Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

To Balance or Not to Balance: The Quest for the Essence of Rights

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Proportionality, Balancing, and Rights

Part of the book series: Law and Philosophy Library ((LAPS,volume 136))

Abstract

A well-known objection to the method of balancing rights is that individual rights are absolute or almost absolute and hence must not be balanced with competing rights, principles, or policies, or at least must receive priority in such a balancing. I will argue that, as an attempt to exclude the balancing of rights, this objection is mistaken even regarding human rights, because the justification of substantive human rights is intrinsically linked to the method of balancing. In addition, also the recognition of morally justified human rights in constitutional law depends on balancing. On the other hand, some human rights have a priori character, exempt from balancing. Moreover, some human rights include prohibitions to be balanced against competing requirements. These prohibitions hold, however, only in principle and may again be the object of balancing.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 139.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 179.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 179.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    Habermas (1994), p. 315; (1996), p. 258f.: firewalls; Nozick (1974), p. 29: side-constraints; Tsakyrakis (2009), p. 468.

  2. 2.

    Dworkin (1978), p. xi: rights as trumps; Schauer (1993), pp. 415, 429: shields.

  3. 3.

    See also Sieckmann (2012), p. 142ff.

  4. 4.

    See Höffe (1998), p. 29; Wellman (1997), p. 15.

  5. 5.

    Sieckmann (2017), pp. 416, 420.

  6. 6.

    This is a normative issue. The problem is whether certain rights ought to be recognized universally, not whether there are human rights that are recognized by all cultures. Accordingly, neither the fact of cultural pluralism nor the actual universal recognition of some minimal human rights is dispositive on the issue.

  7. 7.

    See also Sieckmann (2012), p. 63ff.

  8. 8.

    This comes close to Kant’s “Categorical imperative”, however, not regarding action-guiding norms, but applied to individual normative conceptions. In Kantian terms, one could speak of coherent maxims. The requirement of universalisability serves to exclude incoherent maxims from rational argument, but not to establish the validity of binding norms.

  9. 9.

    Normative competence in the sense of power to bring about normative change. See Hohfeld (1923).

  10. 10.

    This resembles the demand of equal concern and respect, see Dworkin (1978).

  11. 11.

    See also the “discourse principle D” of Habermas (1996), p. 107.

  12. 12.

    One should note, here, that autonomy rights do not presuppose autonomy as a capacity. They apply also to beings who actually are not capable of autonomous action. In these cases, interests and life-plans mustbe assigned to them and introduced into discourse by other agents.

  13. 13.

    The limitation to human beings is not conceptual, but contingent. As far as we know, all autonomous agents are human beings, but the concept of autonomy rights is not limited to them.

  14. 14.

    This need not be understood as a transcendental “a priori” in a Kantian sense, but rather that one can know something about the possible result of an argumentation before commencing with it.

  15. 15.

    See Sieckmann (2012), p. 148.

  16. 16.

    The constitution of a legal system may be defined as the norms that constitute the legitimacy of the respective legal system. In this sense, it is not limited to positive law. However, a common understanding of constitutions is that they result from positive enactment. Therefore, I prefer the term “fundamental rights”.

  17. 17.

    However, the demand of equal respect for autonomous individuals does not preclude judging individual normative conceptions according to criteria of rationality.

  18. 18.

    On this notion of principles, Sieckmann (2011), p. 178ff.; (2010), p. 49ff. See also Kallmeyer (2016), p. 242ff.

  19. 19.

    See below, Sect. 3.3.

  20. 20.

    The right to correct balancing is, in first place, a moral right. It might suffer limitations with respect to its legal validity. A legal or even constitutional right to the correct balancing of interest-based claims might be too demanding or detrimental to the constitutional system, for example, respecting its consequences for a system of judicial review. Therefore, legal systems have to determine the extent to which they are willing to recognize such a right. However, in this decision at least they are subject to the claim of correct balancing.

  21. 21.

    This extends the idea of exclusionary reasons, introduced by Raz (1999), p. 40. Raz’s conception is different, however, for it suggests that exclusionary reasons exclude certain reasons or types of reasons from deliberation. The consequence is the pre-emptive character of a decision or a norm. This conception can be extended. The exclusion can refer not only to certain reasons or types of reason but to all competing reasons or means of entering into procedures of reasoning. Moreover, the exclusionary character of a reason is not sufficient to establish the peremptory character of a norm, for the distinction of definitive validity and validity in principle can be applied to exclusionary reasons as well, and the exclusionary reason may hold only in principle.

