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Extraterritoriality in EU Competition Law

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Extraterritoriality of EU Economic Law

Part of the book series: European Union and its Neighbours in a Globalized World ((EUNGW,volume 4))

Abstract

This piece critically analyses extraterritorial application of competition law by the European Union. The EU is a key global player in competition law and policy. Its competition law is actively and assertively applied to foreign activities of foreign entities affecting EU market. In the recent decision in Intel the EU for the first time recognised extraterritoriality two steps removed (‘extraterritoriality v2’), significantly broadening the reach of EU competition laws and setting an international precedent. Getting to this point was a gradual process. It reflected evolving circumstances, changing intra-EU dynamics and setbacks in striving for multilateral governance of international business practices. The EU embraced extraterritoriality out of necessity, not convenience. The rise of the doctrine marks the emergence of a multi-polar governance of transnational anticompetitive conduct, and of the European Union as a key global player in competition law and policy.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Case C-413/14 P, Intel v Commission.

  2. 2.

    Oppenheim et al. (1992), p. 456.

  3. 3.

    The continuing tolerance of export cartels (also in the EU) is the best example of such indulgence at the expense of others. Martyniszyn (2012), p. 181.

  4. 4.

    Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v Westinghouse Elec. Corp., [1978] A.C. 547, 617.

  5. 5.

    Staker (2014), p. 312.

  6. 6.

    Ibid, 331.

  7. 7.

    France v Turkey, Ser. A, No. 10 (PCIJ 1927). For further analsysis see von Bogdandy and Rau (2008).

  8. 8.

    Ibid, 19.

  9. 9.

    Ibid, 23.

  10. 10.

    Ibid, 25.

  11. 11.

    The Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§1-2.

  12. 12.

    United States v Aluminium Company of America (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416 (2nd Cir. 1945).

  13. 13.

    Ibid, 443.

  14. 14.

    Ibid, 444.

  15. 15.

    For example, Thomsen v Cayser, 243 U.S. 66 (1917); United States v Pacific & Arctic Ry & Nav. Co., 228 U.S. 87 (1913); United States v American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911).

  16. 16.

    For a broader political context see Stoller (2019), pp. 130–140.

  17. 17.

    The Clayton Act §4, 15 U.S.C. §15.

  18. 18.

    Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993).

  19. 19.

    15 U.S.C. § 6(a)–the FTAIA: Sections 1 to 7 of this title shall not apply to conduct involving trade or commerce (other than import trade or import commerce) with foreign nations unless:

    1. (1)

      such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect:

      1. (A)

        on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce with foreign nations, or on import trade or import commerce with foreign nations; or

      2. (B)

        on export trade or export commerce with foreign nations, of a person engaged in such trade or commerce in the United States; and

    2. (2)

      such effect gives rise to a claim under the provisions of sections 1 to 7 of this title, other than this section.

    Proviso: If sections 1 to 7 of this title apply to such conduct only because of the operation of paragraph (1)(B), then sections 1 to 7 of this title shall apply to such conduct only for injury to export business in the United States.

  20. 20.

    Fox and Crane (2010), p. 455.

  21. 21.

    For analysis see Martyniszyn (2014), p. 103.

  22. 22.

    For analysis of foreign governments’ protests by means of amicus curiae briefs submitted in US antitrust cases see Martyniszyn (2016), pp. 626–632.

  23. 23.

    See further Martyniszyn (2021).

  24. 24.

    For example, R v Mitsubishi Corp. [2005] 40 C.P.R. (4th) 333 (Can).

  25. 25.

    For example, JFTC, Cease-and-Desist Order and Surcharge Payment Order against Marine Hose Manufacturers (22 February 2008), at http://www.jftc.go.jp/en/pressreleases/yearly-2008/feb/individual_000147.files/2008-Feb-22.pdf. For analysis see Martyniszyn (2017), p. 747.

  26. 26.

    For example, Administrative Proceeding n° 08012.004599/1999-18.

  27. 27.

    For example, Supr. Ct. (24 September 2012), available at https://www.fne.gob.cl/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/secs_xx_2013.pdf.

