Moral Psychology of Emotion in Korean Neo-Confucianism and Its Philosophical Debates on the Affective Nature of the Mind

Abstract

This chapter discusses the Four-Seven Debate and the Horak Debate, the two major philosophical debates of Korean Neo-Confucianism and analyzes how Korean Neo-Confucians in the Joseon dynasty understood and explained emotions in their theories of the mind, morality, and human nature. Although the Korean thinkers respected and followed the philosophical framework of the Cheng-Zhu Neo-Confucianism, they also developed their own theories of emotions. The philosophical significance of Korean Neo-Confucianism lies in its unique moral psychology, the moral psychology of the emotional mind with its dedication to the moral nature of human beings and the regulative principle of the universe.

1 Introduction

Korean Neo-Confucian philosophers in the Joseon dynasty (1392–1910) discussed the nature of the mind and emotions. Although they were deeply influenced by the Chung-Zhu school of Chinese Neo-Confucianism, their approach is distinctively moral psychological and their stance is thoroughly analytic.¹ They developed stimulating philosophical interpretations of seong/xing (性 human nature or nature), i/li (理 principle, order, or coherent pattern), and gi/qi (氣 vital energy or material force) in their theories of sim/xin (心 the heart-mind or mind-and-heart) and jeong/qing (情 emotions, feelings, or interactive senses). This chapter discusses how Korean Neo-Confucians understood emotions in their philosophical debates by focusing on the two major philosophical debates in the Joseon dynasty (Four-Seven Debate [Sachil nonjaeng 四七論爭 1559–1572] and the Horak Debate [Horak nonjaeng 湖洛論爭 1709–1715]), and how they explained emotions from the perspectives of the mind, morality, and human nature through the governing principle (i/li) and the generative force (gi/qi) of the Neo-Confucian universe.

In Western psychology, emotions are defined as inner subjective feelings that are contrasted with reason (rational thinking or reasoning). In Neo-Confucianism, however, emotions (jeong/qing 情) are not understood exclusively as inner subjective feelings. Unlike Western notions, the Neo-Confucian notions of emotions include one’s responsiveness to external simulation, one’s reflection of the moral nature of human beings, as well as one’s subjective feelings toward others. Specifically, Neo-Confucian philosophers understood emotions broadly to include not only one’s affective expressions but also one’s pure and undisturbed states of the mind that can reflect on and represent the original nature of human beings.² In this chapter, I will discuss the Korean Neo-Confucian notions of emotions that integrate the psychological (responsive to external stimulation), ontological (resonating with the inherent human nature), and moral (following the order of goodness) dimensions of the mind. I will argue that, although many comparative scholars approach Korean Neo-Confucianism from the perspective of its abstract metaphysics, Korean Neo-Confucians develop a unique form of moral psychology founded upon the emotional sensitivity of the mind and the moral nature of human beings.³

This chapter discusses emotions in two different ways. First, I will explain how the mind and emotions are understood in the philosophical debates of the Joseon dynasty. The Four-Seven Debate is a philosophical debate on the moral psychological nature of the Four Beginnings (sadan/siduan 四端, the four innate moral emotions) and the Seven Emotions (the seven ordinary emotions; chiljeong/qiqing 七情). The Horak Debate is a philosophical debate on the nature of human beings as reflected in the unaroused and pure state of the mind. They are the two well-known and influential debates that set the philosophical direction and culminate the intellectual rigor of Korean Neo-Confucianism in the Joseon dynasty. In the context of the two major philosophical debates, I will discuss the moral psychological significance of emotions in Korean Neo-Confucianism.

Second, I will discuss the two philosophical approaches the Korean Neo-Confucians developed in their debates. The first approach is the psycho-affective approach. According to this approach, emotions affect and motivate us in our reaction to external stimulation. They are aroused and activated states of the mind caused by the interactive flow of material force (gi/qi) and governed by the regulative order of principle (i/li). The second approach is the onto-directive approach. According to this approach, emotions are affective moral awareness and devotional self-cultivation. They reveal and reflect the underlying nature of moral goodness in one’s mind and represent what a person truly is and what she/he should become in a broad philosophical context of Confucianism.

