Keywords

Introduction

This paper aims to explore how practices of remittances have been used as a form of political activism by the transnational Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora broadly, and the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora in Switzerland (henceforth referred to as ‘the Tamil Swiss diaspora’) specifically. It explores these practices within the context of the Sri Lankan civil war (1983–2009) and post-war period (2010 to present) to analyse how remittance practices change with the second-generation Tamil Swiss diaspora. It aims to answer the following research questions: In what ways have the Tamil Swiss diaspora used political remittances? And what intergenerational changes, from the first to the second generation, can we observe?

The paper is structured as follows. Firstly, it will provide an overview of the method and framework and introduce key concepts to the reader. Then, it will introduce the transnational Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora and the politicization of remittances, to be followed with an outline of the Tamil Swiss diaspora. Further, it will provide some empirical reflection on the second-generation Tamil Swiss diaspora and on how they are engaging in post-war political activism. Finally, it will share some concluding remarks.

Methodology

This chapter is predominantly based on data collected as part of a post-doctoral research project on the role of the transnational Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora in Peacebuilding and Development with the University of Zurich and, to a lesser extent, on data collected during PhD research on the role of local economic actors in peacebuilding in Sri Lanka with the University of Basel (Alluri 2014). The research approach is qualitative and relied on analysing and interpreting academic, policy and organizational documents, social media sources and interview material.

The bulk of the empirical data is based on qualitative semi-structured interviews that were carried out face-to-face in Switzerland from April 2017 to January 2019 as part of my post-doctoral research. A small number of interviews were carried out via Skype and telephone with persons based in Germany, India, Italy, Sri Lanka and the UK. Interviews were also conducted with representatives from the Tamil Swiss diaspora and abroad, Tamil diaspora organizations, Swiss and international governmental and non-governmental organizations working on Sri Lanka, diaspora and migration issues. Twelve (five male and seven female) interview partners between 27 and 38 years old belong to the second-generation Tamil Swiss diaspora. For the purpose of this chapter, second-generation Tamil diaspora are understood as comprising of youth who were either born in Switzerland or came to Switzerland in the 1990s when they were under the age of 13. All of the second-generation interviewees were predominantly raised in the Swiss German-speaking part of Switzerland, where the majority of Tamils reside.

Theoretical Concepts

Transnationalism

Transnationalism can be conceptualized as the interconnected linkages between home and host land that reflect the alternating relations of migrants (Glick-Schiller, et al. 1992). Transnationalism includes the ways in which migrants establish bonds and durable ties that span across countries to capture ideas of community, social formations such as cross-border active networks, groups and organizations (Faist 2008). It further includes the movement and practices of migrants, the migratory flows of commodities, capital and resources, questions related to nation-states, physical borders as well as spaces of transnational citizenship and belonging (Leitner and Ehrkamp 2006).

When looking at transnational diaspora, there are “the multiple ties and interactions linking people or institutions across the borders of nation states” (Vertovec 1999b, p. 447). However, while it appears that “politics has been unlinked from territory”, locality remains important: “much of the new transnational politics is intensely focused on specific locations, identities and issues. Politics remains fundamentally about local, parochial issues even while political processes are increasingly transnational” (Lyons 2007, p. 530). Transnationalism may include formal forms of engagement such as electoral politics or also other forms of collective action such as cross-border political organizations (Chaudhary and Moss 2016). It may include non-institutional activities such as political protest, demonstrations or social media campaigns or activities that aim to sustain linkages to the politics of the homeland (Lyons 2007). Transnational processes are also very much centred in the home environment and used to connote everyday practices and life experiences of migrants engaged within various activities (Bloch and Hirsch 2018).

Conflict-generated Diaspora and Translocal Communities

Diaspora communities are more than just ‘war mongers’ or ‘peacemakers’ (Smith and Stares 2007). They manifest their politics of belonging through international networks and events, political action and online spaces that comprise social relationships, a tension of political orientations and economic strategies. The diaspora engages in these domains via “a ‘triadic relationship’ between a) globally dispersed yet collectively self-identified ethnic groups [the transnational], (b) the territorial states and contexts where such groups reside [hostland], and (c) the homeland states and contexts whence they or their forebears came [homeland]” (Vertovec 1999a, p. 5, insertion and emphasis by Alluri).

