Abstract
A distinction between two categories of normative modalities is proposed, called evaluative and directional. It is suggested that evaluative and directional modalities may be applied in modelling, respectively, the affective and conative aspects of the mind. Using both types of normative modality, together with modalities for belief and knowledge, a modal-logical framework is proposed for the characterization of emotions, in terms of their cognitive, conative and affective aspects. In particular, a modality is defined to represent an agent’s approval/disapproval of a given state of affairs; it is proposed that a strengthened version of this modality is capable of representing the situation in which an agent deems a state of affairs to be unacceptable. Examples are given to illustrate the claim that unacceptability, desire, certainty and uncertainty are the key building blocks in terms of which a number of types of emotions may be characterized.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
As will be evident in due course, the principal reason for this choice is that the JP1definition of Ought provides the basis for defining a stronger modality: Must. It will be suggested that a strong notion of approval/disapproval is required in the characterization of emotions.
- 2.
This criticism applies equally to (Jones 2015), in which I adopted a version of Pörn’s model, and mistakenly assumed that the affective aspect of trust could be captured using cognitive and volitional modalities alone.
- 3.
OCC’s choice of these three categories is of no import in relation to the main point I wish to draw from their model; but I need to indicate those categories in order to give a flavour of their overall approach.
- 4.
For an overview of the method of generating ‘normative positions’, see, for instance, (Jones and Sergot 1983).
- 5.
(Pörn 1986) and (Jones 2015) described these cases in terms of despair and hopelessness; that was evidently a misdescription, since those emotional states require not only that the agent is certain that p, or not-p, but that he also believes it to be unavoidably the case that p/not-p. See also (Ortony et al. 1988, p. 132).
References
Farrell, Daniel M. 1980. Jealousy. Philosophical Review 89 (4): 527–559.
Hilgard, Ernest R. 1980. The trilogy of mind: Cognition, affection and conation. Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences 16: 107–117.
Hintikka, Jaakko. 1962. Knowledge and belief: An introduction to the logic of the two notions. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Jones, Andrew J.I. 2015. On the attitude of trust: A formal characterization of trust, distrust, and associated notions. In The Cognitive Foundations of Group Attitudes and Social Interaction, Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality 5, ed. Andreas Herzig and Emiliano Lorini, 121–132. Springer International Publishing Switzerland.
Jones, Andrew J.I., and Ingmar Pörn. 1985. Ideality, sub-ideality and deontic logic. Synthese 65: 275–290.
———. 1986. ‘Ought’ and ‘Must’. Synthese 66: 89–93.
Jones, Andrew J.I., and Marek J. Sergot. 1983. On the characterization of law and computer systems: The normative systems perspective. In Deontic logic in computer science: Normative system specification, ed. J.-J.Ch. Meyer and R.J. Wieringa, 275–307. Chichester: Wiley.
Kanger, Stig. 1972. Law and logic. Theoria 38: 105–129.
Ortony, Andrew, Gerald L. Clore, and Allan Collins. 1988. The cognitive structure of emotions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pörn, Ingmar. 1977. Action theory and social science – Some formal models, Synthese Library. Vol. 120. Dordrecht/Holland: D. Reidel.
———. 1986. On the nature of emotions. In Changing positions, Philosophical Studies published by the Department of Philosophy, University of Uppsala, Sweden, No. 38, 205–214.
Acknowledgements
My thanks to Professor Karl Jacobsen of the Department of Psychology, Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU), Trondheim, Norway, for many interesting discussions about the theory of emotions. I am also most grateful to Professor Jacobsen and his department for financial support and hospitality during my research visits to NTNU Trondheim, where some of the groundwork for this paper was carried out. Thanks are also due to two referees for their helpful comments.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2022 Springer Nature Switzerland AG
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Jones, A.J.I. (2022). On the Role of Normative Modalities in the Characterization of Emotions. In: McNamara, P., Jones, A.J.I., Brown, M.A. (eds) Agency, Norms, Inquiry, and Artifacts: Essays in Honor of Risto Hilpinen. Synthese Library, vol 454. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-90749-5_6
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-90749-5_6
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-90748-8
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-90749-5
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)