Hans Reichenbach and the Freistudentenschaft: School Reform, Pedagogy, and Freedom

Abstract

Like many of his contemporary students, Hans Reichenbach was a member of the Freistudentenschaft. This movement strongly defended the idea of moral self-determination and intellectual autonomy of the individual, and aimed at reforming the German university system that the Free Students regarded as no longer adequate to reflect their needs. As a Free Student, Reichenbach stood against any form of dogmatism, be it scholastic, religious, philosophical, political, or institutional. It is against this background that he developed the ideals that would ultimately provide the basis for his philosophical thought, and to which he would remain faithful until the end of his life.

The aim of this paper is to provide a brief overview of Reichenbach’s experience as a Free Student and its impact on his later work. I will consider archival materials that significantly epitomise his early involvement within the German Youth Movement, specifically in relation to: his political partaking in the university reform, which extends until 1919; a psychological research project he carried out around 1912–1913; and his position on the war, which emerges in his 1915 correspondence with the education reformer Gustav Wyneken.

1 Introduction

For the young Hans Reichenbach, his university years represented an opportunity not only for professional and personal advancement by means of the subject he chose to study, but also for engaging in social and political activities. Between 1911 and 1914 (and to a certain degree in 1918 and 1919), Reichenbach briefly turned his attention from science and philosophy to the project of reforming the German university system, one of the main objectives of the Free Student Movement (Freie Studentenschaft).

Driven by the idea of the moral self-determination of individuals and freedom of choice regarding one’s future, the Free Students (Freistudenten) strongly defended the autonomy of thought and thus opposed any form of dogmatism, whether scholastic, religious, philosophical, political, or institutional. During the period that Reichenbach was a member, the Free Students’ criticism was especially aimed at reforming the German university, which they regarded as obsolete and inadequate to reflect their needs. It is against this background that Reichenbach developed ideals that would ultimately provide the basis for his philosophical thought and to which he would remain faithful until his death. In fact, Reichenbach’s intransigent opposition to any form of hypostatised theory would rest on these ideals, as would his sharp criticism of speculative metaphysics, even in the form of neo-Kantianism and phenomenology, which he viewed as incapable of mirroring the crucial advances in the science of his time.

This paper aims to provide a brief overview of Reichenbach’s experience as a Free Student and of the impact of that experience on his later work.¹ To this end, I consider (1) archival materials that characterise Reichenbach’s early involvement in the German Youth Movement² in relation to his political participation in university reform, which extended until 1919; (2) a psychological research project he undertook in approximately 1912–1913 while a student in Munich; and (3) his ambivalent position on the war, which is exemplified to a certain extent by his 1915 correspondence with education reformer Gustav Wyneken.³

2 School Reform and the Ideal of the Freie Studentenschaft

2.1 The Pre-War Period and the Demand for Neutrality in Education

Reichenbach began his academic studies at the Stuttgart Technische Hochschule in the winter semester of 1910–1911 in civil engineering, a discipline in which he initially hoped to find a wide-ranging methodology that combined theory and practice.⁴ Within a short time, he became a well-recognised member of the Freie Studentenschaft.⁵ His first publications as a Free Student considered two approaches to the study of science: one practical, the other theoretical. These two papers, “Universität und Technische Hochschule. Ein Vergleich” (Reichenbach, 1911a) and “Universität und Technische Hochschule” (Reichenbach, 1911b) compared the values and aims of studying technical disciplines at a Fachschule (i.e., a technical university) with those of studying general scientific topics at a more traditional university. Reichenbach was soon disappointed by the lack of in-depth theoretical investigation of technical subjects in Stuttgart. During his second semester, he abandoned the institution to study mathematics, physics, and philosophy at the University of Berlin, where he enrolled first in the academic year of 1911–1912 and later in 1913–1914.