In particular, ‘conflict-generated diasporas’ that have been forcibly displaced and detached from their homeland territory as a result of violent conflict tend to have an amplified symbolic attachment and thus shared identity that is linked to the politics of belonging to their homeland (Lyons 2007). Here, conflict-generated diaspora are composed of “networks of those forced across borders by conflict or repression [who] commonly have a specific set of traumatic memories and hence retain symbolic ties to the homeland” (Adamson 2005). In order to maintain these ties and establish a politics of belonging, conflict-affected diaspora create ‘translocal’ networks of social relations they sustain across locations networks in their host land (Lyons 2007). The diaspora creates symbolic and imagined communities through forming local households, kin networks, elite fractions, religious communities, language schools, cultural centres and other social clubs and associations to celebrate ethno-religious holidays or to mark other important dates (Smith and Guarnizo 1998, p. 7). These are seen as common processes of identity formation, community formation and integration support (Lyons 2007, pp. 532–533). The creation of de-territorialized ‘translocal’ communities (Appadurai 1996) helps to ensure an ongoing relationship with (an often mythical) homeland, hostland and transnational spaces. These communities become sites not only of refuge or collective engagement within the group, but also as sites of political mobilization, activism and the creation of organizations that contribute to social change and political transformation. Through translocal place making and identity formation, the diasporas are “holding together both de-territorialization and re-territorialization” (Carter 2005, p. 61) as they are in constant motion, evolution and fluidity.

Political Remittances

Conflict-generated diaspora engage in different forms of transnational practices in order to maintain ties to their homeland. Diaspora engagement can include individual and collective aspects, through both financial and human capital and through voluntary or for-profit activities (Erdal and Horst 2010). This chapter focuses on how remittances have become a transnational practice that is bound with an intrinsic desire to maintain not only economic and social but also political ties to the homeland. Diaspora may send remittances in the form of money, goods, services and knowledge contributions but they also contribute by political mobilization such as political rallies, voting practices, social organizations or fundraising events that are closely linked with an orientation and identification that motivates them (Vélez-Torres and Agergaard 2014). Political remittances can encompass both political mobilization and supporting religious organizations and sites (Baumann 2010; Hollenbach et al. 2020). They are an “act of transferring political principles, vocabulary and practices between two or more places, which migrants and their descendants share a connection with. Political remittances […] influence political behaviour, mobilization, organization and narratives of belonging in places of destination and origin” (Krawatzek and Müller-Funk 2019, p. 1004).

Second-generation Diaspora

The second generation of the conflict-generated diaspora establishes multiple ‘ways of belonging’ (Levitt and Glick-Schiller 2004) through different forms of transnational and translocal engagement. They create an ‘interculturality’ of identities (Burgio 2016) that are connected to the political and cultural aspirations of the homeland, the symbolic and material ties in their hostland as well as to the globally dispersed yet collectively self-identified transnational communities (Burgio 2016. pp. 107–113; Vertovec 1999a, p. 5). Some studies on second-generation diaspora show that they tend to have weaker ties to the homeland and tend to remit less than the first generation (Bloch and Hirsch 2018). Rather, they engage in translocal activities that may include fundraising, donations to religious or local organizations, or to the family pool of remittances (Hammond 2013; see also Erdal in this volume). Class and region-based inequalities amongst diaspora groups impact not only the way in which they can engage in transnational activities such as remittances but also impact their ability to travel back to the homeland (Viruell-Fuentes 2006). Further, the ability of the second generation to travel back to the homeland plays an important role in influencing the way in which they construct their linguistic, cultural and ethnic identities and their sense of belonging in the homeland (Viruell-Fuentes 2006). However, Barber (2017) argues that homeland visits can also have the opposite effect on the second generation, as they may feel alienated should there be stark differences in wealth, culture and linguistic connections. This could have a direct effect on their motivation to send remittances to family members who they feel close or distant to. Finally, the connection to homeland politics also has an impact on how the second generation approach political remittances and whether they direct these engagements to the homeland, hostland or transnational communities.