  22. 22.

    For the notions of competence (power), subjection, and immunity and their relations see Hohfeld (1923), p. 36, 50 ff.; Alexy (2002), pp. 155–156.

  23. 23.

    One should note that the distinction of definitive validity and validity in principle applies also to legal principles. There may be an argument to recognize a principle as valid, hence it is valid in principle, but subject to balancing. Only if it prevails in a balancing with competing arguments, it will be definitively recognized as a legal principle. In the example, the exclusionary character of a right to general liberty is not definitively valid as far as conflicts with some other legitimate interests occur. As a simple, non-exclusionary human rights principle, the right to general liberty remains justifiable.

  24. 24.

    This justification of human rights would imply an argument for a right to resistance against public regulation. On the link between human rights and the right to resistance, see also Brugger (1999), p. 88.

  25. 25.

    Usually they are part of positive constitutional law. However, one cannot exclude the possibility that they are directly justified by moral argument.

  26. 26.

    This justification can follow exclusionary human rights principles, or might have independent grounds, where constitutional laws recognizes exclusionary rights beyond human rights principles. Some fundamental rights might not be based on human rights claims. However, I will not address this issue here.

  27. 27.

    See above, references to Habermas (1994), p. 315; Nozick (1974), Schauer (1993), Tsakyrakis (2009).

  28. 28.

    Urbina (2017); Webber (2010), p. 179; Webber (2009); Tsakyrakis (2009); Greer (2004), pp. 211–213; Möller (2007), p. 454; Huscroft et al. (2014); Çali (2007), p. 251ff. In defense of proportionality Alexy (2002); Barak (2012); Klatt and Meister (2012); Petersen (2015); Stone Sweet and Mathews (2019).

  29. 29.

    See also Tremblay (2014), p. 864, who distinguishes “priority of rights-model” and the model of “optimization of values”.

  30. 30.

    See Tremblay (2014), p. 866.

  31. 31.

    One can call this approach “deontological”, although using this term does not contribute to the analysis. Indeed, also the model of balancing includes elements that can be called “deontological”. See also Stone Sweet and Mathews (2019), p. 57.

  32. 32.

    In addition, constitutional law may grant absolute validity to certain rights. For example, the prohibition to torture may hold absolutely if constitutional law or human rights treaties decide so, even though this might not be justified at the level of mere moral argument.

  33. 33.

    The idea of optimisation is ambiguous and contested. For a critique see for example Slote (1989). Nevertheless, it seems at least possible to integrate critiques, such as the suggestion that one should choose a second best solution, into a more complex model of optimisation. In addition, it is not clear whether the critiques against optimisation apply to the model of autonomous balancing proposed here. In any case, analyses of balancing that do not refer to this model of optimisation are not of interest here. This holds, e.g., for Urbina (2017); Webber (2010, 2009); Tsakyrakis (2009); Réaume (2009); Greer (2004, pp. 211–213); Möller (2007), p. 454; Çali (2007), p. 251ff.

  34. 34.

    Following Hurley (1989), p. 70. This model has been applied by quite a number of authors, see Barry (1990), p. xxxix; Sieckmann (1995); (2012), p. 90ff.; Steiner (1994), p. 164; Jansen (1997), p. 29 ff.; (1998), p. 112 f.; Rivers (2006, 2007).

  35. 35.

    See also Hurley (1989), p. 70; Barry (1990), p. xxxix; Steiner (1994), p. 164; Jansen (1997), p. 29 ff.; (1998), p. 112 f.; Rivers (2006, 2007); Sieckmann (2012), p. 90 ff.; (Sieckmann 2016), p. 353ff.; (Sieckmann 2018), p. 14ff.

  36. 36.

    Dworkin (1986), p. 87 ff. and (1996), p. 87 ff., suggests that the quest for objectivity does not make sense. However, his position ignores a crucial philosophical problem and is convincingly refuted, for example, by Rodriguez Blanco (2004).

  37. 37.

