Abstract
It is well known that traditional Chinese culture gives special weight to family life and understands and arranges other forms of social interaction by drawing on ideas of family (Liang 1969: 11–13), especially the idea of filial piety. Since the twentieth century, however, the traditional conception of filial piety has been negotiating its place in the process of modernization and facing the West. As Li Chenyang states, “filial morality is one of the areas that deeply divide traditional China from the contemporary West” (Li 1997: 219). In academia, there is a continuous debate on whether traditional conceptions of filial piety are still relevant in contemporary societies. Not surprisingly, the debate usually revolves around Confucianism, and relatively little has been said about whether non-Confucian schools can contribute to our understanding of the issue at hand. In this chapter, I contribute to this debate from a different perspective. I articulate a conception of filial piety by drawing on the Zhuangzi, in particular its ideas of “forgetting” (wang 忘) and “authenticity” (zhen 真), and its tendency toward egalitarian modes of interaction. I argue that there are at least two major differences between Zhuangzi’s conception of filial piety and that of its Confucian counterparts. First, Zhuangzi does not exalt the family as a special organization for moral cultivation. Second, Zhuangzi does not regard filial piety as a moral requirement, at least not with the stringency or even sacredness usually contained in Confucianism. I also argue that such a conception better fits contemporary views on family life, mainly because it situates the interaction between parents and children within a more egalitarian framework and allows for a more flexible approach.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
Unless specified, all translations of passages in the Analects are taken from Lau (2002) with my adaption.
- 3.
Lau’s translation is based on a version that contains the character “人” (Lau 2002: 2–3). However, the more common version of this sentence has “仁” (benevolence) instead of “人” (person). As a person’s character should be benevolent in the ideal case, the difference does not affect our discussion.
- 4.
See also Rosemont and Ames (2009: 59–63).
- 5.
Wong (2004: 32) shares the worry of Heiner Roetz that an overemphasis on community may threaten individual rights and leave little room for individuals to critically reflect on their roles and tradition.
- 6.
I take the majority view that the Zhuangzi was written by different people in different periods, and that the Inner Chapters (or at least a significant portion of them) contain the earliest stratum of the text as a whole and the core philosophical vision. Herein, the term “Zhuangzi” refers to the writers of the Zhuangzi text, regardless of whether the historical figure, Zhuang Zhou (莊周), wrote any part of it. All references to the Chinese Zhuangzi text are to Hong (1986). All of the translations of the Zhuangzi in this chapter are my own, although I rely on the following commentaries and translations: Graham (1981), Mair (1994), Chen (2001), and Ziporyn (2009). The arrangement of the order of chapters and sentences follows the explanation in Chen’s book.
- 7.
- 8.
One can at once recall the Analects 2.7: “Nowadays for a man to be filial means no more than that he is able to provide his parents with food. Even hounds and horses are, in some way, provided with food. If a man shows no reverence, where is the difference?”
- 9.
Etymological studies show that the character 敬 originally referred to either a bowing or guarding posture. See Guwenzi Gulin Bianzuan Weiyuanhui (2003: 173–78).
- 10.
This can refer to Yan Hui’s own qi, qi in the environment, or both. Ultimately, as qi is always moving and has no fixed boundary, one’s own qi and qi in the environment cannot be separated.
- 11.
Especially when the attitude of reverence is accompanied by nervousness.
- 12.
If the child focuses on reverence, it is difficult for her to express her feelings and emotions. Indeed, psychological research shows that contemporary Chinese parents place more emphasis on the control of behavior and restraint of emotions than Caucasian Americans (Lin and Fu 1990: 431), which may be because of Confucian principles (Lin and Fu 1990: 432).
- 13.
I take Analects 2.5 as stating that rites should be the proper form of expressing filial piety. See also Wee (2014: 90). The problem of rites is further elaborated in the next section.
- 14.
As stated in the Zhuangzi Chapter 6, “The Great Ancestral Teacher” (“Dazongshi 大宗師”), this understanding is achieved by a genuine person (i.e., a person with authenticity). Authenticity is discussed in the next section.
