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Extraterritoriality of EU Competition Law and the Changing Face of Global Cartel Enforcement

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Extraterritoriality of EU Economic Law

Part of the book series: European Union and its Neighbours in a Globalized World ((EUNGW,volume 4))

Abstract

This chapter focuses on the EU’s evolving approach to extraterritoriality in the light of the changing face of global cartel enforcement. The fast few decades have witnessed a remarkable proliferation of authorities actively and effectively pursuing international cartel conduct. This results in concurrent jurisdiction, parallel investigations and multiple fines being imposed for the same overall conduct. The increasingly crowded enforcement community arguably calls for greater self-restraint and enhanced international coordination. But this is inconsistent with the continuing trend of expanding the European Commission’s jurisdictional reach over foreign conduct. And while the Commission makes serious efforts to coordinate its investigations with other authorities, attempts to genuinely coordinate the punishment of international cartel violations are still in their infancy. There are certainly many challenges to overcome in this regard. Still, it would be unsustainable to continue to stretch the ‘long arm’ of the Commission and to continue to maintain an isolated and unilateral perspective on sanctioning, while ignoring the growingly mature enforcement regimes existing around the world.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Huizing (2020a), p. 102.

  2. 2.

    Ibid.

  3. 3.

    Connor (2016), p. 6. International cartels in this context refer to cartels of which the membership composition is international.

  4. 4.

    See also Connor (2015).

  5. 5.

    See also Capobianco et al. (2016).

  6. 6.

    Huizing (2020a), pp. 101–102.

  7. 7.

    ICN (2008), p. 44; ICN (2017), p. 57.

  8. 8.

    Not adjusted for Court judgments. See https://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/statistics/statistics.pdf.

  9. 9.

    Subject-matter jurisdiction can be distinguished from enforcement jurisdiction. Subject-matter jurisdiction concerns the application of a state’s own laws, whereas enforcement jurisdiction concerns the ability to take measures in order to enforce these laws. This chapter will focus on the former.

  10. 10.

    In particular, they may rely on the active personality (nationality) principle, the passive personality principle, the protective principle or the universality principle. See e.g. Ryngaert (2015).

  11. 11.

    It could be argued that the ‘effects doctrine’ as developed under US antitrust law was not entirely new because it could be linked to the existing objective territoriality principle (also objective application principle), as also recognised in the 1927 Lotus ruling by the Permanent Court of International Justice. See e.g. Raymond (1967), pp. 560–562. Also, it may be argued that the effects doctrine is not in fact ‘extraterritorial’ because it considers the effects within a state’s own territory. Ryngaert (2007), p. 198.

  12. 12.

    Raymond (1967), p. 558.

  13. 13.

    Whish and Bailey (2018), p. 512.

  14. 14.

    See An Introduction to the Extraterritorial Application of the American Antitrust Laws (1969), p. 149.

  15. 15.

    ICPAC (2000), p. 185.

  16. 16.

    Huizing (2018), p. 25.

  17. 17.

    ECJ judgment of 14 July 1972 in case 48/69, Dyestuffs, ECLI:EU:C:1972:70.

  18. 18.

    Dyestuffs, 628-9.

  19. 19.

    Dyestuffs, paras 125–142.

  20. 20.

    The ECJ found this implementation doctrine to be “covered by the territoriality principle as universally recognized in public international law”. ECJ judgment of 27 September 1988 in joined cases 89, 104, 114, 116, 117 and 125 to 129/85, Woodpulp, ECLI:EU:C:1988:447, para 18.

  21. 21.

    ECJ judgment of 6 September 2017 in case C-413/14 Intel, ECLI:EU:C:2017:632, paras 40–47; General Court judgment of 12 June 2014 in case T-286/09, ECLI:EU:T:2014:547, paras 251, 268-271, 280–290. See Huizing (2018).

  22. 22.

    See Opinion of AG Mayras in Dyestuffs, ECLI:EU:C:1972:32; Opinion of AG Darmon in Woodpulp, ECLI:EU:C:1988:258; Opinion of AG Wathelet in InnoLux, ECLI:EU:C:2015:292 and Opinion of AG Wahl in Intel, ECLI:EU:C:2016:788.

