first, to bring China’s AI sector up to the level of the global state of the art; second, to achieve major breakthroughs in terms of basic AI theory by 2025; and third, by 2030, make China the global leader in AI theory, technology, and application, as well as the major AI innovation center of the world (Slijper et al., 2019, April, p. 12).

In addition to these investments in AI, China is seeking to become a world leader in other 4IR technologies, including quantum computing, 5G, robotics, and biotechnology, among others. Beijing sees its strategies to lead in AI and these other technologies as mutually reinforcing; accordingly, it is investing heavily (e.g., through its “Made in China 2025” initiative) in associate technologies, companies (both domestic and foreign), and human capital in order to realize those ambitions of global superiority (National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, 2021, p. 256).

China’s New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan, together with other strategic investments in key technology sectors, is intricately tied to the modernization of the PLA and its eventual mastery of intelligentized warfare. AI in particular is explicitly linked to “national defense construction, security assessment, and control capabilities” (Slijper et al., 2019, April, p. 12). Ultimately, the aim is to “inject AI” into nearly every aspect of the PLA’s table of equipment and inventory of operational systems (Work & Grant, 2019, p. 14).

2.3 Intelligentized Warfare and Military-Civil Fusion

This emphasis on the revolutionary and disruptive nature of 4IR technologies when it comes to future military advantage means that Chinese military modernization will be increasingly entwined with civilian technological innovation, since most 4IR breakthroughs—particularly in the areas of AI, machine learning, big data, etc.—are taking place in the commercial sector. This dependency on commercial technologies has, in turn, raised the importance of “military-civil fusion” (MCF—also known as “civil-military integration,” or CMI) as a core military-technological innovation strategy. MCF has become an essential ingredient in Beijing’s long-term effort to make China a technological superpower, in both military and civilian respects.

China’s national approach toward military-technological innovation is enabled by three ingredients: motivation, money, and manpower. In the first place, China’s central leadership (i.e., the Chinese Communist Party and the PLA) has been unwavering in its commitment to modernizing the country’s military. Reconstructing and upgrading the military-industrial base have been a priority for more than 25 years. This steadfastness has, in turn, manifested itself in large, steady annual increases in Chinese military expenditures. In 2021, for example, China raised its defense budget by 6.8%, to US$209 billion (Liu, 2021, March 5). According to the country’s own official national statistics (which many experts nevertheless believed to substantially understate actual spending levels) (Tian & Su, 2021, January, pp. 4–21), Chinese military expenditures from 1999 to 2019 grew by at least 600% after inflation. These consistent and sizable defense budget increases have translated into more money for innovation, more money for military research and development (R & D), more money for procurement, and more money to upgrade the defense industry with new tools, new computers, and new technical skills. It has also enabled the growth and modernization of the nation’s military-industrial workforce, from its R & D institutes to its factory floor labor force (Kirchberger & Mohr, 2019).

This innovation strategy is being replicated with regard to 4IR technologies and MCF. China is, for the most part, pursuing a two-pronged innovation approach, fostering R & D in critical, commercial 4IR technologies, such as AI, robotics, advanced microelectronics, and quantum technologies, while simultaneously promoting the spin-off of these technologies to the military sector. Beijing has expanded funding of S & T pertaining to 4IR technologies, particularly artificial intelligence. China is building and training “a new generation of AI engineers in new AI hubs,” particularly through the support of “national champions” like Huawei, Baidu, and Alibaba. Finally, it is carrying out a “centrally directed systematic plan” to extract 4IR (especially AI) knowledge from abroad through talent recruitment, technology transfer, investments, and even espionage (National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, 2021, p. 25).

Simultaneously, China has made the “aligning of civil and defense technology development” a national priority. China’s 2015 White Paper on China’s Military Strategy, for example, called for an “all-element, multi-domain and cost-efficient pattern of CMI.” At the 19th Party Congress in October 2017, President Xi was finally able to fully realize his vision for MCF. As Béraud-Sudreau and Nouwens put it:

The deepening of the CMI policy can be interpreted both as a way to tackle the lack of competitiveness and the lack of innovation. This has become an integral part of Xi’s strategy to complete the modernization of China’s armed forces by 2035 and turn them into a world-class army by midcentury. Xi reiterated the importance of CMI for China and for the PLA by declaring at the 19th Party Congress that “we will... deepen reform of defense-related science, technology, and industry, achieve greater military–civilian integration, and build integrated national strategies and strategic capabilities.” (Béraud-Sudreau & Nouwens, 2019, p. 12)

As a result, in 2017, Beijing created the Central Commission for Integrated Military and Civilian Development, a new powerful body for overseeing MCF strategy and implementation. That same year, China issued the “13th 5-Year Special Plan for Science and Technology MCF Development,” which “detailed the establishment of an integrated system to conduct basic cutting-edge R & D in AI, bio-tech, advanced electronics, quantum, advanced energy, advanced manufacturing, future networks [and] new materials,” in order “to capture commanding heights of international competition” (Cheung, 2019, April, p. 12).

