Abstract
This paper focusses on a thought experiment devised by some Masters of Arts (John de Sècheville, De principiis naturae, 1956, 128–131; Anonymi Magistri Artium Quaestiones super librum de anima, ed. P. Bernardini, 2009, q. 60; Ps.-Petrus Guentin de Ortemberg, Quaestiones super Physicam, II, q. 1, mss. London, Wellcome Hist. Med. Libr., 333, fols. 26rb-27va; Firenze, Bibl. Naz. Centr., Conv. Soppr. A.V.563, fols. 29rb-31ra) in three works devoted to naturalistic issues and composed around 1250–1268. The experiment concerns the possibility that the human species be transmitted just by natural generation, that is thanks to the vegetative power rooted in the human being and without any need for God’s intervention. The experiment belongs to the set of arguments employed by the Masters in support of the thesis of the natural specific difference of man. Such a thesis was judged heretical and included in the Parisian Syllabus of 1277 (see art. 113: a human being is a human being independently of the rational soul). The three texts examined here show a strikingly naturalistic approach, which is deeply in contrast with both the common view of contemporary Masters of Arts and standard thirteenth-century theological theories of human generation.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
Hissette 1977, 184 and Piché 1999, 82: ‘Homo est homo praeter animam rationalem’. The same formulation can be found in Ps.-Petrus Guentin de Ortemberg, L, 27va; F, 31ra: ‘Et ita ultra sensitivam est alia forma ulterior et nobilior sensitiva qua homo est homo preter intellectivam. Et hoc concedo’. Obviously, what is meant here by anima rationalis is the intellectual soul.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
A Master of Arts around the year 1245, John of Sècheville was active in Oxford and Paris for roughly 20 years. In all likelihood, it was during his second sojourn in Paris (after 1263) that he composed the De principiis naturae (1265). For further biographical information on John of Sècheville, see Weijers 2003, 165–167.
- 6.
Here John de Sècheville discusses the problem of the multiplicability of forms. See Sècheville 1956, 126, ll. 21–25. It must be supposed that the production of intelligentiae and intellectus is not a generation, and that they are not material beings: according to John, they could be multiplied only by God, thanks to His omnipotence: Sècheville 1956, 127, ll. 4–9.
- 7.
See Sècheville 1956, 127, ll. 20–23: ‘Non enim collocatur homo in specie per formam intellectivam quae est ejus perfectio, sed per formam naturalem, sicut leo et asinus; et nos ostendimus hoc esse indubitabile verum, licet videatur valde improbabile (…)’.
- 8.
The source of this argument is Averroes 1953, I, 53, 75: ‘Membra leonis non differunt a membris cervi, nisi propter diversitatem animae leonis ab anima cervi’. It is one of the major passages explicitly quoted by the Masters of Arts engaged in the debate on the natural specific difference. See Bernardini 2017, 52.
- 9.
See also Sècheville 1956, 128, ll. 32–35.
- 10.
See Sècheville 1956, 129, ll. 4–5: ‘in re [i.e. in homine (et in A)] est aliquid aliud ab intellectiva, unde specie differens a cervo, leone et aliis’.
- 11.
See Sècheville 1956, 129, ll. 24–26: ‘Ergo anima ipsius A erit differentia constitutiva speciei sub hoc genere animal, sicut anima leonis vel anima cervi, vel multo forcius’.
- 12.
See Sècheville 1956, 130, ll. 6–13: ‘(…) sed virtus formativa membrorum operatur in semine opus simile artificio, et organizat ipsum et figurat modis convenientibus suae speciei, sicut manus figuli operatur in olla, et illa eadem virtus in fine operationis fit forma rei. Dicere enim quod virtutes formatrices in fine operationum suarum corrumpuntur non est bonum. Ergo, qua necessitate virtus formativa membrorum cervi fit in fine operationis forma ejus substantialis, dans ei esse specificum sub hoc genere animal et distinguens ipsum secundum speciem ab aliis animalibus, eadem necessitate forma ipsius A consimiliter se habebit ad ipsam, immo, multo fortius, cum longe major sit sollicitudo naturae in perficiendo materiam humanam, ex qua factura est materiam, quae est quasi necessitas respectu intelligentiae, quae est nobilissima perfectio materiae’.