While his first publications testify to Reichenbach’s early propensity for a philosophical understanding of academic disciplines, it was with his transfer from Berlin to Munich in the academic year 1912–1913 that he began to actively influence the Freie Studentenschaft in terms of its concerns and attitudes, especially in the quest for a programmatic vision for the movement.⁶ In his 1912 report on the state of the Munich branch of the Freistudentenschaft, published in the Dresdner Studentische Blätter,⁷ Reichenbach illustrated the points unanimously accepted at the Munich meeting of 4 July 1912. These points concerned 1) assigning equal rights and committee representation to all students, including those who were not, de facto, active members of student corporations or fraternities (the so-called Nicht-Inkorporierte); 2) implementing a reform of student rights through a self-governance organ that would repeal all elements of civil rights that could limit students (thus weakening their sense of responsibility); 3) providing extensive opportunities to complement university offerings through additional scientific, artistic, civic, and physical education courses while welcoming all students to partake in the discussions of pedagogical questions such extracurricular activities implied; and 4) adopting a neutral stance with respect to religious and political matters.⁸

In Reichenbach’s view, the unifying principle of the movement, especially in relation to freedom of knowledge, still required spelling out.⁹ In an article he published in a brochure co-authored with Carl Landauer, “Die freistudentische Idee. Ihr Inhalt als Einheit” (1913c),¹⁰ Reichenbach articulated the Free Students’ ideal, and their spirit of self-determination as follows:

The supreme moral ideal is exemplified in the person who determines his own values freely and independently of others and who, as a member of a society, demands this autonomy for all members and of all members.

This ideal is purely formal, for it says nothing as to the direction the individual should follow in choosing for himself. […] Only one universal demand can be made: the formal ideal. We require the autonomous creation of the ideal; that is, we require that each person, of his own free will, set the goal to which he will aspire and follow none but a suitable course of action. The individual may do whatever he considers to be right. Indeed, he ought to do it; in general, we consider as immoral nothing but an inconsistency between goal and action. To force a person to commit an act that he himself does not consider right is to compel him to be immoral. That is why we reject every authoritarian morality that wants to replace the autonomy of the individual with principles of actions set forth by some external authority or other. That is the essence of our morality […].

If, in the formulation of our ideals, we put forth a second point of view concerning society, that is not to be regarded as contradicting the principle of autonomy just presented. It is incorrect to speak of a contradiction between individualism and socialism […]. When we demand the autonomy of the individual and require at the same time that the individual grant to everyone else the same right to self-determination, we are really presenting one and the same thought from two different aspects. The second is an extension that is necessary to complete the ideal, an addition that transforms what is desired for the individual into a universal law. […] The task of the Free Students is this: to educate students to the acceptance of this ethical ideal (Reichenbach, 1913c, 109–110).

There are a number of interesting elements in this presentation of the movement’s central tenets. However, the emphasis is clearly on the educational work necessary to attain this ethical ideal, more specifically, on the conditions of possibility for this work to be carried out and on how to finally achieve the goal of unification within the student movement.¹¹ The core message is rooted in the idea of the “autonomy of the individual”, a form of “neutrality”—as Reichenbach envisions it—that should enable education to lead to self-education through focusing on the ethical ideal and its equally fundamental implementation in society. The means to achieve this ideal is school reform: the university and all of academic life must be restructured in such a way that, as Reichenbach phrases it, “the student can educate himself according to the ideal of autonomy as a universal precept [nach dem Ideal der Autonomie als allgemeinen Gesetzes]” (1913c, 111).

Welfare agencies must make up for the limited opportunities of students with restricted means to fight social inequalities, which is “the Free Students’ task at the university with regard to politics [die hochschulpolitische Tätigkeit]” (1913c, 111). Nationalism (as well as Catholicism and religion generally) should also have no place in the movement. Considerations based on, e.g., politics, religious affiliation, or race should neither influence the hiring of instructors, which must be performed with complete neutrality,¹² nor the academic and intellectual development of students.¹³ This is why Reichenbach demands freedom of research and teaching from any influence by outside authorities, which would ultimately guarantee scientific autonomy. A reform of the student code of rights would enable students to develop their views freely in accordance with their knowledge and their self-determination, thus rejecting the “principle of education by authority”.¹⁴

Another interesting element of this programmatic text is the idea that students must be accorded the right to self-organisation in general student committees. In another paper along the same lines, “Der Sinn der Hochschulreform” (1914b), Reichenbach emphasises how university reform must begin with a critique of science as a form of organised knowledge.¹⁵ This critique would promote a spirit of community in contrast to the divide between professors and students and thus create a close tie between the two groups, resulting in a more vital academic organism.

2.2 The Post-War Period: From Neutrality to Socialism

Through his involvement in the Freistudentenschaft, Reichenbach meant to transform and ultimately improve the scholastic and educational system, which he viewed as static and too rigid. For him, this system represented an obstacle to the students’ aspiration to freely follow their inclinations, develop their lives in line with them, and finally determine their own destinies. This involvement had a sequel in 1918 when Reichenbach addressed the reform of the university system from a more political (socialist) perspective. Such politicisation was a natural development for many Free Students, especially considering the radical tendencies of the left wing of the Freistudentenschaft, which largely contributed to creating the groundwork for this development. Among these students, Reichenbach stood out as a “leading figure of this passage from democratisation to socialisation of the university”, as Linse put it (Linse, 1974, 12).