Efforts to leverage artificial intelligence in order to drive the PLA’s adoption of intelligentized warfare highlight the centrality of military-civil fusion as a modernization strategy. Work and Grant argue that China’s New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan is the “poster child” for MCF, as it exploits advances in commercial AI to help leapfrog the development of technologies critical to future military modernization (Work & Grant, 2019, p. 14).

In recent years, China has implemented several reforms of its defense-industrial sector in order to improve MCF. Special attention is being paid to R & D, testing, and evaluation (RDT & E) in critical technologies such as jet engines, gas turbines, advanced microelectronics, artificial intelligence, quantum communications and computing, automation and robotics, and nanotechnology, as well as nuclear fusion, hypersonics, and space exploration (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2020, p. 141). In 2016, as part of a general reorganization of the PLA command structure, the Central Military Commission (CMC) established a subordinate body titled the Science and Technology Commission (STC). The STC is intended to strengthen strategic management of science and technology in support of national defense, promoting cutting-edge technological innovation in the area of military technology, and encourage closer military-civilian cooperation in the development of advanced technologies. In 2017, the CMC created the Scientific Research Steering Committee, which functions largely along the lines of the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). This agency is intended to fuel technological innovation and the development of advanced technologies that might have military applications. The Scientific Research Steering Committee, along with the STC, forms a “new ‘top-level architecture’ of China’s military technology innovation system” (Ni, 2017, July 28). In addition, China has reorganized and refocused the PLA’s top three academic institutes—the Academy of Military Science (AMS), the National Defense University, and National University of Defense Technology; in particular, the AMS will emphasize scientific research related to military affairs, with an eye toward more closely aligning military theory with national S & T development (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2020, p. 142).

China’s MCF development strategy is at the center of China’s current defense sector reforms. China emphasizes assimilating private sector innovation into the defense-industrial base. Responsibility for MCF was centralized in 2017 with the establishment of the Central Commission for Integrated Military and Civilian Development, subordinate to the CCP Central Committee and intended to speed up the transfer of AI technology from commercial companies and research institutions to the PLA. That said, post-2017 MCF differs from earlier efforts in several critical ways. In the first place, it seeks to fully integrate its civilian industrial base into the PLA’s supply chain; for the first time, nondefense companies are being encouraged to sell directly to the military (Street, 2019, September 30). Second, MCF is being explicitly used to help China’s military access critical 4IR technologies, particularly AI. MCF entails the militarization of AI, as the PLA sees AI as critical for such tasks as command and control, for intelligence processing and analysis (e.g., imagery recognition and data mining), targeting, navigation, etc. (Hille, 2018, November 8).

Third, given its demands for cutting-edge commercial technologies, MCF inevitably necessitates the redirection of foreign technologies to supporting the modernization of the PLA. This is because much of China’s high-tech industrial base is still highly dependent on imported technologies, designs, and manufacturing equipment and processes. In many instances, private Chinese firms are being encouraged by the government to acquire foreign technology for its military (O’Keefe, 2019, September 25). This, in turn, risks making foreign companies doing business in China “de facto suppliers” to the PLA (Scissors & Blumenthal, 2019, January 14).

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, MCF is part of a long-term and broad-based strategic effort by Beijing to position China as a “technological superpower,” by pursuing guns and butter and having them mutually support each other. According to Levesque, Chinese leaders are using MCF to position the country “to compete militarily and economically in an emerging technological revolution” (Levesque, 2019, October 8). In this respects, Chinese MCF is far more ambitious and far-reaching than any present US efforts at CMI, particularly in its determination “to fuse [China’s] defense and commercial economies” (Laskai, 2018, January 29). According to Laskai, “Since Xi Jinping ascended to power in 2012, civil-military fusion has been part of nearly every major strategic initiative, including Made in China 2025 and Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Plan” (Laskai, 2018, January 29).

