Abstract
The development of Islamicate dialectical theory (jadal / munāẓara/ādāb al-baḥth) is both pluralistic and nonlinear, even when restricted to the juridical domain. Deeper trends are nevertheless apparent; the most important may be the infusion of post-Avicennan syllogistic commonly understood to have begun in the eleventh century CE. This trend towards logical formalism found its greatest expression in a rigorously syllogistic twelfth and thirteenth century Eastern juristic dialectic which in turn informed a new, universal dialectical method: the ādāb al-baḥth wa’l-munāẓara, or “protocols for dialectical inquiry and disputation.” Equally applicable in theology, philosophy, and law, this streamlined system quickly grew into a core discipline in the Islamic sciences, generating a massive commentary tradition. This article presents three vignettes of dialectical argument in action—snapshots from various moments in variant streams of Islamic juridical dialectic—marking certain key features at each stage. Critical roles are highlighted for the dialectical objections of intra-doctrinal inconsistency (naqḍ) and counter-indication (muʿāraḍa), and special focus is maintained on the formative dynamic of dialectical disputation in shaping both legal theory and dialectical theory itself.
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Notes
- 1.
See, in particular: Miller, Islamic Disputation Theory; Belhaj, Argumentation et Dialectique; Dziri, Ars Disputationis; El-Rouayheb, Islamic Intellectual History (esp. Chap. 2); Young, Dialectical Forge.
- 2.
Miller (Islamic Disputation Theory), for example, considers theological dialectic to have appeared first, being afterwards “taken over” by jurists and expanded upon in three periods, with the middle stage marked by the infusion of logical concepts, and the latter stage spawning the ādāb al-baḥth, which thereafter changed little. Dziri (Ars Disputationis), on the other hand, proposes: (1) pre- and early “phases” (up to 400/1009) of universal, peripatetic, grammatical, and other discipline-specific theories; (2) a high phase (up to 650/1252) of theological and juristic dialectic; and (3) a late phase (up to 900/1495) of juristic dialectic and al-Samarqandī’s ādāb al-baḥth. Karabela (The Development of Dialectic), correcting Miller, shows that the ādāb al-baḥth indeed continued to develop after al-Samarqandī; and El-Rouayheb (Islamic Intellectual History) goes yet further in his study of seventeenth and eighteenth century Ottoman authors, showing the significant evolution and influence of the Ottoman ādāb al-baḥth.
- 3.
On varying aspects of these trends, see Miller, Islamic Disputation Theory, 75–123; Wisnovsky, “Nature and Scope,” 169–173 (for a listing of ādāb al-baḥth works, commentaries, and glosses, drawn from Brockelmann’s Geschichte der arabischen Litteratur); Young, “Dialectic in the Religious Sciences.”
- 4.
By way of a disclaimer, I should here point out that my intentions in this article, and elsewhere, are not to assess the validity or soundness of any of the studied premodern arguments, but simply to present them—to the best of my ability—in their own terms, as illustrations of dialectical styles in distinct periods and contexts.
- 5.
See Young, Dialectical Forge, pp. 491–551, for a preliminary attempt at a dialectical forge theoretical model.
- 6.
More precisely, it is from al-Shāfiʿī’s expansion upon an older treatise on juristic disagreement (ikhtilāf)—the Book of Disagreement of Abū Ḥanīfa and Ibn Abī Laylā (Kitāb Ikhtilāf Abī Ḥanīfa wa Ibn Abī Laylā) or Book of Disagreement of the (Two) Iraqis (Kitāb Ikhtilāf al-ʿIrāqiyyīn / al-ʿIrāqiyyayn)—which is incorporated into his compendious Kitāb al-Umm (Ḥassūn ed., vol. 9, pp. 117–20; ʿAbd al-Muṭṭalib ed., vol. 8, pp. 296–8). Note that another version of this disputation is recorded in the Risāla, al-Shāfiʿī’s famed treatise on legal theory (Shākir ed., pp. 591–596, §§1773–1804; Lowry transl. 2013, pp. 717–725, 2015, pp. 251–254).