The contrast or conflict between the onto-directive and the psycho-affective approaches to emotions can be witnessed in many philosophical debates in Korean Neo-Confucianism.⁴ Among those debates, the chapter focuses on the two exemplary ones to discuss how the Korean Neo-Confucians distinguished the onto-directive and the psycho-affective dimensions of emotions, how they developed the unique notions of emotions (jeong/qing 情), and how they advanced their philosophical theories on the moral goodness of the mind and the holistic and inclusive nature of emotions.

2 The Four-Seven Debate and the Moral Emotions

The Korean Neo-Confucians in the Four-Seven Debate discussed the moral, psychological, and metaphysical nature of the two sets of emotions. The Four Beginnings (sadan/siduan 四端) are four intrinsically moral emotions: the mind-and-heart of pity and compassion (cheugeunjisim/ceyinzhixin 惻隱之心), the mind-and-heart of shame and dislike (suojisim/xiuwuzhixin 羞惡之心), the mind-and-heart of deference and compliance (sayangjisim/cirangzhixin 辭讓之心), and the mind-and-heart of right and wrong (sibijisim/shifeizhixin 是非之心) that are listed and discussed in the Mencius (2A: 6, 6A: 6).⁵ Mencius states that if one, for example, does not feel pity and compassion [cheugeunjisim/ceyinzhixin 惻隱之心] toward others who are in pain and suffering, one is not a human being (2A: 6). The Seven Emotions (chiljeong/qiqing 七情) are seven ordinary emotions: joy, anger, grief, fear, love, hate, and desire (huinoaeguaeoyok/xǐnuaijuaieyu 喜怒愛懼哀惡欲) that are listed in the Book of Rites (Yegi/Liji 禮記). They are not intrinsically good but can become good and virtuous by careful self-cultivation and reflection. The goal of the debate, therefore, is to explain the moral psychological difference between the two sets of emotions (the morally intrinsic Four Beginnings and the morally contingent Seven Emotions) in terms of the Neo-Confucian i-gi/li-qi metaphysics.⁶

The participants of the debate, Toegye (退溪, Yi Hwang 李滉 1501–1570), Ugye (牛溪, Seong Hon成渾, 1535–1598), Gobong (高峰, Gi Daesung 奇大升 1527–1572) and Yulgok (栗谷, Yi I 李珥 1586–1584) recognized the nominal difference between the Four and the Seven but explained and analyzed them from two different viewpoints.⁷ Toegye and Ugye explained and justified the difference between the Four and the Seven but Gobong and Yulgok raised doubts on the full justification of the difference.⁸ Toegye and Ugye took a philosophical approach where the intrinsic moral nature of the Four is found in the onto-directive side of emotion, that is, the aspect of emotion that reveals the original nature of human being and the moral mind. They followed Mencius’s view (2A: 6, 6A: 6) that the Four are affective moral senses that derive from the innately given moral sprouts of the mind rooted in human nature. The Seven, however, are only contingently moral (or possibly evil) and, therefore, do not necessarily reflect the underlying goodness of the moral mind.

In his second letter to Gobong, Toegye explains the difference between the Four and the Seven in terms of i/li and gi/qi, the two foundational concepts of Neo-Confucian metaphysics.

although the neither of the two [the Four and the Seven] is separable from principle [i/li] and material force [gi/qi], on the basis of their point of origin, each points to a predominant factor and emphasis, so there is no reason why we cannot say that the one [the Four] is a matter of principle and the other [the Seven] a matter of material force. (Kalton et al. 1994: 11)

In this letter to Gobong, Toegye explained that although both i/li and gi/qi are involved in the arousal and expressions of emotional states, some emotions such as the Four predominantly or essentially derive from i/li, whereas other emotions such as the Seven derive mainly from gi/qi. He focused on i/li to explain the intrinsic moral nature of the Four but discussed gi/qi to explain the contingent moral nature of the Seven. The distinction between the Four and the Seven through the consistent nature of i/li and the contingent process of gi/qi, therefore, is the main thesis of Toegye and Ugye’s view in the Four-Seven Debate.