It should come as no surprise, therefore, to see that MCF has intertwined military modernization with civilian technological innovation in a number of critical dual-use technology sectors, including aerospace, advanced equipment manufacturing, artificial intelligence, and alternative sources of energy. At the same time, MCF also “involves greater integration of military and civilian administration at all levels of government: in national defense mobilization, airspace management and civil air defense, reserve and militia forces, and border and coastal defense” (Levesque, 2019, October 8). As Laskai notes, the recently established PLA Strategic Support Force (SSF), which is responsible for space, cyber, and electronic warfare, has “energetically built ties outside the military, signing cooperation agreements with research universities and even stationing officers within an unnamed software development company” (Laskai, 2018, January 29).

To be sure, China is still intensely active in areas of R & D not conducive to MCF, such as missiles or submarines. For example, the PLA is working on several hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs), such as the DF-17, which has already been tested several times. The DF-17 is reportedly capable of flying up to Mach 10 (12,000 kilometers an hour) and could possibly be nuclear armed (Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, 2019, March). In October 2021, China test-flew an earth-orbiting missile that circled the globe before gliding at hypersonic speed toward its target (therefore also demonstrating a potential “fractional orbital bombardment” capability).

At the same time, 4IR technologies are being used to expand the capabilities of weapons systems such as drones (both armed and unarmed) by giving them greater autonomy or creating new man-machine warfighting synergies (e.g., “loyal wingman” drones or naval “motherships”).

China is only at the beginning of an arduous, multiyear (multi-decade, even) effort to harness commercial high technologies for the technological advancement of the PLA. The barriers to the widespread development and diffusion of many 4IR technologies to the military sector remain high. There is no certainty that Xi’s MCF initiatives will work any better than early CMI efforts. According to Béraud-Sudreau and Nouwens, many obstacles remain, including “the private sector’s lack of access to large-scale and high-tech facilities and experimental instruments” and whether private-sector companies will get permission and clearances to work on larger and more sensitive projects, or “simply be used to supply less sensitive components” (Béraud-Sudreau & Nouwens, 2019, p. 12).

Nevertheless, it is unlikely that Xi, the Chinese Communist Party, and the PLA will walk away from the 4IR or the MCF anytime soon, even if they do experience setbacks. Beijing particularly believes that advances in AI will fundamentally reshape military and economic competition in the coming decades, and it is shaping its long-term plans accordingly. In particular, it is providing “significant” government subsidies to technology firms and academic institutions that engage in cutting-edge AI research (National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, 2021, p. 161). Moreover, Xi’s “personal legitimacy” is increasingly tied to the success or failure of MCF. According to Warden, MCF is categorically entwined with “long-term Party planning” and “Party consensus,” and any move to “de-intensify” MCF would come at a great cost to Xi’s authority (Warden, 2019, October 1). Consequently, “the Party-state’s long-term ambitions [for MCF] should not be underestimated,” and China’s “doctrine” of civil-military fusion will continue to serve as a “guiding principle” for its long-term strategy of parallel economic development and military modernization (Warden, 2019, October 1).

3 Russia: Weaponizing Artificial Intelligence

3.1 The Soviet Era: The Military-Technical Revolution (MTR)

Since the 1970s, Russian strategic thinkers became increasingly aware of the potential of emerging technologies, particularly in the US arsenal that created new military capabilities—force multipliers—threatening to exploit traditional Soviet quantitative advantages vis-à-vis US and NATO forces in Europe. As Murray and Knox noted, “the appearance in the 1970s of striking new technologies within the American armed forces…suggested to Soviet thinkers that a further technological revolution was taking place that had potentially decisive implications for the Soviet Union…from the Soviet perspective this was a particularly frightening prospect” (Murray & Knox, 2001, p. 3). At that time, the Soviets were also alarmed by the military lessons of wars between Israel and its Soviet-armed Arab neighbors, in which radar detection and precision firepower combined with new technologies and weapons produced high attrition rates on both sides (Shimko, 2010, p. 6). Consequently, they studied the operational implications of the new AirLand Battle and Follow-on Forces Attack (FOFA) doctrines, which stressed “initiative, depth, agility and synchronization” by attacking deep in the rear through a combination of stand-off precision fire, interdiction, and ground offensive operations (Adamsky, 2008, pp. 257–94). From a Soviet perspective, this inherently threatened the potential for Soviet forces to rely on their traditional strategy of multiple echelons/combined arms formations pushing forward on the battlefield.