- 7.
See Young, Dialectical Forge, p. 290, n. 183.
- 8.
See, for example, the qiyās-theory of the Shāfiʿī scholar Abū Isḥāq al-Shīrāzī (d. 476/1083), outlined in Young, Dialectical Forge, pp. 110–128.
- 9.
For an analysis of the full dialectical sequence from which vignette #1 is excerpted, see Young, Dialectical Forge, “Masā’il-Set #4,” pp. 283–305.
- 10.
See al-Shīrāzī, Maʿūna, al-ʿUmayrīnī ed., p. 123; Turkī ed., p. 275, §157.
- 11.
See al-Shīrāzī, Maʿūna, al-ʿUmayrīnī ed., pp. 36, 116–17; Turkī ed., pp. 140, 263–4; al-Bājī, Minhāj, Turkī ed., p. 27, §48; pp. 203–204, §§461–462. For an overview of al-Shīrāzī on this type of qiyās, see Young, Dialectical Forge, pp. 115–118.
- 12.
See al-Baṣrī, al-Qiyās al-Sharʿī, Ḥamīd Allāh ed., p. 1039; transl. in Hallaq, “Treatise,” pp. 216–217.
- 13.
See al-Shīrāzī, Maʿūna, Turkī ed., p. 262, §147 [missing from al-ʿUmayrīnī ed.]; al-Bājī, Minhāj, Turkī ed., p. 201, §454.
- 14.
See al-Bājī, Minhāj, Turkī ed., pp. 39–40, §§76–7; Young, Dialectical Forge, pp. 132–133.
- 15.
See al-Shīrāzī, Maʿūna, al-ʿUmayrīnī ed., pp. 104–107; Turkī ed., pp. 242–245; al-Bājī, Minhāj, Turkī ed., pp. 185–191, §§412–431; Miller, Islamic Disputation Theory, pp. 67–68; Young, Dialectical Forge, 169–172.
- 16.
See Young, Dialectical Forge, pp. 418–429; Young, “Have You Considered (A-raʾayta)?”
- 17.
Cf. al-Shīrāzī’s prescribed response (Maʿūna, al-ʿUmayrīnī ed., p. 42; Turkī ed., p. 147)—to a type of objection against drawing indication from the Qur’ān—via appeal to customary linguistic usage (ʿurf al-lugha), since “the instruction [of the Qur’ān] is in the language (lugha) of the Arabs.”
- 18.
See al-Baṣrī, al-Qiyās al-Sharʿī, Ḥamīd Allāh ed., p. 1039; Hallaq, “Treatise,” pp. 216–217; Young, Dialectical Forge, pp. 295–296.
- 19.
This of course is not sufficient to rule out the possibility that such as al-Shāfiʿī was familiar with, e.g., Aristotle’s Topics; but there is simply no sign of his systematic application of such a syllogistic logic. (What a systematic application looks like will become clear in reviewing the third vignette.) Rather, al-Shāfiʿī was both continuing and developing a dialectically forged, “indigenous” proto-system of Islamic legal logic born (in Iraq and the Ḥijāz, especially) from the infusion of prior “indigenous” argumentation epistemes with distinctly Islamic principles and premises.
- 20.
To my knowledge, there is no evidence as yet for any systematic development of paraconsistent logics in pre-modern Islamicate logic traditions. A reviewer of this article, however, has cautioned that such a view should be qualified by (1) the elements of relevance logic evident in the premodern Arabic logic tradition, and (2) the fact that, although no system in this tradition appears to consider some contradictions as true, neither does any such system seem to allow explosion (ex contradictione quodlibet).
- 21.
For his full discussion of naqḍ, see al-Bājī, Minhāj, Turkī ed., pp. 185–191, §§412–431. Our vignette is extracted from pp. 186–187, §420.
- 22.