- 13.
See Sècheville 1956, 130–131, ll. 31–2: ‘Apparet ergo quod A (…) comparatum ad hominem habentem intelligentiam actum et perfectionem sui, debeat dici incompletum seu inperfectum, tamen ipsum comparatum ad quodcumque brutum, est longe dignius et perfectius eo, et verius ens in specie, quia longe plus abundat a genere quam aliquod brutum; ipsum autem non potest reponi in aliqua specie animalis irrationalis; erit ergo speciei separatae’. See also Sècheville 1956, 131, ll. 9–13: ‘(…) Quando huic formae quae, sicut visum est, est nobilissima forma quam natura potest educere de potentia materiae ad actum, advenit ab extra intellectus, qui est per se perfectio hominis secundum quod homo et nobilissimus actus materiae, non constituitur nova species per ejus adventum (…)’.
- 14.
This anonymous collection of quaestiones on books I and II of the De anima dates from 1250 to 1260 and was probably composed by an English Master of Arts just before or after Albert the Great’s commentary on the De anima, since certain sections of the two works are in close agreement. For further information on the text, see Bernardini 2009, IX–XVIII.
- 15.
Anonymus 2009, q. 60 (a, b,c), 195–203: ‘Queritur utrum sit dare aliquam formam via nature eductam aliam quam intellectivam, que reponat hominem in specie animalis, an ipsa sit intellectiva’. See also q. 54, 175–180: ‘Queritur utrum vegetativa et sensitiva in homine sint una substantia’; q. 59, 194–195: ‘Queritur utrum intellectiva exit in esse per creationem’.
- 16.
In Bernardini 2017, 42–51, esp. 42–43, I have tried to demonstrate that this theory is the doctrinal background of the thesis of the natural specific difference of the human being. Even if this theory can be connected to the theory of the plurality of substantial forms, the two are not identical, because this textual tradition attests to several expressions for the potencies of the soul (not only formae substanciales, but also differencie, substancie, essencie, and animae). Nevertheless, all these texts share the view that the vegetative-sensitive faculties and the intellectual faculties are ontologically irreducible, on account of their different origins: the first two faculties are drawn from the potency of matter, whereas the third has a divine origin. On the thesis of the plurality of forms, see at least the classic works Callus 1939, Zavalloni 1951. As far as the Masters of Arts are concerned, see Bazán 1969 and Bernardini 2014; for a more extensive discussion of this topic, see also de Boer 2013, 33–44.
- 17.
See above, n. 15.
- 18.
Anonymus 2009, Contra I, 196, ll. 37–41: ‘Accipiatur semen hominis; in hoc semine operatur vegetativa virtus nutrendo et augendo, et qualitates active et passive operantur alterando; operatur etiam virtus sensitiva formando sibi membra et organa. Demus ergo quod illud progenitum in summo dispositum ad recepcionem intellective, et ponamus quod Creator non infundit intellectivam’.
- 19.
Anonymus 2009, Contra II, 197, ll. 49–72: ‘Set ista differencia sic contrahens constituet hunc fetum in specie animalis, non nisi in specie hominis, ergo et cetera; quod patet quia membra in hoc semine non sunt membra bruti, set membra racionalis creature. (…) Igitur, si ultra formam sensitive in semine bruti educatur forma specifica, igitur multo forcius in semine hominis; ultra sensitivam simpliciter educetur forma aliqua specifica consituens speciem. Et dicens quod racio pocius concludit oppositum, quia ex hoc quod semen hominis in tanta equalitate consistit, ideo est in potencia ad tam nobilem formam quam naturam non potest inducere, et ideo sua perfectio ab extra est’.
- 20.
