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Portmann, Goethe and Modern Biology: Two and a Half Ways of Looking at Nature

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Adolf Portmann

Part of the book series: Biosemiotics ((BSEM,volume 23))

Abstract

A fundamental and bold claim of Portmann’s philosophy of biology is a thesis about the autonomy of self-representation (Selbstdarstellung) of all living beings: “Self-presentation has to be understood as a basic fact of life, on a par with self-maintenance and the preservation of the species.” In other words, the perceivable appearance of organisms cannot be reduced to its chemical, physiological, morphological or functional causes, but must be understood as a phenomenon in its own right. The aim of the following contribution is threefold. First, it aims at establishing the relevant context for the bold claim by embedding the claim in Portmann’s broader view of biology. Secondly, it aims at reconstructing Portmann’s rather scattered argument for the bold claim by recasting it as an appeal to what Portmann calls “unaddressed authentic appearances” (unadressierte eigentliche Erscheinungen). Finally, it presents Portmann’s partly phenomenological approach to biological phenomena as a reluctant relative of Goethe’s approach, thereby claiming that Portmann is no advocate of a genuine Goethean science of nature.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Portmann’s general point of view on biology is laid out in Portmann (1961). This relatively small book constitutes the summa of Portmann’s thinking on biology. The philosophical importance of Portmann’s reflection on the nature of biology is best acknowledged in Grene (1968: 3–54, 1974:s 254–293).

  2. 2.

    Portmann worked on these topics during his very productive career. For morphology cf. Portmann (1948a, last edition Senn 2013) and Portmann (1948b), which deals with the “self-representation” (Selbstdarstellung) of the animal Gestalt; for ethology cf. Portmann (1953c); for anthropology cf. Portmann (1944, 1956).

  3. 3.

    By expressing this thought as a “relative autonomy” I take criticisms of very liberal formulations of the thesis of multiple realization into account (Shapiro 2004); to be sure, there are material and biological constraints for function-carrying structures, yet the idea of multiple realization still holds within those constraints.

  4. 4.

    For the notion of intuitive judgement in Goethe’s view of natural philosophy or natural science cf. Förster (2012), Hindrichs (2011). For elaborations on Förster’s view see Haag und Wild (2013), for an elaboration of different views of intuition see Wild (2012).

  5. 5.

    Portmann’s extensive data collection has recently played a role in the establishment of a new nomenclature of the bird brain. Primates have been taken to be the most cognitively advanced creatures in the animal kingdom. Recently, birds have been shown to be cognitively very sophisticated as well. The New Caledonian crow, the blue jay or the grey parrot are just the more celebrated examples. In primates and other mammals, the exercise of cognitive skills is controlled by the neocortex, a brain structure birds lack. The brains of mammals and birds have very different structures; in addition, birds have much smaller brains than apes. However, both types of brain are wired in similar ways. This, however, raises two questions: Are avian and mammalian brains comparable? Do we have to redraw the atlas of the avian brain? Simply put, the answer to both questions is: Yes.

  6. 6.

    Portmann’s additional thesis accounts for an “extra-uterine year” (extrauterinäres Frühjahr) during the first year after birth, allowing the human infant to develop cognitive and motor-neuronal skills in a sociocultural environment, which is also an inference from a comparative series. For a recent discussion of Portmann’s hypothesis see Dunsworth et al. (2012).

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Wild, M. (2021). Portmann, Goethe and Modern Biology: Two and a Half Ways of Looking at Nature. In: Jaroš, F., Klouda, J. (eds) Adolf Portmann. Biosemiotics, vol 23. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-67810-4_8

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