The Civil War, Transnational Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora and Political Remittances

The Sri Lankan civil war (1983–2009) between the Government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was a violent, protracted and multi-faceted conflict that lasted 26 years. Following anti-Tamil pogroms in 1983 and numerous clashes between different Tamil militant groups in the 1980s, the LTTE emerged as the dominant protagonist or the self-proclaimed ‘sole representative’ of the Tamil nation in 1987, demanding self-governance for the country’s Tamils in a separate state in the North and East (Nadarajah and Vimalarajah 2008, pp. 7–9). The civil war is understood as a “grievance-driven ethnopolitical conflict” (Palmer 2005, p. 3) that relied on an organized system of external financing, particularly through diaspora remittances, taxations and illicit activities to maintain its military undertakings (Alluri 2014). After numerous failed attempts of mediated peace processes, the Sri Lankan civil war ended militarily when the Government of Sri Lanka defeated the LTTE in April 2009.

The Sri Lankan civil war led to the large emigration of (predominantly) Tamils particularly to Europe, North America and Australia. The transnational Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora is highly diverse, sometimes fragmented and conflictive, then collaborative and community-oriented and other times still, passive, apolitical or indifferent. In this vein, different parts of the diaspora community have played pivotal roles in Sri Lanka’s political life. An estimation of the size of the Tamil diaspora is over one million, or about one quarter of the entire Sri Lankan Tamil population (International Crisis Group 2010, pp. 1–4). The Tamil diaspora are as heterogeneous as the society within the country and can often be categorized based on their date of arrival, length of stay and legal status in their host countries, gender, caste, region, socio-economic standing and political orientation. However, there is still an important element of collective identity or ‘global Tamilness’ that is “linked to a de-territorialized diaspora that is cemented and constantly recreated through artefacts, popular culture, and a shared imagery” (Cohen 2008, pp. 6–8).

While there are many factions within the Tamil diaspora which were avidly against the war and highly critical of the LTTE (Vimalarajah and Cheran 2010), there were other influential groups that have been categorized through their strong economic, political and social support of the LTTE throughout the war as “‘externally situated internal actors’ […] who acted as an extension of the Tamil aspiration for self-determination within the country, provided a financial support base, facilitated critique of the Government of Sri Lanka and impacted foreign policy towards Sri Lanka from within their ‘host countries’” (Hettiarachchi 2011, p. 4). This came predominantly in the forms of: global communication and information exchange; awareness raising and political lobbying, and; lawful as well as illegal fundraising that directly supported the perpetuation of conflict (Amarasingham 2013; Wayland 2004). This chapter focuses on the factions of the Tamil diaspora who have actively engaged in political remittances through, for example, their financial support of the LTTE, their participation in transnational networks and organizations that fight for the cause of Tamil Eelam, through raising awareness on Tamil issues in their hostland or sending money to their families in Sri Lanka.

Significant research has been carried out on the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora and their use of political mobilization in the hostland to engage in homeland politics in Sri Lanka. Specific research has looked at the larger diaspora communities in the UK (approximately 100,000) (Bloch and Hirsch 2018; Hettiarachchi 2011; Thangarajah and Holdaway 2011; Van Hear et al. 2004; Vimalarajah and Cheran 2010) and Canada (approximately 400,000 Tamils) (Amarasingham 2013; Thurairajah 2017). Considerably less research has been carried out in Switzerland with the exception of a few (Hess and Korf 2014; Lüthi 2005; McDowell 1996; Stürzinger 2002; Thurairajah 2015; Thurairajah et al. 2020).

Political Remittances During the Civil War (1983–2009)

The role of the Tamil diaspora amidst the Sri Lankan civil war has always been complex. From afar, they often bore witness to atrocities taking place in their homeland in Sri Lanka at the hands of the Government of Sri Lanka as well as the LTTE. This led to the harbouring of deep-seated resentment towards one or both conflict parties as they found themselves helpless at a distance (International Crisis Group 2010). During the war, the LTTE was able to appeal to Tamils as a ‘victim diaspora’ that had a collective sense of trauma as linked to their common territory, forced migration, persecution and exile, as well as a sense of guilt for leaving the country while others were left behind (McDowell 1996, p. 12). The common and specific set of traumas and the symbolic ties to the homeland enabled the LTTE to gain significant political, financial and social support from the diaspora.

