Abstract
A duopoly model with a linear demand function and nonlinear cost functions of agents is considered. The game with the multilevel Stackelberg leadership is investigated. We analyze conjectural variations, i.e., the agent’s assumption about changes in the counterparty’s actions, which optimize the latter’s utility function. For an arbitrary Stackelberg leadership level, the formula for calculating the conjectural variations of agents is derived. The main insights are as follows: (1) the variations depend not only on the leadership level, but also on the product of the cost functions concavity/convexity indicators; (2) if at least one of agents has the concave cost function, then the variations can be not only negative, but also positive, and are not limited in absolute value, i.e., the bifurcations can occur.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
References
Askar, S., Alnowibet, K.: Nonlinear oligopolistic game with isoelastic demand function: rationality and local monopolistic approximation. Chaos Solit. Fractal. 84, 15–22 (2016)
Bowley, A.L.: The Mathematical Groundwork of Economics. Oxford University Press, Oxford (1951)
Cavalli, F., Naimzada, A., Tramontana, F.: Nonlinear dynamics and global analysis of a geterogeneous Cournot duopoly with a local monopolistic approach versus a gradient rule with endogenous reactivity. Commun. Nonlinear Sci. Numer. Simulat. 23(1–3), 245–262 (2015)
Cournot, A.A.: Researches into the Mathematical Principles of the Theory of Wealth. Hafner, London (Original 1838) (1960)
Currarini, S., Marini, M.A.: Sequential play and cartel stability in Cournot oligopoly. Appl. Math. Sci. No. 7(1–4), 197–200 (2012)
Geraskin, M.I.: Analysis of conjectural variations in nonlinear model of Stackelberg duopoly. Mathematical methods in engineering and technology. MMTT 5, 81–84 (2020)
Geraskin, M.I., Chkhartishvili, A.G.: Game-theoretic models of an oligopoly market with nonlinear agent cost functions. Autom. Remote Control 78(9), 1631–1650 (2017)
Intriligator, M.D.: Mathematical Optimization and Economic Theory. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs (1971)
Karmarkar, U.S., Rajaram, K.: Aggregate production planning for process industries under oligopolistic competition. Eur. J. Oper. Res. 223(3), 680–689 (2012)
Korn, G., Korn, T.: Mathematical Handbook for Scientists and Engineers: Definitions, Theorems, and Formulas for Reference and Review. McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York (1968)
Ledvina, A., Sigar, R.: Oligopoly games under asymmetric costs and an application to energy production. Math. Financ. Econ. 6(4), 261–293 (2012)
Naimzada, A.K., Sbragia, L.: Oligopoly games with nonlinear demand and cost functions: two boundedly rational adjustment processes. Chaos Solit. Fractal. 29(3), 707–722 (2006)
Naimzada, A., Tramontana, F.: Two different routes to complex dynamics in an heterogeneous triopoly game. J. Difference Equations Appl. 21(7), 553–563 (2015)
Nash, J.: Non-cooperative games. Ann. Math. 54, 286–295 (1951)
Novikov, D.A., Chkhartishvili, A.G.: Reflexion and Control: Mathematical Models. CRC Press, London (2014)
Stackelberg, H.: Market Structure and Equilibrium: 1st Edition. Translation into English, Bazin, Urch & Hill, Springer. (Original 1934) (2011)
Sun, F., Liu, B., Hou, F., Gui, L., Chen, J.: Cournot equilibrium in the mobile virtual network operator oriented oligopoly offloading market. In: IEEE Int. Conf. Communicat., ICC No. 7511340 (2016)
Vasin, A.: Game-theoretic study of electricity market mechanisms. Procedia Comput. Sci. 31, 124–132 (2014)
Walters, A.A.: Production and cost functions: and econometric survey. Econometrica 31(1), 23–44 (1963)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Appendix
Appendix
Proof (Of Proposition 1)
We transform the expansion (6a) of continued fraction (6) in convergent fractions as follows:
Substituting these formulas in (6a), and, taking into account the fact that \(\frac {u_1^{r-\tau }u_2^{\tau -1}}{u_1^{r-\tau }u_2^{\tau }}=u_2^{-1}\) and the notation \(y=u_1^{-1}u_2^{-1}\), we obtain the following expression for the variation of the first agent:
Similar reasoning for the second agent leads to the following formula for its variation:
We write the formulas P (r), Q (r) in the following generalized form:
Because \(\prod _{\gamma =t+1}^{2t} (r-\gamma ) = \frac {(r-t-1)!}{(r-2t-1)!}\), \(\prod _{\gamma =t}^{2t-1} (r-\gamma ) =\frac {(r-t)!}{(r-2t)!}\), then these formulas have the following form [10]:
Comparison of these formulas proves that Q (r) = P (r+1); therefore, \(x_{1(r)}=u_2^{-1} \frac {P_{(r)}}{P_{(r+1)}}\), \(x_{2(r)}=u_1^{-1} \frac {P_{(r)}}{P_{(r+1)}}\) and, in general, these expressions are written as (7).