Anonymus 2009, Contra II, 198, ll. 96–101: ‘Item accipiatur istud progenitum A et [non] interdicatur ei intellectiva. In isto est virtus vegetativa et sensitiva: poterit ergo exercere operaciones suas que sunt nutrire, augere, generare, sentire. Poterit ergo anima generare: generet ergo illud progenitum aliud, sit B; tunc sicut A est in summa disposicione ad intellectivam fit B; eodem modo, summe dispositus ad intellectivam detur, ergo ei intellectiva constat, quod tunc est homo’.
- 21.
On the comparison between A and the donkey, see also Bacon 1911, IV, 4, 2, 284–285, ll. 35–8. Bacon harshly criticizes the thesis of the natural specific difference of the human being: see Bacon 1911, 286, ll. 7–16: ‘Item si hec differencia perficeret hominem in specie animalis, tunc si non adveniret anima racionalis, esset sicut species alia animalis que caret intellectu, ut asinus vel aliud habens solam sensitivam. Et possit vivere et moveri et opera animalis exercere secundum proprietatem sue speciei, sicut asinus secundum suam. Set asinus quia sic facit non est in potencia ad ulteriorem formam specificam (…) quia non poterit anima racionalis recipi in hac specie animalis, sicut nec in asino vel leone’. See Bernardini 2017, 55–56. On the relationship between the human species and irrational animals, extensive documentation is available in Köhler 2008, 341–443.
- 22.
By assuming that we are dealing with a form produced by nature, the author simply supposes that A and B belong to the same species. See Anonymus 2009, 198, ll. 103–107.
- 23.
See Anonymus 2009, 199–200, ll. 108–141. In particular, the arguments concern the absurd consequences deriving from the assumption of the identity between A and the donkey, namely: 1. the identity between A and any other brute; 2. the potency of the donkey to the intellective soul. The following reasoning rules out the possibility of an accidental or material difference between A and the donkey, so we must accept that A and the donkey differ by a substantial, formal difference, and hence by species. Ultimately – also considering argument 1′ – A must have a natural specific difference by which it belongs to the same species as human beings.
- 24.
See Anonymus 2009, 202, l. 215–203, l. 1: ‘Unde homo uno modo nominat sensitivam cum forma illa ulteriori inducta per naturam, et sic dicitur quod homo generat hominem et sol. Alio modo nominat illud totum cum anima intellectiva superaddita (…)’.
- 25.
On the esse as what constitutes the difference between A and a perfect man, see also the critical discussion in Sècheville 1256, 129, ll. 7–12.
- 26.
For a preliminary description of the composite nature of the Quaestiones, based on the London codex, see Donati 1993, 58–60 (with a full list of the quaestiones on books I and II, still based on the London codex: see 78–84). The attribution of this work has been disputed with good reason: Petrus Guentin de Ortemberg is a much later author (d. ca. 1450). See Schwarz 2012, 703.
- 27.
All these arguments emphasize the crucial role of the intellective soul as the unique specific difference of the human being: see Ps.-Ortemberg, F, 29va, l. 14-29vb, l. 5: ‘Set quod istud 2um sit impossibile ostenditur, quia, si sit forma in potencia materie que educta de ea per actum agentis constituat hominem in specie animalis, oportet quod illa sit nobilior quam forma generis per quam constituir genus in suo esse, que videlicet est anima sensitiva: animal enim constituitur in esse per animam sensitivam. Oportet ergo quod sit nobilior quam sensitiva quoniam ipsa est posterior quam sensitiva, et aliquid addit super eam, et ita nobilior. Set vita est nobilior non vita, ut dicit Aristotiles, et vivens non vivente; set sensitiva anima est vita sive vivens, ergo oportet quod illa forma educta de potencia generis, si sit nobilior quam sensitiva, sit vita, et etiam vita nobilior quam sensitiva. Ergo ultra sensitivam est alia vita nobilior, sive forma, quam sensitiva, que tamen non est eadem cum anima intellectiva, quod est impossibile. Ergo homo constituetur in specie animalis non per illam formam, set per animam intellectivam. // Item, si homo constituatur in specie per formam illam eductam de potencia generis sive materie, tunc dicetur completum in esse specificum per illam habitam, non habita tamen anima intellectiva. Est ergo repositum in specie per illam formam, set ulterius advenit anima intellectiva, ergo adhuc constituet speciem inferiorem: ergo una species fuit in potencia ad aliam speciem constitutam per formam additam prime post sui complectionem in esse specifico, quod est impossibile.// Item Porphirius dicit quod animal racionale mortale est diffinicio hominis, et similiter Boetius et Aristotiles quod animal racionale est eius diffinicio /29vb/[hominis, exp.]. Set racionale est racionale ab anima intellectiva: set racionale est differencia reponens hominem sub specie animalis, ergo sub specie animalis reponitur per animam intellectivam et non per formam eductam de potencia materie’.
