Abstract
The notion of nature is central not only to Abelard’s theory of cognition and to his treatment of universals, but also to Abelard’s modal logic, to his discussion of future contingents and to his theory of conditionals. In this essay, I emphasize how the notion of nature—despite its pervasiveness in Abelard’s philosophy and despite the attention that has been paid to it—still raises puzzling questions to interpreters. One of these puzzles has to do with Abelard’s idea that different individuals may be “of a same nature (eiusdem naturae),” a claim that according to some is hardly compatible with the nominalist position he endorsed. Another interpretative issue is raised by Abelard’s claims in De Intellectibus that substances have more than one nature, and that we might consider things as being of a different nature depending on which of their properties we pay attention to. Given Abelard’s essentialist framework, his assertions on the multiplicity of natures associable to a single individual may sound perplexing. Other issues that I take into account are Abelard’s attribution of natures to non-existent things such as chimaeras or horned men, and his remarks concerning the accessibility of natures to our knowledge.
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Notes
- 1.
Apart from the passages that are quoted in Noël’s article, see also Dial. 196–198 and 200–204. The same idea is rehearsed in Dial. 98.16–18 (“Nullam formam in nomine ‘potentis’ intelligamus, sed id tantum quod naturae non repugnet; in qua quidem significatione nomine ‘possibilis’ in modalibus propositionibus utimur”); Dial. 176.27–31 (“Haec igitur: ‘quidam homo non est homo,’ idest ‘quaedam res quae est animal rationale mortale, non est animal rationale mortale uel animal simpliciter,’ semper falsa est; est enim omnino impossibile quod ipsa dicit nec ullo tempore contingere potest nec eius exemplum natura patitur”); and Dial. 385.3–5 (“Potentiam enim et impotentiam secundum naturam accipimus, ut id tantum quisque possit suscipere quod eius natura permittit, idque non possit quod natura expellit”). For Abelard’s Logica “Ingredientibus,” see, for example, LI 124.33–37 (“Potentia quoque cum dicitur posse inesse alicui, talis est sensus quod eam subiectam habere queat, hoc est naturae eius non repugnat, ut habeat”); LI, De Int. 266.541–545; 408.426–427; 414.568–415.594.
- 2.
H9 = Orléans, Bibliothèque municipale, MS. 266, pp. 5a–43a; Assisi, Biblioteca Conventuale Francescana, MS. 573, ff. 48rb–67vb; all references are to the Orléans manuscript.
- 3.
M3 = Orléans, Bibliothèque municipale, MS. 266, pp. 252b–257b.
- 4.
See, for instance, H9 (p. 18a). See also H11 (= Paris, Bibliothèque nationale, lat. 13368, f. 229va), and the Glossae “Doctrinae Sermonum” c. 9 (GDS 130.731).
- 5.
“Singula quae dicuntur certificari nobis possunt ex natura aliqua rerum iam cognita.”
- 6.
“Quicquid ergo suggeri potest rationi ex aliqua naturae rerum perceptione, determinatum est.”
- 7.
See, for example, LI, De Int. 252.211–212 and 254.275–277.
- 8.
In a famous passage from the Dialectica, Abelard states that it is not the aim of the logician to investigate the nature of things, but that studying natures and their causes is the purpose of physics, or natural philosophy. He does nevertheless recommend to logicians and natural philosophers, who are both interested in natures, albeit for different purposes, to take each other’s achievements into consideration (Dial. 286.31–287.1).
- 9.
See LI, De Int. 29.96–102: “Est autem ratio potentia discernendi, id est attendendi et deliberandi apud se aliquid quasi in aliqua natura uel proprietate consistens, ueluti si quis rem aliquam uel in eo quod est res, uel in eo quod est substantia uel corporea uel sensibilis uel colorata penset, uel quasi in aliqua natura uel proprietate excogitet ipsam, etsi ipsa non sit, sicut hircoceruus uel dies crastina uel lapis risibilis.”
- 10.
See TI:M, §6: “At uero intellectus esse non potest, nisi ex ratione aliquid iuxta aliquam naturam aut proprietatem attendatur, etiam si sit intelligentia cassa. Quippe cum centaurum sibi animus confingit tamquam animal partim ex homine partim ex aequo compositum; itaque animalis naturam, ac per hoc corporis siue substantie, attendere eum necesse est. Et cum hominis et equi quasi partes quasdam sibi iunctas consideret, et humani quoque et equini corporis non pretermittit proprietatem.”
- 11.
The relevant passage for this thesis is the incipit of the Isagoge on accidents, where Porphyry claims (in the Latin translation): “Accidens uero est quod adest et abest praeter subiecti corruptionem. Diuiditur autem in duo, in separabile et in inseparabile; namque dormire est separabile accidens, nigrum uero esse inseparabiliter coruo et Aethiopi accidit (potest autem subintellegi et coruus albus et Aethiops amittens colorem praeter subiecti corruptionem).”
- 12.
“Bene natura hominis pateretur ipsum esse sine risibilitate, quippe ea substantiam eius non constituit sicut rationalitas et mortalitas nec per eam natura hominem facit sicut per illas.”
A thesis similar to the one presented by Abelard in the commentary on Porphyry is repeated in the Theologia Summi Boni, where Abelard claims that even if propria are actually inseparable from substances, they are posterior to these substance’s generic and specific forms with respect to nature, and they do not constitute nature in the way that substantial forms or differentiae do. See TSB 2.37–38.
- 13.
Another similar expression used by Abelard is that members of the same species convene and “are united into the same nature” (secundum eamdem naturam uniuntur). See Dial. 188.14.