- 15.
Arguably, this challenge can be already found in the Inner Chapters. For example, Møllgaard argues that the display of people with disabilities and mutilations in Chapter 5 of the Zhuangzi serves to criticize the notion of filial piety because Confucians demand that children honor their parents by keeping their bodies whole and intact (Møllgaard 2007: 111–13).
- 16.
This and many similar phrases appear in the Zhuangzi Chapter 2, “Discourse on Equalizing Things” (“Qiwulun 齊物論”).
- 17.
Munro focuses on the Mencian strand of Confucianism, but even non-Mencian Confucians such as Xunzi agree that kin-preference is inborn. The difference is that Xunzi does not think that the inborn kin-preference is good in itself without the operation of rites and therefore that it should not be developed without the regulation of rites.
- 18.
All translations of passages in the Mencius are taken from Lau (2003).
- 19.
If one focuses on the continuous movement of heaven, it will be an activity rather than an entity. This difference does not affect our discussion.
- 20.
All translations of passages in the Mozi are taken from Johnston (2010).
- 21.
According to the Zhuangzi Chapter 7, “Responding to Emperors and Kings” (“Yingdiwang 應帝王”), a sage ruler is supposed to “follow along with things spontaneously and leave no room for personal preference” (20/7/11); only in this way can all under heaven be well governed. In the Zhuangzi Chapter 18, it is stated that sage rulers “did not unify people’s capacities and did not set them the same tasks” (47/18/39). Zhuangzi Chapter 11, “Preserving and Accepting” (“Zaiyou 在宥”), even states that “I have heard of preserving and accepting all under heaven, but I have not heard of governing all under heaven” (25/11/1).
- 22.
One may wonder whether the contrast here is legitimate, given that the Analects refers to physical travel and the Zhuangzi to freeing one’s spirit. However, in these two texts, physical and spiritual travel are closely related. In the Analects, the limitation on physical travel is supported by the overarching concern of filial piety, which shapes, if not restricts, one’s behavior, status and thinking style. In the Zhuangzi, there are plenty of stories depicting travel to the forest, mountain, or seaside. These can be seen as inviting one to physically leave her comfort zone. I thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this question.
- 23.
If one regards care not as an intention but rather as a state of successful assistance and an expression of feelings, then one does minimize entanglement, but this is so only from the perspective of conventional filial piety.
- 24.
Or a beautiful person, if the term “lady” remains tied up with social expectations.
- 25.
Depending on the situation, one may even see her mother from a negative perspective. Although this is rare, as doing so may increase the chance of conflict, the possibility is not ruled out.
- 26.
However, note that Zhuangzi offers no guarantee that this will always be successful. Therefore, it is more difficult to cause one’s parents to forget oneself, and this lack of forgetting will sometimes become an obstacle to situating the family in the world without privileging it (i.e., to forgetting all under heaven) because one will need to make special responses based on the recognition that her parents are not practicing forgetting.
- 27.
Lao Si Guang argues that the doctrine of rectifying names does not in itself prescribe what a person should do, but only states that there is something one should do if they bear certain names. See Lao (2002: 119–21). If this is correct, then Confucians need the stipulation of rites to prescribe precisely what a person should do.
- 28.
In Chapter 2 of the Zhuangzi, it is stated that the enlightened person considers things as one yet situates each judgment in the realm of the ordinary activities of life (yu zhu yong 寓諸庸) (4/2/36). The enlightened person does not simply refrain from making judgments. If we regard role duties as a series of judgments, then the enlightened person need not refrain from performing role duties either; however, she may perform them for reasons other than a firm commitment to role virtues, and in a style different from conventional role models. I thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this point.
- 29.
The same applies to mother–son, father–daughter, and mother–daughter relationships. I believe that Zhuangzi picks out the father–son relationship not because he thinks it is the most important but rather to mock the conventional Confucian perspective.
