Abstract
A fundamental and bold claim of Portmann’s philosophy of biology is a thesis about the autonomy of self-representation (Selbstdarstellung) of all living beings: “Self-presentation has to be understood as a basic fact of life, on a par with self-maintenance and the preservation of the species.” In other words, the perceivable appearance of organisms cannot be reduced to its chemical, physiological, morphological or functional causes, but must be understood as a phenomenon in its own right. The aim of the following contribution is threefold. First, it aims at establishing the relevant context for the bold claim by embedding the claim in Portmann’s broader view of biology. Secondly, it aims at reconstructing Portmann’s rather scattered argument for the bold claim by recasting it as an appeal to what Portmann calls “unaddressed authentic appearances” (unadressierte eigentliche Erscheinungen). Finally, it presents Portmann’s partly phenomenological approach to biological phenomena as a reluctant relative of Goethe’s approach, thereby claiming that Portmann is no advocate of a genuine Goethean science of nature.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
- 2.
Portmann worked on these topics during his very productive career. For morphology cf. Portmann (1948a, last edition Senn 2013) and Portmann (1948b), which deals with the “self-representation” (Selbstdarstellung) of the animal Gestalt; for ethology cf. Portmann (1953c); for anthropology cf. Portmann (1944, 1956).
- 3.
By expressing this thought as a “relative autonomy” I take criticisms of very liberal formulations of the thesis of multiple realization into account (Shapiro 2004); to be sure, there are material and biological constraints for function-carrying structures, yet the idea of multiple realization still holds within those constraints.
- 4.
- 5.
Portmann’s extensive data collection has recently played a role in the establishment of a new nomenclature of the bird brain. Primates have been taken to be the most cognitively advanced creatures in the animal kingdom. Recently, birds have been shown to be cognitively very sophisticated as well. The New Caledonian crow, the blue jay or the grey parrot are just the more celebrated examples. In primates and other mammals, the exercise of cognitive skills is controlled by the neocortex, a brain structure birds lack. The brains of mammals and birds have very different structures; in addition, birds have much smaller brains than apes. However, both types of brain are wired in similar ways. This, however, raises two questions: Are avian and mammalian brains comparable? Do we have to redraw the atlas of the avian brain? Simply put, the answer to both questions is: Yes.
- 6.
Portmann’s additional thesis accounts for an “extra-uterine year” (extrauterinäres Frühjahr) during the first year after birth, allowing the human infant to develop cognitive and motor-neuronal skills in a sociocultural environment, which is also an inference from a comparative series. For a recent discussion of Portmann’s hypothesis see Dunsworth et al. (2012).
References
Allen, C., & Bekoff, M. (1997). Species of mind. The philosophy and biology of cognitive ethology. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Amrine, F., & Zucker, F. J. (1987). Goethe’s science. An alternative to modern science or within it – Or no alternative at all? In F. Amrine & F. J. Zucker (Eds.), Goethe and the sciences. A reappraisal (pp. 373–388). Boston: D. Riedel.
Bennett, M. R., & Hacker, P. M. S. (2003). Philosophical foundations of neuroscience. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
Dunsworth, H. M., et al. (2012). Metabolic hypothesis for human altriciality. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 109(38), 15212–15216.
Förster, E. (2012). The twenty-five years of philosophy. A systematic reconstruction. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Godfrey-Smith, P. (1994). A modern history theory of functions. Noûs, 28(3), 344–362.
Godfrey-Smith, P. (2016). Mind, matter, and metabolism. The Journal of Philosophy, 113(10), 481–506.
Grene, M. (1968). Approaches to a philosophical biology. New York: Basic Books.
Grene, M. (1974). The understanding of nature. Essays in the philosophy of biology. Dordrecht: Springer.
Griffiths, P. (1993). Functional analysis and proper functions. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 44, 409–422.
Haag, J., & Wild, M. (Eds.). (2013). Übergänge - diskursiv oder intuitiv? Essays zu Eckart Försters Die 25 Jahre der Philosophie. Frankfurt/M: Klostermann.
Hegge, H. (1996). Transcending darwinism in the spirit of goethe’s science: A philosophical perspective on the works of Adolf Portmann. Newsletter of the Society for the Evolution of Science, 12(2), 1–26.
Heinemann, F. (1934). Goethe’s phenomenological method. Philosophy, 9(33), 67–81.
Hindrichs, G. (2011). Goethe’s notion of an intuitive power of judgment. Goethe Yearbook, 18, 51–65.
