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Federalism in the European Union

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Emerging Federal Structures in the Post-Cold War Era

Part of the book series: Federalism and Internal Conflicts ((FEINCO))

Abstract

There are two conceptualizations of the European Union (EU) as federation. First, the EU is a normative project. Building a federal European entity remains a guiding theme of European integration. This teleological goal serves both as a hands-on political program and as an ultimate threat by EU-skeptics who insinuate an inevitable teleology of EU integration. However, empirically, a consistent federal state-building process can hardly be observed, albeit European integration has proceeded. The EU falls still short of key state features. This leads to the second, analytical notion of the EU as a federal polity beyond the state. The analytical definition enables us to compare the EU on key dimensions of federalism: federation/confederation, coming-together/holding-together federations as well as divided/integrated and coordinated/cooperative federalism. It is shown that the EU falls by-and-large between all categories. Comparative federalism conveys which type of specific federal system the EU represents and can, in addition, pinpoint which systematic weaknesses this specific system produces. Whereas the EU is a highly functional federal polity, normative questions about the prerequisites for democratic legitimacy of federal polities beyond the state persist. The EU is a prototype of a federal polity in action—rather than a federal state in the making.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The shift from the constitutional-moment claim to the only slightly modified Treaty of Lisbon is clearly spelled out in the Council mandate for revising the original draft: “the term ‘Constitution’ will not be used [. …] Likewise, there will be no article in the amended Treaties mentioning the symbols of the EU such as the flag, the anthem or the motto” (Council of the European Union, 2007, Annex: ICC Mandate).

  2. 2.

    Secession of state sub-units does not gain automatic EU membership but has to formally apply and negotiate membership. Northern Ireland represents an exception in this case because the Good Friday Agreement (1998) guarantees that in case Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland would unite, Northern Ireland would gain automatic EU membership.

  3. 3.

    Mirroring Brexit, the process of Eastern Enlargement necessitated a stock-taking and positive definition of the legal body the applicant states were acceding to. Accordingly, Eastern Enlargement caused a codification of the body of law commonly understood as acquis communautaire (Heidbreder, 2011, p. 174).

  4. 4.

    Notably, the German Bundesverfassungsgericht that criticized the European Central Bank (ECB) in 2020 for having failed to sufficiently justify its crisis measures, thus putting into question the legitimacy of the legal practice of the primacy of EU law. This ruling set an example for the competition of constitutional principles between member state constitutions and EU treaties and jurisprudence—welcomed as evidence for the unlawful intervention of the EU in particular by Polish and Hungarian constitutionalists.

  5. 5.

    An exception to this is the exclusive competences for which decision-making authority has been delegated to agents outside the political realm, in particular the European Central Bank that can take widely independent decisions. However, member state representatives are on the governing boards of EU agencies, including the ECB, and can thus exert influence within these organizations.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Otto von Guericke University Magdeburg, Magdeburg, Germany

    Eva G. Heidbreder

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  1. Eva G. Heidbreder
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Correspondence to Eva G. Heidbreder .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Institute of Federalism, University of Fribourg, Fribourg, Switzerland

    Soeren Keil

  2. Otto-Suhr-Institut für Politikwissenschaft, Freie Universität Berlin, Berlin, Germany

    Sabine Kropp

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Heidbreder, E.G. (2022). Federalism in the European Union. In: Keil, S., Kropp, S. (eds) Emerging Federal Structures in the Post-Cold War Era. Federalism and Internal Conflicts. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93669-3_13

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