  28. 28.

    For example, NDRC Decision of 4 January 2013, the LCD Price-Fixing Cartel.

  29. 29.

    For example, Order of the Competition Tribunal Confirming the Settlement Agreement of 4 November 2008, Competition Commission v American Natural Soda Ash Corp (Soda Ash), Case 49/CR/Apr00.

  30. 30.

    EEC Council: Regulation No 17: First Regulation implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty, OJ 13, 21.2.1962, 204–211.

  31. 31.

    Commission Decision of 11 March 1964 (IV/A-00061—Grosfillex-Fillistorf), 64/233/CEE, OJ 58, 9.4.1964, 915-916.

  32. 32.

    ‘… considérant que le seul fait que l'entreprise concédante est située en dehors du marché commun ne fait pas obstacle à l'application de l'article [101] du traité dès lors que l'accord a des effets à l'intérieur du marché commun.’ Commission Decision of 1 June 1964 (IV-A/12.868), 64/344/CEE, OJ 92, 10.6.1964, 1426-27.

  33. 33.

    Case 22/71, Béguelin Import Co. v S.A.G.L. Import Export [1971] ECR 949.

  34. 34.

    Ibid, para 11.

  35. 35.

    Bekanntmachung betreffend die Einfuhr japanischer Erzeugnisse in die Gemeinschaft, auf die der Vertrag von Rom anwendbar ist, OJ C111, 21 November 1972, 13. See also Bulletin of the European Communities, 5(10) 1972, 55–56.

  36. 36.

    Commission Decision of 29 November 1974 relating to proceedings under Article 85 of the Treaty establishing the EEC (IV/27.095 - Franco-Japanese ball- bearings agreement), 74/634/EEC, OJ L343, 21.12.1974, 19–26.

  37. 37.

    ECSC, EEC, EAEC, Fourth Report on Competition Policy (1974 Report), 50–51.

  38. 38.

    European Commission, 69/243/EWG, Decision Relating to a Proceeding Under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty, IV/26 267- Dyestuffs, OJ L195, 11-17 (1969).

  39. 39.

    ‘Die Wettbewerbsregeln des Vertrages finden demnach Anwendung auf alle Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen, die die in Artikel 85 Absatz 1 bezeichneten Auswirkungen innerhalb des Gemeinsamen Marktes haben. Es kommt deshalb nicht darauf an, ob die Unternehmen, die derartige Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen verursachen, ihren Sitz innerhalb oder ausserhalb der Gemeinschaft haben.’

  40. 40.

    Reprinted in Lauterpacht (1967), pp. 58–59.

  41. 41.

    Case 48/69, Opinion of Mr Advocate General Mayras in case Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. v Commission [1972] ECR 619. Original text in French. For English translation see 'Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. v Commission of the European Communities, Opinion of Advocate-General Mayras delivered on 2 May 1972, Case 48/69’, Competition Law in Western Europe and the USA (Kluwer Law International 1976, last updated January 1979, Supplement No. 13) (1988).

  42. 42.

    Ibid, 176–182.

  43. 43.

    Ibid, 190–192.

  44. 44.

    Ibid, 192.

  45. 45.

    Case 48/69, Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. v Commission (Dyestuffs), [1972] ECR 619, paras 125–142.

  46. 46.

    Allen (1974), p. 35, 58.

  47. 47.

    However, even that step did not escape criticism. It was argued that the notion of a unity of a group of companies may be recognised only after jurisdiction over the entities involved has been established. As Schenck noted, the EU was ‘putting the cart of prescriptive authority before the horse of jurisdiction.’ Schenck (1989), p. 495, 509.

  48. 48.

    For example, in Case 6/72, Europemballage Corp and Continental Can Co. Inc. v Commission [1973] ECR 215 and Cases 6-7/73, Commercial Solvents v Commission, [1974] ECR 223.

  49. 49.

    ECSC, EEC, EAEC, Second on Competition Policy (1972 Report), 30-1.

  50. 50.

