Abstract
The relationship between national regulatory agencies (NRAs) and national competition agencies (NCAs) plays an important role in terms of having a harmonized enforcement and an effective free market economy. Accordingly, this chapter focuses on the interaction between NRAs and NCAs, while setting out the structural and practical distinctions between their respective regulatory functions. Along these lines, we also distinguish the technical regulations from the competition regulations and discuss the risk of double sanctioning, as well as exploitation of jurisdictional overlaps via forum shopping. In an effort to address these issues, we evaluate the efficiency of three essential methods: (i) legislative rules, (ii) bilateral cooperation protocols, and (iii) judicial review. Additionally, this chapter assesses the filtering method as an alternative for allocating the regulatory duties. In essence, this method provides that if the sector-specific regulation is capable of remedying the competition law failures in the market, the competition authorities may not engage in such failure. That said, if the behavior in question violates both the sectoral regulation and the competition regulation, but the sectoral regulation is not sufficient to remedy the antitrust concerns, then both authorities may engage with the issue based on their own legislations.
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Notes
- 1.
Refer to the TCA’s decision dated August 8, 2018 and numbered 18-27/461-224.
- 2.
For detailed information, please see https://www.btk.gov.tr/uploads/pages/elektronik-haberlesme-sektorunde-pazar-analizleri/btk-rk-protokol-22012015.pdf (last accessed August 9, 2020).
- 3.
Under Turkish law, NCA and the NRAs are considered to be part of the governmental administration. Accordingly, the related parties are entitled to challenge such decisions before the Administrative Courts of First Instance (and subsequently the Regional Administrative Court and the Council of State). Hence, judicial review of administrative decisions is among the most prominent sources of guidance for how to interpret the rules and allocate the regulation duties.
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Ardıyok, Ş., Canbeyli, A. (2021). Relationship Between Competition Law and Sector-Specific Regulations. In: Eroğlu, M., Finger, M. (eds) The Regulation of Turkish Network Industries. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-81720-6_24
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