- 28.
Ps.-Ortemberg, F, 29vb, ll. 9–17: ‘Et ad hoc ostendendum ponatur quod natura operata fuerit in semine hominis, et introduxerit de potencia ipsius seminis in ipso fetu animam vegetativam et sensitivam; et ulterius operata fuerit quantum potest ad preparacionem introductionis anime intellective, ita quod istud generatum iam sit in propinqua sive in proxima disposicione dispositum ad recipiendum animam intellectivam. Et ponatur per impossibile quod denegetur ei (…)’.
- 29.
Several parallel passages may be adduced here: see e.g. the three arguments against the thesis of sensitiva nobilitata quoted above, n. 21 and Anonymus 2009, q. 60a, 196, ll. 10–35. Then, in support of the thesis of the sensitiva nobilitata as a form able to constitute the human species, an analogy with light is provided: when air receives the form of light (considered as a substantial, not accidental, form), coming from outside and not from the potency of the air, the air in itself does not change its nature: in analogous way, the intellective soul which is created by God and comes ab extra does not change the species of the individual constituted by that natural form, the noblest of all. See Anonymus 2009, q. 60a, 203, ll. 228–233; and Ps.-Ortemberg, F, 31va, l. 40 -31vb, l. 11: ‘(…) non quecumque forma adveniens speciei constituit speciem, set forma substancialis educta de potencia materie; set anima intellectiva, licet adveniat homini post complectionem sui /31vb/in esse specifico, tamen, quia non est educta de potencia materie, set totaliter ab extrinseco, non oportet quod constituat novam speciem. Et datur similiter ad ostendendum quod forma substancialis que est ab extrinseco totaliter non constituit novam speciem, quia aer recipit lucem que est forma substancialis, et tamen non differt secundum speciem ab aere existente sine luce, quia illa forma substancialis non educitur de potencia aeris, set est totaliter ab extrinseco. Et sicut lux non constituit ibi novam speciem, ita nec anima intellectiva in homine’.
- 30.
For a general reconstruction of the Aristotelian embryological theory and its reception, see Dunstan 1990. On the role of vis formativa in generation, see e.g. Van der Lugt, 2008, 233,254. Medieval embryology is a domain that has been far more extensively explored in the last few decades, especially as far as the Thomistic theory and bioethics are concerned; on this topic, see e.g. the discussion on the beginning of human life in Pasnau 2002, 100–130, its criticism in Haldane and Lee 2003, and Pasnau’s reply in Pasnau 2003.
- 31.
See above, n. 28.
- 32.
See Ps.-Ortemberg, F, 30ra, ll. 15–24: ‘Item, ut habitum est, vegetativa nihil ad intellectivam de suis operacionibus: set A habet vegetativam, ergo in ipso erunt virtutes vegetative, scilicet nutritiva, augmentativa, generativa. Habet ergo virtutem generativam: generet, ergo generabit aliquid aptum ad recepcionem anime intellective, quoniam generabit sibi simile. Et ipsum A est tale: tunc illud generatum ab A, cum sit aptum recipere animam intellectivam, recipiat eam, tunc est homo, ut manifestum est cuilibet’.
- 33.
See above, esp. n. 21.
- 34.
