Abstract
Most studies of Wolff’s psychology focus on his Latin works. However, Wolff’s psychological project was first developed in his German writings, especially in the Deutsche Metaphysik (1720), Anmerckungen zur Deutschen Metaphysik (1724), and Ausführliche Nachricht (1726). The goal of this chapter is to offer a historical and philosophical account of Wolff’s psychology based on his German writings. We will also show their relationship to his early professional life and the debates they aroused. We conclude that Wolff’s early psychological ideas play a key role in the development of his later psychological program, thus guaranteeing their place in the history of psychology.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
Actually, it was published in December 1719 (see footnote 8 in Chap. 1).
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Except when otherwise indicated, all the translations from the original German sources were made by the authors of this chapter.
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- 5.
- 6.
Each title starts with the phrase “Rational thoughts on.”―The “rational” aspect of these writings is to be found in the way they are organized (as a demonstrative chain), as well as in their general appeal to reason rather than tradition, authority, or faith.
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- 8.
Wolff neither calls his psychological chapters by the name “psychology” nor offers a formal definition of psychology. Everything here falls under the general label “metaphysics.” However, there is no doubt that they represent what Wolff would later call empirical and rational psychology. Those terms appear for the first time in his Ausführliche Nachricht (Wolff, 1726, §.79), referring to Chaps. 3 and 5 of his Deutsche Metaphysik (see Sect. 3.5).
- 9.
It is controversial as to whether this first chapter belongs to psychology, logic, or ontology (e.g., Arnaud, 2003; Paccioni, 2001). For us, it is clearly a part of psychology, since it deals with the empirical consciousness of our own existence and how it is achieved, topics that are related to the soul’s activities (consciousness and inference). More specifically, it should belong to empirical psychology, because it refers to what can be apprehended through experience. This becomes obvious when one considers that Wolff’s Psychologia Empirica begins in the same way (see Wolff, 1738/1968, §§.11–19).
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Here and in other passages, we have benefited much from Corey Dyck’s partial translation of the first edition of the German Metaphysics (Dyck, 2019). However, we have not always followed it.
- 12.
Some scholars see here a kind of Wolffian cogito, implying Wolff’s adoption of Cartesian philosophy (e.g., Arnaud, 2002; Vittadello, 1973). Blackwell (1961) and Euler (2004) have pointed out some problems with this reading. We would like to add to this debate three distinctive aspects of Wolff’s approach: first, it is the existence of real conscious beings that is being inferred here, not of a purely metaphysical res cogitans; second, the ultimate ground of metaphysical certainty is the logical form of demonstration, not the existence of a thinking substance; third, the senses play here an important role, which is not the case in Descartes, for whom they are not to be trusted.
- 13.
For the syllogistic form of the phenomena occurring in the soul, see the contribution from Matteo Camposampiero to this volume.
- 14.
For Wolff, geometrical truths are as certain as our consciousness of ourselves because their demonstration is equivalent (a valid syllogism). In the latter case, the major premise is “Whoever is conscious of themselves, exists” whereas the minor premise is “We are conscious of ourselves.” The conclusion (“Therefore, we exist”) follows necessarily.
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It is important to note, however, that this descriptive exercise is not the only purpose of empirical psychology. In later editions, Wolff adds that it will also provide empirical rules for the soul’s operations that will serve as the fundamentals of logic, ethics, and politics (Wolff, 1751/2003, §.191). This grounding role of psychology for other disciplines is of paramount importance to Wolff.
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It should be noted that empirical psychology itself already presupposes the concept of the soul as a thing, derived from ontology, even though Wolff will only develop it in his rational psychology.
- 17.
One might understand this to mean that only the common element reappears in the imagination. However, in the later editions, Wolff added, “when a part of the whole present sensation is part of a previous one, then the whole previous sensation reappears” (Wolff, 1751/2003, §.238, p. 132). It is thus the whole past sensation that reappears as part of our imagination.
- 18.
Here, it is important to keep in mind that, for Wolff, representations can achieve four degrees of clearness. For instance, if we cannot see the difference between a square and a triangle, our representation is obscure. If we can, then our representation is clear. Moreover, if we can see that this difference consists in the number of sides, our representation is not only clear, but also distinct. However, if we are unable to do this, our representation is clear but indistinct (§§.198–214). Through the senses and imagination, we can have only clear representations. Through attention and the understanding, we achieve distinctness.
- 19.
It is important to note that experience, for Wolff, is a general concept that includes two subordinate concepts, namely, common experiences (gemeine Erfahrungen) and experiments (Versuche). “The knowledge we acquire when we pay attention to our sensations and the modifications of the soul we call experience. And when sensations occur spontaneously, we call it common experiences; experiments, by contrast, when we acquire it through our efforts” (Wolff, 1720, §.325, p. 159). In principle, therefore, the possibility of an experimental psychology is given already at this early stage of Wolff’s theory.
- 20.
In the later editions, after explaining the difference between experience and reason (§.371), Wolff adds that “science, however, comes from reason” (Wolff, 1751/2003, §.371, p. 228). This makes clear that, for him, experience alone cannot lead to scientific knowledge (broadly understood).
- 21.
