Abstract
One of the most remarkable economic ascents in the world’s modern history is widely-recognized to be China’s. In the recent over forty years, capitalizing on the favourable global trends of economic liberalization and globalization, drawing lessons from the other countries’ development praxis and devising its own tailor-made domestic policies, this 1.4 billion inhabitants nation managed a spectacular catching-up process, transiting from isolation to wide integration into the global economy and making a stunning leap from poverty and famine to wellbeing, from the lowest international rankings to their top and from the world’s periphery to its forefront. Within this narrow time-frame of about four decades, China became the second largest economy in the world, the world’s leader in manufacturing and international trade, the holder of the largest foreign exchange reserve and the most important actor in many of the global markets. Such tempestuous economic growth, facilitated by policies such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) eventually spiralled into politically-centred objectives aimed at extending Chinese interests abroad. This chapter will therefore examine the various pathways China is taking to progress its economic and political agenda, focusing particularly on the role of the current administration.
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Notes
- 1.
OBOR was a curious name to many, especially in the West, as the strategy didn’t seem to aim at just building one road or belt, but many more, also because naming the maritime lanes “a road” didn’t make much sense in English. Moreover, this grand plan was quite clearly aiming at just linking all the other countries to China.
- 2.
The names and acronyms One Belt One Road/OBOR, New Silk Road/NSR and Belt and Road Initiative/BRI are used interchangeably.
- 3.
The document Vision and Actions on Jointly Building the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road, was framed by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and the ministries of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) and of Commerce (MoC), in 2015.
- 4.
Contrary to the Silk Road Fund’s declared purpose, China used it to acquire the Italian tyre manufacturer Pirelli, as well as to buy stakes in two Russian companies (9.9% of Yamal LNG and 10% of SIBUR Holding).
- 5.
The network of trails that connected China and the Mediterranean didn’t have a name for almost two thousand years before 1877, when a German geographer, Ferdinand von Richthofen, coined the Silk Road name, used ever since.
- 6.
In 2011, the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton proposed a New Silk Road trade and investment programme to underpin Afghanistan’s development after the US troops’ withdrawal, but China opposed to the use of that name at the time, pretending that it owned it.
- 7.
Deng Xiaoping paraphrased some old Chinese proverbs in a December 1990 speech.
- 8.
16 + 1 is a cooperation platform setup in 2012 by China and 16 Central Eastern European and Balkan countries (CEE16). Albania (AL), Bosnia and Herzegovina (BA), Bulgaria (BG), Croatia (HR), Czech Republic (CZ), Estonia (EE), Hungary (HU), Latvia (LV), Lithuania (LT), North Macedonia (MK), Montenegro (ME), Poland (PL), Romania (RO), Serbia (SR), Slovakia (SK), Slovenia (SI). 11 of these 16 countries are EU Member States (CEE11) while 5, the ones in the Balkans, are not (CEE5). After 2013, the 16 + 1 Platform has turned into an instrument of implementing BRI in Europe. In 2019 it included Greece, becoming 17 + 1.
- 9.
Premier Wen Jiabao’s speech at the National People’s Congress, March 2007.
- 10.
An estimated 80% of China’s total oil supply passes through these two straits, which provide the shortest access route to Middle East, Africa and Europe.
- 11.
By 2019, Chinese ODI under BRI were made in only 18% of the low risk countries; most of those investments were directed to medium risk and high-risk countries (in 68% and 28% of their respective totals).
- 12.
Such as: AIIB, New Silk Fund, New Development Bank, Chinese Courts for BRI disputes, a soon-to-come coordinating Chinese Agency for Foreign Aid programmes etc.
- 13.
China Development Bank (CDB), Export–Import Bank of China (Eximbank).
- 14.
Pakistan, Tajikistan, Djibouti, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, the Maldives, Mongolia and Montenegro.
- 15.
According to United States Geological Survey.
- 16.
In the meantime, the number of NATO members within the 16 + 1 platform has raised to 13: CZ, HU, PL (since 1999), BG, EE, LT, LV, RO, SK, SI (since 2004), AL, HR (since 2009) and ME (since 2017). The 17 + 1 includes another NATO member state, Greece, bringing the total to 14 NATO members.
- 17.
Resulting from their stronger economic relations, the dependence—for instance—of many of the EU17 countries on China is higher than that of any of the CEE16, or of their group taken together.
- 18.
The USD 10 billion amount was supplemented twice, first with another USD 1.0 billion credit line and then with an additional USD 3.0 billion fund.
- 19.
According to UN Comtrade Database, by the end of 2018, Slovakia in the CEE16 group and Austria, France, Germany, Ireland and Sweden in the EU17 were running trade surpluses with China. All the others were running deficits.
- 20.
NBR exchange rate on 31.12.2019: 1 EUR = 1.12 USD.
- 21.
Such as: Refurbishing and extending Doicesti, Mintia-Deva and Rovinari thermal power plants; building the Tarnita-Lapusesti pumped-storage hydro-power plant; extending the Cernavoda nuclear plant etc.
- 22.
Such as: Braila bridge over the Danube; highways, various routes; high-speed railways such as Costanta-Bucharest-Timișoara or, more recently, cross-border ones such as Sofia-Bucharest-Timișoara, with adjacent lines to Budapest and Belgrade; upgrading and extending ports etc.
- 23.
Such as: the industrial park along the Danube-Black Sea Canal.
- 24.
Such as: Govora healthcare resort etc.
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Pencea, S. (2022). Unwary Dreams, Rude Awakenings: BRI in the Developing World and Emerging Europe. In: Kim, YC. (eds) China and the Belt and Road Initiative. Understanding China. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86122-3_6
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