Abstract
The so-called national margin of appreciation doctrine stems both from the limited scope of an international protection system and from subsidiarity. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) uses this instrument for self-restraint, as well as to force itself to be deferent towards national decisions regarding certain rights given political, religious or moral circumstances that might be sensitive for public opinion or social identity. Many studies on the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) system have focused on this doctrine. However, there is still no well-settled scholarly and case law approach.
This study has been prepared within the framework of the Research Project entitled “Amenazas y debilidades en los sistemas europeo e interamericano de derechos humanos particularismos nacionales y protección de los derechos sociales (under reference no. DER2017-82304-C3-1-P)” or, in English, “Threats and Weaknesses in the European and Inter-American Human Rights Systems; national particularism and protection of social rights.” Except for the new approach on procedural review and reasonable decision-making, I have departed from my book García-Roca (2010) further elaborating on my insights a decade after, seeking to clarify this vague notion. See also García-Roca (2019).
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Notes
- 1.
It is worth highlighting three classic works: Mahoney (1998), p. 1; Human Rights Law Journal (1998); Yourow (1996), p. XXIII, who addresses the issue of margin of appreciation as follows: “finding the tenuous passage between the undue interference with the sovereignty and autonomy of national authorities, in particular supreme and constitutional courts on the one hand, and the effective protection of the rights guaranteed under the Convention…”. See also, Arai-Takahashi (2002). There are other remarkable works published after my monograph. See, among others: De Shutter and Tulkens (2008); Spano (2014); Popelier and Van de Heyning (2017). These authors include the “procedural review of legislation” criterion.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
Arai-Takahashi (2002), p. 3.
- 5.
Vasel (2009), p. 3; it elaborates on this notion of German procedural law although—according to Vasel—it does not comprise all aspects of the margin of appreciation.
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.
Macdonald (1987), p. 189.
- 9.
See a detailed analysis by Tulken and Donnay (2006), p. 4.
- 10.
Yourow (1996), p. 186.
- 11.
Gross and Ní Aoláin (2001), p. 626. The margin cannot be understood as some form of immunity in time of emergency. That is why these scholars advocate a more stringent construction.
- 12.
See Macdonald (1987), p. 192 et seq. He claims that neither the Court nor the Commission have tried to provide a definition of the margin of appreciation and yet they take a stance in the case.
- 13.
Vasel (2009), p. 16.
- 14.
Klatt and Meister (2012), chapter entitled “Discretion and deference.” According to them—who also rely on the insights of Robert Alexy—there are various types of discretion. On the one hand, there is structural discretion, where the Constitution neither imposes nor prevents any given conduct. On the other, there is epistemic discretion, under which such obligations or impediments are uncertain or unacknowledged. They should both play a role in judicial deference construed as an element of the principle of proportionality in order not to overstep the legislature’s scope through court rulings whilst carefully reviewing its considerations and weighings of interests: the flourishing of judicialization in politics. In this connection, see Gruszcynski and Werner (2014).
- 15.
As stated in the Case of Fedorenko v. Ukraine of 1 June 2006, paragraph 356.
- 16.
Legg (2012) also applies the notion of judicial deference. In his view, the threefold foundation of the margin of appreciation stems from the following aspects: (i) democratic legitimacy lies in States; (ii) it is necessary to abide by standard practice, and (iii) the degree of experience, expertise and legal quality of decision-making. He examines these foundations chapter by chapter, taking an approach with which I do not always agree. He discusses the issue within the ECtHR, the Inter-American Court and the UN Human Rights Committee.
- 17.
Yourow (1996), p. 13.
- 18.
Callewaert (2000), p. 149 (own translation).
- 19.
Cited by Tulken and Donnay (2006), p. 6. It contains the transcript of a lecture (own translation).
- 20.
See the work of Mahoney (1998). In the same journal, see Schoekkenbroek (1998). He also believes that the margin of appreciation provides for an allocation or distribution of powers between States Parties and ECHR bodies. This idea had been previously put out there by Mahoney (1990), p. 81, who aptly recalls that this separation is based on the principle of democracy: “decision-making by freely elected representatives of the people”.
- 21.
Galetta (1999), p. 750.
- 22.
Arai-Takahashi (2002), p. 189.
- 23.
See Gerards (2018).
- 24.
See Cohen-Eliya and Porat (2013).
