Abstract
The paper argues that the point of a business ethics course is to improve behavior in business, and that an essential ingredient in that improved behavior is knowing what’s right or wrong. To make that claim, the paper attempts to dispose of three arguments that support the contrary claim, that business ethics courses are useless. First, it is argued that morals can’t be taught, since they only result from training. Second, it is argued that such courses are unnecessary because business executives already know right from wrong. Third, it is argued that ethical knowledge is impossible, so there is nothing to teach. The first two arguments are dealt with briefly, and the third is addressed extensively. The paper argues that the skepticism about ethical knowledge is part of a pervasive “relativism” in our society, but shows that such a relativism/skepticism is untenable and indicates how ethical knowledge is possible. If, then, knowledge of right and wrong is an essential ingredient for improving business behavior, and such knowledge can be imparted in an ethics course, there is some point to teaching business ethics.
“What’s the Point of a Business Ethics Course?,” Business Ethics Quarterly, 4 (1991) pp. 335–354.
I wish to thank several people who have read earlier versions of this paper and given invaluable advice for its improvement. They, however, should not be held accountable for the final results. In particular I would like to thank Henry Veatch whose lengthy and pertinent critique not only helped me see the flaws in the earlier structure, but afforded me some hints for improving the paper. It is no fault of his if that improvement has not come about. I would also like to thank John Serembus, for his help and insights and his seconding of Veatch’s critique. Further, I would like to thank Norm Bowie who read the earliest version of this paper, the reviewers for the Business Ethics Society Meeting, where the paper was first summarized and the reviewers of the Business Ethics Quarterly. All of them agreed, correctly, that the paper needed restructuring. I trust the final product reflects some of that advice. Finally, thanks to the editors of the Quarterly for their comments and encouragement, Al Gini, for insisting on re-editing, and Pat Werhane for her early critiques of the relativism section, and, her insistence that I take a stronger stand.
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Notes
- 1.
Without going into the issue at length, a good deal of the “relativism” can be seen in “postmodern” critiques of philosophy. Post modernism claims the death of a philosophy that could articulate the basis of the validity of right knowledge and correct action. This, according to Seyla Benhabib, is the view of philosophy as a meta-discourse of legitimation, articulating the criteria of validity presupposed by all other discourses.
“Once we have detranscendentalized, contextualised, historicised, genderised the subject of knowledge, the context of inquiry, and even the methods of justification what remains of philosophy? Does not philosophy become a form of genealogical critique of regimes of discourse and power as they succeed each other in their endless historical monotony? Or maybe philosophy becomes a form of thick cultural narration of the sort that hitherto only poets had provided us with? Or maybe all that remains of philosophy is a form of sociology of knowledge, which instead of investigating the conditions of the validity of knowledge and action, investigates the empirical conditions under which communities of interpretation generate such validity claims.”
The “detranscendentalizing, contextualizing, historicizing and genderizing” of the knower, the context of inquiry and methods of justification, is exactly a move to “relativizing.” We can substitute the word “ethics” where Benhabib uses “philosophy” and the existence of contemporary academic relativism with respect to ethical matters comes clear. Cf. Also, Richard Bernstein, Beyond Relativism and Objectivism, for an account of the development of relativism.
- 2.
Cf. Robin Derry and Ron Green who note the sharp divisions of ethical theorists, who write text books, over issues in normative ethical theory. “The existence of these divisions makes one wonder why theory is viewed as helpful in any way. On the surface, it would seem that the opposite would be true: that a familiarity with theoretical debates would only complicate students’ approach to concrete cases … . [I]t would seem that the presence of fundamental disagreement at the theoretical level would tend to reinforce the impression, … that ethics is ultimately “subjective” and lacks the rigor attaching to other, more “scientific” fields of study.” “Ethical Theory in Business Ethics: A Critical Assessment,” Robin Derry and Ronald M. Green, a paper delivered at the Business Ethics Society’s annual meeting, 1989.
- 3.
See Richard Brantd’s treatment of relativism in Ethical Theory, Englewood Cliffs NJ: Prentice Hall, 1959.
- 4.
Here I have in mind the rather remarkable passage in the third chapter of book one of Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics where he indicates that ethics will not yield exactitude. “Our discussion will be adequate if it achieves clarity within the limits of the subject matter. For precision cannot be expected in the treatment of all subjects alike, any more than it can be expected in all manufactured articles …. Therefore, in a discussion of such subjects (the noble, just and good), … we must be satisfied to indicate the truth with a rough and general sketch …. For a well-schooled man is one who searches for that degree of precision in each kind of study which the nature of the subject at hand admits: it is obviously just as foolish to accept arguments of probability from a mathematician as to demand strict demonstrations from an orator.” (1094b12–27)
In the next paragraph Aristotle continues to discuss the implications this has for answering some of the questions we have raised in this paper. We quote the paragraph in its entirety. Its relevance for our concerns is probably clear without our comments. Still, we will offer our observations in the parentheses.
“Each man can judge competently the things he knows, and of those he is a good judge. Accordingly, a good judge in each particular field is one who has been trained in it, and a good judge in general, a man who has received an all-round schooling. (Here Aristotle can be said to answer the question, ‘Who’s to say?’) For that reason, a young man is not equipped to be a student of politics; for he has no experience in the actions which life demands of him, and these actions form the basis and subject matter of the discussion. (A thorough-going investigation of this matter, might yield some intersting results. Is what Aristotle says about the young, true?) Moreover, since he follows his emotions, his study will be pointless and unprofitable, for the end of this kind of study is not knowledge but action. (A course which does not lead to better behavior is pointless!) Whether he is young in years or immature in character makes no difference; for his deficiency is not a matter of time but of living and of pursuing all his interests under the influence of his emotions. Knowledge brings no benefit to this kind of person, just as it brings none to the morally weak. (If Alisdair Maclntyre is right in After Virtue, that ours is an emotive society, the claim that knowledge is of no benefit to one who lives under the influence of his emotions, would explain why ethical knowledge has so little standing in our society.) But those who regulate their desires and actions by a rational principle will greatly benefit from a knowledge of this subject. (Italics mine). So much by way of a preface about the student, the limitations which have to be accepted, and the objective before us” 1094b26–1095a14. Paraphrasing the penultimate sentence, then, we get: “Business people who regulate their desires and actions by a rational principle, will greatly benefit from a knowledge of ethics.” Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, translated by Martin Oswald. (New York, Bobbs-Merrill, 1962).
- 5.
The claim that the acceptance of this form of life is simply the acceptance of western ethno-centrism, is, of course, a possible objection. To counter the objection we need to claim a human nature, that has objective needs and possibilities which are transcultural, given the way human beings have developed. I have no difficulty with that position and have argued it elsewhere. I would suggest, it is precisely Aristotle’s rejection of Plato’s world of forms that makes the good we are talking about in ethics, the good for human beings as they are and potentially can be, Cf. The Justification of Ethical Principles, Northwestern University Doctoral Dissertation, University Microfilms, 1970.
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Duska, R. (2022). What’s the Point of a Business Ethics Course?. In: Bowie, N.E., Werhane, P.H. (eds) Contemporary Reflections on Business Ethics. Issues in Business Ethics(), vol 52. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73928-7_5
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