The similarity between Ps.-Ortemberg and Anonymus 2009 here is striking. See Ps.-Ortemberg, F, 30va, ll. 26–43: ‘Item A differt ab asino, ut patet eo quod ponunt in numerum. Aut ergo differt ab ipso differencia substanciali aut accidentali. Si accidentali: set que solum differunt differencia accidentali, conveniunt in numero, idem est ergo A cum asino, et tunc habetur propositum, quoniam sicut asinus reponitur in specie per differenciam sive formam additam priori forme scilicet generis, ita quod A reponeretur in specie per eandem, et tunc addit formam. Si autem differat ab asino differencia substanciali, aut ergo materiali aut formali. Si materiali: set differencia materialis non facit diversitatem in specie, quoniam solus actus dividit, idest sola forma facit diversitatem in specie: ergo erit in specie asini, et tunc habetur propositum ut prius. Si autem differat differencia formali substanciali ab asino, habebit ergo aliam differenciam formalem et substancialem quam asinus; set asinus habet formam substancialem generis, ergo istud progenitum ultra formam generis addit differenciam formalem substancialem, et sic habetur propositum’.
- 35.
The aliquis mentioned by Ps.-Ortemberg also objects that this substantial form is ‘less’ than the genus’s form (in minus). See Ps.-Ortemberg, F, 30va, l. 43- 30vb, l. 23: ‘Et dicet aliquis quod tale pro/30vb/genitum est differens ab asino secundum esse, set non per essenciam. Set hec responsio adhuc non valet, quia quero: cum unumquodque habeat causam immediatam qua posita ponitur ipsum et qua remota removetur ipsum, que sit causa per quam A differt ab asino secundum esse et non per essenciam in qua sit causa istius esse quod facit differenciam, qua causa posita ponitur hoc esse et hec differencia, utrum scilicet hec causa sit materia aut forma. Si causa istius esse sit materia, cum illa, ut ostensum est, que solum differunt secundum esse causatum a materia, possint esse sub eadem specie, A erit in specie asini, et tunc ut prius. Si autem causa istius esse facientis hanc differenciam sit forma, aut ergo accidentalis aut substancialis: si accidentalis, tunc hec non causabit diversitatem in specie, et tunc ut prius. Si substancialis, aut ista forma substancialis est ibi (in F) eque cum forma generis, aut in plus aut in minus. Set hec forma non est ibi (in F) eque cum forma generis, quia sicut in forma generis non habent diversitatem, immo magis ydemptitatem, et ita non diversum esse; ita nec in ista habebunt diversitatem, nec diversum esse. Eadem racione non potest ista forma esse in plus quam forma generis, ergo erit in minus et inferior, per additionem se habens respectu forme generis, et sic habetur propositum’. See Anonymus 2009, q. 60b, 200, ll. 145–154.
- 36.
Ps.-Ortemberg, F, 31rb, ll. 16–31: ‘Sed opponet aliquis: dicis quod ista forma est eadem per essenciam cum sensitiva et non differunt nisi penes magis completum et minus, quia sensitiva iam est sub compleciori, iam sub incompleciori. Dicis ita. Similiter video quod vegetativa et sensitiva non differunt nisi penes completum et incompletum, et non per essenciam, et sicut ibi fuit sensitiva nobilitata, ita similiter hic est vegetativa nobilitata. Set video quod, licet sensitiva non sit alia per essenciam a vegetativa, set vegetativa est nobilitata, attamen sensitiva addit super vegetativam novam potenciam, et hoc quia est sub esse nobiliori; ergo, si sensitiva nobilitetur ulterius, forma adveniens addet adhuc aliam potenciam supra potenciam sensitive, et hoc ideo, quia ista forma est sub esse nobiliori. Set hoc est inauditum, quod sit alia potencia anime post sensitivam nisi sola intellectiva’. See again Anonymus 2009, q. 60a, 202, ll. 198–201.
- 37.