    ECSC, EEC, EAEC, Sixth on Competition Policy (1976 Report), 37.

  51. 51.

    The European Commission, Eleventh on Competition Policy (1981 Report), 35.

  52. 52.

    Ibid, 36.

  53. 53.

    Frans Andriessen, ‘Antitrust in the International Sphere; Antitrust- an Endangered Species?’ (Address at the American Bar Association's National Institute on Antitrust, Washington, 6 November 1981).

  54. 54.

    Commission Decision of 23 December 1977 relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty (IV/29.176 - Vegetable parchment), 8/252/EEC, OJ L70, 13/3/1978, 54–68.

  55. 55.

    Commission Decision of 12 December 1978 on a proceeding under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty (IV/29.535 - white lead), 79/90/EEC, OJ L 21, 30.1.1979, 16–24.

  56. 56.

    Ibid, para 32.

  57. 57.

    European Commission, 85/206/EEC, Decision of 19 December 1984, IV/26.870- Aluminium Imports from Eastern Europe (Aluminium imports), OJ L 92, 1 (1985).

  58. 58.

    Ibid, 14.3, 14.6 and 14.8.

  59. 59.

    1984 Report, 59.

  60. 60.

    European Commission, 85/202/EEC, Decision Relating to a Proceeding Under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty, IV/29.725- Wood Pulp, OJ L85, 1-52 (1984), 83.

  61. 61.

    Ibid, 79.

  62. 62.

    Joined Cases 89, 104, 114, 116, 117 and 125 to 129/85, Opinion of Mr Advocate General Darmon in case A Ahlström Osakeyhtiö and others v. Commission (Wood Pulp), [1988] ECR 5193, 53.

  63. 63.

    Ibid, 27.

  64. 64.

    Ibid, 63.

  65. 65.

    Ibid, 12.

  66. 66.

    Ibid, 13.

  67. 67.

    Ibid, 16.

  68. 68.

    Ibid, 18.

  69. 69.

    Ibid, 24–28.

  70. 70.

    See, in particular, Timberlane Lumber Co. v Bank of America, N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1977) and Mannington Mills, Inc. v Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3rd Cir. 1979).

  71. 71.

    European Commission, 89/190/EEC, Decision of 21 December 1988 Relating to a Proceeding Pursuant to Article 85 of the EEC Treaty, IV/31.865- PVC, OJ L74, 1–20 (1989).

  72. 72.

    European Commission, 94/601/EC, Decision of 13 July 1994 Relating to a Proceeding under Article 85 of the EC Treaty, IV/C/33.833- Cartonboard, OJ L 243, 1–78 (1994).

  73. 73.

    Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the Control of Concentrations between Undertakings (the Old Merger Regulation), OJ 1989 L 395, 1-12, corrigenda OJ 1990 L 257, 13.

  74. 74.

    The 10th recital in the preamble of the Merger Regulation: ‘A concentration with a Community dimension should be deemed to exist where the aggregate turnover of the undertakings concerned exceeds given thresholds; that is the case irrespective of whether or not the undertakings effecting the concentration have their seat or their principal fields of activity in the Community, provided they have substantial operations there.’ Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the Control of Concentrations between Undertakings (the Merger Regulation) OJ L 24, 1-22. The Old Merger Regulation followed the same approach.

  75. 75.

    Brittan (1991), p. 33.

  76. 76.

    Idem, 43.

  77. 77.

    European Commission, Decision of 30 June 1993 Declaring a Concentration to be Compatible with the Common Market according to Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89, IV/M.346 - JCSAT/SAJAC, OJ C219, 14.

  78. 78.

    Case T-102/96, Gencor Ltd v Commission [1999] ECR II-753.

  79. 79.

    European Commission, 97/26/EC, Decision Declaring a Concentration to be Incompatible with the Common Market and the Functioning of the EEA Agreement, IV/M.619- Gencor, OJ L11, 30-72 (1996). Note, Gencor was dealt with under the Old Merger Regulation.

  80. 80.

    Gencor (n 77), 62.

  81. 81.