To understand the conflicting views developed in the Four-Seven Debate, it is important to discuss the broad philosophical significance of i/li and gi/qi. In Neo-Confucian metaphysics, i/li and gi/qi play different roles in the explanation of the nature and the process of physical and psychological phenomena. Gi/Qi is a physical force behind the concrete, variable, and active processes in the universe but i/li is a penetrating and integrating pattern of the invariable, consistent, and universal coherence of the universe. The former is efficacious and tangible but the latter is inefficacious and intangible. However, as foundational elements of the Neo-Confucian universe, i/li and gi/qi are always together (bulsangli/buxianli 不相離) even though they are different from each other (bulsangjap/buxiangza 不相雜). With this contrastive but integrative relation between i/li and gi/qi, Toegye approached and explained the intrinsic moral nature of the Four through i/li.⁹

Since i/li and gi/qi are always together and gi/qi is necessary for the active arousal of emotions, Toegye’s exclusive emphasis on i/li in his explanation of the intrinsically moral nature of the Four does not seem to be consistent or convincing. Given the inseparability of i/li and gi/qi, it is not easy to understand that the Four is mostly i/li and the Seven is mostly gi/qi.¹⁰ However, Toegye argued that the distinction between the Four and the Seven should be maintained because the intrinsic moral goodness of the Four following the orderly principle of i/li should not be confused with the unrestraint activity of gi/qi in human desires that can be evil. He stated that “to pursue learning while disliking distinctions and concentrating on explanations” is a highly problematic approach, and adds that “if one goes on like this, without even being aware of it, one may ineluctably slip into the abuse of discussing the nature in terms of material force and fall into the calamity of thinking of human desires as Heavenly principle. How could that be allowed!” (Kalton et al. 1994: 56).

Against Toegye’s i/li-based explanation of the Four, Gobong focused on the interactivity and inseparability of i/li and gi/qi. He argued that emotions (whether they are the Four or the Seven) are all aroused by gi/qi’s activity because i/li does not have any particular form/shape (muhyeong/wuxing 無形). Nor does it have any physical action (muwi/wuwei 無爲) with causal efficacy.¹¹ Although i/li supports the governing order and the intrinsic goodness of the moral emotions, gi/qi is still necessary for their arousal and manifestation. That is, from the perspective of the inseparability of i/li and gi/qi in human emotions, the Four and the Seven are not inherently different: They are all aroused and active states of the mind with the inseparable combination of i/li and gi/qi.¹² In his first letter to Toegye, Gobong argued that “The two [i/li and gi/qi] are certainly distinct, but when it comes to their presence in actual things, they are certainly mixed together and cannot be split apart. It’s just that principle is weak while material force is physically in evidence… This is what I describe as the Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings from the start not meaning two different things” (Kalton et al. 1994: 6). He added, in his second letter to Toegye, that “Both the Four Beginnings and the Seven Feelings issue from the mind-and-heart. Since the mind-and-heart is a conjunction of principle [i/li] and material force [gi/qi], feelings certainly combine both principle and material force. It is not the case that there is a particular distinctive kind of feelings that only issues from principle and not from material force” (Kalton et al. 1994: 32). What Gobong argued in these letters to Toegye is that, although the Four and the Seven have different moral psychological characteristics, they are all aroused states with gi/qi’s causal energy and i/li’s regulative order. One cannot say, as Toegye does, that the Four are exclusively i/li-driven states and therefore different from the Seven.