One way in which the Tamil diaspora was able to stay engaged was through financial support such as remittances. Family and friends that were left behind shared accounts of the situation on the ground with the diaspora abroad. Much of the diaspora sent money home to Sri Lanka, either in the form of financial support for their friends and family, through payments to organizations and charities based in the country, or in some cases directly to the LTTE to support their fight for Tamil Eelam (Chalk 2008). In the absence of natural resources, the LTTE created a war economy that relied on diaspora remittances and contributions (allegedly forced), ‘taxation’ and illicit activities to help finance the war effort. The LTTE established overseas branches and campaigns through business networks, systematic fundraising and arms procurement, often using an informal money transfer system (International Crisis Group 2010). They also permeated diaspora organizations and institutions such as Tamil language schools, community groups, temple management committees and social and cultural organizations. In this way, the LTTE created their own informal war economy that helped ensure they were able to maintain the costs of their war effort against the state (Alluri 2014, p. 290). The LTTE used its finances for military purposes, to support the families of its supporters and to engage in income generation projects in areas under its control (Weiss Fagen and Bump 2006). This contributed to a historical politicization of remittances (International Crisis Group 2010) that was intrinsically linked to the war economy and the armed struggle for a ‘Tamil homeland’ (Alluri 2014, p. 292). The LTTE used the diaspora (both willingly and through coercion) as a tool to remit financial, ideological and logistical contributions for its insurgency (Chalk 2008; Wayland 2004). Thus, the diaspora has historically used political remittances to maintain political, social and personal ties to the homeland and to have an impact on political processes and activities. In this case, the Tamil diaspora’s remittances had a direct effect on the continuation of the civil war. Diaspora organizations, fundraising events and front companies and organizations were set up worldwide to help facilitate remittances and fundraising for the LTTE (Amarasingham 2013, pp. 10–20; Vimalarajah et al., 2011). In 2009, the diaspora were remitting approximately USD 2.8 billion, one of the largest sources of foreign exchange (International Crisis Group 2010, p. 5).

In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, and the subsequent naming of the LTTE as a terrorist organization, fundraising and remittances from diaspora communities in countries such as the United States, United Kingdom, Canada and Switzerland became much more challenging as investigations and raids of LTTE front organizations persisted (Amarasingham 2013; Crinari 2019). As the diaspora became increasingly criticized as the financiers of the LTTE and thus supporters of a separatist state, a deep-rooted mistrust between the Government of Sri Lanka and the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora was harboured that continues until today.

Transformation of Remittance Practices: The Tamil Diaspora after the Civil War

With the military defeat of the LTTE and subsequent end of the civil war in April 2009, the role and relationships of the Tamil diaspora significantly changed (Amarasingham 2013); however, the deep-seated mistrust between the Government of Sri Lanka and the Tamil diaspora persisted. While some efforts have been made to reconcile these differences by some politicians, the term ‘diaspora’, particularly when linked to the Tamil diaspora, has become somewhat of a pejorative term. This has led to the strategic use of a more ethnically inclusive and investment-oriented term, Overseas Sri Lankans (OSLs) when trying to support diaspora engagement in Sri Lanka (International Alert 2016).

The defeat of the ‘old guard’ of pro-LTTE activists and LTTE cadres working within the Tamil diaspora (Brun and Van Hear 2012) led to a new and different approach to diaspora politics (Amarasingham 2013), particularly through the creation of global diaspora initiatives to fill the political vacuum that the LTTE left in order to continue to advocate for issues related to human and cultural rights of Tamils (Guyot 2017). In particular, groups such as the Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam (TGTE) and the Global Tamil Forum (GTF) were formed with different goals to support the Tamil cause. But these organizations tend to reflect some of the ongoing cleavages and fragmentation within the diaspora itself as they pit themselves against one another instead of finding unity of purpose (ibid.). Despite their different approaches, the establishment of a separatist state of Tamil Eelam (Hess and Korf 2014; Vimalarajah and Cheran 2010) and a fight for minority rights issues in Sri Lanka (Thangarajah and Holdaway 2011) tend to be the main goals of these initiatives. While some of these initiatives raised awareness on the Tamil plight in the hostland (such as Canada, Switzerland, UK, Australia, etc.) and on a global scale, and succeeded in creating linkages to Tamil political parties in Sri Lanka, these have not been translated into more political rights of Tamils in Sri Lanka itself. The post-war context appears to have, in some ways, contributed to wider divides between the politically active within the diaspora itself. Amidst these changing political leanings, the second-generation Tamil diaspora have been perceived as a potential force for change in Tamil political activism, while still appearing as a sort of an interesting enigma to researchers (Brun and Van Hear 2012; Hess and Korf 2014; Vimalarajah and Cheran 2010).

