Abstract
In this discussion I want to argue – with certain qualifications – that there cannot be any vague identities, and to outline reasons for scepticism about the view that the world contains vague objects. I also argue that even if there were vague identities, this would lend no support to the vague objects view.
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Notes
- 1.
This example is taken from (Wiggins, 1986, 174).
- 2.
The term “precise designator” is due to Thomason (1982, 331).
- 3.
Elsewhere, I have criticised Wiggins’s argument; see Garrett (1988).
- 4.
Lewis allowed me to see these letters. In his letter, Lewis essentially puts forward the interpretation, see Lewis (1988).
- 5.
This result is endorsed by Michael Dummett, see (Dummett, 1980, 257).
- 6.
However, Dummett has subsequently withdrawn this claim in (Dummett, 1981, 440).
- 7.
Michael Tye (1990) proposed (a) (the Fuzzy Boundaries Criterion). Criterion (b) (a version of the Fuzzy Parts Criterion) was proposed by R. M. Sainsbury (1989). Criteria (a) and (b), though related, are not equivalent: an object with precise spatial boundaries will count as vague by (b), but not by (a), if its vague part(s) lies within its spatial boundaries.
References
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Garrett, B., Joven Joaquin, J. (2022). Vague Identity and Vague Objects. In: Joaquin, J.J. (eds) Time, Identity and the Self: Essays on Metaphysics. Synthese Library, vol 442. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-85517-8_12
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