Yulgok’s view comes out of this unified interpretation of emotions: whether the Four or the Seven, all emotions are affective states that are aroused by gi/qi and regulated by i/li. He presented two arguments. First, everything, whether it is Heaven and Earth or the mind-and-heart, changes with a uniform fashion. Yulgok, in his response to Ugye’s third letter, stated that “the transformative process of Heaven and Earth is completely a matter of material force [gi/qi] transforming and principle [i/li] mounting it…Heaven and Earth’s [natural] process of transformation is identical with the issuing of our minds-and-hearts…If someone were to say that our minds-and-hearts are different from the transformative process of Heaven and Earth, that’s not something I could understand” (Kalton et al. 1994: 132). That is, the Four and the Seven should follow the same pattern of the transformative change in the universe (the inseparable integration of i/li and gi/qi, i.e., qi’s arousal followed by i/li’s guidance). Second, although the Dao mind (dosim/daoxin 道心, the mind of ideal moral goodness) and the human mind (insim/renxin 人心, the mind of ordinary human beings) can be differentiated as the intrinsically moral mind and the potentially evil mind, the Four and the Seven are not distinguished in such a way because the Four are included in the Seven. The Seven exhaust the whole spectrum of emotions including the Four. Yulgok, in his reply to Ugye’s third letter, stated,“In general, the human mind and Tao mind are terms set up in contrast with each other. When one says, ‘Tao mind,’ the human mind is excluded; when one says, ‘human mind,’ the Tao mind is excluded. Therefore, one can explain them dichotomously. But when it comes to the Seven Feelings, they already include the Four Beginnings” (Kalton et al. 1994: 134). He added, “the feelings comprise pleasure, anger, sorrow, fear, love, hatred, and desire — these seven and that is all. Beyond these seven, there are no other feelings…if one says, ‘the Seven Feelings,’ the Four Beginnings are included in them” (Kalton et al. 1994: 134). With the two arguments, Yulgok explained the nature and the arousal of emotions through his theory of gibaliseungildoseol/qifalichengyitushuo (氣發理乘一途說): all emotions are gi/qi issued, i/li mounted states of the mind.¹³

3 Two Approaches to Emotion in the Four-Seven Debate

One can describe and analyze the Four-Seven Debate as a philosophical conflict between the two different ways of understanding emotions. First, emotions reflect and represent the true nature (seong/xing 性) of the mind and human beings. When they are pure and clear, emotions are not just subjective feelings but a conduit of the order and generative process of the universe. While some emotions are spontaneous, inconsistent, variable, and distracting, other emotions, such as the Four, arise directly from the intrinsic moral goodness of human nature and the governing principle of the universe. Toegye’s view follows this line of thinking. He differentiated the Four from the Seven and focus on the Four’s intrinsically moral nature from the perspective of i/li. Because of this connection between emotions and the underlying nature of the mind and human beings, Toegye stressed the inner cultivation through gyeong/jing (敬 reverential piety, reverential seriousness, or mindfulness), and sindok/shendu (愼獨 careful self-regulation in one’s solitude). Gyeong/jing (敬) is the careful monitoring of the mind with reverential piety, seriousness, or mindfulness toward the underlying human nature in one’s inner self that is resonating with the regulative order of the universe.¹⁴ Sindok/shendu (愼獨) means sustained self-regulation in one’s solitude when one is vulnerable to temptations and deviances. In his Jaseongnok (自省錄), Toegye stated, “when people study they just have to follow reverence as the master of learning and should not lose it while being active or tranquil.”¹⁵ In his Seonghaksipdo (聖學十圖), he states that “reverential seriousness is the beginning and end of the learning for sagehood [seonghak/shengxue 聖學]” and “The method [of simhak/xinxue 心學] is to be gravely cautious and watchful over what is not seen and heard, as well as to be more reverential and serious. It is to practice self-watchfulness and self-reflection in a more refined way where things are invisible or subtle and when one is alone.”¹⁶ All these methods of Confucian cultivation help one to reflect upon, regain, and cultivate the original nature of human beings and its foundational connection to the universe, specifically to the governing order and the consistent coherence of i/li. Toegye saw the ontological and moral side (i.e., the onto-directive side) of emotions in the Four and emphasized the cultivation of its full potential in the virtuous mind.

Second, emotions reflect the psychological reality of the mind. Gobong understood emotions as an aroused state from the perspective of the physical activity and psychological expression of the mind and Yulgok understood emotions as a reactive state to external stimuli from the perspective of the interactive nature of the mind (Kalton et al. 1994: 6, 28, 133–134). On the basis of these psychological tendencies of the mind, they argued that gi/qi’s energy is needed for emotions’ affective arousal and reactive feeling. They emphasized gi/qi’s contribution to emotions (whether they are the Four or the Seven). Gobong stated that “It’s just that principle [i/li] is weak while material force [gi/qi] is strong; principle has no concrete sign, but material force is physically in evidence” (Kalton et al. 1994: 6). Yulgok stated, “Generally speaking, that which gives issuance is material force; that whereby there is issuance is principle. Without material force, there would not be the power of issuing; without principle, there would not be that whereby it issues” (Kalton et al. 1994: 131). The moral goodness of emotions, therefore, should start with gi/qi’s activity followed by i/li’s guidance.