Recognizing these developments and changes in the “correlation of forces,” the Soviets, under the command of Marshal Nikolai V. Ogarkov, Chief of the Soviet General Staff from 1977 to 1984, began to intellectualize the contours of the emerging military-technical revolution (MTR). Throughout the 1980s, Ogarkov and others developed conceptions of the future of warfare, arguing that the MTR may render traditional Soviet operational art and strategy obsolete and stipulate a major discontinuity in military affairs in which quality is far more important than quantity. Ogarkov believed that advanced technologies—conventional precision-guided weapons coupled with enhanced sensors—would pave a way for qualitatively new and incomparably more destructive forms of warfare than ever before, diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in future wars. In his perspective, the effectiveness of new conventional weapons combined with “informatics” or advanced command, control, and reconnaissance systems would essentially correspond in magnitude to strategic or political effects as tactical nuclear weapons (Petersen, 1984, p. 34).

Back then, Russian military thinkers emphasized that the future battlefield would merge traditional conceptions of the front and rear areas, with new weapons, technologies, and information systems allowing a near-simultaneous engagement of entire arrays of targets at greater distances, precision, lethality, and speed. The increasing value of space-based systems, unmanned systems, and automated detection and engagement integrated in a network of networks would dramatically redefine linear concepts of warfare. Amid these changes, the Red Army would have to rethink its operational concepts, adjust force structure, and redefine methods of waging war in each military service. As Adamsky noted, “Soviet theorists argued that given the tendency toward greater mobility and deception, the time available for destroying a target once it was identified would be limited. Thus, there was an acute need to develop an architecture that would consolidate the reconnaissance systems with high precision, fire-destruction elements, linked through the command and control channels” (Adamsky, 2008, p. 257).

These efforts essentially shaped the development of two operational concepts: (1) reconnaissance-strike complexes (RUK) and (2) operational maneuver groups (OMG). Both concepts were essentially doctrinal responses to the Western “deep strike” ALB and FOFA doctrines, projecting a Soviet “deep strike” version—an integrated mix of long-range-fire systems, information systems, and command and control systems in a “network of networks” capable of engaging “a wide array of critical targets at extended ranges with a high degree of accuracy and lethality” (Krepinevich, 1992, p. 6). In theory, the “RUK” (in Russian, rekognostsirovochnoye-udarnyy kompleks) would allow “simultaneous engagements of the enemy throughout the entire depth of his deployment… capable of destroying small, mobile targets with the use of long-range, high-precision munitions in combination with area sensors and automated command and control” (Watts, 1995, p. 2).

However, as the internal politico-economic conditions of the Soviet Union rapidly deteriorated in the late 1980s, leading to the eventual collapse of the Eastern Bloc and dissolution of the Soviet Union, Ogarkov’s MTR vision remained solely theoretical and conceptually focused on technological over operational and organizational factors. The Soviet Union lacked the technical capabilities and financial resources to pursue the MTR, while its seminal military writings on the MTR at that time projected a far more coherent understanding of its scope and implications than in the West—from abstract thinking to definitions of its sources, elements, and long-term consequences (Naveh, 1996). Therefore, the credit for the intellectual discovery of the MTR and later the RMA is largely given to them.

3.2 4IR Exploitation Under Putin

Russia also increasingly views emerging 4IR technologies—particularly AI—along with some form of MCF, as essential to the country’s future (“Whoever Leads in AI”, 2017, September 1). In October 2019, Putin approved a new Russian “National Strategy for the Development of Artificial Intelligence Until 2030” (Office of the President of the Russian Federation, 2019, October 10). This new strategy document is intended to accelerate Russian development of AI capabilities, in particular by expanding research, training, and information-sharing in AI. In addition, in December 2019, the Russian government raised the status of AI to a strategic program in its national “Digital Economy” project (“Aleksey Volin obsudil voprosy,” 2015, November 27).

Together, these initiatives have the goal of raising Russia up to the level of global leaders in AI by 2030. Moreover, Russia appears to be increasingly keen on the idea of exploiting AI for military purposes. The Russian armed forces frequently refer to the “intellectualization” and “digitization” of the military and are actively exploring the use of AI for intelligence gathering and processing, as well as the development of robots and “multi-agent systems” (e.g., swarming) (Bendett, 2020, pp. 8–13).

In this regard, Putin has repeatedly called upon Russia’s scientific potential to improve the country’s defense capability via the convergence of military and civilian science. In 2012, Putin “clearly spoke out in favor of using Russia’s scientific potential to enhance the country’s defense capability,” arguing that “without a doubt, the normal development of military research is impossible without partnership with civil science” (Kozyulin, 2020, p. 7). Although how it might be accomplished is still unclear, the stress on “convergence” very clearly points to some kind of strategy utilizing MCF.