Al-Bājī, Minhāj, Turkī ed., pp. 14, 185, §§18, 412.
- 23.
A full washing of the whole body.
- 24.
The sort of impure state that comes about through sexual intercourse and menstruation.
- 25.
See al-Bājī, Minhāj, Turkī ed., pp. 36–39, §§70–75; Young, Dialectical Forge, pp. 131–132.
- 26.
See, e.g., Hallaq, “Logic, Formal Arguments;” Miller, Islamic Disputation Theory, pp. 75–101; Young, “Concomitance to Causation;” and Young and Elwert, Digital Edition of the Kitāb ʿAyn al-Naẓar.
- 27.
Though truly dialectical venues are rare or perhaps totally absent in our modern world, we have all of us engaged in this kind of “shoring up” of arguments against internal contradictions before submitting dissertation, conference paper, article draft, etc.
- 28.
Again, this claim is of course more relevant to premodern, Islamicate contexts, absent the systematic development of paraconsistent logics.
- 29.
al-Samarqandī, Risāla fī Ādāb al-Baḥth, al-Nādī ed., p. 76; Young ed., §14; Ādāb al-Ḥakīm, p.126.
- 30.
al-Kīlānī, Sharḥ, §22.3.
- 31.
Al-Kīlānī, Sharḥ, §22.8–11. Note that this example has been treated in more detail in Young, “Mulāzama in Action,” pp. 349–358 (“Example Sequence #2”).
- 32.
Please note that in this section I employ modern logical symbols only as a shorthand method to present arguments from the texts; I am not using them to make strong statements about the semantics and syntax of the premodern formulae of the texts. Put differently, the symbol → represents, here, that relationship which al-Samarqandī and al-Kīlānī express in terms of mulāzama (“necessary implication”), while ⇒ represents, here, that relationship which they express in terms of taqdīr (“assumptive determination,” or “hypothetical assumption”). It is important to bear in mind that the intentions of these terms and formulae, and the precise nature of the relations which they convey—especially taqdīr, for which I have yet to locate dedicated expository discussions—is the subject of ongoing research.
- 33.
See Young, “Mulāzama in Action,” p. 355, for a schematic explanation of this particular instance of “composite consensus.”
- 34.
I am in the habit of translating mulāzama as “necessary implication.” This is due to al-Samarqandī’s definition of mulāzama (Risāla fī Ādāb al-Baḥth, al-Nādī ed., p. 76; Young ed., §10; Ādāb al-Ḥakīm, pp. 125–126) as “when one judgment-assertion (ḥukm) is a necessitator (muqtaḍī) of another,” with al-Kīlānī’s comment (Sharḥ, §10.1): “in the sense that the ḥukm is such that, if it occurs, it necessitates the occurrence of another ḥukm, with an immediately necessary necessity (iqtiḍā’an ḍarūriyyan).” Al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī says the same in his Taʿrīfāt (Flügel ed., p. 247), adding the examples: “like smoke for fire, at daytime; and fire for smoke, at night.” Elsewhere, in the ʿAyn al-Naẓar (§2), al-Samarqandī defines talāzum / mulāzama as “the impossibility (imtināʿ) of the realization (taḥaqquq) of one of the two [things] except upon realization of the other;” and this is exemplified by “the impossibility of knowledge (ʿilm) without life (ḥayāt).” He then explains: “What is impossible (mumtaniʿ) of the two”—that is, “knowledge” in the example—is the malzūm, or implicans; the other component—“life” in the example—is the lāzim, or implicatum. So mulāzama is, in the Risāla, when one judgment-assertion (p; the malzūm), is a necessitator (muqtaḍī) of another (q; the lāzim). But in the ʿAyn al-Naẓar it is the impossibility of the realization of the malzūm (p) except upon realization of the lāzim (q). It is as though the first definition highlights the malzūm’s quality as a sufficient condition, and the second definition highlights the lāzim’s quality as a necessary condition.
- 35.