Although Gobong and Yulgok focused on different aspects of emotions, they took emotions primarily as aroused, affective, and reactive states of the human mind (insim/renxin 人心) that are often uneven, unbalanced, and unregulated. For this reason, careful balance and harmony are necessary to regulate and guide the aroused states to become moral and virtuous by developing the Dao mind (dosim/daoxin 道心). However, Yulgok did not distinguish the Four and the Seven from the perspective of the Dao mind and the human mind. He stated, “one can explain them [the Dao mind and the human mind] dichotomously. But when it comes to the Seven Feelings, they already include the Four Beginnings” (Kalton et al. 1994: 134). According to him, the Four and the Seven, from the perspective of psycho-affectivity, are all affective-reactive states. Therefore, the Four and the Seven are not sharply distinguished as the Dao mind and the human mind. Gobong developed a similar argument in his brief discussion of the two minds. He asked, “could it be permissible to take the Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings as mutually contrasting expressions and speak of them as [respectively] ‘pure principle’ and ‘including material force’?” Then he answered, “In discussing the human mind and the Tao mind, perhaps one may use such an explanation, but when it come to the Four Beginnings and the Seven Feelings, I suspect one may not explain it in such fashion” (Kalton et al. 1994: 5–6). Although the Dao mind and the human mind can be characterized by their associations with i/li and gi/qi respectively, the Four and the Seven cannot be differentiated in this way because all emotions, whether they are the Four or the Seven, are aroused by gi/qi and guided by i/li.

The Four-Seven debate, therefore, is a philosophical conflict between the two different ways of understanding emotions. Although emotions have both dimensions in the Confucian mind-and-heart, Toegye and Ugye focused on the onto-directive side of emotions that reflects the foundational goodness of human nature, whereas Gobong and Yulgok focused on the psycho-affective side of emotions. Toegye and Ugye argued that there exists a special category of moral emotions (the Four) from the perspective of the innate moral tendencies and their regulative functions through i/li’s governing order. For them, emotions are not just subjective senses or feelings. They can include deep personal reflection and careful awareness of one’s true nature in the broad context of Confucian self-cultivation including reverential piety and self-regulation.¹⁷

In contrast, Gobong and Yulgok believed that the activity of gi/qi provides a better understanding of emotions because all emotions, whether they are the Four or the Seven, are psychological states aroused by gi/qi. Although the mind can reflect the original nature of human beings and the governing order of i/li in the universe, the psychological reality of aroused emotions can be explained by the causal efficacy of gi/qi. Once aroused, emotions can become good and virtuous by following the guidance of i/li, but regarding the arousal and activity of emotions, “the predominant factor lies with material force [gi/qi]” as Yulgok pointed out (Kalton et al. 1994: 181).

4 The Horak Debate and the Unaroused Emotions

Two groups of Korean Neo-Confucians within the Yulgok school (generally known as the Gi/Qi school [jugipa 主氣派] or the Western Party [seoin 西人] in its rivalry with Toegye’s I/Li-school [juripa 主理派] or the Eastern Party, [dongin 東人]) started a philosophical debate in the eighteenth century over the nature of human beings (seong/xing 性) and the mind (sim/xin 心). The discussants of this debate were Han Wonjin (韓元震 1682–1751, pen name Namdang, 南塘) and Yi Gan (李柬 1677–1727, pen name Oeam 巍巖). Han and Yi discussed the distinction between human nature and the nature of other things (such as animals). Hence, this debate is called the debate on the similarity and difference between human nature and nature of things (inmulseong dongi nonjaeng 人物性同異論爭).