    This is not denying that rights also may protect choice, as the will theory of rights claims. However, the reason to recognize rights has to do with the protection of individual interests.

  38. 38.

    On this issue see also the critique of Schauer (1993), p. 415, against Fallon.

  39. 39.

    For different aspects of universalisability see Alexy (1989), p. 65, 116, 190, 203, and 222–223.

  40. 40.

    A similar idea is Dworkin’s thesis of rights as trumps, see Dworkin (1984), p. 153. However, this thesis proposes the priority of rights against policies, it does not exclude balancing.

  41. 41.

    A weaker form of exclusion is Dworkin’s suggestion to exclude external preferences from balancing rights. This, however, might work in some cases, but does not explain the character of fundamental rights as excluding balancing.

  42. 42.

    One might suggest that individualistic rights do not present a special structure but are merely rights that are regarded as very important. However, the balancing of a right that is regarded as very important is different from an argument about the issue of whether one is allowed to enter into a balancing of this right. Even if the result would be the same, the structure of the argument is different. The prohibition of balancing means that legal organs do not have the competence to subject this right to a balancing procedure. The respective right is, accordingly, immune against balancing.

References

  • Alexy R (1989) A theory of legal argumentation. Oxford University Press, Oxford. (Original: Theorie der juristischen Argumentation. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, 1978)

    Google Scholar 

  • Alexy R (2002) A theory of constitutional rights. Oxford University Press, Oxford. (Original: Theorie der Grundrechte. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, 1985)

    Google Scholar 

  • Barak A (2012) Proportionality. Constitutional Rights and their limitations. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Barry B (1990) Political argument, 2nd. edn. Harvester/Wheatsheaf, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Brugger W (1999) Liberalismus, Pluralismus, Kommunitarismus, Nomos, Baden-Baden

    Google Scholar 

  • Çali B (2007) Balancing human rights? Methodological problems with weights, scales and proportions. Human Rights Q 29:251–270

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dworkin R (1978) Taking rights seriously, 2nd. edn. Harvard University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Dworkin R (1984) Rights as trumps. In: Waldron J (ed) Theories of rights. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 153–167

    Google Scholar 

  • Dworkin R (1986) Law’s empire. Fontana Press, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Dworkin R (1996) Objectivity and truth: You’d better believe it. Philos Public Aff 25:87–139

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Engisch K (1930) Untersuchungen über Vorsatz und Fahrlässigkeit im Strafrecht. O. Liebermann, Berlin

    Google Scholar 

  • Greer S (2004) Balancing and the European Court of Human Rights: a contribution to the Habermas-Alexy Debate. Cambridge Law J 63:412–434

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Habermas J (1994) Faktizität und Geltung. Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des demokratischen Rechtsstaats. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main

    Google Scholar 

  • Habermas J (1996) Between facts and norms. MIT Press, Cambridge (engl. transl. of Habermas 1994)

    Google Scholar 

  • Höffe O (1998) Transzendentaler Tausch - eine Legitimationsfigur für Menschenrechte?. In: Gosepath/Lohmann (Hg.), Philosophie der Menschenrechte, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M., 29–47

    Google Scholar 

  • Hohfeld WN (1923) Some fundamental legal conceptions as applied in judicial reasoning. In: Id fundamental legal conceptions as applied in judicial reasoning and other legal essays. Yale University Press, New Haven, pp 23–64

    Google Scholar 

  • Hurley S (1989) Natural reasons. Oxford University Press, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Huscroft G, Miller B, Webber G (eds) (2014) Proportionality and the rule of law. Rights, justification, reasoning. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Jansen N (1997) Die Abwägung von Grundrechten. Der Staat 36:27–54

    Google Scholar 

  • Jansen N (1998) Die Struktur der Gerechtigkeit. Nomos, Baden-Baden

    Google Scholar 

  • Kallmeyer C (2016) Ideales Sollen. Eine Analyse der Prinzipienkonstruktion. Nomos, Baden-Baden

    Google Scholar 

  • Klatt M, Meister M (2012) The constitutional structure of proportionality. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Kumm M (2007) Jenseits des Verhältnismäßigkeitsgrundsatzes. Grundrechtlicher Strukturpluralismus im Verfassungsrecht der Vereinigten Staaten. In: Sieckmann J (ed) Die Prinzipientheorie der Grundrechte. Nomos, Baden-Baden, pp 241–262