At the heart of Reichenbach’s pre-war writings lie the ideas of social responsibility and community. All the measures suggested in his criticism of the educational system ultimately included a robust social component. Clarifying the risks of the loss of scientific freedom did not just symbolise the starting point of the liberation from an obsolete, non-neutral university organisation and education. It also opened the way to a criticism of the social structure. Especially immediately after the war, Reichenbach perceived that such societal change could not be realised within a capitalistic framework. Thus, a remodelling or reorganisation of society on the basis of socialist principles was not only desirable but also necessary if radical change was to be implemented at any social level.¹⁶

It is with this socialist model of reorganisation in mind that in 1918 Reichenbach drafted the programme of the Socialist Student Party and published a number of pamphlets that would be distributed in various alternative circles, including the “Programm der sozialistischen Studentenpartei” (“Platform of the Socialist Students’ Party”), the “Bericht der sozialistischen Studentenpartei Berlin. Erläuterungen zum Programm” (“Report of the Socialist Student Party, Berlin and Notes on the Program”), the manuscript “Die Sozialisierung der Hochschule” (“Socializing the University”), and the paper “Student und Sozialismus”.¹⁷ The central idea of the first text, the “Platform of the Socialist Students’ Party” (1918a), is the application of the basic tenets of socialism to society in general and to schools in particular. For Reichenbach, the reformation of the university should occur “in accordance with the socialist platform” (Reichenbach, 1918a, 132). All of elements sketched in this short document appear to be a natural development of Reichenbach’s Freistudent views, which now include the abolition of fees for lectures, registration, and examinations, particularly for disadvantaged students (while higher fees are envisaged for better-off students), in addition to state support for those lacking private means. Another characteristic element of this “socialist trend” is the demand for freedom of speech and the hiring of lecturers and the admission of students regardless of social class, political party, religion, race, sex, or nationality. The promotion of student committees to implement student self-government, emphasised in this first paper, already appeared as a desideratum in the work Reichenbach performed in the Munich division of the Freistudentenschaft. As we have previously noted, in “Die Neuorganisierung der Münchner Freistudententschaft” (1912b), Reichenbach discussed how the entire system of instruction should be reformed according to agreed-on pedagogical principles and by actively engaging the complete student body. An interesting new demand concerns the creation of new faculty chairs in the areas of education, socialism, and sociology.¹⁸

From a theoretical viewpoint, the richest and most elaborated document among these writings on socialism is “Socializing the University” (1918b). The paper’s introduction emphatically states the importance of the key concept of community and how it should be organised to promote cultural development.¹⁹ In Reichenbach’s words:

Cultural development will always rest basically upon community, and all creative periods will find their support in communities. […] The significance of society consists in its serving as a precondition for the existence and expansion of communities. […] [A] justly organized society—which has never yet existed—may be called the precondition of culture. […] [W]e must look for the conditions that this society will have to fulfil if it is to become the precondition for the development of spiritual and intellectual culture, i.e., if the effects of the intellect are to be manifested in communities, if organizations are to be based upon mutual respect, if the just society is to arise among people who differ completely in material and intellectual respects. Socialism has already undertaken to solve this problem (Reichenbach, 1918b, 137–141).

The socialist ideal requires the abolition of privileges in favour of a meritocratic system that rewards students for their competence and potential.²⁰ Once again, the elimination of academic prejudice among students according to “class, party, church, race, sex, or citizenship” (Reichenbach, 1918b, 158) is an essential part of the reform process. Additionally, every person should be granted the right to education, and the state should support such egalitarianism in the spirit of genuine inclusion. Socialising the university is not simply viewed as a useful procedure but as a “necessary condition” to enable those with a “purely scientific orientation” (Reichenbach, 1918b, 148) to sincerely and effectively realise the ideal of an open, socially just, and conceptually creative university community. The implementation of these socialist features would not only help develop a better university and, overall, a better society but would also go hand in hand with the highly desirable development of the university as an international institution.²¹