Ps.-Ortemberg, F, 31ra, ll. 11–24: ‘Quod autem ista forma sit alia ab intellectiva ostenditur quia quando natura movetur ad aliquam formam, oportet quod illa forma sit aliquo modo in eo in quo inducitur ab operacione nature, quia natura educit formam de potencia materie et ita illa forma est aliquo modo in materia. Set intellectiva nullo modo est in materia, quoniam infunditur ab extra et etiam totaliter ab extra. Ergo illa quam educit natura de potencia materie est alia ab intellectiva, et ut visum est, natura educit de potencia materie illam formam substancialem ultra formam generis per quam homo differt in specie ab aliis animalibus, et reponitur in specie animalis. Et ita ultra sensitivam est alia forma ulterior et nobilior sensitiva qua homo est homo preter intellectivam. Et hoc concedo’.
- 38.
On the autonomy of the vegetative soul’s power, see above, n. 32; and Ps.-Ortemberg, F, 29vb, ll. 22–33: ‘A habet animam vegetativam, ergo vegetativa operabitur suas operaciones et, licet ibi non sit intellectiva, non minus operabitur, quoniam vegetativam quantum ad suas operaciones nihil ad intellectivam, quoniam velit nolit intellectiva, vegetativa operatur suas operaciones. Set operaciones vegetative sunt nutrire, augmentare et generare, ergo ipsa nutriet A et augmentabit donec perduxerit ad quantitatem perfectam et ibi conservare intendit. De quodlibet circa quod operatur, illud productum ad suam quantitatem <perfectam> habet membra alia secundum speciem a membris cuiuslibet bruti, ut patet’.
- 39.
See above nn. 12, 18, 19. The process of development, set in motion by the vis formativa, is directed towards this nobler sensitiva, which is the cornerstone of the process itself: see Ps.-Ortemberg, F, 30ra, ll. 8–15: ‘Virtus agens ulterius erit ultima forma rei, et non virtus sensitiva, sive anima sensitiva: adhuc si virtus sensitiva formaret membra, tunc equaliter in semine hominis formaret membra asini, sicut et in semine asini [vel sicut] membra hominis, in quantum est sensitiva. Ergo oportet ponere aliam formam ultra sensitivam que primo movet ad formacionem membrorum, et ultimo fit forma rei’.
- 40.
See Ps.-Ortemberg, F, 30ra, ll. 24–25: ‘Ergo A est ita conveniens ad generandum hominem intelligentem sicut et ego vel tu’.
- 41.
See Ps.-Ortemberg, F, 30rb, ll. 27–40: ‘Unde genus per Porphirium potencia habet utrasque differencias, actu vero nullam. Educuntur igitur differencie opposite de potencia generis ultra formam ipsius, set ex ypotesi brutum et homo sunt species opposite, ergo habent oppositas differencias eductas de potencia generis ultra formam (ipsius exp.) suam; set forma generis est anima sensitiva, ergo ultra animam sensitivam advenit tam in bruto quam in homine nova forma sive differencia, educta de potencia generis, constituens utrumque in esse specifico. Ergo adhuc sequitur, si dicatur sic, quod homo reponatur in specie animalis per formam eductam de potencia generis ultra formam ipsius generis’.
- 42.
On this subject, see Bernardini 2017.
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Acknowledgments
I am very grateful to Silvia Donati, who let me look at her transcription of some portions of Ps.-Petrus Guentin de Ortemberg, Quaestiones super Physicam, II, q. 1, mss. London, Wellcome Hist. Med. Libr., 333, fols. 26rb-27va (“L”); Firenze, Bibl. Naz. Centr., Conv. Soppr. A.V.563, fols. 29rb- 31ra (“F”). Donati is currently preparing a critical edition of Ps.-Petrus Guentin de Ortembergʼs Quaestiones super Physicam I-II. Unless otherwise specified, quotations of this text are from my transcription of the Florentine manuscript. All the translations of Latin texts are mine.
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Bernardini, P. (2021). On the Natural Generation of Human Beings: The Vegetative Power in a Thought Experiment by Some Masters of Arts (1250-c. 1268). In: Baldassarri, F., Blank, A. (eds) Vegetative Powers. International Archives of the History of Ideas Archives internationales d'histoire des idées, vol 234. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-69709-9_8
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