In particular, Russia has made serious efforts to spread AI over the country. The Putin regime has over the past decade greatly boosted R & D in the field of AI, and the AI and digital economy programs launched in 2019 include several projects intended to promote national AI and other 4IR technology-development efforts, underwritten by a total budget of some US$26 billion. Russian businesses and individuals engaged in AI research and applications are eligible for tax incentives or grants. Moscow is making “digitization” a dominant concept in such areas as finance and banking, law enforcement, and social services, and the Russian government increasingly stresses new concepts like “smart cities” and “smart transport.” Putin has publicly described AI as “a crucial element for safeguarding Russia’s own place in the world,” crucial to “protecting Russia’s ‘unique civilization.’” According to Samuel Bendett, Putin sees the development of AI and other digital technologies as one of the most important issues for Russia at this time, noting that the future of Russia is “simply impossible” without the development of AI (Bendett, 2020, p. 1).

Russia’s military is only just beginning to grasp the importance of 4IR technologies. According to a report released by Chatham House, the Russian armed forces emphasize “a repair-and-upgrade” and “retain-and-adapt” approach to military innovation that emphasizes only being “good enough to contest and deny the perceived conventional military advantage of more advanced competitors.” This is partly due to the fact that the country’s military R & D base remains limited in its abilities to develop and manufacture “genuinely new systems.” Consequently, “instead of trying to catch up with the West (and increasingly China) in the traditional way, Russia seeks to counter and contest by developing technologically enabled force multipliers” in specific sectors (Bendett et al., 2021, September 23, p. 12).

As such, the Russian armed forces have been slow to exploit 4IR technologies. However, they are increasingly and particularly keen on the prospects for exploiting AI for military use. Like other great powers, Russia sees AI as occupying an instrumental role in the battlefield of the future. The Russian military wants to integrate AI, big data, machine learning, and other digital technologies into such areas as autonomous systems, electronic warfare, and long-range strike, as well as improving data and imagery collection and analysis and increasing the speed and quality of information processing (Bendett, 2018, August 27).

3.3 Exploiting the 4IR

According to a Chatham House research report, innovation in Russia overall is very much a “top-down, state-driven” process (Bendett et al., 2021, September 23, p. 12). The report further delineates the process of military R & D in Russia as progressing along “three major pathways”:

  • “Modernization and upgrading of existing and well-established nuclear and non-nuclear technologies”

  • “Experimentation in and pursuit of ‘risky’ innovation projects within a broad spectrum of novel technologies that can potentially yield significant advantages”

  • “Integration of some of the new technologies into the established weapons systems” (Bendett et al., 2021, September 23, p. 13)

As a result, almost all 4IR innovation initiatives in Russia—and particularly R & D and innovation in the area of AI—are carried out by the Russian government. This includes the “National Strategy for the Development of Artificial Intelligence Until 2030” and the “National Program Digital Economy of the Russian Federation.”

According to Katarzyna Zysk, the “basic Russian innovation model” for enabling breakthrough technologies is to rely on state-sponsored, government-run “radical innovation centers”—also known as “technoparks,” “technopolises,” “futuropolises,” or “innopolises” (Zysk, 2021, p. 547). Accordingly, Russian R & D in the area of 4IR technologies is concentrated in various “innovation centers” established by the state as “generators of ideas and dual-use technologies” (Zysk, 2021, p. 544).

These innovation centers are particularly focused not just on AI but also on quantum computing, big data, smart unmanned systems (e.g., robots), machine learning, man-machine interfaces, hypersonics, and weapons based on “new physical principles” (Wright, 2018, December, p. 165; Kozyulin, 2020, pp. 30–31). Two of the best-known innovation centers are the ERA Military Innovative Technopolis and the Advanced Research Foundation (ARF). ERA is intended to develop technology specifically for the Russian armed forces. As such, ERA’s focus is on promoting scientific research and innovation in such breakthrough military technology areas as AI, robotics, microsats, automated control systems, informatics and computer technology, biotechnology, and nanotechnologies, among others (Kozyulin, 2020, pp. 30–31).

The ARF (also known as the Fond perspektivnykh issledovanii or FPI) was established in 2012 to function as the equivalent of the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). According to Vadim Kozyulin, the ARF focuses on three key research fields—information systems, physical-technical, and chemical-biological—and also addresses “AI standardization” in four areas: image decryption, speech processing, the control of autonomous robotic systems, and information support of the life cycle of weapons and equipment (Kozyulin, 2020, p. 32). AI-enabled robot systems (e.g., aerial drones and unmanned ground vehicles) are a key research area; this takes into account such discreet technologies as image recognition, autonomous navigation, and control methods for group use (e.g., swarming techniques).