  23. 23.

    Opinion of AG Wahl in Intel, ECLI:EU:C:2016:788, para 291.

  24. 24.

    Opinion of AG Mayras, p. 693-694; Opinion of AG Darmon, para 53.

  25. 25.

    Opinion of AG Wathelet in InnoLux, ECLI:EU:C:2015:292, para 42.

  26. 26.

    Opinion of AG Wahl in Intel, ECLI:EU:C:2016:788, para 300.

  27. 27.

    Ibid., para 303.

  28. 28.

    On the potential for conflicts and need for comity in international competition cases more generally, see Ginsburg and Taladay (2017).

  29. 29.

    See the long lists of competition cooperation agreements signed by the European Commission and the DOJ since the mid-1990s, at https://ec.europa.eu/competition/international/bilateral/ and https://www.justice.gov/atr/antitrust-cooperation-agreements.

  30. 30.

    Simultaneous, coordinated inspections occurred for example in the global cartel cases regarding marine hoses, cathode ray tubes, freight forwarders, high voltage power cables, refrigeration compressors, auto parts and maritime car carriers.

  31. 31.

    Huizing (2020b), pp. 76–79.

  32. 32.

    Vestager speech (2015). She noted: “For instance, in 2012 and 2013, we cooperated with non-EU agencies in 62% of our enforcement decisions. And the trend is on the rise.”

  33. 33.

    Commission decision 2001/418/EC in Lysine (Case COMP/36.545/F3), para 311.

  34. 34.

    ECJ judgment of 13 February 1969 in case 14/68, Walt Wilhelm v Bundeskartellamt, ECLI:EU:C:1969:4, para 11.

  35. 35.

    ECJ judgment of 9 July 2015 in Case C-231/14 P, InnoLux, ECLI:EU:C:2015:451, para 75.

  36. 36.

    Commission decision of 9 November 2010 in Air cargo (Case COMP/39258), para 1217.

  37. 37.

    LCD (Case COMP/39.309) Commission Decision C(2010) 8761 final (8 December 2010), para 381.

  38. 38.

    Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 775 F.3d 816, 826 (7th Cir. 2015).

  39. 39.

    See the 2004 Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities.

  40. 40.

    ICN (2008), p. 32; Huizing (2020b), p. 77.

  41. 41.

    See Huizing (2020a), p. 103.

  42. 42.

    One such exception is the judgment of the US District Court in San Francisco in the case against AU Optronics in the TFT-LCD cartel case. The court set the fine at USD 500 million—half the figure requested by the DOJ—inter alia because of the fines that the company had already paid and would still be paying. Transcript of Proceedings, United States v AU Optronics, No 3:09-cr-00110-SI (N.D. Cal. 20 September 2012), 16. Australian courts have also taken into account prior fines imposed elsewhere, e.g. in the Maritime car carriers and Air cargo cartel cases. See Huizing (2020a), p. 106.

  43. 43.

    Article 23(2) of EU Regulation 1/2003.

  44. 44.

    ICN (2017), p. 34; OECD (2016), p. 21.

  45. 45.

    See ECJ judgement in joined cases C-189/02 Dansk Rørindustri A/S and others v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2005:408, para 281.

  46. 46.

    See also Lee (2016), pp. 18–19.

  47. 47.

    In the Belgian Flour cartel case, the Belgian competition authority refrained from imposing additional fines for cartel conduct that was already penalised by the Dutch authority with fines reaching the maximum amount of 10% of a company’s worldwide turnover. The Belgian authority considered that imposing additional fines on these companies would result in these companies being worse off compared to the situation where only one fine was imposed by the European Commission up to the 10% maximum. Decision of the BMA-ABC in case 13-IO-06 Meel (28 February 2013).

  48. 48.

    Wils (2004), para 33.

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    Pieter J. F. Huizing

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    Nuno Cunha Rodrigues

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Huizing, P.J.F. (2021). Extraterritoriality of EU Competition Law and the Changing Face of Global Cartel Enforcement. In: Cunha Rodrigues, N. (eds) Extraterritoriality of EU Economic Law. European Union and its Neighbours in a Globalized World, vol 4. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-82291-0_6

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