- 30.
There is an ongoing debate about the Inner Chapters’ stance on ethics in general. Many scholars regard Zhuangzi as a relativist (Hansen 1992, 290; Eno 1996, 142; Huang 2018, 883), although they hold different conceptions of relativism and draw different practical implications. Hans-Georg Moeller argues that Zhuangzi is agnostic and deconstructs even ethical relativism (Moeller 2009, 30). Chris Fraser thinks that Zhuangzi’s skepticism and relativism are grounded “in a metaethical theory about the nature of value, according to which value is inherently plural, perspectival, heterogeneous, and contingent” (Fraser 2009, 440). Without resolving this debate, my point here is that Zhuangzi puts forward certain ideals and values, but their stringency, binding power, and practical implications are indeterminate.
- 31.
Ikeda (2004: 17, 23).
- 32.
- 33.
From the Hanfeizi Chapter 46, “Six Contrarieties” (“Liufan 六反”).
- 34.
“Forgetting” here is used in its normal sense of ignoring or neglecting, not in the specific sense of forgetting discussed in this chapter.
- 35.
For Zhuangzi, although they are sometimes less rigid than policies and legal punishments, rites can still be obstacles to wandering because their regulative nature can make them excessively demanding.
- 36.
Although some chapters in the Zhuangzi (notably Chapters 8 and 9 and the first part of Chapter 11) treat the term 性 as “inborn,” this does not imply that the term itself necessarily refers to inborn features or tendencies. Chapter 19, for example, states that it is a swimmer’s 性 to grow up in water and become comfortable with it (50/19/53). My discussion here is restricted to inborn characteristic tendencies and not to 性 in general.
- 37.
Especially in Chapters 8, 9, and 10 and the first part of Chapter 11.
- 38.
This brings Zhuangzi close to Mencius, who claims that we have sprouts of benevolence and rightness just as we have four limbs (Mencius 2A6). Even on this reading, however, Zhuangzi would not regard rites as the natural development of our sprouts.
- 39.
Ying is a major city within the territory of Chu (楚), a state in southern China. Mount Ming is a legendary mountain in northern China. Zhuangzi is arguing here that the more one insists on developing the aforementioned affection into full-blown benevolence, the more probable it is that one will get lost.
- 40.
Especially if family members are raised in different cultures.
- 41.
For example, the Analects 4.18.
- 42.
The term “Daoism” is used only retrospectively. Unlike Confucians and Mohists, no one regarded themselves as “Daoists” in the pre-Qin period.
- 43.
According to Blakeley, the Analects and the Mencius place friendship in the context of cultivating benevolence. One implication of this interpretation, I believe, is that one’s expression of benevolence and one’s choice of friends are mutually dependent. This interdependence constitutes the fabric of virtuous politics and society. Zhuangzi, however, “exercise[s] a negative polemic on every position and flaunt[s] the social and political realities that are taken to be the proper context of cultivating a flourishing human life” (2008: 332).
- 44.
Yan Hui is not Confucius’s son, but Confucius himself said that he treated him like a son—perhaps more than a son. See the Analects 11.7–11.11.
- 45.
Refer to Zi Qi’s story in the third section of this chapter.
- 46.
Especially when we consider their religious dimension. This is not to say that they cannot be accepted as religious practices in contemporary societies, but that their appeal faces great challenges if one wants them to be universalized to the same degree as in traditional China.
- 47.
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Acknowledgments
A draft version of this paper was presented at the 19th International Conference on Chinese Philosophy in Hong Kong, 2015. I thank the organizers and participants who gave me feedback. I also thank Kim-Chong Chong and an anonymous reviewer for their valuable comments.
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Chiu, W.W. (2022). “Let the Parents Forget You”: Filial Piety (xiao 孝) in the Zhuangzi. In: Chong, Kc. (eds) Dao Companion to the Philosophy of the Zhuangzi. Dao Companions to Chinese Philosophy, vol 16. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-92331-0_24
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