While the bulk of Russian 4IR innovation activity is state-centered and top-down, Moscow appears to have promoted some military-civil fusion efforts. This includes encouraging public-private partnerships in order to facilitate collaboration between the commercial high-technology sector and academic institutions on the one hand and the Russian armed forces on the other (Wright, 2018, December, p. 165). According to Zysk, the ERA technopolis model is “a combination of laboratories, engineering centers, and ‘open spaces’” intended to nurture cooperative innovation between the military and academia. The goal is “to create a strong link between theory and practice in order to integrate all stages of the product generation cycle: from idea to limited-scale testing” (Zysk, 2021, pp. 549–550).

MCF is also viewed as a means to create new jobs and new civilian high-tech products, both for the Russian market and for export. Consequently, the Russian defense industry has been ordered to increase its output of “civilian and dual-purpose products” to 30% by 2025 (compared to just under 17% in 2016) and up to 50% by 2030 (Zysk, 2021, pp. 544–545).

Nevertheless, in spite of all these efforts, Russian successes when it comes to generating 4IR breakthroughs—especially via the pursuit of military-civil fusion—have been few. As Zysk put it, “despite grand ambitions, new initiatives, and modifications of the traditional defense innovation model to incorporate civilian and private-sector innovation, Russia struggles to leverage 4IR technologies” (Zysk, 2021, p. 546). According to many analysts, several factors have hindered Russia’s ability to develop and exploit the fourth industrial revolution. In the first place, Russia lacks sufficient resources to support innovative R & D in either the military or civilian sectors. The country’s defense budget, as well as its overall economy, is much smaller than its geostrategic rivals (i.e., the United States and China); Russian military expenditures are less than one-third of the official Chinese defense budget (in US dollars) (Kashin & Raska, 2020, December, p. 4; Bendett et al., 2021, September 23, p. 37).

Analysts have also noted the “low level of innovation in Russia’s overall economy,” a “decline in professional expertise and the human resources,” and “gaps in the Russian defense-industrial base.” These problems were made all the worse by sanctions imposed on Russia after Moscow’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 (Kashin & Raska, 2020, December, p. 37).

Consequently, Russia is not able to compete in 4IR technologies across-the-board or otherwise develop practical military applications for many of these emerging technologies. According to Kashin and Raska, Russian innovation priorities reflect these reduced resources and that therefore, for “Russia to remain relevant in the current defense technological race,” it needs to concentrate its efforts on a few, hopefully breakthrough technologies (Kashin & Raska, 2020, December, p. 4).

Most of all, this means AI. According to Samuel Bendett, the Russian armed forces are investing heavily in AI development while simultaneously attempting to expand collaboration between the military’s R & D base and the country’s commercial high-technology sector. At the same time, Moscow is putting a lot of effort into robotics, particularly unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs). As a result, the Russian army has deployed dozens of UGVs. The long-term goal is to marry AI with unmanned systems to create autonomous aerial and ground fighting vehicles (Wright, 2018, December, pp. 161–169; Bendett et al., 2021, September 23, pp. 47–62).

To be sure, Russia is still far behind the United States and China when it comes to the field of AI. It is estimated that total Russian spending on AI—around US$12 million in 2017, projected to rise to US$360 million during the period 2020–2024—is dwarfed by the billions of dollars that the US Defense Department alone has spent on AI (roughly US$7.4 billion just in 2017) (Dougherty & Jay, 2018). Nevertheless, even if Russia cannot compete head-to-head in an “AI arms race” with China and the United States, it is forging ahead with a multipronged approach to wringing as much benefit as it can from its AI-related research capacities and activities (Gady, 2019, December 21).

4 Chinese and Russian Prospects for Exploiting the 4IR for Military Modernization

It is obvious that both China and Russia appreciate the potential military value of technologies embedded in the fourth industrial revolution. It is also apparent that both countries want to innovate with 4IR technologies and apply these innovations to their respective armed forces. As such, both countries are forging ahead with initiatives and efforts to develop 4IR technologies, with particular attention being paid to artificial intelligence, quantum computing, big data, and autonomous systems. Moreover, these efforts increasingly entail some form of military-civil fusion, that is, partnering military and commercial R & D in order to produce military-technological innovation.

All this is intended, ultimately, to enable what the Chinese have come to call “intelligentized warfare.” This means leveraging 4IR technologies in order to gain a dominant military-technological advantage over one’s likely competitors and adversaries by the middle of the twenty-first century. 4IR technologies lie at the center of the next great military-technical revolution.