From the third edition (1725) onward, Wolff adds the following comment to this passage: “One sees, thus, that what was mentioned before about the soul based on experience is the touchstone of what is taught here about its nature and essence as well as those effects grounded in it. However, by no means what is taught here is a touchstone of what experience teaches us” (Wolff, 1751/2003, §.727, pp. 453–454). We will explain later why Wolff made such an addition.
- 22.
In Chap. 2 (on ontology), after presenting the concepts of simple and compound things (§§.75–80), Wolff explains that simple things cannot have any property of compound things, such as extension or spatial movement (§§.82–91), and thus must be substances that have a force that constitutes their essence and nature (§§.112–117).
- 23.
By 1720, Wolff had already published not only his Deutsche Metaphysik, but also his Deutsche Logik (1713) and his Deutsche Ethik (1720).
- 24.
For a general presentation of Wolff’s disciples, see the contribution from Sonia Carboncini to this volume.
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The history of the conflict leading to Wolff’s expulsion from Halle is a complex subject. It has generally been regarded as a series of theoretical disputes between Wolff and the Halle pietists. Some scholars even suggest that it was a consequence of a particular interpretation of pre-established harmony offered to the emperor (himself a pietist and militarist), according to which army deserters could not be punished if their acts had been pre-established by God (e.g., Drechsler, 1997; Watkins, 1998). However, a more recent study (Holloran, 2010) claims that Wolff’s personal, political, and administrative disputes with his colleagues (notably with Lange) were the actual reason for his expulsion. This interpretation challenges the more romantic narrative of a struggle between religious intolerance and enlightened reason, in which Wolff appears as a champion of academic freedom and Enlightenment principles. Be that as it may, most authors agree that the emperor’s reaction was not expected or intended by Wolff’s opponents and that it had the side-effect of promoting an image of Wolff as a martyr of the Enlightenment, which gained him more advantages than disadvantages over the subsequent years. For more details about the controversies surrounding Wolff’s career and his banishment from Halle, see Biller (2018), Kertscher (2018), Pečar et al. (2015), and the contribution from Ursula Goldenbaum to this volume.
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In general, Wolff’s amendments and additions to psychology consist in a series of conceptual clarifications that serve different purposes (Pereira, 2017), the most important of which is to explain the place and role of pre-established harmony in his psychological system. It is important to note that the structural division between empirical and rational psychology is not useful to a proper understanding of Wolff’s Anmerckungen, since his conceptual clarifications and discussions about pre-established harmony are cross-disciplinary.
- 28.
In the preface to the second edition of his Deutsche Metaphysik, Wolff recognizes that the rational psychology chapter could be understood as if it were “nothing but an explanation of pre-established harmony between the soul and the body” (Wolff, 1751/2003, p. 16).
- 29.
The characterization of those theories (natural influx, occasionalism, and pre-established harmony) as hypotheses is an important amendment to the Deutsche Metaphysik, which Wolff employed to answer his critics. For him, no fundamental truth can be derived from hypotheses. Thus, the truths of empirical psychology and practical philosophy do not depend on pre-established harmony. However, Corey Dyck (personal communication) argues that, rather than an amendment, Wolff’s response may be seen merely as a clarification, representing no significant change in Wolff’s early account. We thank him for presenting us with this interpretation. For a discussion of Wolff’s notion of hypothesis, see Leduc (2017).
- 30.
In the following passage, Wolff reinforces the irrelevance of those theories for practical life: “as if people’s salvation and blessedness, as well as the Roman Empire’s well-being, depended on the explanation of how body and soul interact with each other” (Wolff, 1724, Ad §.527ff, p. 232).
- 31.
In this attempt to separate the demonstration of the faculties of the soul from the explanation of the body-soul relationship, Wolff indicates his intention to develop this idea in a future Latin work (Wolff, 1724, Ad §.876). This is confirmed by his later statements that the Psychologia rationalis was organized in such a way that the independence of those topics is absolutely clear (Wolff, 1740/1983, Ad §.844 and Ad §.876). This shows that the development of Wolff’s German psychology is important for understanding his Latin psychology.
- 32.
We can understand, then, why Wolff spends so much time discussing the advantages and disadvantages of these theories in a balanced manner (e.g., Wolff, 1724, Ad §.727, Ad §.760, §§.780–782, Ad §.842, Ad §.844). It allows him not only to avoid materialism but also to escape the accusation of having defended pre-established harmony to the detriment of other theories.
- 33.
- 34.
Wolff makes several references to Thümmig and Bilfinger throughout this work. He stresses that their work exemplifies those principles presented by him in the Deutsche Metaphysic and Anmerckungen (Wolff, 1726, §§.90–103). In the Latin writings, he adopted many features displayed in the works of Thümmig and Bilfinger. It is possible that Wolff owes more to them than is generally acknowledged in the literature. See the contribution from Sonia Carboncini to this volume.
- 35.
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Pereira, T.C.R., Araujo, S.d.F. (2021). The Origins and Development of Wolff’s Psychology in His German Writings. In: Araujo, S.d.F., Pereira, T.C.R., Sturm, T. (eds) The Force of an Idea. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, vol 50. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74435-9_3
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