Since scientific and intellectual progress is impossible without social progress, members of the different societal levels should cooperate towards creating a new society. Hence, as Reichenbach argues in “Student und Sozialismus” (1919), the urgency to connect all the layers of youth—both proletarians and those benefitting from an academic education—to create a genuine societal “organism”. The fight for a more “rational social order” embodies the “societal task of the students in a socialist state”. Students should therefore abandon the limitations placed on them by their social origins to join in and promote “the one and only great movement of our time: socialism” (Reichenbach, 1919, 9).²²

The strong appeal to intellectuals to cooperate and implement this change ultimately implies a reorientation of philosophy towards a new, radical approach.²³ For Reichenbach, the new, socialist trend was bound to result in a restructuring of society, a task that students could not accomplish in the pre-war period. In a similar vein, Reichenbach will envisage another reorientation of philosophy and a consequent, equally radical new approach when he shifts his focus from educational and societal matters to scientific philosophy beginning in 1920.

2.3 Reichenbach’s Political Background and the Berlin University Appointment

The portrait of Reichenbach that emerges from his early political writings and from the letters he exchanged with colleagues or family in the 1910s is that of a researcher who although very young is endowed with an ability to think independently and a resolute determination to fight for his objective: the reform of the educational system in general and that of the German universities in particular.

His political writings from the post-war period caused Reichenbach trouble in 1925, when he endeavoured (with the help of his former teacher Max Planck) to be appointed as a full professor at the University of Berlin.²⁴ In this period of his life, Reichenbach was no longer engaged in politics and was seemingly less proud of his early political activity, primarily because of his interest in pursuing an academic career. Because his early socialist pamphlets had circulated only within restricted groups, Reichenbach did not include them in the list of publications he submitted to the hiring committee. Nonetheless, the early publications came to notice during the appointment procedure.²⁵ As a result, Reichenbach was accused of trying to hide his political activity, the extent of which was deemed unsuitable for such an institution.

In a letter to Planck from February 1925, Reichenbach explained his activities in the Free Student Movement and his membership in the Socialist Student Party as being grounded in his liberal views. He further claimed to have always awarded priority to questions of education and Weltanschauung. To him, such questions were separate from party politics, in which he claimed never having been interested (something not entirely true, as we have just seen). As Reichenbach went on to explain, he was fully preoccupied by his scientific interests, which ultimately prevented him from pursuing purely educational matters.²⁶ This, at least, is the explanation he presented to the politically conservative Planck. Maria Reichenbach, however, suggested a different reason for Reichenbach to relinquish his educational and political interests. In her view, Reichenbach’s turn from politics was related to the fact that after the publication of his habilitation thesis, Relativitätstheorie und Erkenntnis Apriori (Reichenbach, 1920), he aspired to an academic career and, from a more practical perspective, needed to earn money to support a family with two children.²⁷ Whatever the motives behind Reichenbach’s decision, it is difficult to regard his political, educational, and ethical activism as completely separate from his scientific engagement: in Reichenbach’s student years, they were definitely two sides of the same coin.²⁸

3 Pedagogy

As we have noted in Sect. 5.2.1, at the time of his involvement in the Munich Freistudentenschaft, Reichenbach suggested that university education be complemented with more “neutral” and independent learning opportunities that the Free Students would organise and offer to first-year students. These educational activities were targeted at the creation of free thinkers, i.e., “self-determining people,” and “carried out through the organization of mass lectures, discussion evenings for smaller groups, tours of every kind, student trips, and athletic activities” (Reichenbach, 1913c, 111–112).

In the frame of this educational work, one debate that fascinated Reichenbach concerned the study of philosophy not only as a university requirement but also as a tool for life. Other debates prompted further reflection on the form in which the independent courses would need to be taught.²⁹

Another noteworthy example of his inclinations is the draft of a research project that Reichenbach most likely undertook in the framework of Aloys Fischer’s lectures on “Character and the Formation of Character”, which he attended at the University of Munich in the winter semester 1912–1913. The purpose of this incomplete research project, entitled “Psychologische Untersuchungen an Volkshochschulkindern”,³⁰ seems to have been to clarify and assess the modality of constitution of an “ethical conscience” as compared to Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason.³¹