The Tamil Swiss Diaspora

The emergence of a Tamil Swiss diaspora is based on several waves of migration, with a first wave coming with the outbreak of widespread violence in the 1980s. These were migrants predominantly from more educated and upper caste groups who were able to access economic opportunities and achieve some form of renewable residence (McDowell 1996, pp. 227). Many European countries during the 1980s allowed a large number of Sri Lankan Tamils to enter the country without obtaining a visa (Thangarajah and Holdaway 2011, p. 6). The largest wave came during the early 1990s as a reaction to the civil war and mostly comprised asylum seekers and political refugees who were less educated, less able to integrate into the Swiss economy and faced the risk of repatriation to Sri Lanka (McDowell 1996, p. 227). Moreover, these asylum seekers were identified as predominantly single young men who had been deeply affected by the war and were particularly keen to support the LTTE’s campaigns and activities in Switzerland (McDowell 1996, p. 254). A third but significantly smaller wave of Sri Lankans came towards the end of the war, and after the war ended, and mostly comprised asylum seekers (swissinfo 2019).

Of the approximately 50,000 Sri Lankans in Switzerland, approximately 17,800 have gained Swiss citizenship and 28,000 have a secure legal stay based on their resident permit status (Swiss Federal Office for Statistics 2018; Baumann 2010). Of this population, about 90–95% of them are Tamil with about 35% having been born in Switzerland. The majority of the Tamil Swiss diaspora are Hindus (87%), some Christians (13%) (McDowell 2005) and a few Muslims (Lüthi 2005). Of the first generation of Tamils who came to Switzerland, 65.5% of them had primary education, while only 17.5% had a secondary education and 17% held an advanced education. This is comparable to the Swiss national education of 19.2% held an advanced and 51.3% a secondary education (Alluri 2020; Bovay 2004; Baumann 2010).

While considerable research has been carried out on the Tamil diaspora in UK and Canada, significantly less research has been conducted in Switzerland. A seminal work is that of McDowell (1996), which remains a key source of in-depth demographic information and Swiss asylum policies until today. Others have provided reflections on their migration demographics, how they are organized, their religious and caste relations and their post-war roles (Gazagne and Sánchez-Cacicedo 2015; Markus 2005; Moret et al. 2007; Stürzinger 2002). Of particular relevance to this study is Hess and Korf (2014) who provided insights into the political activism of the second-generation Tamil Swiss diaspora towards the end of the Sri Lankan civil war. Alluri (2020) has also explored the ‘interculturality’ of identities that exists within the second-generation Tamil Swiss diaspora.

The Tamil Swiss diaspora has been specifically referred to as an ‘asylum diaspora’ that holds a collective sense of persecution, uniqueness and a myth of return. In particular, this group migrated primarily through “chain migration, in which a family member, most often a younger male, makes the initial move overseas, providing the anchor attached to which is the change that pulls in later arrivals of all ages and sexes” (McDowell 1996, p. 12). There were also some who falsely claimed political asylum but who often sought out to come to Switzerland for economic opportunities as ‘immigrant Tamils’ rather than as a result of direct persecution.

In particular, the Tamil Swiss diaspora have been classified as a diaspora group, which were particularly supportive of the LTTE through remittances (Crinari 2019). While there are ultra-nationalists within the Tamil Swiss diaspora community who still aspire for a future independent state of Tamil Eelam, the end of the war and the defeat of the LTTE have opened up space for Tamil Swiss diaspora to redefine their motives and forms of political engagement. In an interview (April 2018), a Swiss government official stated that despite the transnational diaspora’s collective demonstration and movement to create new leadership with the end of the war, apathy, disappointment and in some ways, disillusionment seems to have taken over many diaspora members. Although they used transnational political activism and had a strong financial role throughout the civil war, the diaspora failed in a way to influence global politics, the outcomes of the Sri Lankan civil war and the post-war political transformation.