In this debate, Han and Yi asked two questions about the nature of human beings and the ideal moral mind of the Confucian sages: Is the nature of human beings the same as that of other things (such as [non-human] animals) (inmulseongdongi/renwuxingtongyi 人物性同異)? Is the mind of the Confucian sages the same as that of ordinary people (seongbeomsimdongi/shengfanxintongyi 聖凡心同異)?¹⁸ Yi answers positively: Humans and animals share the same nature and the sages and ordinary people are not different on their moral minds. Han, however, disagreed with Yi and answered negatively to the two questions: Human beings and animals have different natures and the sages and ordinary people have different types of the mind. Specifically, Yi and Han developed conflicting views on the nature mibal/weifa (未發) in their explanations of the nature of human beings and the moral mind. Mibal/Weifa refers to an unaroused and inactive state of the mind (i.e., a state of mental equilibrium) that may reflect the original nature of human beings.

As a way to answer the philosophical questions about nature (seong/xing 性), Yi and Han discussed how nature is reflected in the mind in its mibal/weifa state. Yi stated, “Regardless of whether one is a sage or an ordinary person, the original substance of the mind-and-heart is tranquil and static.”¹⁹ However, Han stated, “The mind-and-heart of an ordinary person is characterized by unevenness in the [gi] qi of temperament. Therefore, although substantial equilibrium is established in the mind-and-heart during the short instance when [gi] qi does not work itself up ([yongsa] yongshi 用事), this equilibrium is lost once the mind-and-heart becomes darkened and distracted right away.”²⁰ In fact, many Neo-Confucian philosophers carefully analyzed this inactive yet pure conscious state of the mind because of its close relation to the ultimate principle and the governing order of the universe and human nature.

In the beginning chapter of the Doctrine of the Mean (Zhongyong 中庸), mibal/weifa is described as a quiet and resting but pure state of the affective mind that stays in equilibrium (jung/zhong 中).

Before the feelings of pleasure, anger, sorrow, and joy are aroused it is called equilibrium (chung [jung/zhong 中], centrality, mean). When these feelings are aroused and each and all attain due measure and degree [jungjeol/zhongjie 中節], it is called harmony [hwa/he 和]. Equilibrium is the great foundation of the world, and harmony its universal path. When equilibrium and harmony are realized to the highest degree, heaven and earth will attain their proper order and all things will flourish. (Chan 1963: 98)

Although the passage can be interpreted in many different ways, it can be understood as a description of the two states of emotions or the two modes of the affective mind and their foundations and projections in the Neo-Confucian universe.

When an emotion is unaroused, it is in equilibrium (jung/zhong 中): It is not biased, deviant, or uneven. When it is aroused with due measure and degree, it becomes harmonized. Zhu Xi, from the perspective of Neo-Confucian metaphysics, commented on this passage in the following way: “joy, anger, sadness, pleasure are jeong/qing (情 aroused or expressed emotions). When they are unaroused, they are seong/xing (性 inherent nature).”²¹ He contrasted the aroused and unaroused states as jeong/qing and seong/xing, respectively. That is, an emotion can be aroused with its particular content and feeling or unaroused with its inherent nature. The discussion of mibal/weifa in the Horak Debate, therefore, helps us to understand how the Korean Neo-Confucians explained emotions in their aroused and unaroused forms in the broad context of the mind, moral goodness, and the underlying affectivity of the universe.

One way to understand an emotion in a mibal/weifa state is to take it as the quiet and resting state of the mind in its pre-active readiness. In this context, equilibrium (jung/zhong 中) means an undecided, unarticulated, or unspecified state of affectivity. Before an emotion is aroused, it is not a particular feeling of joy, anger, sadness, or pleasure but it is still an affect that can be aroused and expressed. The other way to understand an emotion in a mibal/weifa state is to take it as a pure state of consciousness (a state unaffected by variable degrees of clarity and refinement of the mind). It is not simply a quiet state but a transcendental state of the mind that illuminates the underlying nature of the mind and human beings.²² It is important to note that, in the Horak Debate, the mibal/weifa state is understood as a gi/qi-filled or gi/qi-charged state of affectivity. For this reason, the mibal/weifa state, although not a fully aroused state, can be thought of as a quiet and recessed but pre-active potential of emotions.