The draft consists of a series of questionnaires administered to eleven-year-old children interviewed by Reichenbach. The questionnaires focused on the children’s attitudes towards and psychological reaction to illicit acts, such as stealing and lying. Each questionnaire was analysed in combination with the autobiographical profile of the interviewee. Based on these data, Reichenbach outlined what he defined as the “frequency of motivational elements” (Häufigkeit der Motivations-Elemente), that is, the reasons why a certain answer was given. These reasons were informed by the children’s self-portraits and Reichenbachʼs observations. His analysis focused on the twofold nature of conscience formation. On the one hand, he looked at the belief systems to which the children were subjugated by their families, schools, and society. On the other, he investigated the individual character, feelings, and aspirations of the children. According to Reichenbachʼs notes in the margins of the document, before considering any other aspects, it was imperative to distinguish between two possible viewpoints: either one only looks at “the consequences of an action” or one seeks to show these consequences “under the assumption that all men would do the same” (HR 021-02-03).³² Albeit fragmentary, this research is remarkable because it demonstrates how Reichenbach applied his analytical method very early on in an empirical investigation. It also illustrates how Reichenbach was prepared to draw conclusions irrespective of the fact that these conclusions could contradict influential philosophical positions, as is the case here. Although he did not fully spell out his reasoning, to his mind, for those defending Kant’s position in ethics, only the latter approach could be pursued, while the first, which Reichenbach embraced, would have to exclude any ethical evaluations with respect to the twofold nature of conscience construction.

This research project also reveals Reichenbach’s initial propensity for “psycho-ethical” topics. It is also the only document indicating that he implemented his analytical approach in an explicitly psychological domain. Despite being conceived of as a university assignment, this research is presumably also related to Reichenbach’s involvement in the creation of a Pädagogische Abteilung within the Munich division of the Freie Studentenschaft.³³ In her memories of Reichenbach, Hilde Landauer recalled that one topic they often discussed in the Freistudentenschaft in Munich during those years was in fact “education in the specific sense of ‘family or institutions’”. She also commented as follows:

We favored different sides, although our discussion was carried on in the most friendly terms. I felt that the initial role of the nuclear family in bringing up an infant enabled and even destined it to be a potential source of mutual assistance, enjoyment and enrichment in the relationship of the generations; Hans, possibly on the basis of personal experiences, was inclined to emphasize the shackling influence of the family and visualized the institution as a tool for liberating the personality (Landauer, H., 1978, 31).

For Reichenbach, an appropriate school reform was the only option for implementing a new pedagogical strategy that would truly lead youth to freedom of choice and self-determination.

In the “Bericht der sozialistischen Studentenpartei Berlin” (Reichenbach, 1918c), promoting additional lectures for students constituted a central part of the socialisation of students within the hoped-for socialist reorganisation of the university. In this document, Reichenbach himself was listed as having taught a course on the philosophy of socialism in which he had first addressed the materialist conception of history and later examined issues related to ethics and socialism.³⁴

4 Reichenbach, Wyneken, and the War

One of the most significant influences on the young Reichenbach was radical school reformer and founder of the Freie Schulgemeinde Wickersdorf Gustav Wyneken, whom Reichenbach most likely met in Berlin at the beginning of 1912 and whose pedagogical ideas and worldview strongly shaped his own as a Free Student.³⁵ Several of the ideas we have discussed are either a direct consequence of this charismatic leader’s views or evolved from common roots in the back-to-nature movement known as the Wandervogel that most such “alternative” tendencies shared.³⁶

Already in his role as teacher at Hermann Lietz’s Landerziehungsheime at Ilsenburg and Haubinda between 1900 and 1906, Wyneken endorsed an educational model that agreed with the core values later expressed by the Freistudentenschaft.³⁷ This model was marked by the view that education should not involve authoritarianism. In contrast, the educator’s role was to foster through a joint effort with the student the achievement of a previously agreed-upon objective. Guided by this principle, in 1906, Wyneken found and directed his own boarding school at Wickersdorf, the famous Freie Schulgemeinde.³⁸ For reasons we cannot discuss here, Wyneken had to resign from the directorship of the school in 1910 although he did not cease to influence the Wickersdorf community as well as various youth movements developing in those years.³⁹

In 1913, Wyneken delivered the keynote address at the Erster Freideutscher Jugendtag, also known as the Meißner Tagung.⁴⁰ This meeting was an important step in the attempt to unify the various youth movement groups.⁴¹ As Carl Landauer recalls, it was not so much the adoption of a resolution that contributed to this unification but rather the meeting’s impact on public opinion and the criticism the gathering attracted due to the more radical (and somewhat politicised) groups in attendance, including one led by Wyneken.⁴² Within a year and with the war approaching, the pre-war movement of the Free Students ceased to develop as a unified movement and eventually dissolved.⁴³

