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Preserving Democracy and the Rule of Law in a Pandemic. Some Lessons from the Venice Commission

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Populism and Contemporary Democracy in Europe

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Abstract

This chapter analyses the impact the COVID-19 pandemic is having on the European legal systems, and on Spain in particular, through the prism of the studies elaborated in the context of the health crisis by the Venice Commission. These documents explicitly recognise the relevance of the current health crisis in our societies and its impact on the founding objectives of the Council of Europe: the safeguarding of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. The analysis of the criteria of the Venice Commission in relation to the application, regulation and the redistribution of powers during states of emergency is indeed a useful tool to assess the use of the exceptional powers by States during the COVID-19 pandemic. In particular, reference to these standards may be useful to identify possible abuses by populist governments.

An extended version of this text has been published in Spanish in Paloma Biglino y Juan F. Durán (eds), Los efectos horizontales de la covid-19 sobre el sistema constitucional: estudios sobre la primera oleada, Fundación M. Giménez Abad, Zaragoza, 2021.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The Venice Commission has been included in the so-called Transnational Legal Orders (TLOs) and plays an important role in global constitutionalism, in terms of its function, membership and values, as it operates on legal norms relating to democracy, human rights and the rule of law. See Craig, Constitucionalismo transnacional: la contribución de la Comisión de Venecia, 90 ss. The author draws on the definitions of Halliday and Shaffer and apply them to the Venice Commission.

  2. 2.

    Respect for democracy, human rights and the rule of law during states of emergency—Reflections (CDL-PI(2020)005rev). Published on 26 May 2020, by N. Alivizatos, U. Bilkova, I. Cameron, O. Kask, and K. Tuori. The document was “taken into account” by the Plenary session of the Venice Commission of June 2020. Available at: https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-PI(2020)005rev-e.

  3. 3.

    Interim report on the measures taken in the EU Member States as a result of the COVID-19 crisis and their impact on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights, adopted by the Plenary session on 8 October 2020 (CDL-AD(2020)018). Available at: https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2020)018-e.

  4. 4.

    Compilation of Venice Commission opinions and reports on states of emergency, CDL-PI(2020)003. Published on 16 April 2020. Available at: https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2020)018-e

  5. 5.

    Reflections (CDL-PI(2020)005), para. 8; Interim Report CDL-AD(2020)018, paras 18–19.

  6. 6.

    Emergency Powers CDL-STD(1995)012; Compilation CDL-PI(2020)003, 6.

  7. 7.

    Interim Report CDL-AD(2020)018 para. 20.

  8. 8.

    In various blogs and interventions on public media intervened in the debate, amongst many others, J. Díaz Revorio, C. Flores Juverías y C. Vidal. Against E. Vírgala, J. Tajadura, J. De Miguel y J.M. Castellà. 

  9. 9.

    Interim Report CDL-AD (2020)018, paras 35–38 and 41–43.

  10. 10.

    Ibid., paras 29–31; Reflections CDL-PI(2020)005, paras 22–24.

  11. 11.

    Reflections CDL-PI(2020)005, para. 26.

  12. 12.

    Reflections CDL-PI(2020)005, paras 29–30.

  13. 13.

    On the difference between the last two see: Interim Report CDL-AD(2020)018, para. 28.

  14. 14.

    Emergency Powers, CDL-STD(1995)012, 30; Compilation CDL-PI(2020)003, 5.

  15. 15.

    France—Opinion on the Draft Constitutional Law on “Protection of the Nation” CDL-AD(2016)006, para. 28; Compilation CDL-PI(2020)003, 7.

  16. 16.

    Turkey—Opinion on the amendments to the Constitution adopted by the Grand National Assembly on 21 January 2017 and to be submitted to a National Referendum on 16 April 2017 CDL-AD(2017)005, para. 73; Compilation CDL-PI(2020)003, 8.

  17. 17.

    Reflections CDL-PI(2020)005, paras 6–16.

  18. 18.

    Interim Report CDL-AD(2020)018, para. 58.

  19. 19.

    Ibid., para. 58. With a reference to Rule of Law Chechlist CDL-AD(2016)007, para. 1.4.iii.

  20. 20.

    Interim Report CDL-AD(2020)018, paras 46–49.

  21. 21.

