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CCA Secure A Posteriori Openable Encryption in the Standard Model

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Topics in Cryptology – CT-RSA 2022 (CT-RSA 2022)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 13161))

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Abstract

A Posteriori Openable Public Key Encryptions (APOPKE) allow any user to generate a constant-size key that decrypts the messages they have sent over a chosen period of time. As an important feature, the period can be dynamically chosen after the messages have been sent. This primitive was introduced in 2016 by Bultel and Lafourcade. They also defined the Chosen-Plaintext Attack (CPA) security for APOPKE, and designed a scheme called GAPO, which is CPA secure in the random oracle model. In this paper, we formalize the Chosen-Ciphertext Attack (CCA) security for APOPKE, then we design a scheme called CHAPO (for CHosen-ciphetext attack resistant A Posteriori Openable encryption), and we prove its CCA security in the standard model. CHAPO is approximately twice as efficient as GAPO and is more generic. We also give news applications, and discuss the practical impact of its CCA security.

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Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Angèle Bossuat and David Gérault for their helpful comments and suggestions.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. INSA Centre Val de Loire, Laboratoire d’informatique fondamentale d’Orléans, Bourges, France

    Xavier Bultel

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  1. Xavier Bultel
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Correspondence to Xavier Bultel .

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  1. University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand

    Steven D. Galbraith

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Bultel, X. (2022). CCA Secure A Posteriori Openable Encryption in the Standard Model. In: Galbraith, S.D. (eds) Topics in Cryptology – CT-RSA 2022. CT-RSA 2022. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 13161. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95312-6_16

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95312-6_16

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-030-95311-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-95312-6

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