In his writings of 1914, Reichenbach again addressed what he considered to be the problematic (i.e., nonunitary) image of the Freie Studentenschaft and its ramifications. In “Die Jugendbewegung und die Freie Studentenschaft”, he focused on the idea of youth that had emerged from Wyneken’s left circle.⁴⁴ This idea of youth rested on the concept that the period of youth should not be interpreted as one of mere preparation for adulthood but as a period in which young individuals developed their own values and which, as such, should be meaningful in and of itself.⁴⁵ An important feature of youth, according to Reichenbach, was not the possession of “truth” but the search for it, which embodied the “experience of science” (Reichenbach, 1914d, 158).⁴⁶

Reichenbach’s attitude towards the various youth movement groups and their leaders was consistent with the principle he defended, i.e., that no authority must be blindly followed. He also applied this principle to his relationship with Wyneken, particularly after the controversial public address that Wyneken delivered at the Munich Freie Studentenschaft on 25 November 1914, which was a lecture that marked the moment Reichenbach distanced himself from Wyneken. In the lecture, entitled “Der Krieg und die Jugend” (published in Wyneken, 1915), Wyneken tried to make sense of the absurdity of war after his brother Ernst had been killed in combat in August 1914. In his address, he portrayed the war as an ethical experience providing an opportunity to fulfil a moral obligation that young people, whom he viewed as often dominated by moral anarchism, should welcome with joy.⁴⁷ Furthermore, he argued that the war had to be interpreted as an important step towards a societal transformation through the emancipation of youth that such a conflict would necessarily bring about. Strikingly, Wyneken tried to harmonise his role as an education reformer with the brutality of war, arguing that military service represented an intermediate stage between adolescence and adulthood, one that schooling was unable to offer. For him, this new intermediate stage would eventually result in the sought-after dismissal of the dominant educational system through renewed self-conscience, i.e., a new sense of responsibility shared by the totality of youth, not only by young workers but also by students.⁴⁸

In Reichenbachʼs view, military service was completely at odds with the ideal of youth self-determination, which was, as we have noted, at the heart of the unifying movement he had firmly and openly advocated since his first days as a Free Student. In his 1914 paper “Militarismus und Jugend,” Reichenbach had already analysed how the romantically oriented Wandervogel movement began as a “healthy reaction” (Reichenbach, 1914a, 1234) against the rigidity of the school system, fostering instead originality and self-expression. However, for him, this early movement lacked a unitary goal; thus, when it expanded, the various positions animating certain of the “anti-something” Wandervogel tendencies developed into a wide range of perspectives often in contrast with one another, despite emerging from the same movement.⁴⁹ According to Reichenbach, this phenomenon also occurred in the case of the paramilitary movement known as the Jungdeutschland-Bund. Reichenbach deemed this development to directly oppose the initial “open” message of the Wandervogel, which emphasised the spirit of freedom and adventure, and yet, paradoxically, the Wandervogel eventually became affiliated with the Bund and adopted its nationalistic ideology.⁵⁰ As the Jungdeutschland-Bund increasingly gathered force, it attracted the positive recognition of school and state because of the idea of order and obedience it embodied, which resulted in a movement that was politically reactionary and thus no longer aligned with the Wandervogelʼs original ethos.⁵¹

Unsurprisingly, pro-war feelings typically went hand in hand with patriotism and, by extension, nationalism. As Carl Landauer wrote, Wyneken, “like many Germans, succumbed to the temptation of extreme nationalism” (Landauer, C., 1978, 28). Reichenbach opposed the position expressed by Wyneken’s provocative 1915 brochure in an open, extensive exchange with him that occurred in early 1915 and circulated among a limited number of Free Students, certain of whom directly participated in the discussion.⁵² This exchange indicates how strong the influence of Wyneken’s worldview was on Reichenbach’s and on his concept of the objective knowledge of “good,”⁵³ but it is also a testament to the highly independent mindset that Reichenbach defended against any authority, even those who had once substantially shaped his thinking, including Wynken.