Krämer, D. M. (2014). Revisiting recent etiological theories of functions. Biology and Philosophy, 29(5), 747–759.
Matthen, M. (2000). The disunity of color. Philosophical Review, 108, 47–84.
Matthen, M. (2005). Seeing, doing and knowing. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Millikan, R. (1989). In defense of proper functions. Philosophy of Science, 56(2), 288–302.
Mitchell, S. D. (1995). Functions, fitness, and disposition. Biology and Philosophy, 10, 39–54.
Moore, P. (2012). How should we think about the ribosome? Annual Review of Biophysics, 41, 1–19.
Neander, K. (1991). Functions as selected effects. Philosophy of Science, 58, 168–184.
Neander, K., & Rosenberg, A. (2012). Solving the circularity problem for functions: A response to Nanay. The Journal of Philosophy, 109(10), 613–622.
Polger, T. W., & Shapiro, L. A. (2016). The multiple realization book. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Portmann, A. (1944). Biologische Fragmente zu einer Lehre vom Menschen. Basel: Schwabe.
Portmann, A. (1946). Étude sur la cérébralisation chez les oiseaux I. Alauda, 14, 2–20.
Portmann, A. (1947). Étude sur la cérébralisation chez les oiseaux II. Les indices intra-cérébraux. Alauda, 15, 1–15.
Portmann, A. (1948a). Einführung in die vergleichende Morphologie der Wirbeltiere. Basel: Schwabe.
Portmann, A. (1948b). Die Tiergestalt. Studien über die Bedeutung der tierischen Erscheinung. Basel: Friedrich Reinhardt. (Translation into English: Animal Forms and Patterns: A Study of the Appearance of Animals, 1967).
Portmann, A. (1953a). Goethes Naturforschung. Neue Schweizer Rundschau, 21, 406–422.
Portmann, A. (1953b). Biologie und Geist. Zürich: Rhein-Verlag.
Portmann, A. (1953c). Das Tier als soziales Wesen. Zürich: Rhein-Verlag. (Translation into English: Animals as Social Beings, 1961).
Portmann, A. (1956). Zoologie und das neue Bild des Menschen. Hamburg: Rowohlt. (Partial translation into English: A Zoologist Looks at Humankind, 1990).
Portmann, A. (1957). Die Erscheinung der lebendigen Gestalten im Lichtfelde. In K. Ziegler (Ed.), Wesen und Wirklichkeit des Menschen. Festschrift für Helmut Plessner (pp. 29–41). Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
Portmann, A. (1961). Neue Wege der Biologie. München: Piper.
Portmann, A. (1965). Aufbruch der Lebensforschung. Zürich: Rhein-Verlag.
Portmann, A. (1972). Farbensinn und Bedeutungen der Farben aus biologischer Sicht. Eranos Jahrbuch, 41, 465–491.
Portmann, A. (1973). Goethe und der Begriff der Metamorphose. Goethe Jahrbuch, 90, 11–21.
Portmann, A. (1987). Goethe and the concept of metamorphosis. In F. Amrine, F. J. Zucker, & H. Wheeler (Eds.), Goethe and the sciences. A reappraisal (pp. 133–145). Dordrecht: Springer.
Scheler, M. (1926). Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft. Probleme einer Soziologie des Wissens. Leipzig: Der Neue Geist Verlag.
Scheler, M. (1980). Problems of a sociology of knowledge. London: Routledge & Kegan Press.
Senn, D. G. (2013). Einführung in die Morphologie der Wirbeltiere (begründet von Adolf Portmann). Basel: Schwabe.
Shapiro, L. A. (2004). The mind incarnate. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Shettleworth, S. J. (2010). Cognition, evolution and behavior. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Smit, H., & Hacker, P. M. S. (2014). Seven misconceptions about the mereological fallacy: A compilation for the perplexed. Erkenntnis, 79(5), 1077–1097.
Wild, M. (2012). Intuitionen, intuitiver Verstand, Intuition. Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, 60(6), 1011–1018.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2021 Springer Nature Switzerland AG
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Wild, M. (2021). Portmann, Goethe and Modern Biology: Two and a Half Ways of Looking at Nature. In: Jaroš, F., Klouda, J. (eds) Adolf Portmann. Biosemiotics, vol 23. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-67810-4_8
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-67810-4_8
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-67809-8
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-67810-4
eBook Packages: HistoryHistory (R0)