    Ibid., para. 25.

  22. 22.

    Ibid., paras 26–27.

  23. 23.

    Ibid., para. 51. The paragraph cites an excerpt taken from: Turkey—Opinion on Emergency Decree Laws nn 667–676 adopted following the failed coup of 15 July 2016 CDL-AD(2016)037, para. 41; Compilation CDL-PI(2020)003, 22.

  24. 24.

    Interim Report CDL-AD(2020)018, paras 23–24.

  25. 25.

    Turkey—Opinion on Emergency Decree Laws nn 667–676 adopted following the failed coup of 15 July 2016, CDL-AD(2016)037, para. 80; Compilation CDL-PI(2020)003, 22.

  26. 26.

    Turkey—Opinion on the amendments to the Constitution adopted by the Grand National Assembly on 21 January 2017 and to be submitted to a National Referendum on 16 April 2017, CDL-AD(2017)005, para. 29; Compilation CDL-PI(2020)003, 25, with a specific reference to the Spanish case.

  27. 27.

    Interim Report CDL-AD(2020)018, para. 52.

  28. 28.

    Ibid., paras 61, 64.

  29. 29.

    Emergency Powers CDL-STD(1995)012, 16; Compilation CDL-PI(2020)003, 14.

  30. 30.

    Parameters on the Relationship between the Parliamentary Majority and the Opposition in a Democracy: a Checklist CDL-AD(2019)015, para. 121; Compilation CDL-PI(2020)003, 16.

  31. 31.

    Reflections CDL-PI(2020)005, para. 84

  32. 32.

    Ibid., para. 82.

  33. 33.

    Ibid., paras 63–64. With a reference to: Parameters on the Relationship Between the Parliamentary Majority and the Opposition CDL-AD(2019)019, paras 119–212. For a review of the factual situation: Interim Report CDL-AD(2020)018, para. 64.

  34. 34.

    Interim Report CDL-AD(2020)018, para. 75.

  35. 35.

    Ibid., para. 72.

  36. 36.

    Reflections CDL-PI(2020)005, para. 69.

  37. 37.

    Report on the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces CDL-AD(2008)004, para.125; Compilation CDL-PI(2020)003, 27.

  38. 38.

    Emergency Powers CDL-STD(1995)012, 16; Compilation CDL-PI(2020)003, 26; Interim Report CDL-AD(2020)018, para. 54.

  39. 39.

    Opinion on the draft law on the legal regime of the state of emergency of Armenia CDL-AD(2011)049, para. 34; Compilation CDL-PI(2020)003, 26.

  40. 40.

    Turkey—Opinion on the Provisions of the Emergency Decree Law N° 674 of 1 September 2016 which concern the exercise of Local Democracy CDL-AD(2017)021, para. 92; Compilation CDL-PI(2020)003, 26.

  41. 41.

    Reflections CDL-PI(2020)005, para. 61.

  42. 42.

    Interim Report CDL-AD(2020)018, paras 77, 79.

  43. 43.

    Reflections CDL-PI(2020)005, paras 87, 89.

  44. 44.

    Ibid., para. 88. The preference for constitutional justice is nuanced, but not for the adoption of interim measure, in the Interim Report. See: Interim Report CDL-AD(2020)018, para. 88.

  45. 45.

    Ibid., paras 21, and 83–84. With a reference to the doctrine of the European Court of Human Rights. See: Canosa Usera, El marco internacional y supranacional de la reacción estatal europea, 38.

  46. 46.

    Opinion on the Draft Constitutional Law on “Protection of the Nation” of France CDL-AD(2016)006, para. 51; Compilation CDL-PI(2020)003, 12.

  47. 47.

    Rule of Law Checklist (CDL-AD(2016)007), para. 51; Compilation CDL-PI(2020)003, 4.

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  1. University of Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain

    Josep Maria Castellà Andreu

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    Josep Maria Castellà Andreu

  2. University of Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain

    Marco Antonio Simonelli

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Castellà Andreu, J.M. (2022). Preserving Democracy and the Rule of Law in a Pandemic. Some Lessons from the Venice Commission. In: Castellà Andreu, J.M., Simonelli, M.A. (eds) Populism and Contemporary Democracy in Europe. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-92884-1_13

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