In his first letter, dated 18 February 1915, Reichenbach stressed the risk implicit in war of losing one’s sense of authentic, good values if one believed such an “abominable” act could embody the ultimate fulfilment of youth. In this letter, he firmly opposed Wyneken’s suggestion that war could help young individuals make the transition to adulthood through the hardship imposed on them by severe economic and military conditions. These conditions, Wyneken had argued, would prompt the best qualities of youth to emerge, thus leading to a renewed sense of responsibility that schools were unable to convey.⁵⁴ Reichenbach, in contrast, considered support for the war repulsive and counter to the nature of youth.⁵⁵ For him, “the old culture” of the nations was offering their citizens the “drama of a mad Europe” in which youth was given—and was supposed to participate in—an enormous task but was in fact “the victim of that madness” (HR 044-06-15). This task certainly did not provide a better form of education than that offered by traditional schooling. Even less acceptable to Reichenbach was the idea that the same elderly men who had dragged the young generation into this “miserable catastrophe” (HR 044-06-15) still dared to talk about ethics and define the aims of the lives of young men.⁵⁶

In his long reply of 27 February, Wyneken reaffirmed his appreciation for the great opportunity for renewal of the soul of youth that the war offered, certainly not the worst disgrace of their generation, in his opinion.⁵⁷ In his response of 14 March, Reichenbach complained that Wyneken did not address the points he had raised in his initial letter while asserting that no true human value could ever find expression in military action. Moreover, opposing the idea of “war as a value-oriented entity” (HR 044–06–18) was supposed to be their primary task, especially as Freistudenten.⁵⁸ He further emphasised that it was their moral obligation to develop their own culture with their original educational—and ultimately ethical—ideal in mind, the very ideal that Wyneken was betraying. Predictably, Wyneken did not change his opinion in response to this argument.⁵⁹

Like many of his contemporaries, Reichenbach was compelled to participate in the tragedy of the First World War. Although his critical view of the war during his involvement in the Freistudentenschaft and prior to his exchange with Wyneken was evident, the exact circumstances that led him to join the army are unclear.⁶⁰ Despite his critical views and his strong opposition to participation in military activity,⁶¹ Reichenbach’s military passport states that he registered as a volunteer and served in an infantry regiment as early as the beginning of August 1914.⁶² Later, he sought training as an aviator although he was aware he was unsuited for such duty (he suffered from acute myopia). Eventually, Reichenbach ended up serving in a signal corps unit in Neuruppin, near Berlin.⁶³

How important the exchange with Wyneken was for Reichenbach is evident from the fact that he meticulously kept copies of all their letters. Their discussion on war was not the end of their connection, although it was the end of an intimate connection. At the end of 1918, Reichenbach contacted Wyneken to enquire about a position at the Freie Schulgemeinde Wickersdorf, to which Wyneken had meanwhile returned. In his letter from 28 December 1918, Reichenbach emphasised that their parting of ways in 1915 was not due to a difference in their understanding of values but rather to a difference regarding, as he put it, “the intellectual ordering of the empirical” (HR 017-06-36). He affirmed that for him his willingness to work in Wyneken’s school and community was not only attributable to “desire for youthful life” but also to his very “strong scientific commitment” (HR 017-06-36)⁶⁴ and, certainly, to a practical need to find employment. Reichenbach’s intention was to teach physics and philosophy at Wickersdorf, but the plan never materialised.

Reichenbach’s path led elsewhere. However, in 1928, he contacted Wyneken again, this time to send his student Hans Stotz to teach mathematics and physics at Wickersdorf. Reichenbach also visited Wyneken at the Freie Schulgemeinde Wickersdorf in May 1931. This last visit was most likely motivated by Reichenbach’s interest in further discussing educational matters with Wyneken after receiving an invitation to write a piece on the Montessori Method.⁶⁵

5 The End of the “Ethical Ideal”?

In addition to theoretical philosophy and physics, ethical questions and the importance of individual self-determination were at the centre of Reichenbach’s interests in the early years of his studies, as we have seen. Given Reichenbach’s active involvement in the Freistudentenschaft and his strong interest in educational and ethical questions, as attested by a long list of publications and activities in 1911–1914 and 1918–1919, it is striking that Reichenbach did not even marginally continue to work on these issues following the publication of his habilitation thesis in 1920, especially as this period was one in which Germany was undergoing a dramatic historical turn.