That said, the path to realizing these ambitions faces many obstacles. Russia is particularly hindered by a lack of funding and a weak national R & D base, resulting in a relatively low level of innovation in the nation overall. Consequently, Moscow appears to be putting nearly all of its 4IR apples in the single basket of AI and autonomous systems. It remains unanswered, however, whether such a highly focused approach will be enough to produce a sufficient increase in military advantage.

Compared to Russia, China appears to have a stronger national innovation system in place, and it also seems to be further along in facilitating military-commercial technological cooperation. At the same time, it has a much more ambitious agenda when it comes to exploiting the 4IR for military gain—not just AI but also including other research areas like quantum computing, big data, 5G networking, robotics, human-machine interfacing, swarm intelligence, and automated decision-making, in addition to fields like hypersonics and biotechnology. China has other advantages over Russia, including a more advanced indigenous technology base outside the military-industrial complex, the presence of several globally connected and highly competitive high-technology companies (such as Alibaba and Huawei), extensive and intensive linkages to Western high-technology sectors, and—perhaps most important of all—high levels of monetary support, both governmental and private. All of these factors make MCF—that is, the utilization of indigenous commercial high technology in support of military-technological innovation—more doable and more likely to produce results.

Despite these advantages, China still struggles with harnessing the potential of the 4IR. The technological challenges are daunting, and MCF is not assured of success. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that Russia or China will abandon their efforts to exploit the 4IR for military gain, even if they do experience setbacks. In particular, both countries see AI as a real game-changer, one that could affect so many other areas of military-technological innovation. Since neither wants to miss out on the potential of AI, we should at the very least expect to see China and Russia emphasize spirited research efforts in this particular area.

5 Prospects for Sino-Russian Cooperation in 4IR Technologies

Chinese and Russian interests in exploiting the 4IR for military modernization—and their relative weaknesses when it comes to innovating 4IR technologies and applying these to military uses—beg the question of whether these two countries might come to see bilateral cooperation as a means to boosting their respective efforts. There is certainly considerable precedent for doing so. During the 1950s, the USSR provided substantial economic and technical assistance to the newly formed People’s Republic of China (see also Chapter “Russia-China Naval Partnership and Its Significance” by Alexandre Sheldon-Duplaix and Chapter “Russian-Chinese Military-Technological Cooperation and the Ukrainian Factor” by Sarah Kirchberger). The Soviet Union helped expand China’s heavy industries, such as steel mills, shipbuilding, and locomotives, aided China’s coal and oil sectors, and provided machine tools, engineers, and experts to modernize Chinese production. In addition, the USSR brought thousands of Chinese to Soviet Russia for education and training.

The Soviet Union also provided tremendous amounts of military assistance to China. This was not restricted to the supply of finished armaments but also included the establishment of turnkey facilities that permitted the Chinese to manufacture a wide variety of Soviet arms. In fact, the vast majority of Chinese arms produced during the 1950s and 1960s were simply copies of Soviet-designed and developed weaponry—but quite often these were the most modern weapons systems available. During this period, for example, China produced T-54 and T-55 tanks; MiG-15, MiG-17, and MiG-19 fighter aircraft; the SS-N-2 Styx anti-ship missile (designated the HY-2 Silkworm by the PLA); the AA-2 air-to-air missile; and the Romeo-class diesel-electric submarine. In most cases, the USSR made these systems available for licensed manufacture by China within only a few years of deploying the weapons with the Soviet armed forces. Moscow even made available to the PLA its then most potent fighter jet, the MiG-21. While this technology transfer arrangement was partly derailed by the Sino-Soviet split of 1960, the Chinese were able to receive enough MiG-21 airframes, kits, and technical documents so as to successfully reverse engineer the aircraft as the J-7. As a result, during 1950s and early 1960s, the gap between Chinese armaments and those of the rest of the world was not particularly wide.

Russian military-technical assistance resumed following the collapse of the USSR. In the early 1990s, China placed an order with Moscow for 24 Su-27 fighter jets, its first purchase of Russian military equipment in more than 30 years. This was followed up by subsequent buys of additional Su-27 and Su-30 fighters and later an agreement to licensed-produce 200 Su-27 s at the Shenyang Aircraft Corporation in Liaoning province. Between the early 1990s and the mid-2000s, in fact, there was a huge expansion in Russian arms transfers to China. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), China received more than US$21.5 billion worth of arms between 1992 and 2005 (SIPRI, 2021). In addition to Sukhoi fighters, Beijing bought 4 Sovremenny-class destroyers (armed with the Moskit/SS-S-22 supersonic anti-ship cruise missile [ASCM]), 12 Kilo-class diesel-electric submarines, and several dozen Mi-8/−17 Hip helicopters, along with Tor-M1 and S-300 surface-to-air missile systems, AA-11 air-to-air missiles, Il-76 transport aircraft, Kh-31 anti-radiation missiles, and 3 M-54 ASCMs. For much of this period, in fact, Russian weapons systems arguably constituted the most potent armaments in the PLA’s inventories (Bitzinger, 2016, pp. 766–767).