- 25.
Arai-Takahashi (2002), pp. 232–234, distinctly refers to up to four stances: a transitional doctrine, a rhetorical device, an undesirable doctrine, a desirable and necessary doctrine.
- 26.
- 27.
Judge De Meyer’s Dissenting Opinion in Z. v. Finland, dated 25 February 1997, was in favor of banishing the margin of appreciation doctrine from the Court’s line of reasoning. He claimed that “there is no room for a margin of appreciation which would enable the States to decide what is acceptable and what is not.” According to him, it is the Court who should clearly decide, and the Court’s standpoint should be imposed on States Parties.
- 28.
Mahoney (1990). See also the approach of a former judge in the ECtHR and in the International Court of Justice (ICJ), Waldock (1980). In his view, this doctrine is the most important protection for sovereign powers and for the responsibility of governments in a democratic context. See also, among others, Greer (2000), p. 5. He thinks that national margin of appreciation is necessary, but he recalls that the doctrine requires more clarity and consistency regarding its application.
- 29.
Another margin appreciation advocate is Mcgoldric (2016) who seeks to “universalize” this doctrine. He is surprised that the Human Rights Committee under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not apply the margin of appreciation. He mentions European Committee of Social Rights decisions where this doctrine is applied.
- 30.
Schoekkenbroek (1998), p. 30.
- 31.
Jürgen Habermas argues that Europe is a political project essentially inter-governmental in nature. In his view, there is no such thing as a European “people” nor cultural homogeneity, as contended by Grimm (2009), p. 81 et seq. However, he believes that it may be replaced by “a European public sphere” that renders visible the European decision-making processes. In this vein, Häberle (1998) includes the ECtHR case law as an excerpt of a Constitution and a Constitutional State (p. 114), and argues that there is a “European public opinion” with respect to fundamental right violations (p. 125, p. 129). On this sphere in the European Union, see the debate between Grimm (1997) and in the same book, Habermas (1997); and Weiler (1997). By the same author, see Weiler (1999).
- 32.
See Alkema (2000), p. 57. A court exercising international judicial review within an inter-governmental system should keep its distance, and not only for geographical reasons. The Convention cannot be strictly applied. Also, judicial policy reasons related to the ECtHR’s excessive caseload should be weighed. The national margin of appreciation doctrine is essential. Along these lines, see Callewaert (2000); the margin of appreciation should remain in place based on realism, in spite of its lack of “popularity.” In order for it to be preserved, it would suffice to “structure and discipline its application.”
- 33.
Gouttes (1995), p. 603.
- 34.
See Letsas (2006). He inquires about whether rights should be construed as “blockades” for certain options or moral preferences, a “reason-blocking theory,” or rather if States, based on utilitarianism, should define their own public morals. I am afraid (and I do wish this happens) that establishing a treaty-based (or Convention-based for that matter) jurisdiction in Europe entails acknowledging rights in broader domains.
- 35.
In this connection, Bjorge (2015) highlights that this is a purely international technique, whilst confirming that European countries’ courts do not often apply this technique vis-à-vis national authorities, but rather more sophisticated deference techniques.
- 36.
- 37.
The European Court of Justice, when assessing the degree of protection of fundamental rights, also applies this method, yet less frequently. It inquires about common constitutional ground amongst Member States and the protection thereof. It has done so regarding the annulment of various EU provisions in breach of the right to property under Protocol 1 ECHR. Cfr Díaz Crego (2009).
- 38.
Lambert (2017) claims that private and family life have porous boundaries, and that European consensus supplements the national margin of appreciation, since in default of the first, the latter can be applied. However, he notes that European consensus can undermine cultural diversity and impose the vision of a conservative majority on a progressive minority. Self-evidently, it can happen the other way around too.
- 39.
The Court has raised this legal consensus claim in numerous major cases to assess the scope of national discretion to be granted: in the landmark Case of Tyrer v. the United Kingdom, of 25 April 1978, on corporal punishment; as well as in cases of due process, discrimination and property and in many others; for instance, in Handyside, regarding “public morals,” no legal consensus was achieved.
- 40.
Arai-Takahashi (2002), pp. 203–204.
- 41.
See a brief overview on the application of the margin of appreciation to various provisions in many leading cases in Greer (2000).
- 42.
Tulken and Donnay (2006).