One exception to this neglect is a paper on the Montessori School that Reichenbach wrote in the early 1930s.⁶⁶ In the paper, the fundamental ideas developed during his school years reverberate with all their initial intensity.⁶⁷ Reichenbach compared old and new approaches to education, emphasising how negative recollections of oneʼs school years could only be the result of schooling that perceived as its main task merely the introduction of the younger generation to the established cultural tradition. According to Reichenbach, education had to focus more on creativity and productivity in learning than on passive reception.⁶⁸

For him, a more effective idea of schooling could only be established by adopting the free will of children as the foundation of instruction. Thus, he echoed the method Wyneken originally fostered at Wickersdorf. The principle of self-affirmation had to be at the core of a new, progressive education, as perfectly exemplified by the Montessori Method. This method represented a way to overcome the obsolete approach to education that relied on the reiteration of a fixed type of teaching and the imposition of a closed canon of culture on younger students. For Reichenbach, there was no corpus of culture to be inherited. The disintegration of traditional values that could be observed in society was nothing to be passed on to the coming generations. In this sense, understanding the present implied rejecting the traditional educational system in favour of a radical and novel approach, one that would make sense of the present and not be guided by outdated priorities. In Reichenbachʼs view, the contrast between these two educational models was epitomised by the difference between the curriculum of a traditional humanistic Gymnasium and a curriculum that would include the newest trends in technology, much more appreciated by the students at that time and more in line with the spirit of the era. Ultimately, for Reichenbach, a school had to provide an interpretation of the present rather than become a “temple of the past” (Reichenbach, 1931, 93).

The Montessori Method and School embraced the idea that childhood should be experienced as an end in itself, not as a stage of preparation for adulthood. Reichenbach fully shared this view and observed that such thinking was certainly not only appropriate to the type of education promoted by Maria Montessori but also characteristic of the youth movement groups that participated in this type of debate in pre-war Germany.⁶⁹ The idea of childhood as a period with its own values is an idea that Reichenbach forcefully expressed, especially in his essays from 1913–1914, which were closely aligned with Wyneken’s early views.⁷⁰ The awareness that childhood had value was now also understood as the “ideological basis” (Reichenbach, 1931, 94) of the Montessori School. Its “moral basis”, for Reichenbach, was the trust awarded to children to allowing them to do what they would do spontaneously, which corresponded to what they wanted to do.⁷¹ For Reichenbach, the Montessori School, far from underestimating the importance of learning how to deal with obligations in life, addressed learning effectively by shifting the emphasis from coercion by authority to that of compulsion by life situations themselves.⁷² When Montessori students learned to follow their inclinations and to do what they were capable of doing freely, they would learn a fundamental value, i.e., that of taking their present seriously by experiencing and thus deeply understanding it.⁷³

By recognising the value of children’s self-determined acts, this new form of education was intended to strengthen pupils’ lives by developing an awareness of the present, a sense of self-confidence, and the full affirmation of the child’s existence in a time of change. In this sense, Reichenbach concluded, “education to the present is the most beautiful motto that a school could ever have” (Reichenbach, 1931, 99).⁷⁴

Another notable exception to the absence of ethical discussion in Reichenbach’s later work is the seventeenth chapter of The Rise of Scientific Philosophy (1951), entitled “The Nature of Ethics”, where an echo of his early interests reverberates. In concluding it, he writes as follows:

Whoever wants to study ethics, therefore, should not go to the philosopher; he should go where moral issues are fought out. He should live in the community of a group where life is made vivid by competing volitions, be it the group of a political party, or of a trade union, or of a professional organization, or of a ski club, or a group formed by common study in a classroom. There he will experience what it means to set his volition against that of other persons and what it means to adjust oneself to group will. If ethics is the pursuit of volitions, it is also the conditioning of volitions through a group environment. The exponent of individualism is shortsighted when he overlooks the volitional satisfaction which accrues from belonging to a group. Whether we regard the conditioning of volitions through the group as a useful or a dangerous process depends on whether we support or oppose the group; but we must admit that there exists such group influence. […] Whenever there comes a philosopher who tells you he has found the ultimate truth do not trust him. If he tells you that he knows the ultimate good, or has a proof that the good must become reality, do not trust him, either. The man merely repeats the errors which his predecessors have committed for two thousand years. It is time to put an end to this brand of philosophy. Ask the philosopher to be as modest as the scientist; then he may become as successful as the man of science. But do not ask him what he should do. Open your ears to your own will, and try to unite your will with that of others. There is no more purpose or meaning in the world than you put into it (Reichenbach, 1951, 297–302).

Reichenbach died in April 1953, just two years after the publication of his book. He concluded his career in the same spirit in which he began it, emphasising not only the importance of one’s personal volition and goals and, basically, the social origins of ethics but also the fundamental significance of community. Without doubt, this view was a legacy of his time as a Freistudent and a leitmotiv that persisted throughout his life.