Abstract
In his late axiological and ethical reflections, Husserl develops the concept of personal values of love and argues that these very values have a crucial role in the establishment of human communities. In order to get at the core of Husserl’s understanding of the axiological and emotive dimensions of intersubjectivity, I will explicate his concept of values of love by distinguishing between five related features of these values. I demonstrate that personal values of love (1) are rooted in egoic depths and (2) draw their living power from these depths. As such they (3) ground vocations and organize our lives into axiological wholes. This deeply egoic character of personal values of love, I contend, (4) distinguishes them from objective values of all sorts: they are incomparative and operate as sources of absolute obligations. Finally, I show that personal values of love (5) establish transitive relations of care between human beings. On the basis of this explication, I argue that Husserl’s conceptualization of values of love allows us to understand what he means by the community of love, capable of enlarging into an all-embracing charity.
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Notes
- 1.
These are the early lecture courses on axiology and ethics, Vorlesungen über Ethik und Wertlehre 1908–1914, published in volume XXVIII of the Husserliana collection (Hua28).
- 2.
My account draws from several earlier contributions that have touched upon the topic but not worked it out. Husserl’s concept of personal love has been discussed in several interpretative contexts, most importantly when dealing with his late ethical reflections, his theory of values, and his reformulations of the categorical imperative (cf. Melle, 1991; Hart, 1992; Melle, 2002; Hart, 2006; Melle, 2007; Peucker, 2008; Hart, 2009; Römer, 2011; Loidolt, 2012; Drummond, 2015a; Crespo, 2015; Drummond, 2018). In this paper, I will not take a stand on the question of the changes that the concept of personal values brings about in Husserl’s axiology and/or value theory. Nor will I compare Husserl conceptualization to the alternatives offered by other early phenomenologists, Scheler, Stein and Heidegger, or his contemporary neo-Kantians, e.g., Fichte and Rickert (cf. Steinbock, 2015; Staiti, 2017; De Monticelli, 2021).
Comparisons with Husserl’s own earlier value theory as well as with the alternative theories of his contemporaries are a separate issue and require a full-length paper to be handled properly. Here I focus on the primary tasks of reconstruction and leave the comparative problems for further inquiries. The aim is purely systematic, and it is motivated by the conviction that any exegetic or comparative examination will benefit from a robust reconstruction of the key operative concept.
- 3.
In Husserlian framing, values in general are the correlates of axiological acts, i.e., feelings, emotions and valuations (cf. Melle, 2007; Drummond, 2006, 2009, 2015b, 2018; Jardine, 2020, 2021). As such, they differ, on the one hand, from goals that are the correlates of the practical or conative acts of willing and deciding and, on the other hand, from percepts, things, events and facts that are the correlates of the doxic acts of cognition, belief and their modifications.
- 4.
The freedom of the ego consists of its possibility to accept, reject or ignore the affection and the feeling (e.g., Hua4, 213–214/224–225, 278–280/291–293; Hua42, 359).
- 5.
For an explication of Husserl’s account of vocations and their dependence on the habituation and institution of intentional acts, see Heinämaa, 2021a.
- 6.
A vocation can thus be defined as an inner calling that regulates life as a whole (cf. Crespo, 2015, 709). In The Crisis, Husserl defines it as an interested attitude (Interesseneinstellung) (Hua6, 139/136).
- 7.
In the Kaizo essays, Husserl argues that even though vocational loves (love-values) organize our lives as wholes they do not and cannot, by themselves, regulate each and every action or decision. For that purpose – which is the fully ethical purpose – the reflective capacity of self-critique must be practiced universally and habitually, i.e., in respect to each possible personal action and practical capacity (“I can”), but also in respect to each type of intending, cognitive, axiological or practical.
- 8.
Husserl’s theory of personhood is most systematically exposed in the second volume of his Ideas (Hua4; Hua4/5). However, the idea of a person as a dynamic whole is articulated in all his major works (see, e.g., Hua1, 101–102/66–67; Hua4, 266–277/278–290; Hua5, 17; Hu6, 233–235/230–231; Hua4/5, 189–197, 205–229; cf. Hua3, 136–137/164–165, 163–164/194–195; Hua41, 242). For explications, see, Luft, 2006; Heinämaa, 2021b; Hahn, 2009; Jacobs, 2010, 2014; Heinämaa, 2019; cf. Hart, 1992, 2009.
- 9.
Husserl distinguishes between thematically specific vocations and the ethical vocation to become a true human being, that is, self-responsible in a balanced way that covers all three forms of reason – the cognitive, the practical and the axiological – and is grounded in radical self-critique (e.g., Hua27, 29–45; Hua42, 269, 322, 492–494; HuaMat9, 133–134, 142, 167). Answering to the calling of becoming a true human being does not, however, mean that one abandons one’s specific vocation(s) but means that one elevates them by positioning them in the field of human vocations, actual and possible. Husserl writes: “The true artist (...) as such is not yet a true human being in the highest sense. An authentic human being can, however, be a true artist, but can be such only if ethical self-regulation demands this from him” (Hua27, 29; cf. Hua37, 238; Hua42, 35, 353–354).
- 10.
My aim here is not to take a stand on the interpretation of Tolstoy’s novel but merely to use the case of Karenina to illuminate the possibility of a (female) person who makes the unconventional decision to dedicate her life to her lover rather than to her children.
- 11.