- 43.
Greer (2000), p. 6.
- 44.
Will v. Liechtenstein is a well-known case, dated 28 October 1999 that led to a constitutional amendment. The Prince sent to the applicant, President of the Administrative Court, an open letter expressing the Prince’s disagreement with the applicant’s ideas about the interpretation of the Liechtenstein Constitution, threatening not to appoint him ever again to public office. The Court ruled that Mr. Wille’s rights to freedom of expression, to stand as a candidate and the right to an effective legal remedy had been violated. The Court took into account that there was evidence that no court had admitted a claim against the Prince ever since 1925. The ECtHR does not even question its own jurisdiction to review a constitutional provision; in fact, it took it for granted, as if it were reviewing a statutory (legislative, i.e., non-constitutional) provision. This is changing, however, and certain States, such as Russia, are reluctant to having their constitutional provisions reviewed on the grounds of national sovereignty.
- 45.
Schoekkenbroek (1998), p. 32.
- 46.
Mahoney (1998), p. 5.
- 47.
See Şerife Yiğit v. Turkey, 20 March 2008. This case involves the violation of the right to private and family life. Turkish authorities denied a woman’s right to a survivor’s pension and an allowance to take care of her children after her spouse’s decease because she had entered into only a religious marriage (imam nikâhı). Turkish law recognised civil marriage as the sole basis for legal entitlement to social security benefits. The ECtHR carried out a comparative law review and pointed out that certain countries acknowledge, along with traditional ways of getting married, de facto marital unions. However, the Court concluded that “[t]he Contracting States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in assessing whether and to what extent differences in otherwise similar situations justify a different treatment in law” (paragraph 70), so the Court cannot impose an obligation “to enact legislation in this sphere” (paragraph 39). Three of the deciding judges were critical of the judgment; they argued that it entailed an indirect discrimination against women. Leyla Şahin v. Turkey, of 10 November 2005, is a more famous case. The ECtHR upheld the Turkish Constitutional Court’s decision reasserting that no veils, headscarfs or other religious attire could be worn in universities. The ECtHR based its decision, with little legal reasoning, on the margin of appreciation doctrine.
- 48.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern (2000), pp. 839–840, acknowledges that the evolution of thought has an impact on what may be considered reasonable at any given time, regardless of personal opinions. Put differently, what might have been considered inappropriate 40 years ago, can no longer be deemed that way.
- 49.
Mahoney (1998), p. 5. Most individual rights protection in the UK apparently relies on tort law, which helps to understand Mahoney’s approach.
- 50.
Callewaert’s stance was mentioned above (2000), p. 158. He relied on Judge Macdonald’s opinion to support his claim that the margin of appreciation cannot be defined in abstracto, due to its very nature, which is “largely dependent on context” (own translation).
- 51.
García-Roca (2002).
- 52.
In Py v. France, of 15 December 2000, the Court reviews the right to vote in elections to Congress and the provincial assemblies in New Caledonia, a French territory requiring (in order to be eligible to vote) to be a permanent resident therein. The ECtHR acknowledges that Contracting Parties enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in election-related matters; the Court does not challenge this aspect of the New Caledonian regulatory framework. This contrasts with the ruling handed down by the Court in Melnychenko v. Ukraine on 19 October 2004. The Court examines the applicable legislation, which provided that it was necessary to be recognized as permanently resident in Ukraine in order to register to vote; thus, it did not suffice to be legally residing in the territory. The European Court delves into Ukraine’s social reality at the time, acknowledging that there was fear to political persecution under the Ukrainian dictatorship, serious risks to the candidates’ physical integrity, etc. Such circumstances forced the opposition politicians and political opponents to flee the country in order to exercise their political rights.
- 53.
Wicks (2006), p. 136, Chapter 6, with a very revealing title: “1953. The European Convention on Human Rights: an external influence within the Constitution”. She notes that the ECHR has become increasingly important precisely because it has turned into something different than it originally was.
- 54.
Mahoney (1998) , p. 5.
- 55.
Mc Bride (1999), p. 24.
- 56.
Cannizzaro (2000). The author goes over some ECtHR judgments from the perspective of the application of express limitation clauses.
- 57.
Yumak and Sadak v. Turkey, 8 July 2008, paragraph 241.
- 58.
