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Market Equilibrium Models in Large-Scale Internet Markets

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Innovative Technology at the Interface of Finance and Operations

Part of the book series: Springer Series in Supply Chain Management ((SSSCM,volume 13))

Abstract

Markets and their corresponding equilibrium concepts have traditionally been used as very powerful building blocks to find allocations and prices. This chapter provides examples of the use of Fisher markets in the technology industry. We focus on Internet advertising auctions, fair division problems, content recommendation systems, and robust abstractions of large-scale markets. After introducing these markets, we describe how these models fit the relevant application domains and what insights they can generate, exhibiting the most important theoretical and computational results from the recent literature on these topics.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    In this case with continuous distributions, the probability of ties is zero.

  2. 2.

    See also Murray et al. (2020b).

  3. 3.

    Every optimal solution to EG must lie in this set, assuming that every good j has some i such that v ij > 0; if this does not hold then that good can simply be preprocessed away.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Columbia University, New York, NY, USA

    Christian Kroer

  2. Facebook Core Data Science, Menlo Park, CA, USA

    Nicolas E. Stier-Moses

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  1. Christian Kroer
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  2. Nicolas E. Stier-Moses
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Correspondence to Christian Kroer .

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  1. Washington, DC, USA

    Volodymyr Babich

  2. Chicago, IL, USA

    John R. Birge

  3. Washington, DC, USA

    Gilles Hilary

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Kroer, C., Stier-Moses, N.E. (2022). Market Equilibrium Models in Large-Scale Internet Markets. In: Babich, V., Birge, J.R., Hilary, G. (eds) Innovative Technology at the Interface of Finance and Operations. Springer Series in Supply Chain Management, vol 13. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-81945-3_7

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