Proof (Of Proposition 2)
We introduce the function f j(r−1) = u j − x j(r−1), then formula (6) has the following form:
An analysis of the function f 2(r−1) demonstrate that f 2(0) = u 2, \(f_{2(1)}=u_2-\frac {1}{u_1}=u_2-f_{1(0)}^{-1}\), \(f_{2(2)}=u_2-\frac {1}{u_1-\frac {1}{u_2}}=u_2-f_{1(1)}^{-1}\), etc., therefore \(f_{j(r-1)}=u_j-f_{i(r-2)}^{-1}\). For variation x 1(r), we consider the function
The following cases are possible:
-
(i)
if f 1(r−2) > 0, i.e.x 1(r−2) < u 1, then f 2(r−1) < 0, therefore, according to (9),
$$\displaystyle \begin{aligned} x_{1(r)}<0, \quad |x_{1(r)}|<1,\quad \lim_{f_{1(r-2)} \to \infty} |x_{1(r)}| = |u_2|{}^{-1};{} \end{aligned} $$(11) -
(ii)
if f 1(r−2) < 0, i.e. x 1(r−2) > u 1, then, according to (10), two options are possible:
-
(iii)
for |f 1(r−2)| < |u 2|−1, the inequality f 2(r−1) > 0 holds; therefore,
$$\displaystyle \begin{aligned} x_{1(r)}>0, \quad x_{1(r)}=\left(|f_{1(r-2)}|{}^{-1}-|u_2| \right)^{-1},{} \end{aligned} $$(12)$$\displaystyle \begin{aligned} |x_{1(r)}|>1, \lim_{f_{1(r-2)} \to |u_2|{}^{-1}} |x_{1(r)}|=\infty; \end{aligned}$$ -
(iv)
for |f 1(r−2)| > |u 2|−1, the inequality f 2(r−1) < 0 holds; therefore,
$$\displaystyle \begin{aligned} x_{1(r)}<0, \quad x_{1(r)}=\left(|f_{1(r-2)}|{}^{-1}-|u_2| \right)^{-1},{} \end{aligned} $$(13)$$\displaystyle \begin{aligned} |x_{1(r)}|>1, \quad \lim_{f_{1(r-2)} \to |u_2|{}^{-1}} |x_{1(r)}| = \infty. \end{aligned}$$
We introduce the function α 1(r) = |f 1(r−2)|−1 −|u 2| = |u 1 − x 1(r−2)|−1 −|u 2|, and assume that the minimum value of this function is equal to \(A_{1(r)}=\min _{x_{1(r-2)} \in \varOmega _1(u_1, u_2)} |\alpha _{1(r)}|\), where Ω 1(u 1, u 2) is a set of admissible values of the variation x 1(r−2) for given values u 1, u 2. Then conditions (9)–(12) can be written as follows:
Similar reasoning for the second agent leads to general notation (8).
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2021 The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG
About this paper
Cite this paper
Geraskin, M.I. (2021). Problems of Calculation Equilibria in Stackelberg Nonlinear Duopoly. In: Petrosyan, L.A., Mazalov, V.V., Zenkevich, N.A. (eds) Frontiers of Dynamic Games. Trends in Mathematics. Birkhäuser, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93616-7_6
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93616-7_6
Published:
Publisher Name: Birkhäuser, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-93615-0
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-93616-7
eBook Packages: Mathematics and StatisticsMathematics and Statistics (R0)