Again, precisely what taqdīr meant to al-Samarqandī, al-Kīlānī, and their contemporaries is still being pursued in current research. One possibility, suggested by Shahid Rahman in a personal correspondence, is that the notion of taqdīr prefigures the rule of introduction (to the right of the sequent) of implication in Gentzen sequent calculus (see also the postscript at the end of this article).
- 36.
A reviewer of this article has rightly pointed out that A’s second, purely hypothetical, indicant is—as presented in this way by al-Kīlānī—clearly fallacious, and that the fallacy devolves from an erroneous assumption in premise [2.2]; namely, that “universal inclusion of the obligation (shumūl al-wujūb) is confirmed by assuming the contradictory (naqīḍ) of universal inclusion of the absence of obligation (shumūl al-ʿadam).” As the reviewer correctly surmised, assuming the contradictory of shumūl al-ʿadam does not necessarily entail shumūl al-wujūb; both may be false so long as a third option—that one case be obliged and the other not—remains possible (which happens to be the position of opponent B). The principle behind this observation is in fact established as a rule by al-Samarqandī in his ʿAyn al-Naẓar (§27), where he illustrates tripartite disjunction with the example of “existential separation (iftirāq) between two things, or universal inclusion of existence (shumūl al-wujūd) for both, or universal inclusion of nonexistence (shumūl al-ʿadam) [for both].” What the reviewer has identified is that while iftirāq (in this case, that zakāt be obliged for women’s jewelry but not for girls’ jewelry) remains possible, obligation for both is not entailed by assuming the absence of non-obligation for both. But this evident fallacy on the part of A (subsequently mirrored by opponent B in his premise [X2.2]) can easily be explained, I believe, by the context in which the argument is presented. Al-Kīlānī is using it to illustrate a kind of objection: counter-indication by like. As we will see, A’s fallacious argument will, in the end, be blocked and dismissed by B’s ability to produce a parallel counter-argument along the same pattern (and fallacious in the same way). In effect, B will be saying: “Not only is your overall argument invalid, but look: I can block it with a counter-argument structured in precisely the same way to support my counter-thesis.”
- 37.
(Reading Figure 4.5a . A’s thesis is that [1.3] there is no ZWJ. His first indicant, in support of that thesis, is that [1.1] if there were ZWJ, then there would be ZGJ. But [1.2] there is no ZGJ (by consensus). Therefore, [1.3] there is no ZWJ. B then objects to the implication (mulāzama) in premise [1.1], so A brings a second indicant, in support of that implication: [2.1] ZGJ would be confirmed upon assumption (taqdīr) of ŠW; [2.2] ŠW would be confirmed upon assumption of non-ŠA; and [2.3] non-ŠA would be confirmed upon assumption of ZWJ. Therefore, [2.4] ZGJ would be confirmed upon assumption of ZWJ; and this, we are left to understand, means the same as the implication [1.1] “if there were ZWJ, then there would be ZGJ.”).
- 38.
(Reading Figure 4.5b . B objects to A’s premise [2.1], but A dismisses this by stating [tanbīh #1] it is obvious. B then objects to A’s premise [2.2], so A brings a third indicant, in support of that premise: [3.1] if it were not the case that ŠW would be confirmed upon assumption of non-ŠA, then it would be the case that non-ŠW would be confirmed upon assumption of non-ŠA. But [3.2] “non-ŠW is confirmed upon assumption of non-ŠA” converts via transposition to “ŠA is confirmed upon assumption of ŠW,” which is absurd. Therefore, it must be the case that [2.2] ŠW would be confirmed upon assumption of non-ŠA. B then objects to A’s premise [2.3], but A again dismisses this by stating [tanbīh #2] it is obvious)
- 39.
For more on the relationship between taqdīr and mulāzama, see the postscript at the end of this article.
- 40.