    Ibid, 90–100.

  82. 82.

    Ibid, 87.

  83. 83.

    European Commission, IP/10/45, Commission opens formal proceedings concerning iron ore production joint venture between BHP Billiton and Rio Tint (25 January 2010).

  84. 84.

    For the case analysis see Bellis (2016).

  85. 85.

    European Commission, Decision of 24 January 2007, Relating to a Proceeding under Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement, Case COMP/F/38.899—Gas Insulated Switchgear (2012).

  86. 86.

    European Commission, Decision of 8 December 2010 Relating to a Proceeding under Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement, COMP/39.309- LCD- Liquid Crystal Displays (2010), 314–319.

  87. 87.

    Ibid, 236–237.

  88. 88.

    Ibid, 238.

  89. 89.

    Case T-94/11, AU Optronics v Commission, OJ C120, 14.

  90. 90.

    Intel v Commission (n 1).

  91. 91.

    The Commission’s jurisdiction over Gazprom (in relation to investigation of its possible abuse of dominance in the EU), in an investigation launched in 2012, was also initially questioned. The case was settled by means of commitments. However, the initial jurisdictional protest was most likely groundless given Gazprom’s presence and its business conduct in the EU. Hence, Intel remains the first proper unilateral conduct case. For more about Gazprom see Martyniszyn (2015a), p. 291.

  92. 92.

    European Commission, Decision of 13 May 2009 Relating to a Proceeding under Article 82 of the EC Treaty and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement, COMP/C-3/37.990- Intel (2009).

  93. 93.

    Case T-286/09, Intel Corp v Commission, paras 221–228.

  94. 94.

    Ibid, 236, 244.

  95. 95.

    Ibid, 251.

  96. 96.

    Ibid, 250 et seq.

  97. 97.

    Ibid, 303–307.

  98. 98.

    In AG Wahl’s view under such an approach ‘almost any conduct—no matter how remotely related to the EU territory—could be construed as falling under the Commission’s jurisdiction’. Case C-413/14 P, Opinion of Advocate General Wahl in case Intel v Commission, 312.

  99. 99.

    Ibid, 319–320.

  100. 100.

    Ibid, 322.

  101. 101.

    Intel v Commission (n 1), 45.

  102. 102.

    Ibid, 56.

  103. 103.

    Ibid, 57.

  104. 104.

    For an outline of the EU merger review system see notes 72-76 above and accompanying text.

  105. 105.

    Brittan (1991), p. 44.

  106. 106.

    Idem, 44.

  107. 107.

    S. Pearlstein and A. Swardson, ‘U.S. Gets Tough to Ensure Boeing, McDonnell Merger’, The Washington Post, 17 July 1997; Tom Buerkle, ‘Clinton Warns EU Of Trade Conflict Over Boeing Deal’, International Herald Tribune, 18 July 1997.

  108. 108.

    Edmund L. Andrews, ‘Minister of Objection Nettles Washington’, The New York Times, 21 May 1997.

  109. 109.

    European Commission, IP/97/729, The Commission Clears the Merger between Boeing and McDonnell Douglas under Conditions and Obligations (30 July 1997).

  110. 110.

    European Commission, 97/816/EC, Decision Declaring a Concentration to be Compatible with the Common Market and the Functioning of the EEA Agreement, IV/M.877- Boeing/McDonnell-Douglas, OJ L336, 16-47 (1997).

  111. 111.

    European Commission, 2004/134/EC, Decision Declaring a Concentration to be Incompatible with the Common Market and the Functioning of the EEA Agreement, COMP/M.2220- General Electric/Honeywell, OJ L48, 1-85 (2001).

  112. 112.

    ‘Welch squelched’, The Economist, 21 June 2001; ‘Engine failure’, The Economist, 5 July 2001.

  113. 113.

    Case T-210/01, General Electric Co. v Commission [1999] ECR II-753.

  114. 114.

    Wilke (2001).

  115. 115.

    Lambro (2001).

  116. 116.

    Wilke (2001).

  117. 117.

