Abstract
In this discussion, I argue that José Luis Bermúdez has not shown that there is a paradox in our concept of self-consciousness. The deflationary theory is an implausible theory of self-consciousness. A more plausible theory, “the simple theory”, is not paradoxical. However, I do think there is a puzzle about the connection between self-consciousness and ‘I’-thoughts.
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Notes
- 1.
The terminology is from Gareth Evans, see (Evans, 1982, 185).
- 2.
However, there is something (especially) odd about the ‘A’-users. Anscombe writes as if they were like us in having thoughts, sensations, etc. But if an ‘A’-user has a pain, he cannot utter “A is in pain” simply in virtue of feeling the pain. Rather, he must first observe pain-like behaviour, notice that it is exhibited by the body whose ‘A’-inscribed wrist he can see, and then judge “A is in pain” (Anscombe, 1981, 24). But does this make any sense? If he can feel pain, why can he not ascribe it to himself on that basis? Or should the ‘A’-users be understood as insensate zombies?
References
Anscombe, G. E. M. (1981). The first person. In Metaphysics and the philosophy of mind. Oxford: Blackwell.
Bermúdez, J. L. (1998). The paradox of consciousness. Boston: MIT Press.
Castañeda, H. (1967). Indicators and quasi-indicators. American Philosophical Quarterly, 9, 85–100.
Evans, G. (1982). The varieties of reference. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Perry, J. (1979). The Essential indexical. Noûs, 3, 3–21.
Shoemaker, S. (1982). Self-reference and self-awareness. In Identity, cause, and mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wittgenstein, L. (1972). The blue and brown books. Oxford: Blackwell.
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Garrett, B., Joven Joaquin, J. (2022). Bermúdez on Self-Consciousness. In: Joaquin, J.J. (eds) Time, Identity and the Self: Essays on Metaphysics. Synthese Library, vol 442. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-85517-8_21
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