In Works of Love, Kierkegaard argues that erotic love and friendship cannot serve as models of love because both involve a serious limitation. In both case, Kierkegaard contends, the lover finds it difficult to sacrifice his own feeling for the good of the loved one. She hesitates in giving up her love even when “the other’s distinctiveness requites this very sacrifice” (Kierkegaard, [1847] 1995, 273; cf. Ferreira, 2001, 167).
- 12.
The Aristotelian tradition offers philia as a model for mutual or symmetrical relations between persons. Husserl’s concept of love, however, does not require such reciprocal relating. It covers also one-sided and unrequited ways of loving.
- 13.
See, Kierkegaard’s original formulations of the paradox at the beginning of his Fear and Trembling ([1843] 1983).
- 14.
In The Origins of Totalitarianism , Hannah Arendt analyses totalitarianism in terms of the process of institutionalizing policies that generate such alternatives: “When a man is faced with the alternative of betraying and thus murdering his friends or of sending his wife and children, for whom he is in every sense responsible, to their death; when even suicide would mean the immediate murder of his own family – how is he to decide? The alternative is no longer between good and evil, but between murder and murder. Who could solve the moral dilemma of the Greek mother, who was allowed by the Nazis to choose which of her three children should be killed?” (Arendt, [1951] 1968, 452).
- 15.
This means that hope is the constant companion of love, and hopelessness signals its absence.
- 16.
Values of love can be realized in the harshest conditions. This possibility is pictured by Lars von Trier’s film Melancholia in which a family faces global destruction of an apocalyptical scale beyond escape. In a Kierkegaardian vein, the film portrays three alternative manners of reacting to the prospects of global destruction, one aesthetic, the other rationalistic and the third one loving. The aesthete, the mother of the family, comes to think that the majestic dimensions of destruction could perhaps be marveled or honored. The rationalist, the father, when realizing that he cannot do anything to save his family, takes his own life and dies in solitude. The loving person sets out to construct a tent by erecting nine branches and crossing their tops. She takes the mother and the child inside the symbolic shelter, asks the child to hold her hand and close his eyes. In the last scene of the film, the three sit in a tiny circle under an enormous planet that covers the sky, protected by the construction that is physically more fragile than their bodies but emotionally impenetrable.
- 17.
- 18.
Husserl’s disciple and colleague Moritz Geiger presented the case of the loving mother as a counterexample to Husserl’s early Brentanian axiology and praxis, formulated by the concept of the best possible and a purely formal categorical imperative. In the 1919–1920 manuscripts for the lecture course titled “Introduction to Philosophy” (Einleitung in die Philosophie), Husserl adds a self-critical note, writing: “It is obvious that an ethics which is carried out according to the mere categorical imperative like it was, following Brentano, taken as the basis here, is not ethics at all. I have already reverted back to my old lines of thought, although Geiger already made the justified objection to me in 1907 that it would be ridiculous to demand of a mother to deliberate first, if the fostering of her child would be the best [thing to do] within her practical domain” (Hua28, xlvi, cf. 419–422). For more detailed accounts of Geiger’s influence on Husserl, see, Melle, 1988, xlvi–xlviii; Sowa & Vongehr, 2013, c–cii, civ; Averchi, 2015; Drummond, 2018, 140–142; cf. Loidolt, 2012, 4ff.; Crespo, 2015, 722. For the neo-Kantian contexts of Husserl’s early prewar and late postwar ethics, see, Staiti, 2017. For Husserl’s reading of Fichte, see Welton, 2000, 372–392; Staiti, 2017; Drummond, 2018.
- 19.
Husserl also uses his early concept of isolation to characterize this feature of love-values: according to him, all values are isolative but unlike quantitative objective values, values of love are irreversibly isolative (Hua42, 357).
- 20.
In order to avoid quantitative juxtapositions and comparisons between love-values and other values, Husserl invokes the metaphors of sunlight when describing the supreme function of love-values: “[W]hile streaming out from the self, pure love, as fully unfolded, outshines [überstrahlen] all objective values and lets their weight disappear” (Hua42, 624; cf. Hua41, 242–243, 262–266).
- 21.
Cf. the negative imperative formulated in Grenzprobleme : “It is an absolute obligation for each one, so a general [law], a law of the ought, that each one’s absolute obligation belongs in the realm or circuit of my absolute obligation, in the circuit of my absolute ethical responsibilities and values. Therefore, I must not hamper anyone’s engagement nor distract them from their duties, without sinning against myself” (Hua42, 390).
- 22.
Husserl conception of the community of love recalls the Stoic notion of cosmopolitanism and its circles of care and obligation.
- 23.
Earlier versions of this paper were delivered at the international workshop, Perspectives on the Hearth (Stony Brook, 2020); the annual meeting of The German Phenomenological Society / Deutsche Gesellschaft für Phänomenologische Forschung, Fact, Facticity, Reality / Faktum, Faktizität, Wirklichkeit (Vienna, 2019); and the 17th annual meeting of the Nordic Society for Phenomenology (Södertörn UC 2019). I would like to thank Professor Anthony Steinbock and Professors Georg Stenger (Vienna), Sergej Seitz (Vienna) and Inga Römer (Grenoble) for these invitations, and also express my gratitude to the participants at the three events for their stimulating comments and suggestions. Portions of the paper, lightly revised and further developed here, were previously published in Sara Heinämaa, “Values of love: Two forms of infinity characteristic of human persons”, in Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, vol. 19, no. 3, pp.431–450.
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Heinämaa, S. (2022). Personal Love: Feeling from the Depths. In: Steinbock, A.J. (eds) Phenomenology and Perspectives on the Heart. Contributions to Phenomenology, vol 117. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-91928-3_9
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