While China’s defense industry has subsequently improved to the extent that it no longer needs to import so much Russian weaponry or military technology (Bitzinger, 2016, pp. 780, 783–786),Footnote 1 the incentives to cooperate in other technology spheres remain, including 4IR technologies. In fact, according to Bendett and Kania, Beijing and Moscow “recognize the potential synergies of joining forces, in the development of these dual-use technologies, which possess clear military and commercial significance” (Bendett & Kania, 2019, p. 3). As a result, these countries have initiated collaboration in a number of so-called “new era” technology sectors, particularly AI but also robotics, 5G telecommunications, biotechnology, and the digital economy (Bendett & Kania, 2019, pp. 9–13). Consequently, Russia and China have agreed to cooperate, on a broad level, on a number of high-technology initiatives. These include (1) the establishment of an annual “Russian–Chinese High-Tech Forum”; (2) a “Sino-Russian Innovation Dialogue,” convened annually by China’s Ministry of Science and Technology and Russia’s Ministry of Economic Development; (3) the establishment of a Sino-Russian Science and Technology Park in Changchun, China, as a “base for S & T cooperation and innovation,” as well as a China-Russia Innovation Park in Shaanxi; and (4) an agreement to create a Sino-Russian high-tech center at the Skolkovo Innovation Center (Russia’s wannabe “Silicon Valley”). In addition, Moscow and Beijing have established new S & T and investment funds intended to promote Sino-Russian technology cooperation, created innovation competitions, and expanded academic collaboration between the two countries, including joint research and personnel exchanges (Bendett & Kania, 2019, pp. 6–8).

Mutual strategic interests—that is, their respective strategic competitions with the United States—drive much of this Sino-Russian collaboration, and a high-tech partnership is viewed as a potential “force multiplier” (Bendett & Kania, 2020, August 20). Each sees a prospective benefit in leveraging the other’s advantages in order to drive high-technology developments and innovations. Russia possesses proficiencies in various areas of STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) disciplines (many of them legacies of the Soviet era), particularly at the level of basic research (i.e., S & T). At the same time, China is particularly adept in applied systems, particularly when it comes to Internet-enabled solutions (e.g., WeChat, Tencent) or telecommunications (e.g., Huawei, ZTE). Moreover, China has the deep pockets to invest in collaborative projects and programs. Clearly, there is the potential for a complimentary fit between the two countries. In particular, Russia would like to use China’s globalized high-tech capacities to “jump-start” its own indigenous innovation (Bendett & Kania, 2019, pp. 16).

Both countries clearly see the advantages of collaboration in order to raise the respective levels of their national S & T bases when it comes to 4IR technologies. Both also recognize the vast potential military applications of such dual-use research efforts. Nevertheless, such cooperation could still be limited. In particular, the likely imbalance in Sino-Russian collaboration could be its undoing. Russia has certain strengths that it can bring to the table, but overall it lacks the resources or technological capacities (money and manpower, together with an already low level of innovation in the national economy) to function as an equal to China, at least in the long term. Moscow is particularly concerned that Beijing will emerge as the dominant player in this bilateral cooperation, given that China may soon (if it has not done so already) overtake Russia in critical technology areas like AI. Compounding these fears are that China will try—via collaboration but also intellectual property theft and espionage (areas where it has a long history)—to obtain Russia’s high-tech “crown jewels” and become the “epicenter of global innovation” and eventually shut Moscow out (Bendett & Kania, 2020, August 20).

Should Moscow find itself playing the junior partner in 4IR collaboration, this would constitute a reversal of the historical Sino-Russian technology-sharing relationship. China might also eventually believe that it has gained all it can from such a partnership and decide to jettison Russia. In any event, Sino-Russian collaboration when it comes to 4IR technologies may have a built-in governor limiting the extent and depth of this cooperation. In this case, both countries could continue to struggle, separately, with achieving breakthroughs in the areas of 4IR technologies and applying these to military uses. In particular, military-civil fusion can only succeed where there is considerable progress in overall high-tech sectors (like AI or robotics) and where there are also mechanisms for translating innovations to the military-technological-industrial sphere. Overall, both China and Russia still face considerable impediments to both.