The two interpretations of mibal/weifa play a critical role in the Horak Debate. Han developed the first interpretation. He stated that “Although the weifa [mibal] state of the mind-and-heart can be described as clear, empty and bright, there has never been a moment when degrees of purity and clarity, an original condition of [gi/qi’s] temperament, failed to exist in it.”²³ That is, the equilibrium does not necessarily prevent the variability and unevenness of gi/qi from affecting the mind in its mibal/weifa state. Specifically, the mibal/weifa state of the ordinary people is unstable and easily disturbed by gi/qi’s uneven and biased temperament.²⁴ In contrast, Yi argued for the second interpretation. He explained the mibal/weifa state and its equilibrium in the following way: “in its original substance, gi/qi possesses ultimate clarity and purity—this is the original state of gi/qi. The proper and fitting original substance in equilibrium that is neither partial nor one-sided comes to take its stance, and this is the great origin of all.”²⁵

The first (Han’s) interpretation takes the mibal/weifa state as a particular psychological state, but the second (Yi’s) interpretation takes the mibal/weifa state as a pure transcendental state.²⁶ On the basis of their interpretations of the mibal/weifa state, Han and Yi developed distinctive theories of the mind and nature. According to Han, the mind, in its mibal/weifa state, is still under the influence of gi/qi with the varying degrees of clarity and refinement (cheongtaksubak/qingzhuocuibo 淸濁粹駁). For this reason, he believes that the mind, even in its quiet, unaroused state, can be affected and clouded by the fluctuating temperament of gi/qi. He states, “although it [the mind in mibal/weifa state] is quiet, empty, and clear, its varying degrees of clarity and goodness cannot be avoided.”²⁷

According to Yi, however, the mibal/weifa is a state where gi/qi is pure and transparent. Since the mibal/weifa is an unaroused state, the unevenness of gi/qi does not come to the surface and disturb the clear reflection of the original nature in the mind. If gi/qi is pure and transparent, the mind can reveal the intrinsic nature (bonyeonjiseong/benranzhixing 本然之性) and illuminate the bright virtue (meyongdeok/mingde 明德, myeongdeokbonche/mingdebenti 明德本體) of the foundational i/li. To explain the purity of gi/qi in mibal, Yi distinguishes pure gi/qi and blood gi/qi (hyeolgi/xueqi 血氣, gi/qi of the active body) and states that “inside the limited space occupied by an ordinary person, the [gi] qi of flesh and blood [hyeolgi/xueqi 血氣] and outer bodily matter are physical residues, and only the [gi] qi of the mind-and-heart consists of pure and invigorating material. The [gi] qi of flesh and blood and the outer body are characterized by myriad degrees of purity and clarity, but the mind-and-heart is an essentially illuminating substance that is equal for both the sage and the ordinary person.”²⁸ By distinguishing different types or conditions of gi/qi, Yi made it clear that emotions in the mibal/weifa state can transparently reflect the underlying nature of human beings. He argued that his view of mibal/weifa is different from Han’s because he focused on the pure, not just quiet, mibal/weifa state that is not affected by blood gi/qi. Unlike Han, he pursued a transcendental interpretation of the mind and emotions at the foundation of human nature that ordinary people and the sages commonly share.

5 Two Approaches to Emotions in the Horak Debate

Han’s and Yi’s conflicting views in the Horak Debate can be explained by the two contrastive understandings of the mind and emotions.²⁹ Han took the psycho-affective approach and interpreted mibal/weifa as an unaroused state that reveals the resting psychological latencies of the mind. However, the mibal/weifa state is not completely transparent and does not fully reflect the original human nature (bonyeonjiseong/benranzhixing本然之性) and its underlying goodness because the mibal/weifa state can be disturbed by gi/qi’s uneven and deviant properties and immoral tendencies. That is, the mibal/weifa is a psychological state that can be constrained by the physical conditions and temperaments of gi/qi. This does not mean that the mind is completely evil and its emotions are always disturbing. The mind and emotions can become virtuous by careful self-cultivation but the mibal/weifa state is not completely free of gi/qi’s deviant and uneven tendencies.