See Sunstein (2015). When it comes to expect or pick a given constitutional interpretation, he classifies Supreme Court Justices as “the hero, the soldier, the minimalist, [or] the mute.” It is a bright idea, but law (and any legal interpretation theory) are meant to identify the structure of legal provisions, not to examine judges’ psychological profile or ideology.
- 59.
- 60.
Along these lines, see Mahoney (1998), p. 83, “the time has probably come to articulate clearer criteria as to the scope of the margin of appreciation, by drawing together the numerous strands which already exist in the Court’s case law,” “the Court has preferred to process by incremental steps on a case-by-case basis, without enunciating wide-sweeping principles,” “there has now accumulated a sufficient body of individual precedents from which general principles could be deduced.”
- 61.
Among others, see Gerards and Brems (2017), including various studies.
- 62.
Brems (2017), p. 18, holds that an appropriate procedure can be assessed on its own merits or inherent value, or for “instrumental reasons” tied to the subsidiarity rationale in its positive and negative dimension further reinforced by Protocol 15. She also refers to a “process efficacy rationale” (p. 19) leading the Court to “proceduralize substantive rights.” However, she ends up admitting that replacing a substantive review for a merely procedural scrutiny is hardly acceptable.
- 63.
Gerards (2017), p. 129, differentiates between imposing positive procedural obligations, as in Articles 2 and 3 ECHR, and relying on the quality of national decision-making, whether legislative, judicial or administrative/executive. Nonetheless, she concludes that procedural arguments are rarely decisive in the ECtHR’s reasoning; rather, they tend to supplement substantive grounds and arguments. The Court takes a “pick and choose” or a “bric-a brac approach” (p. 159); gathering small arguments mingled together, Gerards and Brems (2017).
- 64.
It is argued that: “… deciding whether a fair balance has been struck between competing interests” (see ECtHR Judgment in Shindler paragraph 117).
- 65.
Bar-Siman-Tov (2012), p. 162. Angelica Nusberger recalls Justice Frankfurter’s dissenting opinion in US Supreme Court case Shaughness v. Mezei in 1953. Frankfurter claimed that he would rather be tried subject to Soviet Union law within a fair procedure than under United States law following a Soviet procedure. Nusberger (2017) holds that procedural review is not necessarily less stringent than substantive review and that it allows for accepting the views of a democratic society. However, he does acknowledge that solely a procedural scrutiny can be dangerous, for instance, to protect minority rights; due process violations should be ancillary to substantive violations, Gerards and Brems (2017).
- 66.
Ely (1980). This was a highly critical stance, more of a philosophical rather than a constitutional law approach, which had to do with the Warren Court experience. One of its commentators, Michael Boudin, soon made the following claim: “I do not expect substantive due process to wither away, as Professor Ely hopes…,” Boudin (1981), p. 1258. He was right.
- 67.
Zagrebelsky (1977), p. 371: “Le funzioni della corte costituzionale hanno a base una matrice indubitabilmente di tipo iluministico,” “una funzione di giustizia costituzionale quale strumento di una benefica dialettica… fra razionalita e politica…”. See another Constitutional Court Justice, Zanon (1989), p. 189: “Les juges constitutionnelles, comme le disait Rudolf Smend… doivent chercher leur légitimité dans leur ouvre même, dans le consensus que leurs décisions sont capable de susciter, dans les enseignements que les motivations et les raisonnements suivis dans un arrêt sage e apprécié peuvent nous donner.” From the same perspective, see García-Roca (2007).
- 68.
Saiz Arnaiz (2018). He mentions, to name a few and in chronological order: Hirst (no. 2) v. the United Kingdom, of 6 October 2005; Maurice v. France, of 6 October 2005; Evans v. the United Kingdom, of 10 April 2007; Alajos Kiss v. Hungary, of 20 May 2010; Lindheim and others v. Norway, of 12 June 2012. Animal Defenders International v. the United Kingdom, of 22 April 2013. National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transporters Workers v. the United Kingdom, of 8 April 2014. Remarkably, there are many cases against the United Kingdom.
- 69.
- 70.
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García-Roca, J. (2021). International Deference, The Vague National Margin of Appreciation and Procedural Review. In: Izquierdo-Sans, C., Martínez-Capdevila, C., Nogueira-Guastavino, M. (eds) Fundamental Rights Challenges. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-72798-7_13
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