(Reading Figure 4.5c . B objects to A’s premise [2.4], so A brings a fourth indicant, in support of that premise: [4.1] if R is confirmed upon assumption of Q which is confirmed upon assumption of P, then R is confirmed upon assumption of P. Because [4.2] if Q is confirmed upon assumption of P, then Q is an implicatum (lāzim) of P (that is, “if P, then Q”); and [4.3] the implicatum of the implicatum of P is an implicatum of P—that is, if it is the case that if P then Q, and if Q then R, then it is the case that if P then R).
- 41.
See al-Samarqandī, Risāla fī Ādāb al-Baḥth, al-Nādī ed., p. 78; Young ed., §§19–20; Ādāb al-Ḥakīm, p. 126.
- 42.
This role-reversal is a hallmark of muʿāraḍa. See al-Samarqandī, Risāla fī Ādāb al-Baḥth, al-Nādī ed., p. 79; Young ed., §24; Ādāb al-Ḥakīm, p. 127.
- 43.
Moreover, should one elaborate on Opponent B’s counter-dalīl, reacting to the simple objections which could be brought against it, one would find that its supporting indicants indeed neatly parallel those of Opponent A’s original dalīl all the way through to the end (see Young, “Mulāzama in Action,” p. 356, fig. 2.2, for a schematic representation). Opponent B has truly produced a “counter-indication by like”—it is the like of A’s dalīl from start to finish.
- 44.
(Reading Figure 4.5d . B finally objects to A’s entire argument via counter-indication by like (muʿāraḍa bi’l-mithl). First he brings a primary counter-indicant, mirroring A’s first indicant: [X1.1] if there were no ZWJ, then there would be no ZM. But [X1.2] there is ZM (by consensus). Therefore, [X1.3] there is ZWJ. Then, also mirroring A, he brings a second counter-indicant in support of the implication in his first premise: [X2.1] non-ZM would be confirmed upon assumption of ŠA; [X2.2] ŠA would be confirmed upon assumption of non-ŠW; and [X2.3] non-ŠW would be confirmed upon assumption of non-ZWJ. Therefore, [X2.4] non-ZM would be confirmed upon assumption of non-ZWJ; and this, we are left to understand, means the same as the implication [X1.1] “if there were no ZWJ, then there would be no ZM.”).
- 45.
On the notions of shumūl, see Young and Elwert, Digital Edition of the Kitāb ʿAyn al-Naẓar, §27; and for an example discourse from the juristic “proto-ādāb al-baḥth,” see Young, “Concomitance to Causation.”
- 46.
There also developed a principle of adherence based on the absence of a valid muʿāraḍa, which would certainly secure a place for muʿāraḍa at the center of dialectic’s formative dynamic. Note, for example, the commentator (possibly Ibn Taymiyya) in his Tanbīh al-Rajul al-ʿĀqil (near the bottom of page 93), when he says that the causality test of concomitance (dawarān) meets the evidentiary standard of “overwhelming probability” (ghalabat al-ẓann), and so must be followed “unless it is counter-indicated by its like or by what is stronger than it.” (See the end of the commentary on §§7–8 in Young, “Concomitance to Causation”).
- 47.
This, in fact, appears to be why a variant of this debate was also included in his legal theory treatise, the Risāla (see note 6).
- 48.
See the other dialectical sequences analyzed in Young, Dialectical Forge, and note that there are hundreds more awaiting analysis in compilations such as al-Shāfiʿī’s Kitāb al-Umm.
- 49.
The former, mulāzama musāwiya, might be recognized as an expression of the biconditional, and the latter, mulāzama ʿāmma, as an expression of the conditional.
- 50.
For more detailed treatment, see Young, “Mulāzama in Action,” pp. 339–349 (“Example Sequence #1”).
- 51.
Remembering that impossibility of separation is one of the definitions of mulāzama-implication.
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Young, W.E. (2022). The Formal Evolution of Islamic Juridical Dialectic: A Brief Glimpse. In: Rahman, S., Armgardt, M., Kvernenes, H.C.N. (eds) New Developments in Legal Reasoning and Logic. Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning, vol 23. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70084-3_4
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