    Deborah P. Majoras, ‘Merger Enforcement at the Antitrust Division’ (Address at the Mergers and Acquisitions Forum, KPMG/Chicago Graduate School of Business, 27 September 2002).

  118. 118.

    OECD, Working Party No. 3 on Co-operation and Enforcement: Roundtable on the Extraterritorial Reach of Competition Remedies—Note by the European Union, DAF/COMP/WP3/WD(2017)35 (30 November 2017), 12.

  119. 119.

    OECD, Working Party No. 3 on Co-operation and Enforcement: Roundtable on the Extraterritorial Reach of Competition Remedies—Note by the European Union, DAF/COMP/WP3/WD(2017)35 (30 November 2017), 19.

  120. 120.

    See, for example, The European Commission, XXIInd Report on Competition Policy 1992, 114.

  121. 121.

    These were J Drexl (DE), W Fikentscher (DE), E Fox (US), A Fuchs (DE), A Heinemann (DE), U Immenga (DE), HP Kunz-Hallstein (DE), EU Petersmann (DE), WR Schluep (CH), A Shoda (JP), S Sołtysiński (PL), LA Sullivan (US).

  122. 122.

    See appended to Gifford (1997), p. 1. For a reflection on DIAC and a critique by one of the drafters see Fikentscher (1996), p. 533.

  123. 123.

    European Commission, Competition Policy in the New Trade Order: Strengthening International Cooperation and Rules. Report of the Group of Experts, COM(95) 359 final (12 July 1995).

  124. 124.

    Ibid, 10.

  125. 125.

    Ibid, 12.

  126. 126.

    Ibid, 14.

  127. 127.

    Ibid, 16.

  128. 128.

    European Commission, Towards an International Framework of Competition Rules. Communication from the Commission to the Council, COM(96) 284 final (18 June 1996).

  129. 129.

    Ibid, 10 et seq.

  130. 130.

    Ibid, 14.

  131. 131.

    Singapore Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(96)/DEC (13 December 1996), available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min96_e/wtodec_e.htm, point 20.

  132. 132.

    WTO Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy, Communication from the European Community and its Member States, WT/WGTCP/W/1 (11 June 1997).

  133. 133.

    Karel Van Miert, ‘Globalization of Competition: The Need for Global Governance’ (Speech at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel, 25 March 1998).

  134. 134.

    See discussion in Maher (2012).

  135. 135.

    Decision Adopted by the General Council on 1 August 2004, WT/l/579.

  136. 136.

    In negotiation theory BATNA stands for best alternative to a negotiated agreement.

  137. 137.

    Pons (2002), p. 12.

  138. 138.

    See, for example, ICN Factsheet and Key Messages, available at https://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Factsheet2009.pdf.

  139. 139.

    These are agreements with: Brazil (2009), Canada (1999), China (2012), India (2013), Japan (2003), Korea (2009), Mexico (2018), Russia (2011), South Africa (2016), Switzerland (2014), United States (1991, 1995 & 1999). See the listing of ‘Bilateral relations on competition issues’ available at https://ec.europa.eu/competition/international/bilateral/#s.

  140. 140.

    It was invoked in the Sabre-Amadeu case. US Department of Justice, ‘Justice Department asks European Communities to investigate possible anticompetitive conduct affecting U.S. airlines’ computer reservation systems’, 28 April 1997. As James Rill put it ‘the pace of action … suggest[s] that the formal process will not produce results living up to early expectations … formal positive comity is not a fully effective mechanism’. Rill (2011).

  141. 141.

    For further analysis see Martyniszyn (2015b), p. 11.

  142. 142.

    Pons (2002), p. 3.

  143. 143.

    Brittan (1991), p. 19.

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  1. Queen’s University Belfast, Belfast, UK

    Marek Martyniszyn

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Martyniszyn, M. (2021). Extraterritoriality in EU Competition Law. In: Cunha Rodrigues, N. (eds) Extraterritoriality of EU Economic Law. European Union and its Neighbours in a Globalized World, vol 4. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-82291-0_3

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