Abstract
Global navigational satellite systems provide accurate time synchronization and location services. Satellites transmit navigation messages that can be used by a receiver to compute its location. However, most navigation messages are not protected and are easily spoofed. Several attacks have been reported that transmit spoofed or replayed GPS signals to divert or hijack autonomous vehicles, ships and drones. Unfortunately, non-cryptographic protection methods that use antenna arrays, pseudorange differences and multi-receivers to detect GPS spoofing tend to be inaccurate due to environmental conditions.
This chapter proposes an efficient GPS signal authentication protocol that engages a dedicated server to continuously compute hash-based message authentication codes of GPS navigation messages received from satellites using the chameleon hash keychain. The keychain is practically unbounded, which enables GPS receivers to easily authenticate the server and verify GPS signals concurrently by checking the hash-based message authentication codes. A proof-of-concept prototype has been developed to demonstrate the feasibility of the authentication scheme. Experimental results demonstrate that the hash key in the keychain can be updated every 30 seconds, enabling every five GPS message subframes to be secured with a different hash key. This makes it difficult for attackers to compromise GPS navigation
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Chu, Y.H., Keoh, S.L., Seow, C.K., Cao, Q., Wen, K., Tan, S.Y. (2022). GPS Signal Authentication Using a Chameleon Hash Keychain. In: Staggs, J., Shenoi, S. (eds) Critical Infrastructure Protection XV. ICCIP 2021. IFIP Advances in Information and Communication Technology, vol 636. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93511-5_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93511-5_10
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