- 14.
- 15.
See TC 3.71–72: “Non est itaque Pater aliud quam Filius uel Spiritus Sanctus, aut Filius quam Spiritus Sanctus, nec etiam in numero diuersus. Non est, inquam, aliud in natura, cum unaquaeque trium personarum sit eadem penitus diuina substantia. Sed alius est in persona alter ab altero, id est in proprietate sua diuersus ab illo, cum hic non sit hic qui ille sed hoc ipsum quod ille; nec alter alterius proprietatem communicet, ut supra meminimus. Alioquin personas sibi permiscendo confunderemus. Sed nec Socrates cum sit a Platone numero diuersus hoc est ex discretione propriae essentiae ab ipso alius, ullo modo ideo ab ipso aliud dicitur, hoc est substantialiter differens, cum ambo sint eiusdem naturae secundum eiusdem speciei conuenientiam, in eo scilicet quod uterque ipsorum homo est; atque ideo nulla substantiali differentia disiuncti sunt, ut hic aliud sit quam ille ex diuersae speciei substantia, sed alius, ut dictum est, in persona, ex discretione scilicet propriae substantiae. Multo minus ergo aliqua trium personarum quae in Deo sunt dicenda est aliud ab alia, quarum unica est penitus substantia singularis, nullam partium aut formarum diuersitatem recipiens. Quippe quod partibus constat, ipsis partibus naturaliter posterius est ex quibus constituitur, et ad esse perducitur et suum esse contrahit.” See also TC 2.32: “Nam et Socrates alius est personaliter a Platone, hoc est ita ab eo in propria essentia discretus ut hic non sit ille; nec tamen aliud est ab eo, hoc est substantialiter differens, cum ambo sint penitus eiusdem naturae secundum eiusdem speciei conuenientiam, in eo scilicet quod uterque ipsorum homo est; atque ideo nulla substantiali differentia disiuncti sunt ut hic aliud sit quam ille ex diuersae speciei substantia, sed alius, ut dictum est, in persona, ex discretione scilicet proprie substantiae. Multo minus ergo aliqua trium personarum quae in deo sunt dicenda est aliud ab alia, quarum unica est penitus substantia singularis, nullam partium aut formarum diuersitatem recipiens. Quippe quod partibus constat, ut diximus, ipsis partibus naturaliter posterius est.”
- 16.
“Uterque autem intellectus, tam abstrahens scilicet quam substrahens, aliter quam res se habet concipere uidetur, cum uidelicet utroque res coniunctas diuisim intelligo, que diuisim non subsistunt; modo uidelicet solam materiam per se, modo solam attendendo formam; praeterea nemo, cum aliquam rem attendit, eam excogitare sufficit secundum omnes naturas eius aut proprietates sed secundum aliquas tantum. Cum itaque rem quamlibet secundum aliquas tantum naturas eius uel proprietates attendimus, ipsa autem res non secundum eas tantum quas consideramus sese habeat profecto aliter quam ipsa sit eam consideramus” (my emphasis).
- 17.
“Verbi gratia hoc corpus et corpus est, et homo, et calens, et candidum, et innumeris aliis naturis uel proprietatibus subiectum; et aliquando tamen ipsum in eo tantum quod corpus est attendo, non in eo quod homo est, uel quod calet, uel quod albet; et sic in singulis rebus quas intellectus noster percipit, aliquam tantum que illis rebus insunt, non omnia, attendit” (my emphasis).
- 18.
“Praeterea cum quislibet corpoream naturam simpliciter ac pure concipit, in eo scilicet tantum attendens quod est corporea, id est corpus, aut quamlibet naturam ut uniuersalem capit, hoc est indifferenter absque ulla scilicet personali discretione eam attendit, profecto aliter eam intelligit quam subsistat. Nusquam enim ita pure subsistit sicut pure concipitur; sed ubicumque sit innumeras, ut dictum est, aut naturas aut proprietates habet quae minime attenduntur; et nulla est natura quae indifferenter subsistat, sed quaelibet res, ubicumque est, personaliter discreta est atque una numero reperitur” (my emphasis).
- 19.
The same association between natures and properties may also be found in other Abelardian texts, such as the commentary on the De Interpretatione contained in the Logica Ingredientibus (LI, De Int. 29.100–101).
- 20.
“Vbi uero attendit naturam aliquam rei uel in eo quod res est uel ens uel substantia uel corpus uel alba uel Socrates, intellectus dicitur, cum quidem de confusione, quae imaginationis erat, ad intellectum per rationem ducitur.” See also LI, De Int. 29.96–102 on the same idea: “Est autem ratio potentia discernendi, id est attendendi et deliberandi apud se aliquid quasi in aliqua natura uel proprietate consistens, ueluti si quis rem aliquam uel in eo quod est res, uel in eo quod est substantia uel corporea uel sensibilis uel colorata penset, uel quasi in aliqua natura uel proprietate excogitet ipsam, etsi ipsa non sit, sicut hircoceruus uel dies crastina uel lapis risibilis.”
- 21.
“Aliud est enim corporis simplicem attendere in eo naturam, aliud hominis proprietatem in eodem considerare.”
- 22.
I advance this interpretation in more detail in Binini (2019).
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Orléans, Bibliothèque Municipale, MS. 266.
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Binini, I. (2021). Some Further Remarks on Abelard’s Notion of Nature. In: Chouinard, I., McConaughey, Z., Medeiros Ramos, A., Noël, R. (eds) Women's Perspectives on Ancient and Medieval Philosophy. Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning, vol 24. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73190-8_16
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