The Second-generation Tamil Swiss Diaspora and Political Remittances

The first-generation Tamil Swiss diaspora’s engagement in remittances has often been intrinsically linked to issues such as their socio-economic status, religious practices, political ideologies, caste, natal village identities (ur), family histories, historical connections to the LTTE in Sri Lanka and abroad, history of migration and so on (Lüthi 2005; Paramsothy 2018). Over time, other issues such as an aging diaspora, health, access to social services, retirement, old-age homes and so on have also influenced the first generation’s remittance practices, fostering a longing to return to the ‘homeland’ (Gerber and Hungerbühler 2018). While many of these factors still play a role (such as political ideologies, caste, religious practices, historical connections to the LTTE in Sri Lanka and abroad, etc.), they are often manifested differently amongst the second generation.

Diasporic youth, particularly the second generation, forge new multiple identities through their primary socialization process where they have “self-consciously selected, syncretised and elaborated from more than one heritage” (Vertovec 1999b, p. 20). In this way, the second-generation Tamil Swiss diaspora establishes multiple ‘ways of belonging’ (Levitt and Glick-Schiller 2004) or ‘hybrid identities’ (Atputharajah 2016). They become straddled, not only between different identities but also between distinct discourses and practices as they navigate a complex ‘balancing act’ (Alluri 2020). While the second generation have not experienced the same migration scars as the first generation of conflict-generated diaspora, they inherit traumas and develop hybrid identities that may serve as motivation to engage in political issues in a way that their parents did not. This serves as impetus to use their intercultural identities to further social and political issues that not only affect them or their ethnonational identity, but broader diaspora groups (Levitt and Glick-Schiller 2004).

This section explores the politicization of remittances and their intergenerational transformation. Whereas the first generation sent financial remittances to support families and friends, the second generation concentrated on political and social remittances. Thus, for many amongst the second-generation Tamil Swiss diaspora, the sending of remittances has historically been a political act, due to the way in which it was intrinsically linked to the LTTE and the fight for a separatist state; also, it has been a social act in the way in which it linked their family to cultural and religious traditions or community groups.

Due to the way in which remittances have been historically politicized amongst the Tamil diaspora generally and the Tamil Swiss diaspora specifically, this chapter looks at three forms of political remittance practices: a political act, a social act, a personal act. Many of these acts overlap and the lines are often blurry, however, the three forms speak to how the second generation see themselves, their forms of engagement and types of contribution to their translocal and transnational ‘Tamilness’.

Many interviewees expressed that while they had some knowledge of the conflict from their parents and from engagement in Tamil community events, there were several media-heavy events such as the 2004 Tsunami and the final months of the civil war that were triggers for awakening them to their Tamil identity, to the civil war in Sri Lanka and their potential role in political activism (Interview, second-generation Tamil diaspora, April 2018; Interview, second-generation Tamil diaspora, January 2019). Despite the long duration of the civil war, it was the brutality of the final months and the images of civilians bearing the weight of the violence that led to global demonstrations, the creation of transnational spaces and significant participation and political activism of the second-generation Tamil diaspora in homeland politics (Thurairajah 2017; Wayland 2004).

For one interviewee who was usually wary of events in Switzerland that support the LTTE ideology such as the annual Hero Day celebration, he did feel compelled to participate in one large demonstration in Geneva in 2009 that was aimed at raising awareness on the civilian casualties in the civil war (Interview, second-generation Tamil diaspora, April 2018). For others, the visual realization of the human casualties was a pivotal moment in kick-starting a longer engagement in supporting the Tamil cause and a realization that they had a role to play in creating awareness on Tamil rights issues in their host land. Another interviewee stated, “Until 2008, I had no contact with Tamils specifically. […] I felt like a Swiss but I had no voice. In 2008, the past came to present. The civilian casualties in the Vanni hurt me a lot and I started joining diaspora youth and academic groups to bring the background of the struggle up. The emotions and capacity were there” (Interview, second-generation Tamil diaspora, February 2018).

Political Remittance Practices

With the end of the war and the defeat of the LTTE in April 2009, members of the second generation have engaged in political remittances as political acts. This has taken several forms. Firstly, some actively continue to support the political ideals of the LTTE through diasporic nationalism (Anderson 1983)—they call for an independent and sovereign Tamil Eelam in the North and East of the island of Sri Lanka. Their political remittance practices comprise supporting the formation of global diasporic networks and organizations that continue to aspire for the plight of Tamil Eelam (Amarasingham 2013). One nationalist group has issued Tamil Eelam national identity cards for members and use social media, small events and flash mobs to inform youth about political issues and events (Interview, second-generation Tamil diaspora, January 2019b). For these diaspora members, there remains a direct and intimate connection to the homeland of Sri Lanka and to the LTTE ideology as a central point of reference.

Secondly, some engage in political remittances by partnering directly with Sri Lankan human rights organizations and human rights defenders based in Sri Lanka to organize protests and demonstrations on particular issues such as disappearances, harassment and militarized violence. However, this direct engagement in Sri Lankan political protests is the exception, also because it is highly politically sensitive (Interview, Swiss civil society representative, November 2017).

Thirdly, there are those who claim to support Tamil rights but who do not feel connected to LTTE ideologies and are opposed to supporting organizations that continue to fight for a separatist state (Interview, second-generation Tamil diaspora, January 2019a). These rights-based activists focus less on the direct impact on political processes in Sri Lanka and more on creating translocal spaces that raise awareness on Tamil human rights issues within the context of the Swiss host land (Hess and Korf 2014, p. 428). They do this through the creation of Tamil student’s organizations, community organizations, fundraisers and so on as well as by joining Swiss legal, human rights and advocacy organizations that tackle rights more broadly and see the Tamil community as one of many target groups (Interview, second-generation Tamil diaspora, July 2018). Some second-generation diasporas feel connected to human rights issues more broadly and its relevance within the Swiss host land and less connected to the political processes in the homeland of Sri Lanka and the nationalist ideologies of the LTTE. Second-generation diaspora have expressed that although they engage in raising awareness on Tamil rights in Switzerland, they are relatively unaware about the Sri Lankan party politics, and they have no desire to return to the homeland (Lüthi 2005).

Social Remittance Practices

Some second-generation diaspora engage in social acts through spreading ideas, behaviours, identities and social capital (Levitt 1998) in different forms.

Firstly, through collaborating with and fundraising for local organizations in Sri Lanka. This can be linked to different issues such as supporting access to education, building and supporting temples, supporting village associations, access to health and so on (Baumann 2010; Hollenbach et al. 2020).

Secondly, by leading communication and organizing platforms for exchange and events that are held in Switzerland with the aim of raising awareness about issues affecting Tamils in Sri Lanka. These can range from podium discussions with different representatives from government, civil society and the diaspora to photo exhibitions or projects that connect Tamil Swiss communities to counterparts in Sri Lanka (Interview, second-generation Tamil diaspora, January 2019).

Thirdly, through forging transnational co-operations such as organizing visits and trips to Sri Lanka to facilitate exchange and collaborate with local initiatives and organizations, sponsor educational opportunities and raise awareness on particular issues (Interview, second-generation Tamil diaspora, January 2019).

Fourthly, through supporting projects that are linked to issues such as arts, culture and integration within the Tamil community. This can be linked to events that promote Tamil arts and culture, that engage with refugee or state-based organizations that support integration projects or initiatives that focus on inter-cultural exchange between Tamils in Switzerland to those in Sri Lanka (Interview, second-generation Tamil diaspora, March 2018a).

Transformation in Remittances in the Second-generation Tamil Diaspora

Sending financial remittances was a deeply personal act for the first generation of migrants as a direct contribution to the sender’s family’s well-being in Sri Lanka. However, despite engaging in political and social acts of political remittances, with the exception of a few, second-generation interviewees did not send financial remittances back home to Sri Lanka. While the first-generation diaspora was heavily engaged in sending financial remittances to their families in Sri Lanka, the shift of the second generation away from this personal act is likely due to a number of factors.

Firstly, an absence of the close family ties that are associated with remittances (Kasinitz et al. 2008). While the first generation may be financially supportive of their immediate family (parents, siblings) for the second generation these ties are much distant as they are less likely to have had a lot of exposure or close relationships with these family members. Due to the highly volatile situation in Sri Lanka during the civil war, and the continued discrimination of Tamils in the country today, many second generation felt reluctant and unsafe to travel back to their homeland. For those who did travel back to Sri Lanka, many experienced disenchantment, disconnect to their Tamil culture and a feeling of relief when they were “going home to Switzerland” (Interview, second-generation Tamil diaspora, March 2018b). A lack of affinity to their family specifically and the country of Sri Lanka more broadly contributes to less connection and a feeling of responsibility to financially support their family members.