Yi, however, took the onto-directive stance and interpreted mibal/weifa as a state that can reveal the original nature of the mind and human beings. According to him, mibal/weifa is not simply a psychological state. It is a pure and tranquil state of the mind that will light up the original nature and the illuminative essence of bright virtue (myeongdeokbonche/mingdebenti 明德本體). It is an unaroused state that lets the mind to represent and resonate with its intrinsic goodness through the transparent illumination of equilibrium. Because the mibal/weifa state is a transparent and revealing state of the mind, Yi believed that myeongdeokbonche/mingdebenti is equally available to the sages and ordinary people in their mibal/weifa states.³⁰ In the pure states of the mind, anyone can cultivate the bright virtue of the original nature. Yi’s approach to mibal/weifa, therefore, is onto-directive and his explanation of emotions is moral and transcendental: emotions in their mibal/weifa states can stay unaffected by the fluctuating psychological conditions of the mind to reflect the original goodness of human nature.

The same pattern of conflict can be observed in the Four-Seven Debate with the aroused emotions. Toegye and Ugye took the onto-directive approach and distinguished the Four and the Seven on the basis of their moral and metaphysical differences. Unlike the Seven, the Four is intrinsically good and reveals the original nature of human beings. However, Kobong and Yulgok took the psycho-affective approach and argued for the gi/qi driven psychological nature of emotions. They believed that both the Four and the Seven are aroused and affective states of the mind.

Although the Four-Seven Debate and the Horak Debate focused on the different aspects of emotions, they highlighted the moral psychological and moral metaphysical significance of emotions and developed the two contrastive philosophical approaches in their discussions of the moral goodness of the mind and human nature.³¹ Specifically, in the Horak Debate, Yi and Han discussed the mibal/weifa state and argued for their theories of emotions at the foundation of the moral mind and human nature. According to them, even in the mibal/weifa state, emotions play an important philosophical role in Neo-Confucian discourse of seong/xing (性 nature) and sim/xin (心 the mind-and-heart). The mibal/weifa state is a quiet and static but inspiring and inspirational state of the mind that can reflect the genuine nature of human beings and the goodness of the mind and cultivate the bright and illustrious virtue (myeongdeok/mingde 明德). The Korean Neo-Confucians broke the boundary of emotions as personal feelings to reach out to the foundational nature of our caring heart for others.

6 Conclusion

In this chapter, I discussed the Four-Seven Debate and the Horak Debate from the perspective of how Korean Neo-Confucians understood and explained the moral psychological nature of the mind and emotions. Specifically, the chapter focused on the philosophical conflicts between Toegye-Ugye and Gobong-Yulgok in the Four-Seven Debate and between Yi Gan and Han Wonjin in the Horak Debate. These thinkers developed their unique moral psychological views on emotions that include not only inner and subjective feelings but also the moral, psychological, and metaphysical nature of human beings. According to them, emotions have the broad dimensions of the reactivity, sensitivity, morality, and ontology of human beings. They also developed a comprehensive notion of the moral mind that is inclusively affective, conative, and self-transformative rather than exclusively rational or cognitive. In this regard, Korean Neo-Confucianism offers a unique philosophical interpretation of emotions and provides stimulating theories of the mind and the affective foundation of moral experience from the onto-directive and the psycho-affective viewpoints.³²

The moral sense of goodness and rightness, according to this interpretation, is fundamentally emotional, intrinsically psychological, and deeply transformational. It not only moves the heart of a moral agent but also reveals the original nature of human beings and the innate moral tendencies of the mind. It also has the energy to motivate moral actions and cultivate virtuous dispositions. In their theories of emotions, therefore, the Korean Neo-Confucians explained the two contrastive forms of the mind (insim/renxin and dosim/daoxin) and endeavored to integrate them in the two dimensions of emotions: the psycho-affective and onto-directive dimensions.³³ Although the Cheng-Zhu school’s moral metaphysics of human nature (seong/xing) and principle (i/li) exerted deep influence in Korean Neo-Confucianism, the Korean Neo-Confucians in these debates advanced their own theories of affective moral psychology and emphasized the stimulating, inspiring, and transformative role of emotions in the cultivation of the moral mind and virtuous human life. I conclude that their rigorous analyses of the Four and the Seven and of the unaroused affective state of the mind provide a holistic and inclusive way of understanding the affective nature of humanity: emotions are not only the aroused and felt states of the mind and/or the body but, more importantly, the profound reflection or representation of the morally devotional, psychologically transformational, and metaphysically reverential nature of human beings. This is a uniquely Korean contribution to Confucian philosophy and comparative moral psychology of emotions.