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Möller K (2007) Balancing and the structure of constitutional rights. Int J Const Law 5:453–468

    Google Scholar 

  • Nozick R (1974) State, Anarchy, and Utopia. Blackwell, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Petersen N (2015) Verhältnismäßigkeit als Rationalitätskontrolle. Eine rechtsempirische Studie verfassungsrechtlicher Rechtsprechung zu den Freiheitsgrundrechten. Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen

    Google Scholar 

  • Rawls J (1971) A theory of justice. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Raz J (1999) Practical reason and norms, 3rd edn. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Réaume D (2009) Limitations on constitutional rights: the logic of proportionality. Oxford Legal Research Papers Series 26/2009

    Google Scholar 

  • Rivers J (2006) Proportionality and variable intensity of review. Camb Law J 65:174–207

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rivers J (2007) Proportionality, discretion and the second law of balancing. In: Pavlakos G (ed) Law, rights and discourse. The legal philosophy of Robert Alexy. Hart, Oxford, pp 189–206

    Google Scholar 

  • Rodriguez Blanco V (2004) Meta-ethics, moral objectivity and law. Mentis, Paderborn

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Schauer F (1993) A comment on the structure of rights. Georgia Law Rev 27:415–434

    Google Scholar 

  • Sieckmann J (1995) Zur Begründung von Abwägungsurteilen. Rechtstheorie 26:45–69

    Google Scholar 

  • Sieckmann J (2010) The theory of principles - a framework for autonomous reasoning. In: Borowski M (ed) On the nature of legal principles, vol 119. ARSP-Beiheft, pp 49–61

    Google Scholar 

  • Sieckmann J (2011) Prinzipien, ideales Sollen und normative Argumente. ARSP 97:178–197

    Google Scholar 

  • Sieckmann J (2012) The logic of autonomy. Hart, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Sieckmann J (2016) Rational lawmaking, proportionality, and balancing. In: Messerschmidt K, Oliver Lalana AD (eds) Rational lawmaking under review. Legisprudence according to the German Federal Constitutional Court. Springer, Heidelberg, pp 349–372

    Google Scholar 

  • Sieckmann J (2017) Menschenrechte als transnationales Verfassungsrecht. In: Borowski M, Paulson SL, Sieckmann J (eds) Rechtsphilosophie und Grundrechtstheorie. Robert Alexys System. Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, pp 411–428

    Google Scholar 

  • Sieckmann J (2018) Proportionality as a human rights principle. In: Duarte D, Sampaio JS (eds) Proportionality in law. Springer, Cham, pp 3–24

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Slote M (1989) Beyond optimizing. Harvard University Press, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Steiner H (1994) an essay on rights. Blackwell, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Stone Sweet A, Mathews J (2019) Proportionality, balancing and constitutional governance. A comparative and global approach. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Tremblay LB (2014) An egalitarian defense of proportionality-based balancing. Int J Const Law (I.Con.) 12:864–890

    Google Scholar 

  • Tsakyrakis S (2009) Proportionality: an assault on human rights. Int J Const Law 7:468–493

    Google Scholar 

  • Urbina F (2017) A critique of proportionality and balancing. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Webber GCN (2009) The negotiable constitution. On the limitation of rights. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Webber GCN (2010) Proportionality, balancing, and the cult of constitutional rights scholarship. Canadian J Law Jurisprudence 23:179–202

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wellman C (1997) An approach to rights. Kluwer, Dordrecht

    Book  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Law, FAU University Erlangen-Nuremberg, Erlangen, Germany

    Jan-R. Sieckmann

Authors
  1. Jan-R. Sieckmann
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Jan-R. Sieckmann .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Law, FAU University Erlangen-Nuremberg, Erlangen, Germany

    Jan-R. Sieckmann

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2021 The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Sieckmann, JR. (2021). To Balance or Not to Balance: The Quest for the Essence of Rights. In: Sieckmann, JR. (eds) Proportionality, Balancing, and Rights . Law and Philosophy Library, vol 136. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-77321-2_5

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-77321-2_5

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-030-77320-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-77321-2

  • eBook Packages: Law and CriminologyLaw and Criminology (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation