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Proportionality Test and Constitutional Social Rights

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Proportionality, Balancing, and Rights

Part of the book series: Law and Philosophy Library ((LAPS,volume 136))

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Abstract

The purpose of this article is to make a rational reconstruction of the use of the proportionality test in contexts of judicial adjudication of constitutional social rights. This reconstruction will be developed in two stages. First, I will deal with the question of whether the proportionality test in its variation regarding omission (that is, in cases of positive rights) does or does not exhibit a different structure with respect to its (better known and developed) variation regarding excess (that is, in cases of negative rights). Second, I will describe the rules and forms of argumentation implied in the use of the proportionality test regarding omission, which constitute their respective sub-tests of suitability, necessity and proportionality stricto sensu. Lastly, I will present a brief summary as conclusion.

First published in Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie (2) 2021. I would like to thank to Laura Clérico, Jan Sieckmann and Florencia Leiva for the very helpful comments they have made on a previous version of this chapter. The mistakes the reader may find are exclusively mine.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The term social rights is ambiguous. Therefore, for the purpose of this paper, the expression social rights will be construed in its narrow sense, that is, as the subjective rights of an individual against an addressee to undertake a factual positive act, that is, the provision of goods or the rendering of a service. Cf.: Alexy (1986), p. 454; Arango (2005), pp. 59 and ff.

  2. 2.

    See: Alexy (2007), p. 107; Bernal (2017), p. 497; Clérico (2018), p. 28; Contiades and Fontiadou (2012), p. 661; Gardbaum (2016), p. 228; Klatt (2015), p. 355; Klatt and Meister (2012), p. 85.

  3. 3.

    According to Alchourrón and Buylgin a rational reconstruction is the method by which an inexact and vague concept -which may belong to ordinary discourse or to a preliminary stage in the development of a scientific language- is transformed into an exact or, at least, more exact concept. Alchourrón and Bulygin (2017), p. 29.

  4. 4.

    Alexy (2007), p. 108; Bernal (2017), p. 512; Borowski (2003), p. 162; Clérico (2018), p. 28; Klatt and Meister (2012), p. 88.

  5. 5.

    Alexy (1986), p. 420.

  6. 6.

    Alexy (1986), p. 420. However, it is important to point out that this does not happen in every case. Sometimes a positive right requires a single positive act. This happens when, for example, the right to health can only be satisfied by providing a specific type of medicine or treatment. In this sense, see: Clérico (2001), p. 393; De Fazio (2019), p. 49.

  7. 7.

    Klatt and Meister (2012), p. 88.

  8. 8.

    Even if this idea is not clearly expressed by those authors who support this first conception, it can be inferred as implied. See: Alexy (2007), p. 113. One way or another (and despite the subtleties that distinguish them) this thesis is supported by Bernal, Borowski, Clérico and Klatt and Meister. Bernal (2017), p. 512; Borowski (2003), p. 162; Clérico (2018), p. 28; Klatt and Meister (2012), p. 96.

  9. 9.

    Barak (2012), p. 432.

  10. 10.

    Alexy (1986), p. 101; Clérico (2009), p. 43.

  11. 11.

    Clérico (2009), p. 47.

  12. 12.

    Nino (1989), p. 238.

  13. 13.

    Nino (1989), p. 231. Much the same way, Nino highlights that also normative reasons allow the allocation of causality to positive actions. Thus, for example, the presence of oxygen in the atmosphere is a necessary condition to start a fire. However, it would be absurd for an insurance inspector to report such a fact as the cause of the fire in a factory. Nino (1989), p. 238.

  14. 14.

    On the rules and forms of the objective-teleological and generic arguments, see: Alexy (1978), pp. 291 and 295.

  15. 15.

    Supreme Court of Argentina, Sentences 326:4931, 3°

  16. 16.

    Constitutional Court of Colombia, Sentence T-271/95, 4°.

  17. 17.

    Constitutional Court of South Africa, Case 32/97, 58°.

  18. 18.

    Clérico (2009), p. 50.

  19. 19.

    Clérico (2009), p. 49.

  20. 20.

    Clérico (2009), p. 85.

  21. 21.

    Idem.

  22. 22.

    Clérico (2009), p. 46.

  23. 23.

    Clérico (2009), p. 46.

  24. 24.

    Clérico (2009), p. 59.

  25. 25.

    Idem.

  26. 26.

    Idem.

  27. 27.

    Supreme Court of Argentina (note 15), 1°.

  28. 28.

    Supreme Court of Argentina (note 15), 3°.

  29. 29.

    Supreme Court of Argentina (note 15), 8°.

  30. 30.

    Clérico (2009), p. 101.

  31. 31.

    Clérico (2009), p. 103.

  32. 32.

    Clérico (2009), p. 118.

  33. 33.

    Clérico (2009), p. 111.

  34. 34.

    Clérico (2009), p. 109.

  35. 35.

    Clérico (2009), p. 111.

  36. 36.

    Constitutional Court of Colombia, Sentence T-561/12, 3.1°.

  37. 37.

    Constitutional Court of Colombia (note 36), 4.2°.

  38. 38.

    Alexy (1986), p. 146; Dworkin (1997), p. 43.

  39. 39.

    Alexy (1986), p. 146. The translation belongs to Julian Rivers. See: Alexy (2002), p. 102.

  40. 40.

    Idem.

  41. 41.

    Alexy (2003), p. 443.

  42. 42.

    Zuleta (2018), pp. 22–24.

  43. 43.

    These presumptions have also been called “abstract relative weight”. See: Alexy (2003), p. 440.

  44. 44.

    Alexy (1978), pp. 334 and ff.; MacCormick (1978), p. 73. A similar idea is found in: Dworkin (1997), p. 112.

  45. 45.

    Constitutional Court of Colombia (note 16), 4°.

  46. 46.

    Constitutional Court of Colombia, Sentence T-073/07, 5°.

  47. 47.

    Aleinikoff (1987), p. 948; Tsakyrakis (2009), p. 470.

  48. 48.

    Clérico (2009), p. 214.

  49. 49.

    Clérico (2009), p. 180.

  50. 50.

    Constitutional Court of Colombia (note 16), 14°.

  51. 51.

    Constitutional Court of Colombia (note 16), 4°.

  52. 52.

    Constitutional Court of Colombia (note 16), 9°.

  53. 53.

    Constitutional Court of Colombia (note 16), II.B.1°.

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    Federico De Fazio

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  1. Faculty of Law, FAU University Erlangen-Nuremberg, Erlangen, Germany

    Jan-R. Sieckmann

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De Fazio, F. (2021). Proportionality Test and Constitutional Social Rights. In: Sieckmann, JR. (eds) Proportionality, Balancing, and Rights . Law and Philosophy Library, vol 136. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-77321-2_8

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