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Detection of Attacks in Cyber-Physical Systems: Theory and Applications

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Safety, Security and Privacy for Cyber-Physical Systems

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Control and Information Sciences ((LNCIS,volume 486))

Abstract

In this chapter, we characterize and illustrate fundamental limitations and trade-offs for the detection of attacks in stochastic systems with linear dynamics. Focusing on attacks that alter the control signals (actuator attacks), we propose metrics to measure the stealthiness level of an attack, which are independent from the specifics of the detection algorithm being used and thus lead to fundamental detectability bounds. Further, we characterize attacks that induce the largest performance degradation, as measured by the error covariance at a state estimator, and illustrate our results via simple examples and more involved power system models.

Text in this chapter is reproduced from Bai et al. (Automatica 82:251–260, 2017), Copyright 2017, with permission from Elsevier.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of California at Riverside, Riverside, CA, 92521, USA

    Vaibhav Katewa & Fabio Pasqualetti

  2. Thermo Fisher Scientific, San Francisco, CA, 94080, USA

    Cheng-Zong Bai

  3. University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN, 46556, USA

    Vijay Gupta

Authors
  1. Vaibhav Katewa
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  2. Cheng-Zong Bai
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  3. Vijay Gupta
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  4. Fabio Pasqualetti
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Fabio Pasqualetti .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Center for Systems and Control, Delft University of Technology, Delft, The Netherlands

    Riccardo M.G. Ferrari

  2. Department of Electrical Engineering, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden

    André M. H. Teixeira

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Katewa, V., Bai, CZ., Gupta, V., Pasqualetti, F. (2021). Detection of Attacks in Cyber-Physical Systems: Theory and Applications. In: Ferrari, R.M., Teixeira, A.M.H. (eds) Safety, Security and Privacy for Cyber-Physical Systems. Lecture Notes in Control and Information Sciences, vol 486. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-65048-3_5

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