Secondly, the act of sending financial remittances is often linked to a desire to return to the homeland more permanently, particularly for the first generation. While there may exist a curiosity and a desire to see and experience the homeland, none of the second-generation interviewees expressed interest to return ‘home’ to Sri Lanka to settle down. On the contrary, despite being politically engaged within the Tamil Swiss diaspora, involved within translocal community spaces such as temples, integration projects, awareness raising of Tamil culture, the second-generation Tamil Swiss diaspora do not appear to have a desire to return to Sri Lanka. When asked whether returning to Sri Lanka would be an option, one interviewee stated, “No. Because I haven’t grown up there, I don’t know anything about the country” (Interview, second-generation Tamil diaspora, January 2019a).

Thirdly, the end of the civil war in 2009 and opening up of the North and the East gives a perception of an improvement in the safety and security in Tamil areas and relatively better access to the rest of the country and to economic opportunities. Despite the fact that Tamils continue to face structural inequalities and ongoing militarization, there is a perception by some in the second generation that Tamils are now better off since the end of the war and their families now have education and work opportunities that negate the need to rely financially on the diaspora (Interview, second-generation Tamil diaspora, April 2018).

Fourthly, while there are some second generation who continue to send money to their families in Sri Lanka, it is understood more as a form of ‘familial support’ and less like the first generation who felt a reciprocal social obligation to send remittances out of guilt because they left their family behind during the civil war (Interview, second-generation Tamil diaspora, April 2018). As a ‘classic victim diaspora’ (Cohen 2008), factions in the first generation are driven by guilt, nostalgia and deprivation (Vimalarajah and Cheran 2010) to continue their moral, political and social responsibility to support family in the homeland. However, with the second generation, a moral obligation to send remittances back becomes less significant.

Fifthly, despite the end of the war, there is also a historical link between the sending of remittances and the financing of the non-state armed group the LTTE. Therefore, the practice of sending financial remittances has become inherently politicized to the point where second generation may choose to explicitly remit if they feel a political affinity to a particular group or opt out should they want to refrain from being associated with any political group. In the case of Sri Lanka, there is the additional fear that any remittances sent are also indirectly supporting the current Government of Sri Lanka, an act that many in the diaspora are likely to want to avoid.

Sixthly, the act of sending financial remittances home to their extended family is still seen as a practice which is still predominantly led by the first generation. This is also likely due to the working and earning age of the second generation who do not feel that they are in the financial position to send money home. However, the aging group of first generation that are soon going into retirement is likely to affect the relationship to this personal act in the near future (Gerber and Hungerbühler 2018).

We thus see that while the second-generation Tamil diaspora may engage in political and social acts of political remittances, their connection to the personal act of sending money home to family appears to be waning.

Conclusion

The chapter concludes that there is a changing relationship between the second generation and the way in which they engage in political remittances. While the first generation engaged in financial remittances, the second generation participate more in political and social remittances through translocal and transnational political activism and by supporting education and exchange respectively. Similar to other second-generation diasporas, the Tamil Swiss diaspora are searching for ways to “combine home- and host-country values and practices in order to meet competing expectations about gender, generation and community” (Levitt 2009, p. 1227). While there may be an increased interest to engage in issues that connect them with their transnational Tamil heritage, the second-generation Tamil Swiss diaspora appear to feel less of a moral, financial and political responsibility to send financial remittances to the homeland of Sri Lanka. Instead, there is an emphasis on the transnational identity that connects them with other like-minded Sri Lankan Tamils and a translocal identity that connects them to their host land of Switzerland. Due to the way in which remittances have been politicized, and in some ways, manipulated by the LTTE during the civil war, some second generation feel a need to distance themselves from the practice altogether. It will be interesting to see how this may change with the aging of the first-generation Tamil Swiss diaspora and thus potentially a further weakening of familial ties between Sri Lanka and Switzerland. As the financial remittances are not just economic but help create social ties between diaspora and their homeland, the absence of remittances over time is likely to contribute to a gap, or even rift as there is no longer a financial tie that binds them, no longer a sense of responsibility and perhaps no longer a feeling that they are contributing to the further development of their home country.